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Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

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Train Wreck:
The U.S. Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

By David A. Koplow*

The United States is violating a multilateral arms control treaty. Russia is, too. It's not just some minor accord at stake; it's the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),¹ the critical, near-universal undertaking to banish the centuries-old scourge of chemical warfare. And it's not just some trivial misstep; it's a blatant transgression of one of the treaty's most fundamental provisions, requiring the timely destruction of the massive inventories of chemical weapons (CW) that the planet's erstwhile superpowers had laboriously constructed and assiduously maintained throughout the Cold War. And it won't be a near-miss; each country will fall years beyond complying with the treaty's April 29, 2012 final deadline for accomplishing the total dismantling of this noxious ordnance -- the United States now figures to eclipse that mandatory mark by at least 11 years.

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How did we get into this mess? How did the United States, the leading exponent of the rule of law and a prime mover in negotiating and implementing the CWC, fall into such conspicuous violation? What can be done at this point to extricate ourselves and the Russians from this grisly political and legal predicament? And what can we do in the future to avoid other similar international law train wrecks?

This article parses the problem of noncompliance with the CWC’s dismantling obligations as a case study in the operation (or non-operation) of international law. Section 1 provides the essential background on chemical weapons and the treaty, highlighting the CWC’s vital role in reining in a horrific global threat and outlining the treaty’s provisions regarding the safe, clean, and verified elimination of chemical stockpiles. The CWC is one of the most ambitious and one of the most successful multilateral arms control regimes in history, but it is hardly without controversy.

Section 2 focuses on the U.S. chemical weapons program: its history, current status, and, especially, the convoluted program for incinerating or chemically neutralizing the lethal agents – and details why it has fallen so far behind the legally-required schedule. Section 3 presents the comparable portrait for Russia and other countries, describing how Moscow, too, despite significant outside financial assistance, has been blatantly unable to comply with the CWC’s negotiated timetables. The declared inventories of Albania, India, Iraq, Libya,
and South Korea pale in comparison to those of the United States and Russia, but their travails have been similar; some have succeeded in timely elimination in conformity with the treaty, but there are some interesting precedents of treaty breach here, too.

Section 4 describes the political remediation efforts that the United States has undertaken to date, in the largely successful effort to manage the violation on a low-key political plane, through increased transparency and a renewed commitment to the ultimate goal of a CW-free planet. These efforts have surely been helpful, and are worth retaining, but they are hardly sufficient to solve the overall legal and political problem. Section 5 then turns to international law, concluding that the ostentatious failure places the United States and Russia into a position of “material breach” of the CWC, even if their violations are not the result of bad faith or deception and even if the retained CW inventories carry little true military significance. This section also argues that international law’s putative excuses for non-performance of a treaty obligation (such as impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure) are unavailing in this case, and it evaluates the effects of a peculiar tension between competing types of CWC obligations. This section also inspects the array of remedies that international law affords to innocent parties aggrieved by these ongoing violations (such as suspension or termination of counter-performance, suit in the International Court of Justice, and invocation of the specialized procedures created by the CWC itself.)
To put this specific CW case study into a larger context, Section 6 asks how previous arms control treaties have managed to resolve this sort of dilemma in the past, and how future accords could handle cognate challenges better. On those rare occasions when the international political stars align in favor of a disarmament measure, we do want the legal documents to exert pressure on the weapons-holding states to eliminate their newly-banned inventories as soon as practicable, but we do not want to again demand the impossible, or to jeopardize the treaty structure if an unavoidable delay crops up. New treaties regulating anti-personnel land mines and cluster munitions already implicate these same dismantling concerns, and others may someday do likewise.

Returning to the CWC, Section 7 next surveys an array of possible responses to the 2012 deadline crisis – it evaluates a roster of options that the United States, Russia, the other CWC parties, and various international institutions may be able to exercise to mitigate the problem. None of these alternatives is perfect (and there may be something of an inverse relationship between the options that would be “best” in some sense and the options that would be most attainable), but consideration of the full cadre of possibilities may be illuminating.

Section 8 offers some recommendations. Despite the fully-understandable and remarkably-successful U.S. government efforts to finesse
this issue, missing this treaty deadline is a big deal. Rarely has the international community been compelled to confront such an open-and-shut case of an important violation of an important arms control treaty – and by the planet’s leading players, no less. It may not be possible to avoid all the damage from this collision, but perhaps some principles of value can still be salvaged.

Finally, Section 9 offers some concluding thoughts. What is at stake here is not merely conformity with a single international obligation. Instead, each occasion where international law is, or is not, adhered to constitutes an expression of support or rejection of the global rule of law – and when the planet’s leading military powers fail to perform as they have promised, the entire fabric of the legal order is called into question. This is an occasion to set an important precedent -- when the United States, in particular, should take the opportunity to “model” for the rest of the world how an honorable country should behave, if it finds itself in the unfortunate situation of violating a solemn international agreement.

Overall, the animating force behind this article is an argument that the long-term interests of the United States lie in validating the importance of full, timely compliance with treaties – especially arms control agreements. Even if, in a particular case, it might be possible to “finesse” an act of U.S. non-compliance with a treaty, achieving by skillful diplomacy an agreement to a muted and non-punitive global response, that short term accomplishment disserves the bigger
picture. Instead, the United States should publicly own up to its breach, take its medicine, and thereby demonstrate in the most powerful manner that compliance with international law really is an enduring U.S. principle, applicable even to ourselves, even when it comes with some pain.

Section 1: The Problem of Chemical Weapons and the Solution in the CWC

The story of chemical weaponry is long, sad, and convoluted. Throughout the centuries and around the world, armies have regularly attempted to employ poisons of varying formulae against their enemies; sometimes this scientific zeal has resulted in telling battlefield advantage; even more often it has inspired indiscriminate pain, horror and public revulsion.2

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Pre-biblical literature from India (1500 B.C.), Greece (429 B.C.) and Rome (150 B.C.) as well as subsequent lore from other combatants carry sagas of fulminating gases wafted toward an adversary’s encampment, lethal potions strategically dumped into enemy wells or rivers, contaminants insinuated into foreign food supplies, and arrows and artillery shells laced with toxins. ³ World War I married modern chemistry with that longstanding lethal intent, and 125,000 tons of mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, cyanide and other insidious concoctions polluted the European trenches, inflicting 1.3 million casualties and nearly 100,000 deaths.⁴

In contrast, the central battlefields of World War II were remarkably CW-free, despite the fact that partisans on both sides were armed to the teeth with enormous arsenals of much more deadly generations of nerve gases – apparently primitive deterrence drove both sides toward mutual (if uncomfortably unsteady) self-restraint.⁵ A handful of notorious episodes of CW use after 1945 - especially the large-scale invocation of poisons by both sides in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict, and by Iraq against its own Kurdish minority in 1987-1988 --

kept the issue in the world’s attention, even if massive casualties and decisive military victories were not necessarily achieved by this form of attack.6

The counterpoint to the use of chemicals – the widespread public loathing of this form of combat – provides a parallel history. Ancient civilizations recorded their antipathy toward these invisible, insidious toxins,7 and the public rejection of the scourge of CW prompted some of the earliest arms control treaties: the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868,8 the Brussels Declaration of 1874,9 and the Hague Conventions of 189910 and 190711 reflected the participants’ visceral rejection of “asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”12

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6 Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1002-04; Walker, supra note __ (reporting that “[c]hemical weapons have been used in warfare and terrorist attacks a dozen times or more in the last three decades”); J.P. Perry Robinson, Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Morel and Olson, supra note __, p. 37, 42-43 (listing dozens of instances after World War I in which CW use was alleged); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 163, 169 (noting that in 1996, “[s]ome 20 nations are now suspected of having chemical weapons or developing a chemical weapons capability.”); Vogel, supra note __; Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 8 (statement of John D. Holum) (stating that “Approximately 25 nations are now suspected of either possessing chemical weapons or having the ability to produce them.”) In the 1980s, the United States alleged that the Soviet Union and its allies used “yellow rain” chemical and biological weapons in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan; these reports were subsequently largely discredited. See U.S. Department of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update, Special Report No. 104, November 1982.

7 Moon, supra note __, p. 657-58.


10 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), concluded July 29, 1899, entered into force September 4, 1900, Annex to the Convention, article 23 (“it is especially prohibited…To employ poison or poisoned arms”) and Declaration 2, Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases (“The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”), 32 Stat. 1803, TS 403, 1 Bevans 247, 187 CTS (1898-99), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp.

11 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, concluded October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539, 1 Bevans 631, Annex, article 23 (“it is especially forbidden...To
The first modern arms control treaty, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, placed the train of CW control firmly onto a steadier international track. That accord (which is still in force and has attracted 137 parties) binds countries to abjure “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices.” This treaty now constitutes essentially a ban only against the first use of CW; it does not restrict countries’ possession of lethal arsenals nor their application in retaliation for an enemy’s opening chemical salvo.

The diplomatic process therefore continued unsated toward a more comprehensive CW accord, but the post-World War II efforts largely succumbed to Cold War politics and other distractions. Three related international agreements did help fill part of the void: the multilateral 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) dealt with the related issue of disease-causing agents (as employ poison or poisoned weapons”), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp.

12 1899 Hague Declaration No. 2, 1899, supra note __.
15 Geneva Protocol, supra note __, second preambular paragraph.
16 See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 164; Moon, supra note __, p. 664; Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1000-02.
18 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS 8062, 1015 UNTS 163 [hereinafter BWC].
partially contrasted with pure poisons\(^{19}\)); the bilateral 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding\(^{20}\) provided an interim U.S.-U.S.S.R. mechanism for exchanging data and inspection visits in anticipation of a forthcoming broader multilateral CW treaty; and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement reflected the two superpowers’ consensus to initiate promptly the process for destroying most of their CW, even prior to the conclusion of a universal treaty.\(^{21}\)

That long-sought comprehensive treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and

\(^{19}\) The precise distinction between “chemical” and “biological” agents is elusive. Essentially, the concept of a biological weapon focuses upon living microorganisms that cause diseases in humans, animals or plants. A chemical weapon operates through poison, rather than disease. A “toxin” is a sort of middle ground, containing some of the characteristics of both CW and BW, and being regulated by both the BWC and the CWC. See Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner (eds.), Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy, 2009, p. 74; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 31-32.


\(^{21}\) U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, June 1, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 934, 1990; 56 Fed.Reg. 25,404 (1991) [hereinafter, Bilateral Destruction Agreement]. This agreement called for each party to begin destroying most, but not all, of its CW and CW production facilities, subject to verification inspections conducted by the other side. The agreement was never operational, and was superseded by the CWC. Federation of American Scientists, Bilateral Destruction Agreement, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bda/index.html; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 26-28, 166-67, 203-04.
on Their Destruction (CWC), finally ripened in 1993. It has now attracted 188 parties; two more states (Israel and Myanmar) have signed, but not yet ratified; and only six countries (Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and the recently-formed South Sudan) have shunned the document altogether.

As its title suggests, the CWC aims to erect a permanent, all-encompassing prohibition on chemical weapons. It exceeds the accomplishment of the Geneva Protocol by banning all production, acquisition, retention, use, preparation for use, and assistance to others for the use of chemical weapons, and it establishes an elaborate mechanism for data exchanges, inspection by an international organization, and dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure verified compliance with the underlying obligations. The treaty defines the prohibited items expansively – it covers active chemical weapons agents and substances that could be their “precursors”; it likewise regulates even “non-lethal” tear gas

and other riot control agents; and it embraces even old, obsolete, and abandoned chemical munitions that failed to detonate in combat or were discarded carelessly in test ranges. It requires dismantling or conversion of facilities formerly used to produce CW, and it regulates international commerce in substances and equipment that could be diverted for weapons purposes.

The CWC may be the longest, most detailed, most elaborately-crafted multilateral arms control agreement in history. It has properly been hailed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as “one of the greatest achievements in the history of multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation” and “a fundamental pillar of international peace and security.”

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29 CWC, supra note __, arts. I.4 and V.

30 CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B, VII.C, and VIII.C.

31 “We Cannot Rest Until We Destroy All Chemical Arms,” Secretary-General Tells Meeting of States Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention, UN Department of Public Information, SG/SM/13974, DC/3316, November 28, 2011. See also OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Note by the Technical Secretariat, Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention Since the First Review Conference, RC-2/S/1, March 31, 2008, para 2.1 (noting that the CWC “is widely appreciated as a unique multilateral agreement that, alone among treaties of a similar nature, effectively bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, for all countries and in a non-discriminatory fashion and under strict international control.”)
In support of those aspirations, the CWC creates an implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),\textsuperscript{32} sitting in The Hague and consisting of a Conference of the States Parties (comprising all treaty members),\textsuperscript{33} an Executive Council (composed of 41 member states)\textsuperscript{34} and a Technical Secretariat (the professional staff, headed by a Director-General).\textsuperscript{35} The organization’s 2012 budget is approximately 70.6 million Euros (about $93 million).\textsuperscript{36}

Adjunct to the basic bans on production, stockpiling, and use of CW, the treaty also requires each party to destroy all the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located at any place within its jurisdiction or control,\textsuperscript{37} and to do so “in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons.”\textsuperscript{38} The CWC further specifies an “agreed rate and sequence of destruction,” known as the “order of destruction.”\textsuperscript{39} Specifically, each party is obligated:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{32} CWC, supra note __, art. VIII; OPCW Basic Facts, supra note __.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. B. The Conference of the States Parties is the “principal organ” of the OPCW, authorized to consider any questions and to make recommendations and decisions on all matters related to the CWC, including setting the budget, selecting members of the Executive Council, appointing the Director-General, and taking “the necessary measures to ensure compliance” with the Convention. Id. at article VIII.19, 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. C. The Executive Council is the “executive organ” of the OPCW; it is to “promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with,” the Convention. Id. at article VIII.31.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. D. The Technical Secretariat assists the other OPCW organs in carrying out their functions, by preparing draft budgets, programs and reports, and conducts the Convention’s verification measures. Id. at article VIII.37, 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2012, C-16/DEC.12, December 2, 2011. The approved 2012 figure (EUR 70,561,800) represents a 5.4 percent decrease from the 2011 budget. Id. at Annex p. 9. See also OPCW Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2012, p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} CWC, supra note __, art. I.1.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.12.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} CWC, supra note __, art. IV.6.
\end{itemize}
-to commence destruction operations within two years after the treaty enters into force for it;\(^{40}\)

- to submit detailed annual plans for the destruction process;\(^{41}\)

- to destroy not less than one percent of its chemical weapons within three years after entry into force;\(^{42}\)

- to destroy not less than 20 percent of the inventory within five years;\(^{43}\)

- to destroy not less than 45 percent within seven years;\(^{44}\) and

- to destroy all its chemical weapons not later than ten years after entry into force.\(^{45}\)

If a party, “due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control,”\(^{46}\) will be unable to achieve any of these benchmarks in the order of destruction, it may propose a modification of the timetable. In the extreme case, a party may submit to the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties a request for an extension of the ten-year completion requirement, but “in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention.”\(^{47}\) The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, so that ultimate, non-renewable deadline for the destruction of all CW was April 29, 2012.

\(^{40}\) CWC, supra note \_, art. IV.6.

\(^{41}\) CWC, supra note \_, art. IV.7.

\(^{42}\) CWC, supra note \_, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(i).

\(^{43}\) CWC, supra note \_, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(ii).

\(^{44}\) CWC, supra note \_, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iii).

\(^{45}\) CWC, supra note \_, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iv).


The request for an extension is to include: the duration of the proposed continuance, a “detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension,” and the party’s detailed plan for pursuing the destruction operations.\textsuperscript{48} In granting a prolongation, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties may set conditions, including specifying additional verification measures; the party is to meet the costs of verification during the extension period.\textsuperscript{49}

The treaty leaves to each party the determination of what mechanism or technique to employ for destroying its CW inventory,\textsuperscript{50} subject to the conditions that: a) each “shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment”\textsuperscript{51}; b) each will avoid the simple but intolerable precedents of ocean dumping, land burial, or open-pit burning of the detritus;\textsuperscript{52} c) each shall bear the costs of its destruction process;\textsuperscript{53} and d) the entire operation must be undertaken in a transparent fashion, accessible to the international inspectorate.\textsuperscript{54}

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\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{48}]
\item CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.25. A detailed annual plan for destruction is to include: the quantity of each type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and the dates of operation; a detailed site diagram of each facility; and a schedule of activities at each facility, including design, construction, installation of equipment, operator training, scheduled periods of inactivity, etc. Id. at C.29.
\item CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13.
\item CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10. Similar provisions, requiring parties to assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and protecting the environment, are included in articles V.11 and VII.3. Notably, both art. IV.10 and art. V.11 specify that the destruction operations shall be conducted “in accordance with [the party’s] national standards for safety and emissions.”
\item CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13.
\item CWC, supra note __, art. IV.16.
\item CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).D.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Unsurprisingly, a treaty of this ambitious scope and prominence – despite its bipartisan origins -- attracted considerable political controversy in the United States and elsewhere.\(^{55}\) The U.S. Senate pondered its advice and consent to ratification of the CWC for four years, ultimately endorsing the instrument on April 24, 1997,\(^{56}\) subject to 28 conditions. These provisos addressed issues such as mandatory detailed reporting to Congress about other parties’ compliance with the treaty; enhancement of U.S. chemical defenses; and the level of dues and other voluntary contributions to the OPCW that the United States would pay.\(^{57}\) But none of the Senate’s expressed limitations concerned the obligation for destruction or the accompanying timetable – on that point, at least, there was a clear consensus both within the United States and internationally.\(^{58}\) The treaty

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\(^{57}\) Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 10 (“Monitoring and verification of compliance”), condition 11 (“Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses”), and condition 22 (“Limitations on the scale of assessment”).

\(^{58}\) See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 186 (noting that “The administration anticipates that the United States will be able to meet the 2004 deadline, provided that environmental issues can be resolved in a ‘timely manner.’”), 187 (“the present program can ensure environmentally safe destruction within the 10-year timeline of the [Convention.”), 189 (discussing the possibility that if the United States became unable to destroy the stockpile within 10 years, it would be possible to seek a 5-year extension, but cautioning that “Any delay on the part of the United States would probably result in an equal or greater delay on the part of Russia….In addition, in the eyes of many, the status of the United States as a major proponent of the Convention and arguably the most technologically advanced Nation places a greater responsibility on its adherence to Convention provisions.”), and 227 (concluding “Meeting the destruction schedule laid out in the CWC will be a major challenge. Important political, environmental, and economic barriers lie ahead. If the destruction effort does not keep pace with implementation of other provisions of the CWC, however, the credibility of the entire Convention will be undermined.”)
entered into force for the United States (and simultaneously for all the other original parties) on April 29, 1997.\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, it must be noted that even a comprehensive, near-universal treaty cannot by itself irrevocably solve the problem of CW. Indeed, rumors and allegations persist of covert evasions, attempts to sneak something past the OPCW inspectorate, or sputtering intentions to sustain a clandestine military CW program on behalf of renegade countries.\textsuperscript{60} The United States has publicly charged China, Iran, Russia and Sudan with violating the CWC,\textsuperscript{61} and similar

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  The Senate did attach conditions that required the president to explore “alternative technologies” for the destruction of U.S. CW, “in order to ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations” and to consult with Congress about whether to submit a request to the OPCW Executive Council for an extension of the deadline for destroying the CW stocks, if “the President determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.” Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 27. That condition also extended until April 29, 2007, the prior 2004 statutory deadline (established by the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986, Public Law 99-145, sec. 1412, 99 Stat. 563, 50 U.S.C. 1521) for destroying U.S. CW. Condition 27 (B).
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\textsuperscript{59} OPCW Website, page on OPCW Member States, \url{http://www.opcw.org/nc/about-opcw/member-states/?tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortField%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortReverse%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BASPS_PAGE%5D=2&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5Bpointer%5D=0}. The treaty entered into force for Russia on May 12, 1997. Id.

\textsuperscript{60} U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2010 [hereinafter, State Compliance Report], p. 37 (general), 43 (China), 45 (Iran), 50 (Russia); U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2010; U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011; Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements, supra note __ (reporting that in 1994, “[t]he number of countries suspected of having or developing [chemical] weapons has increased to 24.”); Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010, p. 3.

apprehensions have been raised regarding CWC non-parties North Korea and Syria.62

Additionally, the threats of non-state actors – terrorist groups from Aum Shinrikyo63 (the Japanese cult that unleashed sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 and injuring scores more) to al Qaeda64 – were not at the forefront of the CWC negotiators’ minds, but have come to loom large in evaluating CW dangers and the treaty today.65 Chemical (and biological)


63 Richard Danzig, et.al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons, Center for a New American Security, July 2011 (describing Aum Shinrikyo’s program for developing a CW capability); Martin Martishak, Report: Cult Demonstrates Chemical Terrorism Threat, Global Security Newswire, July 29, 2011 (concluding that CW is a more viable and accessible option than biological weapons for terrorists).

64 Global Security Newswire, Al-Qaeda Magazine Urges Chemical, Biological Strikes Against Foes, May 3, 2012 (describing recent article by the Yemen affiliate of al-Qaeda, recommending the use of chemical and biological weapons for the mass killing of nonbelievers); Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? Belfer Center, January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (arguing that the al Qaeda leadership is more interested in acquiring nuclear or biological weapons, leaving chemical weapons to the initiative of individual cells; citing examples of prominent small-scale CW terrorist activities); Rene Pita, Assessing al Qaeda’s Chemical Threat, Athena Paper Vol. 2, No. 2, April 17, 2007; Chris Quillen, Three Explanations for al-Qaeda’s Lack of a CBRN Attack, 5 Terrorism Monitor No. 3, February 21, 2007.

