In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is quite compatible with his despite the fact that Burton thinks they disagree.
3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 421-444 (1994)
Scholarly Commons Citation
Barnett, Randy E., "...and Contractual Consent" (1994). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. Paper 1250.