65 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, August 18, 2011 (noting that “preventing chemical terrorism is particularly challenging”); Walker, supra note __ (noting that Iraqi insurgent forces have employed crude chemical weapons, by affixing improvised explosive devices to vehicles carrying tanks of chlorine gas); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 209-11 (assessing the CWC’s likely impact on anti-terrorism efforts); Global Security Newswire, Israel Concerned Syrian Chemical Arms May Be Proliferating to Extremists, January 3, 2012; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 114-
weapons have frequently been referred to as “the poor man’s atomic bomb” --
but with the bonus factor of greater accessibility, since as many as 70 different
compounds have been stockpiled as weapons by various countries.66 The allure
of CW as an inexpensive, obtainable “equalizer” in international conflict has held
a great appeal.67

Section 2: The U.S. Chemical Weapons Program

Just as American weaponeers have pursued virtually every other form of
possible military advantage over the years, so, too, did they explore the realm of
chemistry for hostile applications. Before and during World War II, the United
States manufactured untold quantities of varying chemical concoctions, which it
thankfully never applied in combat.68 After the war, batches of the excess
chemicals were unceremoniously disposed of (often via insanely hazardous
techniques such as dumping in shallow waters or burial in unmarked trenches).69

117; Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010,
p. 3.
66      Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
2009, p. 80.
67     Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb,
68      In 1943, President Roosevelt, speaking about chemical weapons, declared, “I have been
loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, would or would be willing to loose
upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons…Use of such weapons has been outlawed
by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them. I state categorically
that we shall in no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by
69      U.S. Centers for Disease Control, History of U.S. Chemical Weapons Elimination,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/history.htm (noting Operation CHASE (an acronym for “Cut Holes
And Sink ‘Em,” a 1960s program for loading unwanted CW onto obsolete ships which were then
scuttled).
but an enduring inventory of nearly 30,000 metric tonnes of lethal chemicals was retained, and research persisted on new and better agents.70

By 1993, the stockpile consisted of some 3.3 million chemical weapons of three general types: a) rockets, land mines, projectiles, and cartridges, equipped with “energetic” components such as fuzes, propellants, or bursters; b) bombs, which lack energetics; and c) bulk storage drums, especially ton containers and spray tanks.71 The two major categories of lethal CW are nerve agents (denominated GA or tabun, GB or sarin, and VX), which are colorless, odorless, and tasteless organophosphorus compounds that attack the central nervous system, with even a tiny amount proving lethal; and vesicant or blister agents (including mustard gas and lewisite), which kill via inhalation or infiltration through exposed skin.72

These apocalyptic devices and materials were stored at nine star-crossed locations: Aberdeen, Maryland; Lexington, Kentucky; Newport, Indiana; Anniston,

70 CDC, supra note __.
Measurements of the quantities of chemical weapons are expressed inconsistently – sometimes in metric tonnes (1000 kg or approximately 2200 pounds) and sometimes in tons (2000 pounds). For example, in many sources, the original U.S. CW inventory is stated as containing approximately 31,500 tons of agent. Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Chemical Weapons: Better Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD’s Stockpile Destruction Program, General Accounting Office, GAO-04-221T, October 30, 2003, p. 1.


72 Claudine McCarthy and Julie Fischer, Inching Away From Armageddon: Destroying the U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile, Henry L. Stimson Center report, April 2004, p. 21-30; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 167-69 (describing the various chemical weapons, their destructive effects, and their utility); FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, and Types of Chemical Weapons, supra note __; Noyes, supra note __, p. 2 (noting that 3000 chemicals have been studied for use as possible CW agents; 45 have seen widespread application in combat; and about a dozen have been used in quantity.)
Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; Umatilla, Oregon; and Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Most of the ordnance remained in reasonably stable condition, but the United States had stopped producing new chemical weapons after 1969, so by 1993, the inventory was seriously aging, and deterioration of some of the components became inevitable. Leakage, especially from the corroded 40-year old M55 rockets, became a recurrent problem.

In addition to those components of the “active stockpile,” a vast quantity of abandoned and obsolete “non-stockpile materiel” must also be accounted for under the CWC. Nobody really knows how much noxious chemical waste was inconspicuously dumped or buried over the decades, or where and when it might

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73 McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 3-19 (noting that each of the nine locations provides its own mixture of types of chemicals and containers: Aberdeen, for example, held only 1625 tons of CW, almost all of it in the form of mustard agent in ton containers; Pine Bluff contained 3850 tons, including sarin in rockets, VX in rockets and land mines, and mustard in ton containers; Umatilla housed 3717 tons including sarin and VX in projectiles, rockets, bombs, land mines and spray tanks, as well as mustard in ton containers.)

74 Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 185. Between 1987 and 1990, the United States manufactured a small quantity of “binary” chemical weapons – devices in which two relatively less-toxic chemicals are produced and handled separately, and they are combined to create a lethal agent only when the shell or bomb is in flight en route to its target. These weapons were all destroyed by 2007. U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, Binary Chemical Weapons, http://www.cma.army.mil/completedmissions.aspx; FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, supra note __.

turn up – an Army survey in 1993 suggested that as many as 215 sites in 33 states might contain hidden repositories. Some of the chemicals can retain their lethality for decades, so whenever a potential deposit is revealed by an unlucky construction crew’s backhoe, a farmer’s plow, or a fishing trawler’s net, emergency response teams must immediately don their HAZMAT gear for a delicate recovery and disposal operation.

The United States, with the Army in the lead role, had initiated efforts to whittle down the CW arsenal in the 1970s, long before the CWC began to require it. American authorities had already concluded that much of the weaponry was so unstable, so unusable on the battlefield, and so undesirable strategically that the United States should proceed with dismantling and destruction unilaterally,

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77 Walker, supra note __ (reporting that the most conspicuous such cleanup operation, in Spring Valley, an upscale section of Washington, D.C., near American University, has cost more than $250 million, recovering “dozens of buried chemical munitions, related toxic materials, and unexploded ordnance over the last 17 years, all dumped after World War I.”); H.Q. Le and S.J. Knudsen, Exposure to a First World War Blistering Agent, 23 Emergency Medicine Journal p. 296, 2006 (reporting serious injury to a U.S. military male who had suffered a short, small exposure to decades-old mustard agent.)
independent of what other states might eventually do.\textsuperscript{78} In 1985, Congress mandated and funded the destruction operations.\textsuperscript{79}

Significant efforts to “neutralize” some of the toxins via chemical reactions were undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s, but these proved slow, expensive, and hazardous – and they generated even larger quantities of non-weaponized, but still parlous, byproducts.\textsuperscript{80}

Attention next turned to incineration of the ordnance, and in the mid-1980s the Army undertook to construct a series of state-of-the-art combustion chambers at the nine sites where the weapons were housed.\textsuperscript{81} The first such facility, on

\textsuperscript{78} McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 45, Report 104-33, supra note __, at 187 (noting a Congressional Research Service report that in the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defense had declared 90% of the U.S. CW stockpile to be obsolete); U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, Fact Sheet: Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction, August 2009.


\textsuperscript{81} Key Factors, supra note __, at 18 (reporting that the Army, based upon a 1984 study by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, concluded that incineration was a more desirable mechanism for CW destruction, because neutralization was more expensive and produced larger quantities of toxic byproducts); CDC, supra note __, Incineration. The incinerators burn the CW at 2700 degrees Fahrenheit, with additional treatment in a 2000 degrees Fahrenheit afterburner, destroying 99.9999 percent of the agent. OPCW Website,
Johnston Atoll, was erected in 1988 and began operating in 1990; larger versions were then to be erected at most of the stateside locations, beginning with Tooele, Utah, which retained the largest CW inventory. Some 1436 tonnes of CW (5 percent of the U.S. total) had already been destroyed in that fashion before the CWC entered into force in 1997.\textsuperscript{82} The original 1985 expectation was that the destruction process could be efficiently completed within nine years, at a cost of $1.7 billion.\textsuperscript{83} Although that initial time frame quickly became obsolete, U.S. government officials were again willing to stick out their collective necks on this point during the 1994 Senate ratification hearings for the Convention, saying, “We are confident that we can complete the destruction within the 10-year timeline of the CWC.”\textsuperscript{84}

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\item[82] Walker, supra note __.
\item[83] McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 39.
\item[84] Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 61 (statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr.), p. 66 (in response to questioning about whether the destruction could be completed within the allowed ten years, Smith responded, “Yes, sir, it can. One can never predict the effects of obtaining permits, the effects of litigation, et cetera. But if the program proceeds on the path that it is now embarked…we can, indeed, meet the timetable for the CWC. It is technically well within our grasp. Our planning and budgeting is realistic.”), 20 (statement of John D. Holum) (legislation could inhibit the process of destroying the CW, but “we have some cushion there.”) Administration officials were less sanguine regarding Russia’s ability to complete the destruction process within ten years, even with U.S. assistance and advice. Hearing 103-869, supra note __, at 37 (statement of Stephen Ledogar) (recounting that during the CWC negotiations, “the Russians noted there would be problems in meeting this deadline, making it difficult for the Russian federation to ratify. Therefore, a compromise was struck, whereby the ten-year destruction period was retained, with extension an unlikely, but not entirely impossible event.”), 67 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe) (in addressing the likelihood of Russia meeting the Convention deadlines, “I do not say unequivocally that they can meet the deadline. But it is a far more optimistic, realistic situation than people may have thought.”), p. 84 (statement of Donald Mahley) (“The official statements by the Russian federation to us, which we, of course, have no formal way to refute, indicate that they can, with the appropriate priorities and the appropriate resources, complete their destruction program within the 10-year period.”), p. 185 (questions for the record for Stephen Ledogar) (“We believe that despite the political and economic situation in Russia, there is sufficient administrative ability to get a CW destruction program functioning to meet the CWC’s destruction deadline, given U.S. financial and technical assistance.”). See also Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 63 (CWC negotiators included the possible five-year
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Those sanguine projections, however, soon proved illusory. Delays in obtaining the portfolio of required federal and state permits and in drafting and finalizing a series of programmatic and site-specific environmental impact statements led to slippage of the timetable.85 Those delays, in turn, drove inflation in the budget estimates, especially when coupled with the erratic adjustments compelled by the need to incorporate new features of the cutting-edge destruction technologies.86 Whistle-blower charges of insufficient attention to safety threw further spotlight on the problem, as did occasional accidents in the construction and operations processes -- even while the continuing incidence of weapon leakage demonstrated that simply maintaining the status quo was not a viable course.87

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85 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031, September 2003 [hereinafter, Sustained Leadership], p. 20 (destruction operations at several facilities were delayed due to environmental permitting issues, sometimes due to “unanticipated engineering changes related to reprogramming software and design changes that required permit modifications”); Key Factors, supra note __ (concluding that due to lack of consensus about the destruction method to use, the cost and schedule for the CW disposal program were uncertain.)


87 See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 20 (CW destruction operations at the Tooele facility (the largest in the system) were suspended between July 2002 and March 2003 because of an incident involving a plant worker who accidentally came into contact with nerve agent while performing routine maintenance; even after a corrective action plan was instituted, several temporary shutdowns occurred); Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21), Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, March-June 1994, S.Hrg. 103-869 [hereinafter, Hearing 103-869], p. 9 (statement of John D. Holm) (stating that the dangers of leakage and contamination from continuing to hold CW in storage outweigh any potential risks from destroying the weapons), 53 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe (risks of
Two crucial political decisions then intervened, further complicating and delaying the CW destruction process. The first negated a plausible efficiency option, to concentrate the CW inventory into fewer locations, so fewer expensive new incinerators would have to be constructed. The Army at one point had contemplated erecting only three stateside incinerators, in centralized sites, but Congress, responding to constituents’ NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) concerns about the safety and security of transporting the huge quantities of such lethal and sometimes fragile materials via truck or rail, forbade the executive branch from pursuing relocation options. This fateful decision, to construct multiple, arguably redundant facilities, in order to avoid hazardous interstate transfers of delaying the destruction of the aging stockpile are greater than the advantages of developing an alternative technology other than incineration). See also Key Factors, supra note __, at 33-34 (concluding that the CW stockpile would be basically stable through 2013); Hinton, supra note __, at 2 (judging that the U.S. CW demilitarization program “has suffered from several long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues.”) See also several reports of conflicting episodes of high regard for safety – but also conspicuous violations of basic codes – at CW destruction facilities: U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, News Release: Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Achieves Safety Milestone – 1,000,000 Safe Work Hours without a Recordable Injury, July 17, 2009; Utah Chemical Depot Clinic Wins Safety Award, Salt Lake Tribune, January 26, 2011; Global Security Newswire, Umitilla Contractor Fined Over Nerve Agent Monitoring, July 25, 2011; URS Fined for Violations at Umatilla Chemical Depot, Tri-City Herald, November 30, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Anniston Chemical Weapons Disposal Plant Operator Fined, September 15, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Umatilla Contractor Fined Over Permit Breaches, February 2, 2012.

the noxious products, eventually came to carry momentous, irreversible implications for the overall destruction timetable.

Second, simultaneously, some of the communities surrounding the eight continental U.S. CW storage sites became especially interested in alternative technologies, demanding consideration of options other than incineration, to seek mechanisms that would not emit even the tiniest quantities of hazardous byproducts from a smokestack. The Army, relying upon determinations by the National Academy of Sciences that incineration was a fully safe mechanism,

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resisted. Again, Congress waded into the fray, mandating non-incineration methods at two of the locations housing the smallest inventories (Lexington and Pueblo), despite the fact that no chemical neutralization or other alternatives had been demonstrated to be safe, effective and affordable on anything like the requisite scale and cadence of the treaty-required operations.

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In 1994, the Army decided to use nonincineration technologies at Aberdeen and Newport, because each of those sites housed only a single chemical agent, stored only in ton containers, making the demilitarization process simpler. In 1997, pilot testing of neutralization technology was approved for those two facilities. Sustained Leadership, supra note __, at 5; Durant, supra note __, at 182.

92 Noyes, supra note __, p. 40 (reporting that the National Academy of Sciences had concluded in 1984 that neutralization processes would be more expensive and generate large quantities of toxic wastes), p. 58-70 (critically assessing other alternative technologies); Key Factors, supra note __, at 35 (concluding that “alternative technologies may not reduce costs or shorten disposal operations”).
Eventually, a patchwork of five incinerators (at Johnston, Tooele, Umatilla, Anniston, and Pine Bluff) and four neutralization facilities (at Newport, Aberdeen, Pueblo, and Lexington) was created.93

The United States succeeded in meeting its initial CWC deadlines, destroying one percent of the CW inventory by September 1997 and 20 percent by July 2001.94 In October 2003, the United States solicited and received a three-year extension of the original April 2004 deadline for destroying 45 percent of the stocks.95

By 2003, it had also become abundantly clear that the mandate to eliminate the entire CW legacy by the 10-year point – April 2007 – could not be satisfied, and concerns were rising about the program’s compatibility with even a 2012 target.96 The United States therefore took advantage of the CWC procedure to request the single allowable five-year extension of the original

93 Walker, supra note __; Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, fact sheets on Hydrolysate Overview, Neutralization Followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation, and Chemical Weapons Destruction at Blue Grass (describing the destruction technology to be used in Kentucky).

At each site, some “reject” weapons are destroyed using alternative technologies, such as the Detonation of Ammunition in a Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH), an explosive mechanism applicable to units that have leaked, are unstable, contain solidified residues, or are otherwise unsuitable for routine processing. U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, Information Sheet: DAVINCH Overview, December 2009, https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/DAVINCH_fact_sheet.pdf.


96 Hinton, supra note __, at 2, 7-8. See also Semi-Annual Report, supra note __, at 4 (noting 2008 assessments of options for destruction).
milestone. Pursuant to a recommendation from the OPCW Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties granted the request on December 8, 2006, fixing the firm final date for completion of the destruction as April 29, 2012.

Even that 2006 extension was addressed with tongues firmly planted in cheeks: the United States estimated, and the other CWC states heard, that only about 2/3 of the existing American CW inventory would, in fact, be destroyed by April 29, 2012. In a series of presentations over the succeeding years, the United States made clear (typically in “informal,” but quite authoritative, statements) that it was not on a pathway that would get close to full, timely compliance with the treaty’s basic obligation.

In an unusual bit of good news since 2007, a variety of corrective measures (based on “learning the lessons” from the initial incinerator experiences, adopting risk mitigation efforts, and providing additional financial
performance incentives to the construction and operations companies) produced a significant acceleration in the destruction timetable. Exploiting those benefits, a major milestone was reached on January 21, 2012: the incineration of the last CW munition stored at the Tooele site. With that accomplishment, all five of the incineration sites and the first two of the neutralization sites had finished their demilitarization work, totaling almost 90 percent of the U.S. treaty-required destruction; only the last two alternative technology sites now linger past the treaty deadline.

But those two locations will be drawn much further “to the right” on the timeline: Pueblo, which contained 8.5 percent of the original U.S. inventory (some 2371 tonnes of mustard variants HD and HT in 4.2 inch mortars, 105mm projectiles and 155mm projectiles) will commence operations in 2015 and finish in 2019. Lexington, which is home to 1.7 percent of the original stockpile (475

101 Among the tactics adopted to accelerate the timetable have been recruiting experienced operators from the sites that have completed operations, to retain their expertise; using small-scale systems (such as mobile explosive chambers) to destroy individual munitions that are in such weakened or deteriorating condition that standardized handling operations would be hazardous; off-site treatment or disposal of energetics, contaminated wastes and filters; and development of improved systems to lessen the impact of mercury contamination from certain weapons.

102 U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, CMA News, February 2012; U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, Information sheet, Quick Facts: ACWA Program Certification 2011 [hereinafter, Quick Facts], Cleanup work, such as destroying the infrastructure of the incineration facility, including the incinerator itself, will continue for some additional years at each site, even after the CW stocks are eliminated.

tonnes of agents GB, VX and H in M55/56 rockets, 155mm projectiles, and 8 inch projectiles) will begin destruction operations in 2020 and not finish until late 2023.\textsuperscript{103} Thus, even with an expenditure now pegged at over $38 billion, the United States is not projected to complete the task of destroying all its CW until the fourth quarter of 2023, more than 11½ years after the treaty’s absolute deadline.\textsuperscript{104}

Multiple factors account for the protracted delays. First, the job itself is simply very difficult and complex. The weapons are old and extremely
hazardous (both because of the toxic chemicals themselves, and because of the explosives in most units); some of them are quite fragile, corroded or already leaking; and in some instances, the liquid chemical has partially solidified into congealed “heels” that resist ordinary treatment algorithms. The disassembly and destruction processes must be conducted under rigidly controlled conditions in a hermetically sealed environment, to preempt any unwarranted excursions by lethal agents. The various destruction technologies are all novel, not previously proven (or even invented) and few firms are qualified to undertake the massive design, construction and operation requirements. In many instances, there is simply no way to “bake this cake faster,” because the construction of the necessary facilities is an intricate, multi-step process, and is followed by a lengthy “systemization” phase, involving the progressive testing of all components, systems and subsystems and a working demonstration that the plant and its personnel are ready to commence agent operations.\(^{105}\)

Of special interest, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 also imposed unforeseen disruptions on the CW demilitarization effort. Previously, factors such as the type of weapons, the size of each local stockpile, and the difficulty of the particular destruction operation had been the principal drivers in determining the priority of operations among the various sites and within each site. After 9/11, however, the assessed vulnerability to terrorist attack or seizure also became an overriding consideration, triggering a significant reallocation of resources toward the relatively small inventories housed at Aberdeen and Newport. There, bulk

\(^{105}\) See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 30 (describing the systemization process).
mustard agent was held in voluminous container tanks, which were judged to be at greater risk than the warheads or artillery projectiles stored elsewhere.

Responding well to that increased sense of urgency, the program succeeded in eliminating those two repositories relatively quickly (almost two years ahead of the original schedule, in the case of Aberdeen\textsuperscript{106}), but the sudden reorientation of the planned sequence imposed some costs and delays.\textsuperscript{107}

Moreover, the U.S. CW destruction program did itself no favor by creating, and too-frequently revising, a rickety bureaucratic apparatus that provided inconsistent oversight, poor coordination, and unclear goals, seriously undercutting performance. The U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) has issued dozens of reports on various aspects of the CW program, concluding as early as May 2000 that “Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program offices and with state and local officials.”\textsuperscript{108} The GAO amplified that judgment in 2003, scolding that “the program remains in turmoil, affecting management performance because of long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues.”\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{107} Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 5, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{109} Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 3. See also McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 45-47 (presenting a time line highlighting organizational changes in oversight of the CW demilitarization program); Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Missed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2012 (citing drastic budget cuts in 2006 as impeding
The GAO critiques focused on management and bureaucratic weaknesses, shifting leadership, changes in oversight responsibilities, and ineffective reorganizations, as well as safety incidents during operations, delays in environmental permitting, and insecurities about community protection – all of which contributed to plagues of schedule delays and cost overruns.\textsuperscript{110} Even the Department of Defense concurred in those harsh judgments.\textsuperscript{111}

The most recent programmatic introspection, a six-month assessment culminating in June 2011, was occasioned by the mushrooming cost projections at the final two neutralization sites. Under the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a searching federal review is required when a major defense program exceeds its projected budget by 25 percent.\textsuperscript{112} For Pueblo and Lexington together, the estimates surged 33% from the previous (April 2007) $7.9 billion to $10.6 billion.\textsuperscript{113} The

\textsuperscript{110} Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 12, 18, 20. See also Durant, supra note __, at 178-79.
\textsuperscript{111} Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{112} Continued Financing of Government Operations, Public Law 111-123 § 206, 123 Stat. 3483 (2009), May 22, 2009, codified at 10 U.S.C.A. 2433a. A “significant” Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of 15 percent in budgeted costs; these must be notified to Congress. For the chemical destruction program, that notification was provided on July 21, 2010. A “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when the program’s costs exceed the baseline estimates by 25 percent. Any such programs must be terminated unless the Department of Defense makes specified findings and notifies Congress. Quick Facts, supra note __.
Department of Defense therefore reviewed and restructured these final aspects of the CW destruction program, certifying to Congress that:

--continuation of the program is essential to the national security;
--there are no alternatives to the program that can meet the requirements at less cost;
--the new estimates of total program costs are reasonable;
--the program has a higher priority than other programs whose funding must be reduced in order to accommodate the increases here; and
--the program’s management structure is adequate to control costs.\textsuperscript{114}

Concluding that the main cause of the Nunn-McCurdy violation had been the unrealistic earlier budget and risk profiles, rather than a fundamental problem with the CW destruction program itself, the Department of Defense did not impose significant changes in the activities or plans at Lexington or Pueblo, but grafted on some additional options for responding to future difficulties, and

\textsuperscript{114}\hspace{1em} Letter dated June 14, 2011 from Under Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter to President of the Senate Joseph R. Biden, Jr. The letter addresses the five elements that must be resolved in a Nunn-McCurdy justification, arguing a) that the destruction of the remaining CW arsenal was essential to U.S. security because it was necessary to comply with the federal law and the CWC; b) that detailed metrics were examined to determine that no other program could accomplish the mission more successfully; c) that the adjusted cost estimates were based on a 50 percent confidence level; d) that the high priority for this program had been affirmed by both Congress and the executive branch; and e) that the management structure was evaluated in eight primary areas to facilitate evaluation. See also Byun, et. al., supra note __, p. 9 (noting that the CW destruction program had triggered a previous Nunn-McCurdy violation in 2006).
inserted a more realistic set of estimates. Most significantly, these revisions included prolonging the previously-announced timetable by the additional two years, to culminate in 2023.

With the adjustments, the Pueblo facility will employ a chemical neutralization (hydrolysis) operation, followed by secondary bio-treatment of the hydrolysate (the byproduct of neutralization). In (partial) contrast, Lexington will use neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation. Although these two sites contain only a small fraction of the original U.S. CW inventory, they include some of the most troublesome types of munitions (always more difficult to deal with than bulk containers, because of the presence of the explosive components), and the risks of designing, erecting and operating first-of-a-kind systems and equipment are profound.

115 For example, if, following the neutralization operations at Pueblo or Lexington, problems are encountered in the on-site treatment of the hydrolysate, the restructured program could turn to off-site treatment or disposal. Likewise, a supplementary Explosive Destruction Technology could be employed at Lexington to deal with selected problematic mustard munitions. Quick Facts, supra note __.
116 New Cost Estimates, supra note __.
117 U.S. Army, Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, Fact Sheet: Neutralization Followed by Biotreatment, June 18, 2008, https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/pcapp_neut_bio_18june08.pdf. In this process, the first stage uses hot water to neutralize the agent, destroying the mustard molecules; the second stage uses bacteria to consume the remaining organic components.
118 U.S. Army, Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, Fact Sheet: Neutralization Followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation, March 2010, https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/BG_neut_scwo_FINAL_2010.pdf. In this process, hot water first neutralizes the agent, and then the resulting material is exposed to very high temperatures and pressures, breaking it down into common compounds.
In sum, by April 29, 2012, the U.S. CW demilitarization program had accomplished a heroic task, completing the destruction of 24,923.671 tonnes of CW -- all the inventory held at the incineration sites – some 89.75 percent of the original total American inventory. Moreover, progress in the construction of the final two facilities (the neutralization sites at Lexington and Pueblo) has been proceeding apace, and full financial support for the operation has been retained to date, despite the national economic difficulties. Still, the United States will run well past the CWC’s full obligation – 100 percent destruction of the inventory – by at least 11 years.

Section 3: Soviet, Russian, and Other Parties’ Chemical Weapons Programs

The story of the rise and fall of the chemical weapons program in the Soviet Union (and Russia) is distressingly similar to that described above.


Russia joined the CWC on May 12, 1997, two weeks after the United States.

http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 41-44; http://www.opcw.org/nc/about-opcw/member-states/?tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortField%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortReverse%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BASPAGE%5D=2&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5Bpointer%5D=0
Like the United States, the U.S.S.R. willingly invested time, technology, talent, and treasure in developing, refining, and producing a massive, varied CW armada. In fact, by the 1990s, Moscow commanded an unparalleled CW infrastructure, having developed even more types of chemical weapons and having integrated them into the national military planning and training even more fully than did the United States.122 In 1989, the U.S.S.R. declared an inventory of 40,000 metric tonnes of lethal CW, including the nerve agents sarin, soman and VX, as well as mustard, lewisite, phosgene, and other horrors, at seven sites. It estimated at that time that $5-6 billion would be required to destroy that inventory.123

The fact that Soviet and Russian military forces had not used modern chemical weapons in combat did not mean that it was easy to surrender that capability. Indeed, defectors alleged that even in the era of Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, secret research and development continued unabated, to create entire new categories of novel chemical agents, possessing increased lethality and the ability to circumvent existing Western detection and

123 Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements, supra note __, at 14; Walker, supra note __; Alexander Chimiskyan, Russia on the Path Towards Chemical Demilitarization, in Hart and Miller, supra note __, p. 14. See also Russia CW Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia estimates it has spent $5.7 billion to date to prepare and operate its seven CW disposal facilities).
protection equipment. Moreover, severe national financial restrictions in the immediate post-Cold War era hobbled Russia’s ability to undertake the expensive operations necessary to destroy its mountainous CW stockpiles and the associated production and storage facilities.

To help mitigate the continuing threat posed by this looming Russian CW legacy, the United States and other developed Western nations volunteered significant financial, technological and managerial assistance. The U.S. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provided the most substantial support, totaling $1 billion in aid toward the planning and construction of a CW neutralization plant at Shchuch’ye. Others in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (established by the Group of Eight at Kananaskis, Canada in 2002) also contributed greatly:

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125 See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 189-90 (noting the financial difficulties and inadequate management structures that inhibit Russia’s ability to meet the CWC timetables), 205 (commenting that “The administration believes that Russia will have trouble meeting the 10 year destruction deadline. The Russians made it clear to the United States during the final months of chemical negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament that this might be the case. Therefore, the Convention contains provisions that allow for a State Party to request and have approved under certain conditions, an extension of the destruction period of up to five years.”); Natalya Kalinina, The Problems of Russian Chemical Weapon Destruction, in Hart and Miller, supra note __, p. 1, 3 (noting that the main obstacle to Russia’s initial implementation of the CWC was the country’s severe economic deterioration following the dissolution of the USSR).

Germany ($475 million), Canada ($82 million) and the United Kingdom ($39 million). \textsuperscript{127}

These cooperative ventures were not without perturbations; controversies about the relative size of the respective contributions by Russia and its partner nations, about allocation of legal liabilities for possible mishaps, and about the continuing Russian penchant for secrecy in the demilitarization operations were continuous irritants. \textsuperscript{128} Still, funding for Russia’s CW destruction program now seems to have stabilized at last, and progress toward complete destruction has accelerated. \textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127} Walker, supra note __; Chimiskyan in Hart and Miller, supra note __, at 26-28; Germany to Contribute $26.1M for Eliminating Russian Chemical Arms, Global Security Newswire, March 14, 2012 (reporting that Germany has spent $443.7 million to assist Russian CW destruction over the past ten years, and has committed $26.1 million more for 2012.) But see Russia CW Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia estimates that other countries have provided a total of only $970 million in assistance to its CW destruction operations, roughly 48 percent of the amount previously pledged.)

\textsuperscript{128} United States General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482, March 2003, passim and p. 12 (describing U.S. programs to assist Russia in securing its nerve agents and in constructing a destruction facility, but observing that some aspects of the program “face significant resistance and lack of cooperation from the Russian government”), p. 6 (estimating that it may take 40 years to completely destroy Russia’s CW stockpile); Martin Matishak Russia Restricts Transparency at Major Chemical Weapons Site, Group Says, Global Security Newswire, August 14, 2009.

\textsuperscript{129} See OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-2/DG.2, April 7, 2008, para. 46 (opining that “in the Russian Federation destruction has gained momentum and the plan concerning new destruction facilities is well on track.”) See also Additional Cooperation Needed, supra note __, p. 62 (reporting “good access and cooperation from the Russian government” in implementing security upgrades at CW storage sites); Global Security Newswire, Work on Sixth Russian CW Disposal Site Almost Done, September 28, 2010 (reporting progress in constructing and operating the CW destruction facilities); Russia CW Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia estimates it has spent $5.7 billion to date to prepare and operate its seven CW disposal facilities).
Unlike the United States, Russia avoided incineration as a disposal mechanism, considering it a “primitive” solution – unsafe, costly and politically unsustainable – and opted instead for a variety of chemical neutralization processes. These technologies generated their own controversies, including a debate about how much chemical processing of the lethal agent would be required to meet the CWC standard of destroying the CW “in an essentially irreversible way,” to ensure that the residue could not readily be “reverse engineered” back into chemical weapons form.

The current status of the Russian CW destruction program depicts an enterprise that is still running well behind that of the United States on the track toward total elimination of the stockpiles, but that is projected to catch up and surpass the American level of success in the coming years. Seven destruction facilities have been built (again, as with the United States, one at each of the CW storage sites, to minimize transportation.) Russia did not begin CW destruction

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131 CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.12. See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 343 (commenting that the implication of the irreversibility criterion is that the process of reconverting the residual products back into functional chemical weapons must be at least as costly and difficult as a new synthesis of new CW from raw products would be).

132 See State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 50 (noting that the United States and others are concerned that even after the first step in Russia’s planned two-step process for destroying some of its nerve agent stocks, it might be possible to recapture useable chemical agent); U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011, p. 13-16.
operations until December 2002, and the country reached the CWC’s first milestone (for eliminating one percent of the inventory) in April 2003, almost three years late.\(^{133}\)

On October 26, 2001, Russia requested, and on December 8, 2006, the OPCW Conference of the States Parties granted, the single treaty-allowed five-year extension of the original 10-year deadline for complete destruction of the stockpile, creating for Russia the parallel April 29, 2012 deadline applicable for the United States.\(^{134}\) On May 30, 2011, Russia declared that it had destroyed 50 percent of its inventory,\(^{135}\) and at the April 29, 2012 deadline, it announced that it had reached the 62 percent level, having destroyed 24,961 tonnes of CW.\(^{136}\)

Russia also projected that it would reach complete destruction by the end of 2015, some three years later than permissible, but still eight years ahead of

\(^{133}\) Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 7.


\(^{135}\) Russia Eliminates 50% of Chemical Arsenal, Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011

the current U.S. timetable. However, some doubt those projections, predicting that Russia’s program may require until 2017 or 2018 to finish the task.

In addition, it is instructive to note that five other countries, too, have contributed their own lethal drops into the CWC bucket of chemical weapons destruction. South Korea eliminated its modest declared inventory of approximately 2000 tonnes by July 2008 (having received an extension of its original deadline). Likewise, India destroyed its 2000 tonnes by March 16, 2009, pursuant to an extension. Both those states have been quite secretive regarding their CW activities, and little is known about the size, composition, or location of their inventories, or about the process through which they were eliminated. In fact, South Korea is so sensitive about this whole matter that at its insistence, in all official OPCW documents, South Korea is not even identified by

137 Daniel Horner, Russia Revises Chemical Arms Deadline, 40 Arms Control Today No. 6, July/August 2010; Global Security Newswire, Russia Authorizes $1.5 Billion More for Chemical Arms Destruction, June 29, 2012.
140 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.12, December 8, 2006 (granting South Korea’s anonymous request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to December 31, 2008); Walker, supra note __.
141 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.16, December 8, 2006 (granting India’s request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to April 28, 2009); Walker, supra note __.
name as having possessed and destroyed CW, but is referred to obliquely as “a State Party.”

Albania experienced more difficulty; it initially possessed only 16 tonnes of CW, the smallest of any declared national inventory, and a destruction deadline was set for April 29, 2007. In the two months before that date, however, Albania indicated that it would have difficulty meeting the schedule, and on April 27, 2007, it formally notified the OPCW Executive Council that it would be unable to complete the task on time – but it never submitted an actual request for an extension. Albania did continue to make frequent reports to the OPCW about its progress in destroying the weapons, and the Executive Council noted that the country was quite close to finishing the process. The Conference of the States Parties did not address the issue. On July 4 and 11, 2007, the Technical Secretariat notified the Executive Council that Albania had accomplished the destruction – about ten weeks late, with no formal extension or other legal approval from the OPCW. Albania thereby became the first country to

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142 See, e.g., OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.12, December 8, 2006 (granting South Korea’s anonymous request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to December 31, 2008); Walker, supra note __.
143 Albania was an early adopter of the CWC, ratifying the treaty on May 11, 1994, but the government there apparently did not realize, until 2003, that it possessed any chemical weapons. When the undocumented cache (mustard agent, lewisite, and other toxins, probably supplied by China in the mid-1970s) was discovered in a small, remote nondescript bunker in the mountains, Albania and its international partners quickly moved to secure the site and commence incineration operations. The original intention was to complete the task by the April 29, 2007 deadline, but a technical error prevented timely completion. Joby Warrick, Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others, Washington Post, January 10, 2005, p. A1; Walker, supra note __; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extensions of the Intermediate Deadlines for the Destruction by Albania of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-11/DEC.19, December 8, 2006 (establishing deadlines for Albania’s CW destruction); OPCW: Executive Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its Activities in the Period from 8 July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007, paras. 2.14-17. But see
complete the destruction of its CW inventory, and the first to violate its obligations – and there was no overt, formal OPCW response to this tardiness.

Libya, too, presents a somewhat anomalous situation: Under Muammar Gaddafi, Libya had attempted to construct a significant indigenous CW production infrastructure, and it had succeeded in acquiring a noteworthy arsenal of weaponized and bulk mustard agent. Following a major reversal of its foreign policy in 2003, Libya joined the CWC in 2004, and declared a CW inventory of 23 tonnes. Libya was then largely on track for timely destruction (pursuant to an extension from the OPCW), until the “Arab Spring” outbreak of fighting in the country in February, 2011 froze the operation. The OPCW immediately

Matthew V. Tompkins, Albania’s Chemical Weapons Con, 16 Nonproliferation Review No. 1, p. 65, March 2009 (arguing that Albania’s leadership probably knew about the hidden CW stockpile, and decided strategically first to retain it, and then to announce and destroy it).


OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-14/DEC.3, December 2, 2009 (revising an earlier extension granted to Libya by C-11/DEC.15, December 8, 2006, and fixing May 15, 2011 as the final date for destruction of all Libyan CW). Libya’s CW destruction operations began in October 2010; they were temporarily halted in February 2011 because of the failure of a heating component in the plant’s mobile neutralization unit. The outbreak of violence, and the enforcement of subsequent United Nations sanctions, then prohibited the delivery of necessary replacement parts. Daniel Horner, Accord Reached on CWC’s 2012 Deadline, 42 Arms Control Today No. 1 (January/February 2012), p. 38; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraph 34; OPCW, Executive Council, Draft Report
underscored Libya’s continuing responsibility for safeguarding the CW stocks during the insurrection and for resuming verified destruction procedures as soon as possible, and the organization extended the country’s deadline for destruction.147

When the fighting abated, the new government of Libya suddenly discovered and announced that the Gaddafi regime had acquired and retained several hundred additional, undeclared CW munitions loaded with sulfur mustard agent and hundreds of kilograms of additional agent stored in plastic containers that it had illegally secreted away from OPCW authorities.148
The original CW destruction facility has now been repaired, and additional work on improving the infrastructure and security arrangements is underway; destruction operations should resume in March 2013, to deal with both the original residual and the newly-discovered detritus, under OPCW monitoring. But it is clear that the April 29, 2012 deadline was not met, and the current projections indicate that the new government of Libya will not finish the job until December 2016.149

Finally, Iraq, which did not join the CWC until February 12, 2009, declared possession of an unspecified quantity of CW, entombed in two large underground bunkers at Muthanna that had been bombed by U.S. and coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Because of the highly unstable condition of the bunkers, no inventory of the CW remains has been undertaken, and it is still undetermined how, when, or even whether, orderly excavation, recovery and destruction operations may be safely initiated.150


150 Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Features Stories, March 4, 2010 (Bunker 13 contains thousands of sarin-filled rockets, which are damaged, unstable, and leaking; Bunker 41 is in better condition; it was used to entomb contaminated materials and artillery shells; there are no complete records about exactly what is contained in the two bunkers, and any assessment and destruction operations would be difficult, expensive, and hazardous); John Hart and Peter Clevestig, Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological Materials, SIPRI Yearbook
In addition, U.S. and United Kingdom forces in Iraq recovered 4,530 olden (pre-1991) Iraqi chemical weapons during the interval between the end of major combat operations in 2003 and Iraq’s accession to the CWC in 2009. These included degraded artillery projectiles loaded with sarin and mustard, which the occupying forces took custody of, examined, and destroyed, in order to preclude their use by insurgents or terrorists. These operations were eventually disclosed to the Iraqi authorities and to the OPCW, but the CWC provisions for transparency in CW destruction operations were not followed – the U.S. position was that the treaty was simply inapplicable to combat-related recovery operations of this sort undertaken on the territory of a non-party. Iran, on the other hand, has charged the United States and United Kingdom with violating their treaty commitments – citing a party’s obligation to declare CW “located in


Because Iraq joined the CWC after the treaty’s initial 10-year destruction period had expired, it is obligated to destroy its CW “as soon as possible,” pursuant to an order of destruction determined by the Executive Council. CWC, supra note __, article IV.8; Robert P. Mikulak, Statement to the Executive Council, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 56th Session, April 21, 2009, p. 1 (referring to the “uncharted territory” the Executive Council must enter, in establishing a destruction timetable for Iraq’s CW).
any place under its jurisdiction and control”\textsuperscript{151} -- and has invoked the CWC’s procedures for clarification and dispute-resolution.\textsuperscript{152}

Beyond all this, it should be noted that other CWC-related chemical weapons destruction operations are ongoing, but are beyond the scope of this article. Old, abandoned, obsolete and deteriorated chemical weapons and their components routinely turn up in unrecognized land and water dump sites in Europe, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere and are disposed of as toxic waste.\textsuperscript{153} Likewise, Japan has accepted the responsibility for finding, recovering, and destroying hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons it abandoned in

\textsuperscript{151} CWC, supra note __, articles III.1.a.i.; IV.1; IV.9.
\textsuperscript{152} OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, The Islamic Republic of Iran’s View and Concern Over the Discovery and Destruction of Chemical Weapons by the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq, C-15/NAT.1, November 29, 2010; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by Iran at the 15\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Conference of the States, C-15/NAT.15, November 29, 2010; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, United States of America, Response to the Communication of a Member State, C-15/NAT.7, November 30, 2010; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 69\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Executive Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 3; Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Features Stories, March 4, 2010; Letter from Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte to the Honorable Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, providing declassified "Key Points" from a National Ground Intelligence Center report on the recovery of chemical munitions in Iraq, dated June 21, 2006; Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (noting that Iran has alleged that the U.S. and UK actions were inconsistent with the CWC, but in the U.S. view, the prompt seizure, analysis and destruction of these weapons were necessary to support the object and purpose of the Convention. Extensive exchanges of communications between Iran and the United States and United Kingdom have not resolved the issue); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Exercises the Right of Reply to Iran Regarding the Recovery and Destruction of Pre-1991 Chemical Weapons in Iraq, December 23, 2011, \url{http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/179692.htm}; John Hart and Peter Clevestig, Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological Materials, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, p. 389, 398.
\textsuperscript{153} Walker, supra note __ (noting that in 2009, 13 states had reported recovery of 87,000 old chemical weapons awaiting destruction); Bob Drogin, Digging Up Chemical Weapons in D.C., Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2010, p. 1 (World War I era chemical weapons unearthed in the Spring Valley area of Washington, D.C.); Stuart Cumming, Mustard Gas Shells to Be Destroyed, The Chronicle, June 9, 2010 (144 mustard gas shells recovered near U.S. military base in Australia); Paul Walker, Sea-Dumped Chemical Munitions, briefing slides for United Nations Second Committee, November 11, 2010 (describing tons of CW dumped after World War II in ocean areas around the world).
China during and after World War II.154 This is an undertaking of monumental scope, and China has complained that Japan has fallen far behind the promised schedule155 – and disquiet over this unfulfilled commitment may become politically linked to any OPCW resolution of the U.S. and Russian CW destruction deadline.156 However, because the CWC treats these two kinds of issues separately157 – the obligation to destroy current inventories of functional chemical weapons is an even more urgent task than the obligation to deal with old and abandoned weapons, which pose a serious safety and environmental danger, but not a risk of use in chemical warfare – this article will not substantively address the latter set of issues.

In sum, the CWC’s global “box score” to date indicates that as of April 29, 2012, about 51,128 metric tonnes of CW agent stocks had been destroyed,


156 Brombach, supra note __, p. 25.

157 See CWC, supra note __, article I.2 (obligation to destroy all CW a party owns or possesses or located at a place under its jurisdiction and control) and I.3 (obligation to destroy CW abandoned on the territory of another party) and Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A) (destruction of chemical weapons) and Part IV(B) (destruction of old and abandoned CW).
reaching 73.64 percent of the worldwide goal. This also amounts to 3.95 million of the 8.67 million declared CW munitions and containers subject to the treaty (45.56 percent).\textsuperscript{158} Three of the seven declared “possessor states” had completed the process of destroying their inventories (two of them doing so on time); the other four are, and will continue for some time to be, in arrears.

Section 4: Political Remediation Efforts to Date

For several years, the basic U.S. strategy for dealing with the “2012 problem” was fairly low-key; the effort was generally to deflect attention from the forthcoming inevitability, and to display the ugly projections about the future CW destruction timetable mostly via “unofficial” or “informal” presentations.\textsuperscript{159} Some of this modesty in public affairs sprang from a simple desire not to trigger international political controversy before it was unavoidable (why deal with tomorrow’s problems today?) and some of it emerged from apprehension that premature clarity about the coming failure to meet the 2012 deadline could be


\textsuperscript{159} Supra note __ (citing U.S. statements to OPCW organs regarding the anticipated timetable for U.S. CW destruction operations in 2006 and thereafter.) The June 28, 2011 letter from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates was the first “official” top level statement of the U.S. inability to meet the 2012 deadline. See Gates letter, supra note __.
interpreted as an “anticipatory breach”\textsuperscript{160} of the treaty, immediately triggering other parties’ responsive rights, as elaborated in Section 5 below.

More recently, in more overt recognition of its plight, the United States has instituted several noteworthy efforts at political course correction (or at least transparency), to reassure its treaty partners of its continuing good faith and principled commitment to the CWC,\textsuperscript{161} including:

--accelerating the destruction process, by leveraging the successful experiences from the earliest sites and applying them to the latter locations, and by providing additional financial incentives to corporations that are building and operating the facilities;

--sustaining full funding for the construction of the final two sites, even in an era of extreme financial austerity, enabling the program to proceed apace;\textsuperscript{162}

--providing frequent, detailed reporting to the OPCW about the progress and problems in the demilitarization process, including quarterly presentations in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, discussed infra, text accompanying notes ___ does not explicitly employ the concept of “anticipatory breach,” but includes within the definition of “material breach” a “repudiation” of a treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], article 60.3.a. It is unclear whether under international law, a treaty party’s announcement of a forthcoming inability to perform the obligations of a treaty, accompanied by a commitment to pursue the treaty’s ultimate objective, would amount to a “repudiation” of the agreement. See Mohammed M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach, 1996, p. 26-28, 123 (arguing that article 60 “does not accommodate preemptive or preventive measures,” so only any actual breach, not a potential breach, is relevant); Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2011) [hereinafter, Corten and Klein], p. 1358.

In domestic U.S. contract law, the cognate concept of anticipatory breach by repudiation does include a statement by the obligor that it will not or cannot perform the contract without breach, or a voluntary act that renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without breach. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 250.

\item See generally, Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (outlining U.S. practices over the prior five and one-half years in keeping the OPCW and CWC parties aware of its progress and difficulties in meeting the destruction obligations); Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2.

\item Quick Facts, supra note ___; Carter letters, supra note __.
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The Hague by U.S. governmental officials responsible for oversight of the activities;¹⁶³

--hosting OPCW visitors (including the chair and selected members of the Executive Council, the Director-General, and representatives of the Technical Secretariat) for briefings and tours at the sites where CW destruction was occurring and at the sites where construction of the final two facilities was underway, to display first-hand the immense challenges, the efforts to overcome them, and the engagement of local Citizens Advisory Committees in the process;¹⁶⁴

--reaffirming at the most senior levels the absolute U.S. commitment to achieving complete destruction of the CW inventory. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,¹⁶⁵ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,¹⁶⁶ and other senior officials¹⁶⁷ have made this point with crystalline clarity.

¹⁶³ Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Executive Council, Note by the Director-General, Modalities for Implementation of the Obligation of States Parties to Report on Their Destruction Activities During the Extension Period After 29 April 2007, EC-49/DG.1, March 8, 2007 (requiring reports to the Executive Council every 90 days).


¹⁶⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States’ Commitment to the Complete Destruction of U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, press statement, October 3, 2011.

The United States has explained that its inability to meet the treaty deadline is due to the delays (perhaps foreseeable in principle, but impossible to circumvent nonetheless) in incorporating the novel, untried neutralization technologies at the final two sites. Compounding the difficulty, the United States adds, is the CWC’s completely appropriate insistence that a party’s chosen destruction methodology must “assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment,” and must be undertaken in full international transparency, with punctilious monitoring by OPCW experts. Despite a commitment of over $38 billion, developing a viable method for solving that multi-variant equation has simply taken longer than anticipated, and now, unfortunately, cannot reasonably be accelerated sooner than 2023.

To date, the strongest resistance to the U. S. approach has come from Iran. Iranian authorities have not blinked at labeling the United States and Russia as moving into “non-compliance” and “blatant contradiction with the

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169 CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10. The importance of this provision is underscored by the fact that the treaty essentially repeats it two more times: in article V.11 (regarding destruction of CW production facilities) and article VII.3 (concerning national implementation of CWC obligations). Notably, the CWC specifies that in conducting the destruction operations, each party is to conform to “its national standards for safety and emissions.” CWC, supra note __, arts. IV.10, V.11. See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 119 (summarizing numerous CWC provisions regarding environmental protection).  
170 CWC, supra note __, article IV.3,4,5.
obligations" of the CWC, and have argued that those countries "should be held accountable." Teheran has asserted that it is not acceptable to conclude simply that those CW possessor states are "well-intentioned"; the rest of the treaty parties cannot "take it lightly, and forget about recognizing non-compliance." Iran has rejected the effort to resolve the problem through a low-key "political" process, but insisted upon invoking the "legal" remedies of the CWC, including the judgment that such a "breach" of the convention should be brought formally to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

Iran has reminded the parties that it was the victim of widespread CW use not that long ago (during its 1980s war with Iraq), and warned that, "The continued existence of even one chemical bomb will compromise the international peace and security and the nightmare of employment of such destructive and lethal weapons will be perpetuated." Iran calls its position one of "principle," founded in respect for the credibility and integrity of the CWC.

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171 Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the OPCW at the 64th Session of the Executive Council, EC-64/NAT.10, May 3, 2011. See also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the OPCW at the 65th Session of the Executive Council, EC-65/NAT.13, July 12, 2011.

172 Abadi statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by Iran at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States, C-15/NAT.15, November 29, 2010 (asserting that timely destruction of the CW stocks could be accomplished, if the United States and Russia allocate "required funds, good will and strong determination," because "As the saying goes, if there is a will, there is a way.") See also Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (rejecting Iran’s accusation that the United States is deliberately violating the CWC.)


174 Abadi statement, supra note __, p. 2.

175 Abadi Statement, supra note __, p. 2.
Similar critical sentiments – although perhaps more muted rhetoric – might also be expected from countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and Cuba, although observers anticipated that Iran would be “quite isolated” if it sought to impose meaningful sanctions.\textsuperscript{176}

One important climax to these debates came in the November-December 2011 meeting of the Conference of the States Parties, which adopted a “Decision” regarding the impending April 29, 2012 deadline.\textsuperscript{177} That instrument failed to attract “consensus,” the Conference’s preferred mode of decision-making, but won a 101-1 vote, with Iran as the sole nay-sayer.\textsuperscript{178} It followed more than two years of intense consultations under the aegis of successive

\textsuperscript{176} Horner, supra note ___ (quoting Paul Walker). Notably, Iran’s statements on this point do not mention Russia or Libya, but focus entirely on the United States. See also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by Kenya on Behalf of African Group of States at the 66\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.9, October 4, 2011, and OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the 66\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.15, October 4, 2011 (generally endorsing what became the December 1 Decision).


\textsuperscript{178} Daniel Horner, Accord Reached on CWC’s 2012 Deadline, 42 Arms Control Today No. 1 (January/February 2012), p. 38; Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Missed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2012. See Explanation of Vote on the Draft Decision on Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 2012, Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, 28 November – 2 December 2011 (no OPCW document designator yet issued) (expressing Iran’s opposition to the December 1 Decision, explaining that Iran is “profoundly doubtful of the political will of the US administration,” urging that the OPCW document should recognize “the situation of non-compliance,” and contending that the Conference’s decision will undermine the credibility of the CWC.)
chairs of the Executive Council, with informal negotiations and punctilious wordsmithing to balance the competing national interests and perspectives.\textsuperscript{179}

The December 1 Decision:

--recalled the evolution of the problem, with some states timely meeting their treaty obligations for destruction of the CW stocks, but the United States, Russia and Libya not meeting even the extended final April 29, 2012 deadline;\textsuperscript{180}

--noted statements from those three possessor states “underlining their unequivocal commitment to their Obligations” under the Convention, and “taking note that the inability to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 would come about due to reasons that are unrelated to the commitment of these States Parties to the General Obligations for the destruction of chemical weapons established under Article I of the Convention”;\textsuperscript{181}

--decided that the destruction of the remaining CW “shall be completed in the shortest time possible,”\textsuperscript{182} in accordance with the Convention’s provisions,

\textsuperscript{179} In October 2009, the Executive Council requested its chair “to engage in informal consultations with interested delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons and to keep the Council informed of these consultations.” Subsequent Conference sessions welcomed these discussions and urged that they continue. OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Session, December 4, 2009, C-14/5, paragraph 9.7 (welcoming the EC request “to engage in informal consultations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons”); OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Session, December 3, 2010, C-15/5, paragraph 9.10 (encouraging the EC to continue the informal consultations). See also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by Kenya on Behalf of the African Group of States Parties at the 66\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.9, October 4, 2011 (African parties to the Convention largely endorse negotiations on what became the December 1 Decision.)

\textsuperscript{180} December 1 Decision, supra note __, preamble. Notably, the document does not employ the terms “violate,” “breach,” or even “fail to comply.”

\textsuperscript{181} December 1 Decision, supra note __, preamble.

\textsuperscript{182} December 1 Decision, supra note __, para. 3(a).
and that the costs of verifying the destruction shall be borne by the possessor states;\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para. 3(b).}

--decided that each possessor state will submit a detailed plan for the destruction of its remaining CW, specifying a planned completion date, a schedule for destruction, and a description of the destruction facilities, and that each state shall report quarterly to the Executive Council in closed session on its progress;\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(c) and (d).}

--decided that the Conference of the States Parties will undertake annual reviews of the implementation of this agreement, with a special session at the annual meeting in 2017;\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(f).}

--decided that the Director-General will prepare written reports about the destruction process to the Executive Council and the Conference, based on independent information obtained by the Technical Secretariat from OPCW inspectors;\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(e) and (g).}

--decided that the issue will be comprehensively addressed at the next Review Conference for the Convention;\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(h).}

and

--decided that the possessor states will invite OPCW leadership officials to conduct biannual on-site visits at the destruction facilities and to meet with parliamentarians and government officials in capitals.\footnote{December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(h).}
This decision hardly “resolves” the problem – the organization and the parties will be grappling with the predicament of lingering CW stocks for years to come, including at the treaty’s Third Review Conference, April 8-19, 2013. Nonetheless, it does provide the United States and Russia with quite a favorable benchmark: it is a pragmatic, non-confrontational, almost-unanimous posture, avoiding stark legal sanctions and harsh political rhetoric. It enables the United States and the OPCW to “declare victory” (or at least “success”) based upon a judgment about the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to complete the task. The organization’s Director-General, Ahmet Üzümcü, concluded that:

States Parties have dealt with this issue with characteristic wisdom and sagacity. Their decision to enable the major possessor States to complete the task within a reasonable period of time confirms the reputation of the OPCW as a cooperative and purposeful multilateral body. Our members have remained focussed on the mission and what is best to accomplish it.

But is this, overall, the best way to address the problem?

Section 5: Treaty Breach

This section invokes “black letter” international law standards to assess U.S. behavior regarding the CWC. The primary document in this area is the

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188 December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(j).
191 OPCW, Statement by the Director-General at Remembrance Day for All Victims of Chemical Warfare, April 26, 2012.
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), widely accepted as the authoritative international law source regarding the negotiation, implementation, interpretation, and termination of international agreements. Four primary questions are presented: a) Does U.S. behavior amount to a “material breach” of the CWC? b) If so, may the U.S. actions nonetheless be excusable under any of several plausible doctrines available under general international law? C) In the alternative, is any relief available due to a peculiar tension between disparate obligations of the CWC? and d) If there is a breach, what remedies or responses may be available to other states who regard themselves as injured by the American failure to meet the treaty deadline?

The analysis begins with observance of the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda, requiring that agreements must be kept; binding treaty commitments must be honored. This maxim is perhaps the most fundamental proposition of the international community; the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations concludes that it “lies at the core of the law of international agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international law.”

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192 Vienna Convention, supra note __. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Vienna Convention, and has accepted many of its provisions as reflective of customary international law, binding even upon non-party states. Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, p. 144-45; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia), 1997 International Court of Justice reports, p. 7, 35, paragraph 46 (International Court of Justice accepts key provisions of the Vienna Convention as statements of customary international law).


194 Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 321, comment a.
In furtherance of this notion, the Vienna Convention asserts that a treaty must be performed “in good faith” and that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”

Excuses for non-performance, largely akin to the excuses for non-performance of a contract under the domestic law of many states, are few and rarely invoked.

Of particular note, the longstanding official American position regarding compliance with arms control agreements in general, and with the CWC in particular, stakes out an appropriately “high road”: “The United States believes that States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance both with specific detailed declaration and implementation provisions (e.g., Articles III, IV, V, and VII) and with the “general obligations” of Article I.”

a. Is the United States in “material breach” of the CWC? The United States has consistently declined to characterize its CWC behavior as a “breach,” “violation,” or “failure to comply,” favoring instead more gentle (and diplomatic)
vocabulary such as simple “inability to meet the deadline.” Likewise, the other CWC parties (with the conspicuous exception of Iran) have avoided critical or conclusory language, including dodging the issue in the December 1 Decision. No competent international authority – the ICJ, U.N. Security Council, or any organ of the OPCW – has reached a judgment on the applicability of the term “breach.”

Despite these verbal gymnastics, however, nothing could be clearer than this prominent transgression: the Convention requires that all chemical weapons must be destroyed by April 29, 2012; the United States nonetheless continues to possess chemical weapons after that date – ipso facto, there is an ongoing violation.

International law, however, differentiates between a “material breach” of a treaty and other, less consequential violations; which variety is present here? The VCLT defines the relevant legal term with only a parsimonious measure of clarity: a material breach of a treaty consists in “[t]he violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.” The VCLT offers no further elaboration of the term “object or purpose.”

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199 See, e.g., Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (noting “the likelihood that the United States and Russia will miss the 29 April 2012 final extended deadline for the complete destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles”); Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (noting that “the United States does not expect to complete destruction by 20 April 2012.”)

200 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.3(b). See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 335; Gomaa, supra note __, passim; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2d ed., 1984) p. 190 (explaining that to be “material,” the breach must concern a matter of fundamental importance to the treaty, but need not necessarily touch upon its “central
Certainly, not every manifest or serious breach of a treaty rises to the level of "material"; it is an intensely fact-based judgment. The United States, for example, has criticized other CWC parties for failing to comply with the Convention’s mandates to designate a “National Authority” as the responsible point of contact for the Organization; to adopt necessary domestic legislation to implement the Convention as part of their internal law; and to emplace appropriate administrative measures to control international transfers of regulated chemicals. Still, the United States has not applied the “breach” or

(purposes); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Some Lingering Questions about Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 Cornell International Law Journal 549, 552 (1989) (International Law Commission concluded that a provision considered by a party to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty may have been material in inducing that state to join the treaty, even if the provision was of an ancillary character); David S. Jonas and Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law No. 3, p. 565 (2010); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1350-78; Villiger, supra note __, at 742-46; Aust, supra note __, at 295-96; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 545-49, 1029; Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties, 2007, p. 203-34; Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2008, p. 189-202; International Court of Justice, Judgment in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf, paragraph 162-63 (finding that Macedonia’s violation of the agreement with Greece did not amount to a material breach). See also Kirgis, supra note __, at 550 (treating article 60 as a reflection of customary international law).

Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar distinction. A “material breach” of a contract consists of a failure of performance that is sufficiently substantial to discharge the contract; a lesser violation would leave the contract intact, and afford the injured party a claim for damages or other compensation due to the shortcomings. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 237, comment d and sec. 241.

201 State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 39. See also OPCW Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2012, p. 28 (reporting numbers and percentages of CWC parties who had not yet completed the required implementation steps); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 68th Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 2 (saying the United States is “seriously concerned” that CWC requirements for national implementation have not been met by all parties). Arguably, these violations could legitimately be characterized as “material,” especially if they resulted in behavior that contravened a central purpose of the CWC, such as by allowing a state to evade its treaty obligations through the subterfuge of operating through a private citizen or corporation, or by interfering with the OPCW’s ability to exercise its functions inside the territory of that state. Moreover, these breaches are entirely within the political control of the state; there are no technical impediments that complicate compliance with these CWC obligations, as there are with the requirement to destroy the CW on time.
“material breach” designators to these violations, and has not sought to enforce the corresponding remedies. This self-restraint reflects both political and legal strategy, but does not much inform a judgment about whether a persistent failure to meet the fundamental CW destruction deadline would appropriately be deemed “material.” (The consequences of the distinction between a material breach and a lesser violation, in terms of the legally available remedies, are considered further in section d, infra.)

It is important to observe at this point that the United States and Russia are behaving in good faith, and are not seeking or attaining any military advantage by exceeding the 2012 deadline. The two states are not being sneaky, are not attempting to nullify the CWC by subterfuge or evasion, and are not trying to retain operational CW arsenals for any longer than necessary (although Iran has expressed doubts about U.S. bona fides in this regard.202) In this sense, their behavior is quite different – much less threatening and legally offensive – than that of Libya’s Gaddafi, who deliberately concealed militarily significant quantities of functional chemical weapons, with the intention of retaining a covert, illicit capability.

But “good faith” alone is not a complete escape; indeed, no mens rea concept is included in the VCLT definition of “material breach.” The fact that a treaty party is not being deliberately malicious, and is neither seeking nor achieving a significant benefit from its violation, is surely relevant. But its

202 See Iran’s statements, supra note __.
behavior may nonetheless amount to material breach, where it is sufficiently important, persistent, and large scale to defeat the original interests and legitimate negotiating expectations of its treaty partners.203

Looking first to the importance of the provision in question, as directed by the Vienna Convention, the negotiators' goals in creating the CWC, to preclude forever the possibility of use of CW by ensuring the complete elimination of all parties' CW stocks, are manifest by:

a) the title of the treaty (“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”204 (emphasis added));

b) the inclusion in the treaty's preamble of a concluding paragraph explaining that the parties are “Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,”205 (emphasis added); and

203     Commentators have noted a drafting anomaly in the VCLT definition of material breach. That is, the concept is applicable, on its face, to a violation of a provision essential to the treaty – it appears that the critical element is not necessarily how important or fundamental the breach is, but whether it contravenes an especially important or fundamental portion of the treaty. However, this oddity may not reflect the drafters' true intentions, and has not proven to affect the outcome of any reported cases or controversies. See Kirgis, supra note __, at 552-55; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1358-60; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1031 (stating that not only “central” provisions of a treaty, but also “ancillary” provisions, could be deemed “essential” for this purpose, and noting that an obstruction of the CWC's inspection obligations could therefore qualify as a “material” breach).

204     CWC, supra note __, title.

205     CWC, supra note __, preamble, tenth paragraph. See also Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 2 (asserting that “The goals of the CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons, to reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any future use of these weapons.”)
c) the treaty’s very blunt mandate for,\(^{206}\) and the elaborate and detailed mechanisms governing, the destruction of parties’ CW,\(^ {207}\) including the precise interim deadlines specified in the above-noted “order of destruction,”\(^ {208}\) and the insistence that the final deadline for elimination of CW may be extended one time, but “in no case” any further.\(^ {209}\)

In the same vein, the OPCW, responsible for implementing the CWC, has unambiguously affirmed that “The most important obligation under the Convention is the destruction of chemical weapons.”\(^ {210}\) Even the United States has confirmed that “The destruction of chemical weapons is fundamental to the Convention.”\(^ {211}\)

It might be argued, however, that the parties’ true intention was simply to accomplish the “elimination” of CW, not necessarily their “timely elimination.” Under this view, the specifics of the “order of destruction” would be of secondary

\(^ {206}\) CWC, supra note __, article I.2, 3, and 4.
\(^ {207}\) CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).
\(^ {208}\) CWC, supra note __, article IV.6.

importance – they are merely a metric, not the goal. From this perspective, the principal “object and purpose” of the CWC is to ensure that CW destruction is complete; dilatory performance may be accounted as a “breach” of the CWC, but not necessarily a “material breach.”

Certainly, the parties could have based the Convention on that sort of proposition; they could have exhibited a less fastidious concern with timing, and been more relaxed about compliance with a final deadline for CW destruction. But in reality, the negotiators devoted considerable energy and text to specifying a schedule. They deliberately combined elements of rigidity (with precise benchmarks at the three, five, seven, and ten year points) with elements of flexibility (allowing extensions of specified duration, pursuant to prescribed justifications.) They did as much as they could have to demonstrate that the cadence was fundamental to their bargain – it could “in no case” run beyond 15 years.

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212 See Oliver Meier, OPCW Chiefs Ponder Chemical Arms Deadlines, 40 Arms Control Today No. 1, January/February 2010 (quoting Rogelio Pfrirter, then Director-General of the OPCW, saying that the CWC’s core purpose is to ensure the full, irreversible, complete and universal destruction of existing stockpiles by possessor states; but that “we need not…make the ultimate success of the treaty dependent on any particular date.”)

Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar concept: parties to a contract may stipulate that “time is of the essence,” meaning that a failure to perform on time constitutes a material breach, allowing the aggrieved party to rescind the contract. See Samuel Williston, A Treatise on Contracts, 4th ed., by Richard A. Lord (2000), chapter 46.

213 See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 347, n. 34 (noting that a party may request only one extension of the ten-year deadline, to a maximum of five additional years; if a party requested, say, only a three-year extension, it could not thereafter request an additional two-year extension. If such a state failed to meet the 13-year deadline, “it will become non-compliant with the Convention, which could trigger mechanisms under Article XII.”)
In this regard, even 90 percent compliance (which the United States achieved before April 29, 2012, and which Russia will reach some time thereafter) is insufficient. Especially in the vital realm of arms control and national security, merely getting “close” to full conformity is inadequate, and the United States, in particular, has long been a vigorous leader in insisting upon the highest standards of fidelity to international weapons-related obligations.\(^{214}\) Imagine, for comparison, how the United States would respond if, say, North Korea or Iran were to reply to complaints about their illegal nuclear weapons programs by explaining that they possessed only very small numbers of the contraband weapons – less than ten percent or even one percent of the nuclear stockpiles retained by the United States or Russia.\(^{215}\)

Moreover, even the last ten percent of the initial stockpile held by the United States and the last 40 percent or so of Russia’s original holdings – the overages by which they are now violating the treaty – are greater than the initially-reported CW inventories of any other CWC party. And as noted, the infraction here is not a “near miss” – in the case of the United States, the violation will persist for 11½ years.


\(^{215}\) Under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, TIAS 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter, NPT], some countries (including the United States) are legally allowed to continue to possess nuclear weapons, while others (including Iran and North Korea) are not. See State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67 (Iran’s violations of NPT), 72-76 (North Korea’s violations).
In short, this is surely a case of a continuous “breach” of the CWC, even though only one state, and no OPCW organ or international court, has labeled it as such. The better view, moreover, is that it rises to the level of "material breach," based upon the violence that the violation does to the accomplishment of an essential feature of the Convention.

b. Are there applicable legal excuses under general international law for the U.S. material breach of the CWC? If the failure to meet the April 2012 deadline must be accounted as a breach or material breach of the CWC, can any constructive use be made of the traditional “excuses” for non-performance of treaty obligations? Three related mitigation doctrines are considered: impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure.

The Vienna Convention establishes “supervening impossibility of performance” as a valid basis for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty. But the conditions for invoking this doctrine are quite restrictive: the central concept is

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216 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61. In the Vienna Convention, the doctrine is expressed as a basis for a permissible termination or withdrawal from a treaty, but the same concept would also be available as a justifying excuse for non-performance of a treaty obligation, in defense against an allegation of breach. Cf Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 51 and 101; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1249-54 (relationship between VCLT and rules of state responsibility). See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 336, comment c and reporters’ note 3, and sec. 337-38; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1382-1408; Sinclair, supra note __, at 190-92; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1051-65; Kirgis, supra note __, at 566; VCLT, supra note __, article 73 (specifying that provisions of the VCLT are without prejudice to the international law of state responsibility). The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [hereinafter, ILC Draft Articles] Part I, Chapter V, present six circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise amount to a breach of an international legal obligation; several of these are considered, infra. The United States has no interest in terminating or withdrawing from the CWC – quite the contrary; the United States seeks to sustain and support the treaty, while resisting allegations that it is unjustifiably breaching it.
applicable when an impossibility arises from “the permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.” Nothing
of that sort is relevant here. Moreover, a treaty party is not privileged to invoke
impossibility when the situation is the result of that party’s own violation of the
treaty or of another international law obligation.

In the leading International Court of Justice (ICJ) case in the field,
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia) in 1997,
the court established a very high standard for claims of “impossibility.” Ruling
that Hungary was not justified in withdrawing from a joint project to construct an
elaborate system of locks on the Danube River, the ICJ conceded that the
project’s economic viability had greatly diminished over the years and that a new
environmental consciousness had altered the prior appreciation of the desirability
of the changes in navigation and flood control. Nonetheless, the Court held that
increased costliness did not make the project “practically impossible,” as
Hungary had asserted, and the heightened environmental sensitivity did not
provide an easy escape hatch, either. The ICJ also noted that the underlying
agreement between Hungary and Slovakia had incorporated a provision dealing

\[\text{108} \quad 109\]
explicitly with changes or revisions that might become necessary in the life of the project; the existence of this clause demonstrated that the parties had originally envisioned the possibility for some alterations, but had deliberately determined not to allow others.222

Likewise, in the CWC context, the text of the treaty already contemplates a concept akin to impossibility and incorporates what the negotiating states considered an adequate response. The standard for granting an extension of the early phases (for destroying 1, 20, and 45 percent of a party’s CW) is that “a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of destruction specified.”223 The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties may then agree to modulate these intermediate deadlines, as long as the ultimate deadline (to destroy all CW within ten years) remains intact.224 The criteria for requesting the one allowable extension of the ten-year standard is that the party “will be unable to ensure the destruction” as originally contemplated.225 In granting no more than five years of relief, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties shall set “specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme.”226 Thus, the treaty-makers expressly anticipated that the process of fulfilling the goal of destroying CW on schedule could be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, and that a state’s initial estimates of its ability to

222 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraph 103, 104.
do the job could become inaccurate. They agreed to provide a limited amount of “wiggle room,” but were unreceptive to any notion that rising costs or other emerging challenges might provide a valid basis for lengthier or repeated delay.  

In tacit acknowledgement of this reality, American officials in the past have been constrained not to assert that the United States is destroying the remaining chemical weapons “as quickly as possible” (because it would, in fact, have been quite possible to proceed even more quickly, if the United States were to devote additional funding to the task, to improve the management and oversight of the program, and/or to remove the self-imposed legislative barriers against employing the established incineration technology at the final two sites or against transporting the remaining CW inventory to already-functioning locations.) They have, instead, resorted to more vague formulations, such as the insistence that

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227 See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 7 (noting that the CWC “does allow flexibility in the destruction process, permitting extension of the 10-year timeframe for up to 5 years.”) The CWC negotiators also included another provision through which a party could indicate, at the early stage of submitting its “general plan for destruction of chemical weapons” that there might be “issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction programme.” CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).A.6(h).

A slightly different jurisprudential theory would assert that the timetable provisions of the CWC should be deemed invalid due to “error” or mistake. VCLT article 48 confirms this remedy when “the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.” VCLT, supra note __, article 48.1. Perhaps the United States could contend that its projected (but ultimately mistaken) ability to destroy the CW stockpile within 10 (or 15) years was a “fact or situation” within the meaning of this provision. However, the VCLT also specifies that this escape is unavailable “if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or if the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.” Id. at article 48.2. See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 331(1)(a) and comment b. This doctrine would therefore be inapplicable to the CWC deadline, for the same reasons discussed in the accompanying text.
the destruction is occurring as rapidly as “feasible” or “practicable.” In short, this is not an “impossibility” situation.

A second kind of justification for non-performance, changed circumstances or rebus sic stantibus, is conceptually something of a “special case” of the impossibility argument. It asserts that where something important and fundamental has altered the viability of an original agreement, a party may be allowed to vitiate its now-unappealing bargain.

The Vienna Convention validates this concept, but confines it to situations in which: a) the change “was not foreseen by the parties”; b) the original circumstances “constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be

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228 See, e.g., Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 1, 2 (saying that the United States is committed to destroying its CW “as rapidly as practicable” and “as soon as practicable”); Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2, 5 (employing the phrase “as rapidly as practicable”); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 68th Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (same).

See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”)

229 Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1411-33; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1067-1104).

230 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1. See also, Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 336 and reporters’ note 1 (identifying the “chief example of resort to rebus sic stantibus in United States practice” as the suspension of the 1930 International Load Line Convention due to the outbreak of World War II); Sinclair, supra note __, at 192-96 (recounting negotiators’ apprehensions about the concept of rebus sic stantibus, and the limits upon it that they inserted into the Vienna Convention); Aust, supra note __, at 297-300 (noting that the doctrine has routinely been recognized by international authorities and frequently invoked by states, but never applied by an international tribunal); Villiger, supra note __, at 766-81; Richard D. Kearney and Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 American Journal of International Law, 1970, p. 495, 542-44.
bound by the treaty,” and c) “[t]he effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty.”

Here, regarding “foreseeability,” the negotiating states certainly did anticipate that unfavorable conditions might lead to the CW elimination process requiring more time than contemplated in a party’s original order of destruction. They explicitly provided for the possibility of extension of the three-, five-, and seven-year interim deadlines, and even of the final ten-year period. But when the negotiators stared at the possibility that a party might request more than even the allowable 15 years, they balked. They did “foresee” that hypothetical contingency, and they explicitly rejected it, writing that “in no case” could more than 15 years be tolerated.

Likewise, what circumstances that “constituted an essential basis” for the treaty have changed? Costs have certainly risen, but when the ICJ addressed changed circumstances in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, it concluded that even a stark diminution of the originally-estimated economic feasibility of the

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231 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(a).
232 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(b). The Vienna Convention also specifies that the doctrine cannot be invoked to withdraw from a treaty that establishes an international boundary or where the changed circumstances are the result of the party’s own prior violation of its international legal obligations. Id. at article 62.2. See Villiger, supra note __, at 776 Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1078-97 (identifying five conditions for invocation of the doctrine).
233 CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1086 (it would be “manifestly unreasonable” to invoke the doctrine of changed circumstances when the parties had foreseen the possible change of circumstances).
project was insufficient to vitiate the original consent to be bound.\textsuperscript{234} Here, satisfactory chemical neutralization technologies proved more elusive than originally hoped, but they were certainly in contemplation when the treaty was concluded in 1993. At that point, incineration was almost the entire focus of the U.S. program, but Congress had already begun to require examination of alternatives. The belated switch to new methods was wholly a unilateral U.S. choice, not one forced upon it by the Convention, by Nature, or by any other exogenous circumstances.\textsuperscript{235}

Similarly, the “extent of the obligations still to be performed” by the United States under the CWC has not been “radically transformed” (except in the sense that 90 percent of the U.S. stocks have already been disposed of). For example, there have been no new “discoveries” of additional operational chemical weapons that were surprisingly added to the pile to be destroyed (as did occur in both Libya and Albania). So an argument about changed circumstances as a valid exoneration for the United States missing the CWC deadline is also unavailing.

Finally, the third related argument about legitimate non-performance of a treaty is \textit{force majeure}. Here, too, the notion is a variant of impossibility, but the focus is specifically on the intervention of an “irresistible force or unforeseen event,” beyond the control of the state, such as a major earthquake or tsunami,

\textsuperscript{234} Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note \__, paragraph 104.
\textsuperscript{235} See legislation, supra, note \__, mandating pursuit of alternative technologies for CW destruction.
or the outbreak of a war, that suddenly renders the state physically unable to fulfill its legal commitments.\(^{236}\) This mitigation doctrine is also well-established in international law, but it has important limits, too -- in particular the condition that it is not applicable if the situation of *force majeure* is due to the conduct or neglect of the state attempting to invoke it, or if that state has assumed the risk of the situation occurring.\(^{237}\) There must be “no element of free choice” in the defaulting state’s behavior.\(^{238}\)

In the CWC case, the United States, unfortunately, brought most of the compliance trouble upon itself. The belated decision to employ neutralization technology at two sites, the earlier decision not to consolidate the CW inventories at fewer locations, and the questionable management and oversight practices at the sites were not inherent in the treaty. Those are self-inflicted wounds, not ascribable to any external, uncontrollable agent, and not falling within the purview of the doctrine of *force majeure*.

\(^{236}\) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not employ the term “force majeure,” but the concept is familiar in international law, as recognized by the ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23. The ILC states that the doctrine is applicable when there is an “irresistible force” that is beyond the control of the state concerned and that makes it “materially impossible” to perform its obligations. It is not available where the performance has simply become more difficult, as, for example, due to a political or economic crisis. Id. at Commentary, paras 2 and 3. See also Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1396-98.


\(^{238}\) ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23.2. The doctrine of force majeure is inapplicable in situations created by the neglect or default of the breaching state, even if the resulting injury was accidental or unintended. Id., Commentary, paras. 3, 9 (stating that the doctrine might be applicable where a state “may have unwittingly contributed to the occurrence of material impossibility by something which, in hindsight, might have been done differently but which was done in good faith.”)

\(^{238}\) ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23, Commentary, para. 1.
Thus, the most plausible candidate excuses for mitigating U.S. non-performance of the CWC destruction obligations will not suffice. More importantly, the United States should not want them to suffice. If the CWC, and treaties in general, were so malleable, so subject to escape whenever conditions changed, they would not be worth very much. It is decidedly not in the U.S. interest to cheapen the notion of *pacta sunt servanda* in international obligations in that way – even if doing so might help escape liability in this particular instance. In the long run, the United States depends upon the reliability of international legal instruments and should endeavor to make them more secure, not enabling wrong-doers to slide blithely out of accountability.

c. *Does the CWC provide another kind of relief, due to its unusual combination of obligations?* Even if the excuses for non-performance found in general international law are unavailing, one peculiar feature of the CWC may seem to offer yet another possible legal strategy.

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239 The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, discuss some additional circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of a state’s act that might be considered briefly. Under articles 20 and 45, for example, a state may "consent" to the act of another state, or may waive any objection to that act. In the CWC case, however, the parties have expressly not agreed to or accepted the U.S. and Russian violations of the destruction timetable; the December 1 Decision reflects no such release or waiver of objection. Likewise, ILC article 25, regarding the defense of "necessity," establishes a very stringent benchmark, related to an act that "is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole"; the CWC case does not fit that description.

240 Supra, note __.
That is, it might be suggested that the 2012 deadline is “soft,” and that running well past it should not be deemed culpable because the excess time is due to fastidious adherence to other CWC obligations, namely the requirement to “assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment”\(^{241}\) and the requirement to conduct the destruction and other treaty-mandated operations with full transparency, open to OPCW inspection and accountability.\(^{242}\)

This argument has a certain facial attractiveness, and to some extent it is grounded in the reality that safety, security, and verifiability take time and carry costs. But there is treachery in the concept that one treaty obligation may be traded off against others, and that a party has liberty to decide on its own which legal obligations to fulfill and which to skimp or defer. The system of international law requires that a party to a treaty comply with all the obligations, even when there may be some unrecognized tension between them. If the negotiators improvidently embrace genuinely conflicting obligations, so they cannot be simultaneously honored, then wise states should not join the treaty, should join subject to limiting reservations, or should pursue amendments to it. But once a state has consented to a treaty such as the CWC, it must be obligated to find some way – difficult as it may be – to reconcile the obligations, not unilaterally cherry-picking the easiest among them.\(^{243}\)

\(^{241}\) CWC, supra note __, article IV.10
\(^{242}\) CWC, supra note __, article IV.3.

\(^{243}\) See CWC, supra note __, article VII.1 (“Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this
Still, the CWC requires carrying this analysis one step further, because the treaty explicitly imports national standards about safety and environmental protection into the international obligations. Article IV.10 specifies that “Each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.”

Conformity with the full array of relevant federal and state laws, regulations, and judicial decisions is therefore built into the CWC. If the applicable U.S. national standards simply do not allow the destruction to be accomplished within the time frame articulated in the order of destruction, then perhaps the general reference in article IV could be said to trump the specifics of the treaty’s Verification Annex.

That sort of outcome, however, should be inadmissible; standard maxims of treaty interpretation require parties to attempt to effectuate all provisions in a treaty simultaneously, to avoid constructions that contrapose different sections against each other. The different articles in the CWC – as with any lengthy and complicated treaty – establish mandates that are cumulative, not alternative.
The treaty-makers should be understood to require each party to reconcile its various obligations – to find a way, somehow, to implement both the time-limited destruction and the adherence to national safety and environmental standards.\(^{246}\)

The United States would certainly not tolerate some other CWC party’s attempt to evade its fundamental treaty obligations via the simple expedient of drafting very restrictive national “safety” or “emissions” standards that, as a practical matter, succeeded in obliterating an underlying object and purpose of the treaty.\(^{247}\)

\(^{d.}\) **What are the available responses to a breach of the CWC?** If the U.S. failure to destroy its CW stockpile by the final extended April 29, 2012 deadline constitutes a breach of the treaty – indeed, a material breach -- and if none of the putative excuses offers a sufficient defense, what recourse is available to the aggrieved other parties to the treaty? A leading criticism of the efficacy of the system of international law focuses on the paucity of effective restorative or compensatory remedies for violation,\(^{248}\) but both legal and political responses must be evaluated.

\(^{246}\) See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, p. 75, 109 (agreeing that the CWC allows each party considerable discretion regarding the specific measures that will have to be adopted to fulfill its treaty commitments, but concluding that a party lives up to its obligations only “when its national measures ensure the implementation of the rather broad and complex field of diverse obligations contained in all parts of the Convention, especially those in the complex verification mechanism.”)

\(^{247}\) See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, articles 3 and 32 (compliance with domestic law is irrelevant to a determination about compliance with international law); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 692-95.

First, consider the avenues specified in the CWC itself. Here, the assessment is somewhat complicated by the fact that the treaty drafters did not expressly confer upon the OPCW organs any clear authority to make official findings about treaty compliance (as, for example, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency is empowered to do.\textsuperscript{249}) Indeed, during the CWC negotiations, the United States championed the concept that only individual states – not the organization as a whole or the Executive Council or the Conference of the States Parties within it – should exercise that important legal and political power.\textsuperscript{250} On the other hand, the CWC does contain numerous


\textsuperscript{250} See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (recalling that “The United States insisted during the negotiations that the decision on determining a state’s compliance was a sovereign right of individual state parties”); Department of State, Article-by-article analysis of Chemical Weapons Convention, Treaty Doc. 103-21, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/treatyinfo/cwc.aspx (in explaining article VIII.35-36, the Department of State observes “the Executive Council should address concerns and situations related to compliance, as opposed to actually deciding whether or not there has been compliance with the Convention”), Id. at article IX.22 (“the Executive Council is not given any special powers in regard to determining compliance or non–compliance…The language in paragraph 22 is a compromise between certain developing countries that wanted an international body to decide whether a violation had occurred, and other negotiating states, including the U.S., that wanted decisions on violations to be left up to each State Party itself to determine.”) But see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet:
passages related to ensuring compliance with the treaty, redressing situations
contravening its provisions, and settling disputes under it, which implicitly
presume an ability to take official actions in deliberate response to recognized breaches.

The first, most basic, power the CWC confers upon its parties and the
treaty organs is the ability simply to discuss compliance matters of any sort.
Article IX contemplates “consultations” “on any matter” that may affect the object
and purpose, or the implementation, of the Convention.251 The U.S. Department
of State reports that “The United States has successfully used bilateral
consultations under Article IX to clarify and resolve concerns about the
compliance of various States Party.”252 In addition to those “direct” consultations,
both the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties have the
authority, in “regular” or “special” sessions to raise and debate issues affecting
the life of the organization and the CWC.253 Conversely, no one has the

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251 CWC, supra note __, article IX.1. See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 220-21 (noting impasse among the CWC negotiators on the question of whether the Conference should be empowered to find a violation, and observing that “The actual wording [of article XII] does not require such a formal decision” as part of a determination about appropriate responsive measures.)


253 CWC, supra note __, articles VIII.36 and IX.4.f.
automatic right to shut off debate arbitrarily, sweeping uncomfortable issues under the rug.

For example, CWC article XII (“Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions”) empowers the Conference of the States Parties to “take the necessary measures…to ensure compliance…and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention.”254 If a party fails to take measures to “redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance,” the Conference may “restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.”255 Furthermore, in “cases where serious damage to the object and purpose” of the Convention may result, the Conference “may recommend collective measures” to the parties,256 and “in cases of particular gravity,” the Conference may bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.257

In addition, under Article XIV (“Settlement of disputes”) parties to a disagreement about the interpretation or application of the treaty shall consult

254 CWC, supra note __, article XII.1. See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 184-85 (rebutting critics who argued that the Convention’s regime for sanctions and penalties for non-compliance was too vague to constitute an effective deterrent, asserting that “the Convention’s sanctions and provisions are more comprehensive than those of any other similar agreement.”); Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 218-28.
255 CWC, supra note __, article XII.2.
256 CWC, supra note __, article XII.3.
257 CWC, supra note __, article XII.4.
“with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute”\textsuperscript{258} and the Executive Council may contribute its good offices or other support to that effort.\textsuperscript{259} The Executive Council and the Conference are also empowered to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question within the scope of the OPCW activities.\textsuperscript{260}

Each party has the right to request the Executive Council “to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party.”\textsuperscript{261} A series of short deadlines applies to communications and responses between the Executive Council and the party whose behavior is questioned.\textsuperscript{262} The concerned state may also call upon the Director-General to establish a “group of experts” from within the Technical Secretariat or outside it, “to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing concern.”\textsuperscript{263}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{258} CWC, supra note __, article XIV.2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 231-38.
\bibitem{259} CWC, supra note __, article XIV.3.
\bibitem{260} CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5. Pursuant to the Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, concluded in 2000 and entered into force in 2001, the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council are authorized to transmit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Relationship Agreement, article VII, available at \url{http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/un-opcw-relationship/#c4064}.
\bibitem{261} CWC, supra note __, article IX.3. Iran has invoked this set of procedures to challenge the United States and United Kingdom regarding the validity under the CWC of those parties’ actions to recover, examine, and destroy older CW items recovered in Iraq in 2003-09, without application of the Convention’s transparency provisions. See supra, text accompanying notes ___. Jonathan B. Tucker, \textit{Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical Weapons}, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Feature Stories, March 4, 2010.
\bibitem{262} CWC, supra note __, article IX.4.
\bibitem{263} CWC, supra note __, article IX.4(e).
\end{thebibliography}
Finally, any party has the right to request a “challenge inspection” – an on-site observation of a facility or location in another state, for the purpose of “clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance.” Any such inspection would be conducted by the Technical Secretariat, and the CWC elaborates the procedures for authorizing and conducting the inspection. (To date, no challenge inspections have ever been requested or conducted under the CWC.) Notably, a requested challenge inspection may be blocked only by a three-quarters vote of the Executive Council, on the grounds that it would be “frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope” of the CWC. In the case of the missed U.S. destruction deadline, there would be little that an inspection could reveal, beyond all the information that the United States has been self-reporting.

Beyond the avenues specified in the CWC itself, treaty parties may also take advantage of options available under general international law. The most conspicuous category of these remedies is codified in article 60 of the Vienna Convention, which deals with responses to a material breach. This therefore constitutes the most important consequence of a determination that the failure to destroy the CW on time constitutes a “material breach,” as opposed to a lesser transgression.

264 CWC, supra note __, article IX.8.
265 CWC, supra note __, article IX.8-25 and Verification Annex, Part X.
266 CWC, supra note __, article IX.17. If the Executive Council determines that the request for a challenge inspection is abusive, it may require the requesting party to bear the costs of the inspection. CWC, supra note __, article IX.22(c) and 23.
267 See ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, articles 42 and 48; Gomaa, supra note __, p. 90-106; Corten and Klein, supra note __, p. 1361-66; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1021-41.
Under the VCLT, three strands of response are available regarding a multilateral treaty such as the CWC:

--the other treaty parties may, by unanimous consent, suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it (either among all the parties, or just with respect to the defaulting state);\(^{268}\)

--a party that is “specially affected” by the breach may suspend the operation of the treaty, in whole or in part, in its dealings with the breaching state;\(^{269}\) and

--if the treaty is “of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every other party with respect to the further performance of its obligations,” then any party is entitled to suspend the treaty in whole or in part.\(^{270}\)

There has been little operational experience in construing the key terms in these provisions.\(^{271}\) We cannot be confident, therefore, whether any individual CWC party could legitimately contend that it was “specially affected” by the U.S.
delay in destroying its CW or that the CWC is of such a character that this particular violation “radically changes the position” of each of the other parties.

Commentators have suggested that these provisions might be particularly applicable to arms control treaties, where a breach by any party might undermine the entire treaty regime, even if the violation was not targeted at any particular state and none of them was deliberately “specially affected.” Moreover, Iran, for example, might assert that under the current conditions of political tension between itself and the United States, it is “specially affected” by its adversary’s retention, for an additional decade or more, of CW.

The VCLT establishes obligatory procedures for a country wishing to vindicate its article 60 rights, including requirements for written notice of its intention; a “cooling off” period of at least three months; and recourse to the full panoply of U.N. conciliation and dispute resolution facilities. In the current instance, no CWC party has initiated any such procedures; indeed, the

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\text{\textsuperscript{272} Corten and Klein, supra note \_\_\_, at 1365; Villiger, supra note \_\_\_, at 745; ILC Draft Articles, supra note \_\_\_, at article 42, comment 13; Aust, supra note \_\_\_, at 294; Gomaa, supra note \_\_\_, at 104-05; Sinclair, supra note \_\_\_, at 189.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{273} In this sort of situation, it is not clear what it would mean for Iran or any other state to suspend or terminate its CWC obligations only with respect to the United States, if its CWC obligations would nonetheless remain intact with respect to all the other parties.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{274} VCLT, supra note \_\_\_, article 65.1, 67.1.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{275} VCLT, supra note \_\_\_, article 65.2.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{276} VCLT, supra note \_\_\_, article 65.3, 66. See also ILC Draft Articles, supra note \_\_\_, article 43; Corten and Klein, supra note \_\_\_, at 1483-1568; Villiger, supra note \_\_\_, at 799-850; Aust, supra note \_\_\_, at 300-02; Gomaa, supra note \_\_\_, at 157-73; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note \_\_\_, at 1131-76; Kirgis, supra note \_\_\_, at 555-58. See International Court of Justice, Judgment in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf, paragraph 164 (finding that Greece’s response to Macedonia’s violation of their treaty was not justified under the doctrine countermeasures.)}
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December 1 Decision represents precisely the opposite tack, reflecting the parties’ near-consensus determination to sustain and strengthen the CWC, not to suspend or terminate it.

Aside from the VCLT, another category of legal response to a breach – material or otherwise -- arises from the general concept of “countermeasures.” Under this unusual self-help rubric, a state may legitimately initiate an action that would otherwise be illegal, if its step is a timely, temporary response to another state’s prior violation of a legal obligation, is intended to induce that other state to return to compliance with that original obligation, and is proportional to the gravity of the initial offense. Notably, a countermeasure need not be confined to responding to a “material” breach (even a non-material violation can provide an adequate predicate) and the responding state is not restricted to actions within the scope of the same treaty that was the subject of the triggering breach (the responding state may opt to derogate from some wholly different treaty or some other type of international legal obligation, so long as the effort is to motivate the first state to reform its behavior.)

A countermeasure must be non-forceful, and directed solely at the state guilty of the original breach – the concept is that the responding state may attempt to induce the breaching state to right the wrong, but may not aim merely at inflicting retribution or imposing a penalty. Ordinarily,

277 ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 22 and Part III, Chapter II; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 82-87; Aust, supra note __, at 362-66.
278 Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1376.
a state seeking to exercise countermeasures must implement good faith negotiation and dispute resolution procedures.\textsuperscript{279}

Again, it is largely speculation to contemplate what countermeasures might be undertaken by CWC parties who were attempting to put additional pressure on the United States to accelerate its CW destruction. But almost the entire realm of international legal responsibilities, including trade concessions, law enforcement cooperation, diplomatic relations, status of forces agreements, and other arms control accords might legitimately be put onto the table.\textsuperscript{280}

Finally, it is worth noting that an aggrieved party could also respond to the U.S. breach via a host of random political, as opposed to legal, measures and policies.\textsuperscript{281} It may be difficult to imagine the United States being the target, instead of the protagonist, of economic or trade sanctions, or other types of political punishments, but at least in principle, something of that sort could be available. In a different vein, it is likely that the most grave ramifications of the U.S. breach may emerge in the form of diminished respect by other countries for the United States, for the CWC, for arms control efforts more broadly, and for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[I\textsuperscript{279}] ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, at articles 52-53.
\item[I\textsuperscript{280}] ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 50, specifies that countermeasures shall not affect certain types of obligations, such as to refrain from the use of force or to protect fundamental human rights. See, e.g., Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will cease carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, with regard to Russia, in response to Russia’s unjustified unilateral suspension of its performance under that treaty).
\item[I\textsuperscript{281}] The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, Part III, Chapter II, uses the term “countermeasure,” instead of “reprisal” (which refers to actions undertaken during armed conflict) and “retorsion” (which refers to unfriendly conduct that is not inconsistent with a legal obligation.)
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international law in general. It may become harder for the United States to champion effectively the cause of scrupulous adherence to other vital disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. Other states could more readily dismiss as hypocrisy the exhortations and demands they may receive from Washington, D.C. about the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, or the CWC itself, when the United States has been so egregiously unable to keep its own house in order regarding the destruction demands of the CWC.

Indeed, Iran has already seized the moment to excoriate the United States for its CWC violation, in a transparent attempt to deflect attention from the U.S. charges that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Iran’s apparent “offset” strategy has to date failed to gain any traction with the

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282 NPT, supra note __, is the most important instrument regulating the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and a cap on the nuclear arms race.

283 The BWC, supra note __, was the first international agreement to outlaw an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and remains the single most important multilateral instrument regarding biological weapons.

284 The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 610 UNTS 205, entered into force October 10, 1967, incorporates the foundational principles regarding arms control in outer space and peaceful exploration and use of space.

285 See Rademaker statement, supra note __ (asserting that over a dozen countries possess or are actively pursuing chemical weapons, and exhorting that “If this Organization [the OPCW] is to fulfill its promise, it must not shrink from the task of confronting those States Parties that are violating the Convention.”)

286 See supra notes __, regarding Iran’s complaints about US violating CWC. See Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (linking Iran’s attitude on nuclear and chemical treaties).

Regarding U.S. allegations that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, see State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67; U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2011, p. 20-21; U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, p. 72-80.
other CWC parties and remains largely an isolated irritant to the OPCW’s attempt to deal with the 2012 issue in a businesslike fashion. Still, the danger to the Convention, and to the integrity of arms control efforts in general, lingers ominously.

**Section 6: Weapons Destruction Obligations under Other Arms Control Treaties**

How unusual is the CWC’s rigid insistence that a relatively short deadline for destruction of regulated weapons may be extended only once? How have other arms control treaties dealt with the balance between flexibility (to accommodate legitimate reasons for delay) versus finality (to ensure that the job does, in fact, get done on a meaningful timetable)?

Many (but not all\(^{287}\)) arms control treaties do numerically limit or totally ban parties’ possession of particular types of weapons – that is, after all, often

\(^{287}\) Many arms control treaties are designed largely to regulate the testing, use or deployment locations, rather than the possession, of the regulated arms, and do not require any destruction operations. For example, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 14 U.S.T. 1313, TIAS 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, signed August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 1439, signed September 24, 1996 (not in force)) restrict the conduct of nuclear weapons test explosions, but do not restrict continued possession of those weapons. Likewise, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note __, and the 1971 Seabeds Arms Control Treaty (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 UNTS 115, 10 I.L.M. 146, signed February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972) restrict parties’ deployment of weapons in outer space or under water, but do not require destruction of the weapons. Other related non-legally-binding agreements are basically “confidence-building measures,” intended to reassure nervous countries that a neighbor’s ambiguous military deployment, training or other activities are not a prelude to a surprise attack; again, these instruments do not mandate actual cuts in weaponry. See, e.g., 1975 Helsinki Final Act (Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki, August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975)); 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, adopted
the whole point of the exercise. Surprisingly, however, many of the most important treaties do not incorporate any specifications about the weapons-destruction process: some do not contain explicit mandates that countries must rid themselves of excess armaments, and some do not affix particular timetables for the necessary reductions. Even when a particular destruction schedule is required, typically the “glide path” toward the obligatory end point is so gradual that no problems have emerged for countries that adhere.

For example, the NPT, the cornerstone of the global effort to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons, forbids its non-nuclear weapon state parties from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons, but it does not explicitly address the question of what should happen if one of these countries is nonetheless discovered to possess a nuclear weapon. Presumably, that state should destroy the device immediately (consistent with safety and security considerations), but the treaty is silent on the timing. In contrast, the BWC, the most important instrument in the resistance to the scourge of biological weapons, requires parties never to “develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain²⁹⁰ the relevant devices and agents. The treaty includes a commitment to destroy or convert the contraband items “as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention,”²⁹¹ and an injunction that in effectuating that process “all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.”²⁹² Notably, there is no specification of verification measures or of an international authority to oversee the destruction process, despite the fact that at the time the BWC was concluded, several states were known to possess the newly-contraband items. No country publicly reported any difficulties in meeting the nine-month destruction deadline.²⁹³

The 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons²⁹⁴ offers a diverse menu of illustrations here.²⁹⁵ Its Protocol 1 (dealing with weapons that produce fragments that are not detectable in the human body by x-rays),²⁹⁶ Protocol 3 (on incendiary weapons),²⁹⁷ and Protocol 4 (concerning blinding

²⁹⁰ BWC, supra note __, article I.
²⁹¹ BWC, supra note __, article II.
²⁹² BWC, supra note __, article II.
²⁹³ Defectors later revealed that the Soviet Union secretly violated the BWC by retaining and continuing to develop biological weapons. Ken Alibek and Steven Handelman, Biohazard: (1999), The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, 1999.
²⁹⁵ The CCW has an unusual structure. The main treaty itself contains only basic administrative provisions, as a chapeau for a series of five attached protocols dealing with selected topics; each state may decide to join any or all of the protocols independently.
²⁹⁶ CCW, supra note __, Protocol 1.
²⁹⁷ CCW, supra note __, Protocol 3.
lasers)\textsuperscript{298} ban the use (or particular types of uses) of the regulated armaments, but do not proscribe mere possession, and therefore do not address destruction. Meanwhile, amended Protocol 2 (regulating anti-personnel land mines)\textsuperscript{299} and Protocol 5 (about explosive remnants of war),\textsuperscript{300} although primarily concerned with use, also contain obligations to clear, remove, destroy or maintain the mines “[w]ithout delay after the cessation of active hostilities”\textsuperscript{301} and to clear, remove or destroy the explosive remnants of war “[a]fter the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible.”\textsuperscript{302} But they do not describe any mandatory destruction process or specific timetable.

Numerous bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia regarding nuclear weapons have established numerical caps on various categories of treaty-limited items:

--The first such effort, the 1969 SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms\textsuperscript{303} was mostly a “freeze” on existing arsenals of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), without any requirement for elimination of existing systems.\textsuperscript{304} The companion

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\textsuperscript{298} CCW, supra note __, Protocol 4.
\textsuperscript{299} CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2.
\textsuperscript{300} CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5.
\textsuperscript{301} CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2, article 10.1.
\textsuperscript{302} CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5, article 3.2.
\textsuperscript{304} SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note __, articles I, III.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty\textsuperscript{305} likewise capped, rather than reducing, ABM systems, but it did spawn a Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components, and a series of exacting subsidiary agreements and statements. These did not establish overall timetables or deadlines, but did contain some time-bounded steps for the dismantling procedures.\textsuperscript{306}

--The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty\textsuperscript{307} abolished the entire category of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-5500 kilometer range; it required each party to eliminate all such missiles and their launchers and all related support structures and equipment within three years.\textsuperscript{308}


\textsuperscript{306} Article VIII of the ABM Treaty, supra note __, specifies that ABM systems and components in excess of those allowed “shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.” Thereafter, the parties concluded a July 3, 1974 Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components, and a October 28, 1976 Supplementary Protocol to establish certain timing standards, such as a requirement that destruction of excess missile launchers shall be completed within three months after its initiation, Protocol, Procedures Governing Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components, Article I.3., and that destruction of ABM facilities at Malmstrom Air Force Base was to be completed within six months of the agreement on procedures. Id., article II.5, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/dord.htm.


\textsuperscript{308} INF Treaty, supra note __, articles I, II, IV. There is also an interim deadline, requiring destruction of a significant fraction of the banned weapons within the first 29 months after the treaty entered into force. Id. at article IV.2(a). All the eliminations were completed by both countries on time. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty: A History of the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991, 1993; U.S. General Accounting Office, Arms Control: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Implementation, GAO/NSIAD-91-262, September 1991.
--The 1991 START I Treaty\textsuperscript{309} obligated the two parties to reduce their holdings to no more than 1600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and no more than 6000 warheads attributed to those weapons, in three sequential phases, with interim levels to be reached after three, five and seven years.\textsuperscript{310} The 2002 Moscow Treaty\textsuperscript{311} then lowered the ceiling on strategic warheads to 1700-2200 within another ten years.\textsuperscript{312}

--The 2010 New START Treaty\textsuperscript{313} reduced the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to 700 and the number of associated warheads to 1550, within seven years.\textsuperscript{314}

Meeting these generous targets on time never proved especially burdensome for either superpower. For example, Russia’s strategic nuclear inventory was already almost at the desired end-state when New START entered into force on February 5, 2011,\textsuperscript{315} and further reductions have continued on both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{310} START I Treaty, supra note __, article II. START I also included numerous other sub-limits on categories such as warheads attributable to deployed mobile ICBMs, deployed heavy ICBMs, and warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs, with fixed destruction timetables for each. Id.
\item\textsuperscript{312} Moscow Treaty, supra note __, article I. This treaty did not require actual destruction of the excess warheads; they could be removed from deployment and sent to storage.
\item\textsuperscript{314} New START Treaty, supra note __, article II.
\item\textsuperscript{315} The New START Treaty parties’ initial exchange of data revealed that as of February 5, 2011, when the treaty entered into force, Russia possessed 521 deployed strategic delivery systems (700 are allowed by the treaty), 865 deployed and non-deployed systems (800 are allowed) and 1537 warheads on deployed systems (1550 are allowed). The United States data were, respectively, 882, 1124, and 1800. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 1, 2011.
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sides.\footnote{By March 1, 2012, the numbers were: for deployed strategic delivery systems, U.S. 812, Russia 494; for deployed and non-deployed systems, U.S. 1040, Russia 881; for deployed warheads, U.S. 1737, Russia 1492. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 6, 2012; Kingston Reiff, New START; One Year Later, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 2012; Tom Z. Collina, Russia Back Below Treaty’s Warhead Limits, 42 Arms Control Today No. 4, May 2012, p. 39 (noting that reported numbers of weapons can fluctuate, as individual systems are removed from deployed status for maintenance or repair operations).} In fact, one of the perceived problems with the original START I accord had been that the treaty-established procedures for eliminating the weapons, to remove them from accountability, were so exacting, and therefore so expensive, that each country avoided performing them. Instead, each state carried on its books numerous treaty-accountable items that were obsolete, unarmed, and non-functional, because each was comfortably below its allowable ceilings, and it was considerably cheaper to sustain these so-called “phantom weapons” than to complete the prescribed elimination steps.\footnote{See Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 7-5700, December 23, 2011, p. 6-9, 25 (describing how the United States and Russia had avoided the difficulty and expense of complying with the exacting START I procedures for eliminating weapons from accountability, by continuing to count under the treaty many systems that were no longer operational). Compare START I supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Treaty with New START, supra note __, Protocol to the Treaty, Part Three, Conversion or Elimination Procedures.} (The New START treaty considerably simplified the mandatory dismantling standards, ameliorating the problem.)

The multilateral 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty\footnote{Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 30 I.L.M. 1, signed November 19, 1990, entered into force July 17, 1992.} and its associated instruments\footnote{See Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 7-5700, December 23, 2011, p. 6-9, 25 (describing how the United States and Russia had avoided the difficulty and expense of complying with the exacting START I procedures for eliminating weapons from accountability, by continuing to count under the treaty many systems that were no longer operational). Compare START I supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Treaty with New START, supra note __, Protocol to the Treaty, Part Three, Conversion or Elimination Procedures.} may incorporate more separate numerical limits...
than any other arms control system. They establish individual caps for each of
the 30 parties, and for various combinations of them, on each of five categories
of weaponry: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and
combat helicopters, all to be reached within 40 months. Most of the reductions
were readily accomplished on time (where Russia failed to do so, it was not
because of financial or other impediments to the destruction process, but
because of political dissatisfaction with the operation of the treaty in the post-
Cold War environment, when the prior military bloc structure had unraveled).321
Some of the CFE reductions in treaty-limited items were accomplished not
through physical dismantling of excess systems, but through the simple
expedient of moving them out of the treaty’s geographic area, such as Russia’s
abrupt transfer of some 70,000 items to its military districts east of the Ural

319 The CFE Treaty was negotiated on a bloc-to-bloc (NATO and Warsaw Pact) basis, and
defined a series of concentric zones with specified numerical ceilings for each type of equipment.
In addition, an associated non-legally-binding instrument provided national limitations on military
manpower. This original structure became outmoded when the Cold War ended; a 1999
Adaptation Agreement focused on national, rather than bloc, limitations, but it has not entered
Colllina, CFE Treaty Talks Stall, 41 Arms Control Today No. 7, September 2011, p. 30,
320 CFE Treaty, supra note __, articles I-VII. Reductions to meet the specified ceilings on
military equipment are to be carried out in three phases, with interim deadlines at 16, 28 and 40
months after the treaty entered into force. Id., article VIII.4.
321 Russia has objected to sustaining the original limitations on military equipment in the
various zones, now that the Warsaw Pact has collapsed and many of the Soviet Union’s former
allies have joined NATO. The 1999 Adaptation Agreement was designed to provide the
necessary adjustments, but it has not entered into force. See U.S. Department of State,
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, August 2005, p. 32 (regarding CFE generally), p. 38-47 (regarding Russian
activity under the CFE Treaty); U.S. Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance
with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011.
Mountains, and thus out of Europe.\textsuperscript{322} Still, the treaty incorporates excruciatingly detailed procedures for severing, welding, removing, explosively detonating, deforming, smashing, or otherwise disabling each type of limited equipment,\textsuperscript{323} and has accounted for the destruction of some 52,000 pieces of military hardware.\textsuperscript{324}

The most conspicuous example of a recent treaty for which the mandatory dismantling timetable has proven problematic is the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines (APL).\textsuperscript{325} The Ottawa Convention has 160 parties, including most members of NATO, but not the United States.\textsuperscript{326} It incorporates two different destruction obligations, with interestingly different schedules. First, regarding stockpiled mines (those held in a warehouse, not yet deployed into an operational minefield), each party is obligated to destroy all the APL that it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, “as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State

\textsuperscript{322} While the CFE Treaty negotiations were being concluded, Russia suddenly moved a large quantity of soon-to-be-regulated military equipment from its European bases to Asian locations east of the Ural Mountains, and therefore out of the treaty’s geographic coverage. Many considered this to be a dangerous circumvention of the treaty (since the equipment could presumably be returned to the European theater just as quickly); much of it was later destroyed. GlobalSecurity.org, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm


There is no provision for extension of that four-year period. Second, regarding mines already emplaced in minefields, each party must destroy all mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than ten years after the treaty becomes operational. If a party “believes that it will be unable” to accomplish that objective, it may request an extension for up to another ten years, and a Meeting of the States Parties may vote (by simple majority) to grant the request. Moreover, such an extension may be renewed, via the same process, apparently without limit.

The Ottawa Convention specifies that a request for an extension shall contain: a) the duration of the proposed extension; b) a detailed explanation of the reasons for it, including the status of the work already conducted, the financial and technical means available to the country to conduct the necessary destruction activities, and the “[c]ircumstances which impede the ability” of the state to complete the process; c) the “humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension”; and d) any other relevant information.

To date, compliance with these two deadlines has been inconsistent. Most Ottawa parties do not currently possess stockpiles of APL (64 parties declared that they had never owned any such mines). But four states – Belarus, 

\[\text{References}
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\[\text{Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 4.}
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\[\text{Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.1.}
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\[\text{Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.3, 5.5.}
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\[\text{Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.6.}
\]

\[\text{Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.4.}
\]
Greece, Turkey and Ukraine – are in violation of their Ottawa obligations, due to failure to meet the four-year timetable, and only Turkey appears to be moving close to compliance. (For Belarus, Greece and Turkey, the deadline was March 1, 2008; Ukraine joined the treaty later, and started violating this provision on June 1, 2010.)

Regarding destruction of mines fielded in mined areas, 44 states have declared themselves to be (or are otherwise considered to be) subject to the treaty’s obligation to clear the mines within ten years, but 22 of these have already requested and received one or more extensions, and several additional petitions are pending. Many of these countries are registering precious little progress in the clearance task, and are falling behind their own generous schedules. At the treaty’s second Review Conference, in 2009, the parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan, which included Point 13, urging states to work toward rapid implementation of their obligations to clear mines within ten years (plus extensions), but little acceleration in the pace has been noted. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, responsible for overseeing implementation of the Ottawa Convention, concludes that even the states that

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have been granted extensions have made “disappointing progress,” and that “deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the exception.”

The bifurcated Ottawa Convention structure was adapted in the 2008 Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions. There, each party undertakes, first, to destroy all its stockpiled cluster munitions as soon as possible and no later than within eight years (and “to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.”) Unlike the Ottawa Convention, here the stockpile destruction deadline may be extended, upon request to a Meeting of States Parties, for four years, and “in exceptional circumstances,” for additional periods of four years, where doing so is “strictly necessary” to complete the destruction.


A cluster munition is an explosive weapon that releases or disperses multiple, small sub-munitions, allowing it to strike numerous targets simultaneously over a wider area. Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 2.2; Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, RS22907, June 27, 2012.

339 Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.2.
340 Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.3. The request for an extension is to specify the duration of the requested extension, the exceptional circumstances justifying it, the plan for destroying the cluster munitions, the financial and technical resources available to the party to complete the destruction, and the quantity of munitions and sub-munitions to be destroyed. Id. at article 3.4.
Second, regarding the cluster munition remnants in the field, the Oslo Convention requires each party to clear and destroy all such items within ten years; that period may be renewed for successive five-year increments.\textsuperscript{341}

What are the lessons to be learned from all this collective experience with different forms of destruction obligations under arms control agreements? How could conscientious treaty makers find the “sweet spot” that avoids both: a) the excessive rigidity of an immovable deadline that throws into a situation of breach a country that behaves in good faith but simply cannot meet a projected calendar that may have seemed perfectly reasonable when it was originally established and b) the opposite danger of a too-squishy timetable that cavalierly allows recalcitrant countries to defer indefinitely their obligations, cynically appearing to honor the treaty while not truly pursuing one of its key desiderata?

The answer cannot be an automatic preference for either long deadlines or short ones, or for waivable or immutable targets. Likewise, it is too simplistic merely to call for negotiators to be “more realistic” in setting their timetables or for countries to be “more responsible” in carrying out their destruction obligations. With hindsight, it is abundantly clear that a 10- or even 15-year target for destroying all U.S. and Russian chemical weapons was ambitious, perhaps foolishly so. But in the early 1990s, when the time frame was picked, the experts

\textsuperscript{341} Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 4. The request for an extension is to specify the proposed duration, the reasons for the extension, the work already conducted under national clearance programs, the total area remaining to be cleared, the circumstances that have impeded the party’s ability to complete the clearance, and the humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the proposed extension. Id. at article 4.6.
were confident; they regarded the single five-year extension as a probably-unnecessary extra margin of safety. What they apparently did not adequately take into account was the inevitability that political factors, as well as technical factors, would come into play. If NIMBY had not intervened, the deadline could probably have been met.

It is clear that the political dynamics of modern arms control will not tolerate asymmetric deadlines. That is, it would not be generally acceptable to require countries with relatively small inventories of the regulated weapons to destroy them immediately, while providing a significantly longer period for those laboring under a larger legacy of now-excess armaments. Whatever freedom of action is available to one will probably have to be extended to all.342

Perhaps part of the solution may lie in drafting standards that allow extensions, and renewals of extensions, but that specify the particular criteria that the requester must satisfy, as well as procedures to ensure that applications are well-vetted. Some may view the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions as providing useful models here, but others are less sanguine, concluding that even strict-sounding language may be susceptible to exploitation and endless delay.

342 The NPT, regulating nuclear weapons, is “discriminatory,” in that it allows the five states that tested nuclear weapons first (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) to retain nuclear weapons, while outlawing possession for all other parties. NPT, supra note __, articles I, II, VI, IX.3. In contrast, the treaties regulating chemical and biological weapons are “non-discriminatory,” treating all states identically, regardless of their history as possessors (or not) of the regulated weapons. BWC, supra note __, article I; CWC, supra note __, article I.
Section 7: Possible Paths Forward on the CWC

Returning now to the analysis of the CWC destruction mandate, what tools and tactics may be available for resolving the U.S. and Russian 2012 violations? Five clusters of options are considered.

a. Change the treaty obligations. The first obvious kind of response would be to alter the mandate of the treaty – if the leading parties are unable to change their behavior to conform to the treaty’s terms, then possibly they could change the treaty’s terms to match better what those two chemical leviathans could actually accomplish. The CWC provides three possible avenues.

First, the formal amendment provisions of the CWC outline the “front door” mechanism for altering the text. Article XV of the treaty provides that any party may propose an amendment, which is circulated to all parties. If one-third of the parties support it, an Amendment Conference is convened. To be adopted, the proposal must receive “a positive vote of a majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.” It must then be ratified by all the parties who voted in favor of it at the Amendment Conference; 30 days later, the amendment enters into force for all treaty parties.

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343 CWC, supra note __, article XV.1 and 2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 239-47.
344 CWC, supra note __, article XV.2. With 188 states party to the treaty, 63 would have to support the convening of an Amendment Conference.
345 CWC, supra note __, article XV.3(a). A majority vote would require 95 parties.
346 CWC, supra note __, article XV.3.
As a formal matter, this procedure carries the notable virtue that an amendment supported by a majority (and not opposed by any party) can enter into force for all parties simultaneously – it avoids the irregularity that might occur if a state that does nothing (neither supporting nor opposing the amendment) would not be bound by it, while other parties would be. However, as a practical matter, this mechanism makes amendments extremely difficult; it provides each party two separate opportunities to veto any proposal – it may vote against the amendment at the Amendment Conference, or it may vote in favor, but then decline to ratify. Moreover, as a political matter, the United States and like-minded parties have been reluctant to propose any amendments to the CWC, fearing that if the treaty text were opened up to alteration, other parties might take the occasion to propound their own ideas for refinement of the obligations, many of which would be unwelcome. The CWC has never been amended.

The second potential mechanism for modifying the treaty is the “changes” procedure, also found in article XV. This provides an expedited mechanism to “ensure the viability and effectiveness” of the CWC, and is applicable only to “matters of an administrative or technical nature.” Under it, a proposal is circulated to all parties, with an evaluation by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, and the Executive Council makes a recommendation. If the Executive Council’s recommendation is favorable, the proposal is considered

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347 CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.
348 CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.
349 CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(a)-(c).
approved unless a party objects within 90 days, and it enters into force for all parties 180 days later.

This streamlined vehicle allows minor alterations in the CWC to be implemented more quickly (in particular, it does not require an act of “ratification” by the parties, thereby dodging the necessity of returning to national legislatures for consent). But it again relies upon the absence of any objection, and it is applicable only to relatively minor provisions in the Annexes of the CWC, not to the text of the treaty itself.

In the current situation, oddly, the obligation to destroy all chemical weapons within ten years is contained in article IV.6 of the treaty, but the provision for the one limited extension is housed in the Verification Annex, Part IV(A).C.24-26. It is not clear, therefore, whether the expedited procedure could be legitimately implemented to address this matter.

Moreover, in CWC experience, this “viability and effectiveness change” procedure has been employed only twice, regarding quite minor matters: to adapt

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350 CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d). If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it is considered rejected unless a party objects within 90 days. If a party disagrees with the recommendation of the Executive Council, the matter is referred to the Conference of the States Parties. CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d) and (e).

351 CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(g).

352 Some parts of the annexes are also exempt from the changes procedure, reflecting the negotiators' judgment that those particular passages were too important to be subject to the expedited change operations. CWC, supra note __, article XV.4.

353 CWC, supra note __, article IV.6 (destruction “shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.”)

the timetable for consideration of proposals to “convert” to benign applications, rather than to “destroy,” a former chemical weapons production facility, in the case of a state that joins the treaty after the initially-specified timetable for such conversions;\textsuperscript{355} and to allow international transfers of very small quantities (5 milligrams or less) of saxitoxin for medical diagnostic purposes to proceed with notification at the time of transfer, rather than 30 days in advance.\textsuperscript{356}

It seems extremely unlikely that a change to the 15 year destruction deadline (even though expressed in the Verification Annex, instead of in the treaty text) would pass muster as an “administrative or technical” question. If even a single party objected to the gambit, the matter – including the question of whether the proposal truly meets the criteria for a “change” – would be referred to the Conference of the States Parties, where it would be addressed as a matter of substance, again affording any party the power to block an amendment.\textsuperscript{357}

A third, possibly less onerous or restrictive, option for altering the CWC destruction obligations would rely upon an emergent pattern of practice among the parties in interpreting or implementing the accord. That is, the Vienna Convention contemplates that in construing a treaty text, there shall be taken into account “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which

\textsuperscript{355} CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part V.D.72bis (added in 2005).
\textsuperscript{356} CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B.5bis (added in 1999 and corrected in 2000).
\textsuperscript{357} CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(e).
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”358 If the observed “practice” of the leading CWC parties is to careen past the 15-year timetable, without strenuous objection from others, perhaps that pattern could, de facto amount to a revised understanding of the legal obligations.359

Notably, this passage in the Vienna Convention relates to “interpretation” of a treaty, rather to “alterations” in it, but perhaps it may be possible in practice to fuzz the dividing line between ordinary implementation and modification – if the parties were unanimous in their intentions.360 However, it is a stretch to describe the December 1 Document as a tacit “waiver” or forgiveness of the U.S. and Russian violations, or as a consensus to alter the treaty’s demands. The December 1 Document was not labeled or described in those terms, and it seems unlikely that a general loosening of the 15-year deadline would have commanded such universal assent. Even if most parties were disinclined to pound the table about the major powers’ failures, some, at least, would continue,

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358 Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(b). See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 325, comment c; Gardiner, supra note __, at 225-49; Villiger, supra note __, at 431; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 552-60. It would also be possible for the CWC parties to conclude an overt “subsequent agreement” “regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(a). However, it seems extremely unlikely that all CWC parties would join in the negotiation and conclusion of such an instrument.

359 The Albania case, discussed supra, text accompanying notes __, could be instructive as a data point in helping to establish a possible pattern of precedents for this approach.

360 See Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 334, reporters’ note 4 (concluding that “[t]he question of modification by subsequent practice tends to merge into that of interpretation by subsequent practice”), sec. 102, comment j, and reporters’ note 4 (new rule of customary international law may supersede a prior treaty); Gardiner, supra note __, at 243-45; Aust, supra note __, at 241-43; Georg Nolte, Third Report for the International Law Commission Study Group on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p. 43-45 (common practice among treaty parties can indicate agreement on non-application of the treaty).
with reason, to regard this chain of events as simply a “violation” of the CWC, not as a covert consensual “re-interpretation” of one of its key provisions. In that connection, OPCW organs have explicitly stressed that no action should be taken, regarding some parties’ difficulties in meeting the revised deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons, that would “lead to the rewriting or interpreting of the Convention’s provisions.”

b. *Escape the treaty obligations.* A second device for addressing the destruction problem would be to exercise the CWC’s withdrawal provision; this approach could be contemplated either by the United States and Russia or by any other party aggrieved by the prolongation of the CW destruction process.

Like many other modern arms control agreements, the CWC allows its parties to escape the obligations in an extreme situation, providing:

> Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

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362 Cf. ABM Treaty, supra note __, article XV.2; NPT, supra note __, article X.1; BWC, supra note __, article XIII.2; New START Treaty, supra note __, article XIV.3.

363 CWC, supra note __, article XVI.2. Such a withdrawal would not affect a state’s obligations under the Geneva Protocol, supra note __ or under customary international law. CWC, supra note __, article XVI.3.

Withdrawal from an arms control treaty is rare; the only two instances are North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT and the United States’ 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. See
First, regarding the United States and Russia, it would be a stretch for those states to characterize their own (or each other’s) violations of the treaty as events that have jeopardized their supreme interests. A somewhat better rationale might be to cite the unforeseen technical, financial, and organizational difficulties that generated those breaches as “extraordinary events,” and assert that withdrawal was preferable to overtly violating the CWC, because committing a material breach could lead to adverse implications, as described above, casting into disrepute the CWC, other vital arms control agreements, and by extension, all of international law.364

Notably, the concept of the withdrawal provision in arms control treaties allows each state to be entirely “self-judging” in evaluating whether its supreme interests have been jeopardized. It must express the reasons why it regards withdrawal as necessary, but as long as it is behaving in good faith, there is no


364 This provision allows only for a complete “withdrawal” from a treaty, not for a temporary “suspension” of its obligations. Russia has asserted an ability to suspend, not terminate, its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the United States and other parties have resolutely rejected that interpretation. Statement by the United States of America to the Joint Consultative Group, 682nd Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 2(b), December 9, 2008; U.S. Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011; Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will cease carrying out CFE obligations with regard to Russia, in response to Russia’s suspension).
mechanism for the other parties to object effectively or to compel the state to remain inside the treaty regime.\textsuperscript{365}

Here, to mitigate the political fallout from a withdrawal, the United States and Russia might negotiate a new bilateral agreement committing themselves to expeditious destruction of their CW inventories (perhaps akin to the 1989-90 bilateral agreements noted above\textsuperscript{366}) and they might conclude some sort of agreement with the OPCW to apply the verification and related measures to their prolonged extra-CWC functions. And they could make clear their intentions to re-join the CWC as soon as their destruction operations reached fruition.

But any such defection, under any terms, would surely shake the CWC to its core. Where the objective is to sustain the concept of an effective international law prohibition against chemical warfare, any decision by the United States and Russia to abandon the leading instrument in the field would hardly be appreciated as a constructive approach.

Conversely, it is possible that other parties, perturbed by the failure of the United States and Russia to comply with the mandatory destruction timetable, would exercise the right to withdraw. The exiting state might, or might not,

\footnote{Aust, supra note __, at 281-82. In 2006, after North Korea withdrew from the NPT and conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion, the United Nations Security Council deplored the withdrawal and demanded that North Korea rescind its action and rejoin the NPT. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006, paragraphs 3-4. North Korea has not done so.}\footnote{Wyoming MOU and Bilateral Destruction Agreement, supra note __.}
decide to resume production of CW; perhaps it would announce an intention to return to the Convention when the United States and Russia complete their destruction operations. No state has yet insinuated that it might consider such recourse, and in any neutral assessment, the prolonged possession of these quantities of to-be-destroyed munitions and agents by the United States and Russia does not pose any genuine threat to the security or other supreme interests of any other party. The prospect that either the United States or Russia would brandish or use any of these loathsome devices in combat is virtually nil, and even if the U.S. chemical neutralization process consumes another decade or more, no other state is genuinely threatened thereby.

Still, an outlier state may see things differently, and as noted, the operation of the withdrawal power does not afford other states the opportunity to gainsay that option. One or more such defections would hardly “solve” the destruction problem in any sense, but it cannot be dismissed as a possible response by states that wanted to protest the U.S. and Russian dilatory behavior, to punish them for it, or perhaps to incentivize them to improve it.

c. *Excuse the violation.* A third approach would be to convince the CWC parties to waive or simply overlook the violation. At the most elementary level, this could be a low-key political enterprise, to persuade other states that the

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367 After North Korea withdrew from the NPT and conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion, the United Nations Security Council deplored the withdrawal and demanded that North Korea rescind its action and rejoin the NPT. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006. North Korea has not done so.
United States and Russia were behaving in an eminently reasonable fashion – even if they were contravening the terms of the CWC, they were devoting so much money, expertise and innovation to the effort, and were not seeking or achieving any military, diplomatic or other benefit from the prolongation, so no one else should care very much. The hoped-for response would be “nothing” – not a whimper of protest or a wiggle of serious contrary action – in recognition that pressing further on this issue would be both futile and unnecessary.

The world might thus appreciate this situation as a variation on the concept of “efficient breach,” the notion that strict conformity with the exact terms of a binding legal obligation could become wasteful, if the breaching party stands to gain so much by the violation that it could compensate the innocent parties for the loss of their expectations, and still come out ahead. Here, there would be little tangible benefit to the other CWC parties, even if the United States and Russia were now to pour even more billions into a largely futile effort to somehow further accelerate their CW destruction processes. A more relaxed, flexible attitude may therefore be deemed more appropriate.

In a more formal vein, the Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties, or the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat could go overtly on the record with similarly benign conclusions. None of those bodies has any

368 Under the modern “law and economics” theory of “efficient breach,” a party may be excused from performing a contract if breach would be economically more efficient – provided that it pays compensatory damages to the injured party. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition, 2009, p. 592. In the case of the CWC, there is no specific injured party, and there is no procedure for assessing compensatory damages.
express power to expunge treaty violations, and the CWC dispute resolution provisions do not contemplate a “Good Housekeeping seal of approval” for breaches, but discretion and judgment might lead in that direction. The Executive Council has the general authority “to promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention” and to make recommendations “regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.” The Conference of the States Parties has even broader responsibilities; it may “take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention” and “act in order to promote its object and purpose.” If those organs determined that little or no response was necessary or appropriate in reaction to the 2012 issue, that wisdom could not be overturned.

369 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.30.
370 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36(c).
371 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.19.
372 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.20.
373 The organs of the OPCW are not themselves parties to the treaty; they are merely the agents of the states parties. Any legally operative determination to waive or forgive a violation would have to be a decision of the parties themselves, perhaps expressed through the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties. The Director-General has even less express authority to bind the parties, but has used his “bully pulpit” to try to promote a consensus, low-key solution. See OPCW, Executive Council, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Executive Council at Its 61st Session, EC-61/DG.17, June 29, 2010, paras. 10, 11 (saying that the United States and Russia “will not be able to meet the 29 April 2012 deadline,” without labeling that failure as a “breach” or “violation,” and opining that those two countries have shown an excellent track record and firm commitment to the CWC, so “the key goal of achieving the total and irreversible destruction of their declared stockpiles is, in my view, not in question….I have no doubt that they will continue to stay on track.”) See also Georg Nolte, Third Report for the International Law Commission Study Group on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p. 71-88 (surveying different types of treaty implementation bodies and the powers they may wield in treaty interpretation and modification).
The closest precedent for the current situation arose in April 2007 regarding Albania’s small CW stockpile. There, the OPCW, in effect, closely monitored Albania’s tardiness in meeting the deadline, but took no formal action, despite the facts that Albania had clearly violated the treaty’s requirements (albeit, by a very small margin) and that Albania had done so without even bothering to request an extension (which would have easily fixed the problem.) A pragmatic “watch and wait” posture by the Executive Council (it “reiterated its concern”\textsuperscript{374} about the delays, but never addressed the possibility of any sanctions) seems to have led to a satisfactory outcome.

The resolution of the Albania contretemps was found in the power of the Executive Council to negotiate a viable response plan under article VIII.C.36:

In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:
(a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.\textsuperscript{375}

While this passage does not expressly authorize the Executive Council to conclude, on behalf of the OPCW or the parties to the treaty, a binding


\textsuperscript{375} CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36.
agreement, still less to waive a serious act of non-compliance, it may be sufficient to provide a practical basis for reconciliation.

The Executive Council, in grappling with the Albania situation, “emphasized the exceptional nature of this case, and stressed that it shall not set a precedent for the future, nor in any other way affect the legally binding obligations of the possessor States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, and within the deadlines as extended by the Conference of the States Parties.” Of course, the small quantities of CW at stake in Albania, together with the very short duration of that country’s overage in missing the deadline, are immensely different from the situations of the United States and Russia. Still, in a context so starved of authoritative legal guidance, even a remote bit of prior state practice may be illuminating.

The Iraq case may also suggest a whiff of similar flexibility. There, because Iraq joined the CWC after the original ten-year period for CW destruction had already expired, it is bound by a different, more indeterminate, set of rules. Under article IV.8, such a latecomer is to destroy its CW “as soon as possible,” pursuant to an order of destruction to be determined by the Executive Council. Iraq has not yet begun, or even created a plan for, the

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377 CWC, supra note __, article IV.8.
The United States and Russia are not, of course, in that situation; the analogy suggests both that the concept of flexibility is not entirely alien to the CWC, so perhaps it could be borrowed for application here -- and conversely, that the negotiators knew how to modulate the destruction timetable when necessary and they knowingly decided not to do so for states that had joined the treaty at the outset.

A different procedural tack would be to convene a “special session” of the Conference of the States Parties to address the issue. In addition to its annual meetings and its every-five-years review sessions, the Conference may convene at any time in special session to evaluate the operation of the CWC, taking into account “any relevant scientific and technological developments.” The powers of a special session do not exceed those of a regular session, but the extraordinary, sole focus may help concentrate the minds of the participants and generate additional possibilities. Likewise, a party may request a special session of the Executive Council; such a conclave would have no greater powers than a regular session, but might carry an extra dollop of political visibility and clout. To date, there have been no CWC special sessions regarding the

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378 See discussion of Iraq’s damaged CW caches, supra, note __.
380 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.22. The Executive Council may request a special session. Id. at article VIII.C.33.
381 CWC, supra note __, article IX.4(f).
2012 deadline, and the United States has resisted that recourse, favoring the more low-key alternatives, but the option remains on the table.

The December 1 Decision has already begun the implementation of this type of strategy. In that instrument, the Conference of the States Parties balanced the competing political, legal, and operational considerations, and determined – nearly unanimously – a path forward. The resolution does not “forgive” the U.S. and Russian transgressions, but neither does it rebuke them or invoke a litigious or enforcement-oriented approach. It demonstrates a strikingly flexible, pragmatic approach to “law as politics,” rather than an insistence upon strict compliance with the letter of the law. Whether this act solves the problem, or merely kicks it further down the road, remains to be seen.

d. Go to a higher authority. The CWC contemplates that some especially serious compliance issues may not be amenable to resolution within the context of the treaty itself, but may benefit from referral to outside authorities. Under article XII, “[t]he Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.”\(^{382}\) A 2/3 vote of the Conference of the States Parties would be required for any such referral.\(^{383}\)

\(^{382}\) CWC, supra note __, article XII.4 and VIII.36.

\(^{383}\) CWC, supra note __, article VIII.18.
Such a referral has never occurred under the CWC, and the experience under the cognate provisions of other treaties is hardly promising. If the matter were sent to the Security Council, the United States and Russia would, of course, be immunized by their veto power against any unwelcome outcomes.\textsuperscript{384} In the General Assembly, in contrast, the superpowers are not guaranteed of the ability to control the vote, but the General Assembly lacks the power to enforce legally-binding results.\textsuperscript{385} The question is whether any useful political gain could be achieved by opening these fora to a discussion – in whatever structured way that could be managed – of the CWC compliance issues.

The other form of “higher authority” is the International Court of Justice. Unlike many treaties,\textsuperscript{386} the CWC does not incorporate a direct referral of disputes to the court, and the other avenues for lodging a contentious case seem unlikely.\textsuperscript{387} However, the CWC does contemplate a mechanism for seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ “on any legal question arising within the scope of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{384} UN Charter, supra note __, art. 27 (requiring the concurring votes of all permanent members of the Security Council to adopt a substantive decision).

\textsuperscript{385} UN Charter, supra note __, art. 25 (all U.N. members “agree to accept and carry out” decisions of the Security Council; there is no comparable undertaking regarding decisions of the General Assembly).


\textsuperscript{387} Neither the United States nor Russia currently accepts the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the ICJ pursuant to article 36 of the ICJ Statute, and a specific referral to the court of this matter by those states is also unlikely. See ICJ Statute, supra note __, article 36; International Court of Justice website, Jurisdiction: Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, \url{http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3}
\end{footnotesize}
the activities of the Organization.” A variety of such legal questions might be posed in this situation, either mischievously or in an honest attempt to reach consensus – such as whether the U.S. and Russian defaults do rise to the level of “material breach,” and whether any of the theoretical excuses surveyed above would provide partial mitigation. The ICJ has recognized that sometimes, resolution of the legal aspects of a controversy can help contribute to a larger political solution.

Additionally, perhaps some creative use could be made of another CWC organ, the Scientific Advisory Board. This Board, a relatively under-exploited feature of the OPCW infrastructure, comprises 25 prominent experts, mandated to provide scientific and technical advice to the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Director-General. Perhaps the Scientific Advisory Board could be tasked to study independently the U.S. CW destruction operations, evaluate the progress and problems encountered to date, and provide “red team” analysis and recommendations to the OPCW. Such an “outside” audit might be unlikely to generate revolutionary insights about the U.S. activities, but might nonetheless provide another form of corroborating

388 CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5.
389 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States), International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1984 ICJ p. 433, paragraphs 93-97 (quoting from the ICJ’s earlier ruling in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran case, “resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute”).
390 CWC, supra note __, article VIII.21(h) and VIII.45. See OPCW website, http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/ (terms of reference for the Scientific Advisory Board).
reassurance that all avenues for alleviating the problem have been honestly evaluated.

e. *Negotiate a plea agreement.* The final category of approaches would be for the United States and Russia to “confess error” in missing the CWC deadline, overtly apologize, and attempt to negotiate a package of responses that would be more or less satisfactory to all concerned, even if they involved some pain. Many of the steps noted below have already been incorporated into the U.S. approach and the December 1 Decision; one key item that has been conspicuously missing to date is a certain humility about the nation’s failure to comply with its treaty obligations, and a willingness to “pay a price” to help set things straight.

One element in the package, therefore, would be a public recital that forthrightly accepts responsibility for the material breach of the CWC, and commits to do what we can to clean up the current mess and to reform our behavior in the future. This confession/apology/promise could come in the form of a joint statement by the United States and Russia, or separate undertakings from each of them. Valuable elements to stress could include:

---A renewed commitment to complete destruction of the remaining CW. The United States and Russia have no interest in retaining chemical weapons; this lagging destruction is not a treacherous abuse of the dismantling operation,
designed to lull other states into disarming while the large powers sustain a unique military advantage. Therefore, it should be easy to emphasize the two countries’ good will and their unswerving allegiance to the object and purpose of the CWC. They can affirm that they regard the CW as essentially toxic detritus, an unwelcome legacy of an earlier era, providing no military benefit. The June 28, 2011 statement from outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and the equally emphatic October 3, 2011 comments by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton are solid illustrations of the necessary rhetoric; a presidential statement, even if brief, would be even better. In any event, these are the type of reassurances that will need to be reiterated frequently at senior levels in the decade to come.\footnote{See Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 68\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (reassuring OPCW Executive Council that the U.S. “commitment to complete chemical weapons destruction remains unwavering. We will faithfully implement this treaty obligation as well as the additional measures contained in [the December 1 Decision].”)}

--A promise to destroy the remaining stockpiles promptly. Of course, the issue remains: how prompt can we realistically be? At this point, it is probably too late to revise the misbegotten decisions about employing the alternative, non-incineration technologies and about not transporting the chemicals to centralized destruction facilities – reversing those choices now would likely cost more money and take even more time than sticking resolutely to the current still-bumpy course. But the United States should be earnest about avoiding any further delays, and should undertake whatever oversight and management initiatives are necessary to sustain or even accelerate the enterprise. Ironically, it may now be
appropriate for the United States to employ, once again, the rhetoric that it is destroying the CW “as rapidly as possible” – because it may now, in fact, not be possible to rearrange things and proceed any more quickly (but it should also avoid the pitfall of going any more slowly.)

--A commitment to sustained high levels of funding. One obvious way in which the United States could grievously compound its earlier failure would be to relax its financial contribution to the destruction operations.392 This is a particular danger in the current economic emergency, but to date, the CW demilitarization campaign has been spared the worst ravages of the budget cutting zeal. That immunity needs to continue; otherwise, the promise to meet even the current, quite extended, timetable will quickly prove illusory.

--Establishment of realistic, detailed deadlines. The most recurrent feature of the U.S. campaign to destroy its CW has, unfortunately, been repeated delays; if one were making prognostications, the safest (albeit, cynical) bet would be that the current projections, like most of their predecessors, would fall by the wayside. (The one conspicuous exception to this sorry record is the fact that in 2006, when requesting the five-year extension, the United States predicted that it would be able to incinerate approximately two-thirds of its stockpile by April 29, 2012; in fact, the program reached the 90 percent level by that point.) It is hard

392 See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 21 (explaining how the need to meet previously unfunded expenses for augmented community protection equipment at some CW destruction sites resulted in reprogramming funds that had been allocated for systemization and other activities at other sites, delaying work there.)
to mandate that anyone should “be more realistic” in predicting the future; on each occasion, those who issued the projections sincerely believed they were doing the best they could.

At this point, the estimates (that the Pueblo facility will commence CW destruction operations in 2015 and finish in 2019 and that Lexington will start in 2020 and finish in 2023) incorporate a margin of safety, to adapt to currently-unforeseen contingencies; whether that “fudge factor” is sufficient remains to be seen. Certainly, the long track record of disappointed expectations counsels against trying to establish now a “firm” or “final” timetable for completing the destruction – although some have called for such a definitive endpoint, it is simply unrealistic to over-promise. At the same time, it might well be appropriate to publish quite detailed incremental timetables for the two remaining CW destruction facilities, so the world would receive “early warning” about any additional slippages, not being again blindsided when a major, abrupt revision to the announced schedule is suddenly unveiled.

--Submit to enhanced monitoring by the OPCW. The organization is already observing the U.S. and Russian destruction operations quite closely, but if there are any possibilities for even tighter monitoring, that is a price worth paying. The inspected party is generally responsible for meeting the costs of CWC verification operations, and those are costs that the two possessor countries should not try to shuck. Closer monitoring would not, in any practical

393 CWC, supra note __, article IV.16, V.19.
sense, alter the reality on the ground, but in redressing a situation of messy non-compliance it is important to “look good,” as well as to “be good.” Perhaps a permanent OPCW presence inside the facilities at the two sites, in addition to the episodic leadership visits, would help provide appropriate reassurance to the world community. Perhaps creative use of social media could assist in projecting a favorable image of thorough transparency – a website or Facebook page with live 24-hour closed-circuit TV coverage of construction activities, for example. Perhaps a non-adversarial, even friendly, “challenge inspection” of U.S. CW destruction facilities would be in order – it would not illuminate much information that has not already been provided, but it could be a vehicle for exercising one of the treaty’s main (and so far, never used) verification mechanisms.394

The United States has already demonstrated a firm commitment to this sort of transparency – it would not be quite accurate to call it “verification” or even “confidence building,” because all parties should already enjoy 100% confidence that the United States is dedicated to authentic compliance with the Convention (just later, rather than now). The U.S. acceptance of the December 1 Decision by the Conference of the States Parties promises even more accommodation. But such good faith measures will assume even greater importance in the decade to come – especially during the “gap year” periods (2012-2015 and 2019-2023) when construction and systemization of the final two neutralization facilities are proceeding at Pueblo and Lexington, but when no actual destruction

394 CWC, supra note __, article IX.8-25.
operations are yet underway, and no CW is then being destroyed for years at a stretch.

--Protect the security and safety of the remaining CW stocks. Because quantities of these terribly lethal substances will now linger for another decade beyond their originally planned lifespans, it is essential that they be adequately protected against the dangers of leaks, accidents, theft, attack, tornados, and other misfortunes.\textsuperscript{395} To date, most of the mishaps at the eight U.S. CW storage and destruction sites have been minor, with minimal harm, but this would be a good occasion to review again the security and safety procedures, to pre-empt potential disasters (of the real, or the public affairs, varieties).

--Ensure adequate outreach to affected communities – both international and local. The U.S. program is already quite transparent – the eight local communities around the destruction sites and the leadership of the OPCW have been regularly kept up to date via briefings, on-site visits and public presentations.\textsuperscript{396} But outreach is never “finished,” and the appetite for more

\textsuperscript{395} See Andy Mead, Madison County Tornado Was an F3, Kentucky.com, May 12, 2009 (reporting tornado that crossed the Lexington chemical weapons facility); U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 8 (noting that there was no damage to CW storage igloos at the Pueblo facility from a 2011 earthquake nearby.)

\textsuperscript{396} See OPCW, Executive Council, Note by the Director-General, Modalities for Implementation of the Obligation of States Parties to Report on Their Destruction Activities During the Extension Period After 29 April 2007, EC-49/DG.1, March 8, 2007; Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (describing reports made by U.S. officials every 90 days; presentations at informal meetings of the Executive Council; briefings for delegates of the Conference of the States Parties; and hosting members of the Executive Council at the U.S. destruction sites); Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2. The U.S. Army has also established Public Outreach Offices in three communities and Citizens’ Advisory Commissions in each of the states where CW are stored, to inform and engage the local populations. U.S. Army Chemical Materials
information is almost insatiable – and this is a function at which the U.S. program should be able to excel; it should display the zeal and efficacy of the program with clarity and pride.

Beyond those sorts of public undertakings, what additional terms and conditions could be worth considering, as possible parts of a potential “plea bargain”? Here are some more unconventional variants:

--Pay a fine. There is no precedent in modern arms control practice for a country paying a financial penalty for violating a treaty, but it could be considered. Numerous questions would emerge: How much money? (This would be more in the nature of punitive damages, rather than measuring an amount to “compensate” a particular “victim.”) To whom would the reparations be paid? (If the OPCW received it, what would be appropriate applications of the windfall?) What is the scope of the precedent created in this way? (Is it appropriate to allow a country to “buy its way out” of a treaty that implicates global security concerns?) One variant could be for the United States to compensate the OPCW fully for the additional costs of extending the Organization’s inspection capabilities for the period beyond their anticipated expiration of April 29, 2012. That is, the United States could recompense the

OPCW for salaries, overhead, travel and other expenses that the Technical Secretariat would not have incurred, but for the U.S. violation.

--Enlarge the scope of existing security assurances and provide greater financial support to international programs that oppose CW. CWC Article X already commits the parties to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.”397 Each party undertakes to provide assistance through the OPCW, in the form of contributions to an international fund, negotiation of a standing agreement to provide assistance upon demand, or a declaration of the types of assistance it might be able to provide in response to an appeal.398 In addition, each party has the right “to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons.”399

But these commitments are vague, and the level of financial support is unspecified. The question is whether the United States and Russia could contemplate providing even more voluminous assistance than already required – as the treaty’s developing countries have regularly solicited.400 This could take

397  CWC, supra note __, article X.3 Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 199-212.
398  CWC, supra note __, article X.7.
399  CWC, supra note __, article X.8.
the form of donating more money to the international fund, providing a more comprehensive pledge to assist any victim of a CW attack, and assembling a robust capability to dispatch promptly effective CW sensors, alarms, and analytical equipment; protective and decontamination equipment and supplies; and medical countermeasures. Additional assistance to other countries that are (or may one day be) in the process of destroying their own CW residues might also be put on the table.

--Provide additional economic, technical and development assistance.

Related to that concept, CWC article XI requires that the parties “Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”\textsuperscript{401} Again, this rather vague language has not inspired a wellspring of generosity, and economically developing states have complained that the wealthier parties have not fulfilled the expectations about genuine assistance in economic and technological growth.\textsuperscript{402} In the same vein is the treaty’s requirement that parties “Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the

\textsuperscript{401} CWC, supra note __, article XI.2(b); Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 213-17.

development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes."\(^{403}\) Again, developing states had hoped this provision would promote the dissolution of export control regimes that impede the commerce in dual-use chemicals, but it has not.\(^{404}\) Perhaps this would be the time for the United States to pony up greater international economic and chemical technological assistance to the developing world, and consider anew whether the existing restraints on chemical trade could be relaxed somewhat.

--Lose some organizational privileges. CWC article XII.2 contemplates that where a party fails to fulfill a request from the Executive Council that it take particular measures to redress a situation raising problems about its compliance, the Conference of the States Parties may "restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention."\(^{405}\) Here, the Executive Council has not made any such requests that the United States and Russia have failed to honor, but the concept of suspending institutional privileges may have some applicability.

\(^{403}\) CWC, supra note __, article XI.2(c).

\(^{404}\) The most important institution in this field is the Australia Group, an informal collection of 40 economically developed countries that meet periodically to align their respective national export control regimes regarding the international transfer of materials and equipment that could be relevant to chemical and biological weapons. Some developing countries had hoped that the creation of the CWC would lead to a general relaxation of Australia Group activity, and have been disappointed at the vigor with which the institution still operates. See generally Australia Group website, [http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html](http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html); Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2009, p. 116-21.

\(^{405}\) CWC, supra note __, article XII.2.
The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties both need the active participation of the United States and Russia in order to function optimally, but perhaps a temporary suspension of some membership privileges might have a salutary effect. Among the membership benefits that might be reviewed for this purpose are: the right to vote in OPCW policy organs;\textsuperscript{406} the right to serve on the Executive Council;\textsuperscript{407} the opportunity to have nationals of your state be recruited to work in Technical Secretariat positions;\textsuperscript{408} the right to request clarification of ambiguous compliance situations in other states;\textsuperscript{409} the right to request a challenge on-site inspection;\textsuperscript{410} the right to request assistance under programs of international cooperation;\textsuperscript{411} and the right to participate in largely unrestricted international trade in chemicals.\textsuperscript{412} In the extreme case, article XII.3 contemplates that in cases “where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may result,” the Conference may recommend unspecified “collective measures” to the parties.\textsuperscript{413}

--Admit the breach and apologize. To date, the United States has declined to call a spade a spade and overtly admit that it has breached (or violated or failed to comply with) the treaty. At this point, a frank admission and a

\textsuperscript{406} CWC, supra note __, article VIII.17 (voting rights in Conference of the States Parties), article VIII.29 (voting in Executive Council).
\textsuperscript{407} CWC, supra note __, article VIII.23 (each party has the right to serve on the Executive Council).
\textsuperscript{408} CWC, supra note __, article VIII.44 (staff of the Technical Secretariat must be citizens of treaty parties.)
\textsuperscript{409} CWC, supra note __, article IX.3 (party’s right to request assistance from the Executive Council in clarifying a situation that may be considered ambiguous).
\textsuperscript{410} CWC, supra note __, article IX.8 (party’s right to request a challenge on-site inspection).
\textsuperscript{411} CWC, supra note __, article X.3 (party’s right to participate in international exchanges concerning means of protection against CW use).
\textsuperscript{412} CWC, supra note __, articles VI and XI.
\textsuperscript{413} CWC, supra note __, article XII.3.
willingness to employ the more direct language would not alter the objective
facts, but might appeal as a more forthright acceptance of international
responsibility. Political considerations, more than legal requirements, would push
the United States and Russia in the direction of humility and contrition, but any
vocabulary would be welcome that avoids any impression that those states are
attempting to minimize the significance of the transgression or to dismiss it as
some sort of “technical” or non-substantive anomaly. Sometimes, a sincere
confession and apology, not mincing words, can work wonders.

Overall, the general purpose of remedies for breach of a legal obligation is
to wipe out the effects of the illegal act, to restore the parties to the situation they
anticipated in the original bargaining.\footnote{Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 148-50 (citing the 1928 judgment of the Permanent Court of International Judgment in the Chorzow Factory case, asserting that the purpose of reparations is, to the extent possible, to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act.)} In the criminal law context, the
comparable aphorism is to “make the punishment fit the crime.” Unfortunately,
both those objectives are largely inapplicable here – no one wants to return to
any variant of the pre-CWC \textit{status quo ante}; it is just not possible to destroy the
lingering CW stocks more rapidly; and there is no “punishment” that truly
compensates other parties or inflicts a justifiable amount of suffering upon the
United States and Russia.

\section*{Section 8: Where Do We Go from Here?}
What is the path forward for chemical weapons disarmament efforts? How do we minimize the damage done by the large, obvious and continuing U.S. and Russian failures to complete the CW destruction mission on the original timetable, and what can be done to prevent the harm from spiraling further?

A useful first step is to honestly acknowledge – to ourselves and to the world at large -- that this is a treaty violation, that it is a “big deal,” and that we should not attempt to minimize or shirk it. The overshoot on the destruction timetable – especially when the United States will miss the promised 10 or 15 year commitment by an additional 11½ years or more – goes to the heart of the CWC and undercuts the “object and purpose” of the treaty. The United States has been parsimonious about talking publicly about this misjudgment, especially when the train wreck was merely looming in the future – but now that it is upon us, we have to acknowledge it and begin to pick up the pieces.

It is absurd that the politics of NIMBY have so delayed destruction of the last ten percent of the U.S. CW stockpile, and it is absurdity on steroids that elimination of the final 1.7 percent will sustain the United States in a position of continuous breach of a solemn international law obligation until 2023. Now that we know how safe and environmentally clean the incineration methodology has been, it becomes doubly ironic that the local communities that had so successfully insisted upon employment of a neutralization alternative technology will be the sites at which the hazardous materials, vulnerable to leakage,
tornadoes and other mishaps, are sustained for more than a decade beyond their incineration-based peers.

On the other hand, this violation does not genuinely affect the national security of any other CWC party – they are in no greater danger of being victimized by U.S. or Russian chemical warfare, and the persistence of this noxious stockpile for the additional years poses a greater threat to the workers at the Lexington and Pueblo facilities and to the denizens of the neighboring communities than it does to any potential U.S. enemies. The world will surely get to zero chemical weapons at some point – the lurching toward that goal has not been pretty, but the extended timetable should not be mistaken for ambivalence about the ultimate achievement. U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak has denied as “patently false” the Iranian “political rant” to the contrary and has rightly dismissed as “poppycock” the notion that the United States intends to retain an operational chemical warfare capability.415

Critically, this issue should not become an excuse for the CWC to unravel. That treaty has already performed a marvelous service for mankind, in crystalizing the world’s rejection of chemical warfare and substantiating that taboo by prompting a massive global CW disarmament campaign. The treaty faces its own challenges (the incessant march of new technology, the fears of

covert violation, the failure to reach complete universal membership, etc.\textsuperscript{416}) but it should not also suffer defections – other states should not exercise their right to suspend or withdraw from the regime, even though the two largest participating states will stand in persistent, conspicuous violation. Instead, the two giants, and all other parties, should take the occasion to reaffirm their enduring commitment to the enterprise and help protect the treaty.

As a political matter, it would be far preferable for the United States and Russia to stand tightly together on this matter. Neither could get much political mileage out of trying to highlight the other’s violations – the United States had destroyed a larger percentage of its inventory at the time the 2012 deadline was reached, but Russia will probably manage to come into complete compliance years sooner than the United States. Each state’s greater interest is in sustaining the CWC and surviving this whirlwind; neither could deflect international criticism by pointing the finger of blame at the other. Moscow and Washington, D.C. should therefore develop a common approach and implement common tactics. At the same time, the United States should not simply waive its longstanding concerns about Russia’s CWC compliance, including the question of the completeness of Russia’s neutralization process (ensuring that the chemical reaction is practically irreversible) and ascertaining that the funds

supplied by the United States and other foreign donors are being conscientiously applied.

The world needs a political, not a legal, solution to this problem. That means not relying essentially upon the textual remedies built into the CWC itself or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Political accommodation, not formal invocation of the dispute-resolution mechanisms, offers the path forward. Most CWC parties – Iran is the conspicuous, and perhaps the sole, exception – have anticipated a pragmatic, non-judgmental compromise. But legal mechanisms can play a facilitative role, too. The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties should not be barred from adopting the language of legal obligation – including use of the powerful verb “shall” – in their decision-making documents, and even measures that some might regard as “punitive” should not be presumptively off the table.

To start, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties should expressly find that each of the tardy parties has committed, and is continuing to incur, a breach of the Convention, and should formally invoke the compliance mechanisms of Article XII. The breaching parties should apologize, admit their violations, and reimburse the organization for all the incremental costs

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417 This concept – that the 2012 problem requires a political solution, not invocation of the CWC dispute-resolution mechanisms or an amendment to the treaty – has been a frequent theme for U.S. spokespersons. See, e.g., Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 61st Session of the Executive Council, EC-61/NAT.10, June 29, 2010, p. 2.
of the monitoring and inspection activities, which would have largely expired by now, but for the violations.

These confessions and criticisms will be embarrassing; in the short run, it might be far preferable to finesse an issue of this sort via quiet diplomacy. But in the long run, the continuing vitality of international law requires its vigorous exercise. Among the few truly useful enforcement tools for the international community are “naming and shaming” – public condemnation of violations and censure of the guilty parties. In a perverse way, the United States should welcome this ordeal, because it enhances the power of international law, making arms control treaties including the CWC more reliable and meaningful. When even the superpowers are called into account for treaty breaches, others will be deterred from future non-compliance.

Certainly, the current impasse should not offer the occasion for the United States or Russia to relax their destruction vigilance or to retrench their financial commitments to the enterprise. Some might be tempted to propose, “Since we’re going to miss the deadline anyway, and pay the associated political price, we might as well slow down the process and proceed more cheaply.” But this is decidedly not a situation in which “a miss is as good as a mile”; the only way to escape global opprobrium is to demonstrate that we are, in truth, proceeding as rapidly as possible. If anything can be done to accelerate the destruction
operations at the last two sites, Pueblo and Lexington, that would be money well spent.

There will, undoubtedly, be a political price to pay for the U.S. neglect of this legal duty. It will diminish our ability to attract holdout states to join the CWC. It will weaken U.S. credibility in challenging suspected violators of the treaty’s primary and secondary obligations. It will undercut U.S. leadership in helping to adapt the treaty to new technological challenges. More broadly, it will constitute a lingering stain on the Obama Administration’s theme of “constructive re-engagement” in multilateral affairs.\(^{418}\) As the United States seeks to repair the diplomatic damage of prior years, by becoming more positively involved in a variety of international fora and agreements (the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Convention on land mines, and the U.N Human Rights Council, for example) disquiet about violating the CWC will send an unwelcome, contradictory message.

Most fundamentally, this unexcused violation will soil the U.S. reputation as an advocate for the rule of law, for punctilious compliance with the CWC and other arms control treaties, and for fealty to international law in general. How, for

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example, will the United States retain the moral high ground necessary to effectively rebut Iranian challenges that seek to juxtapose the acknowledged U.S. violation of the CWC with the alleged Iranian violation of the NPT? The two cases are not, in any measure, equivalent, but a good deal of the favorable diplomatic posture for insistence upon the doctrine of *pacta sunt servanda* has been sacrificed amid Tehran’s stage thunder.

Even more importantly, what are the lessons for the future? How can the international community develop a formula for insisting upon genuine disarmament (compelling countries to follow through effectively on those rare occasions when they accept a treaty commitment to destroy weaponry) without creating a straightjacket in situations where good faith efforts simply fall short? A timetable is often necessary to convert what could otherwise be simply an abstract agreement in principle into a reliable, actionable undertaking, against which government officials will be driven to commit funds and labor. Without some rigidity in the deadlines, it would be too easy to postpone forever any real (i.e., expensive) operations – but as the current problem illustrates, too much rigidity is unsuitable, too.

One lesson would be to review any such treaty schedules with a jaundiced eye, wary about unforeseen difficulties in the destruction process, especially where large quantities and unproven technologies are at issue. The Ottawa
Convention\textsuperscript{419} on anti-personnel land mines offers a current example. The United States is not a party to this treaty, but has undertaken a thorough review of the desirability of acceding.\textsuperscript{420} That treaty requires parties to destroy their inventories of stockpiled mines within four years; no extensions are possible.\textsuperscript{421} For the United States, this provision could require the abrupt destruction of up to 10 million mostly quite old mines.\textsuperscript{422} These devices were not constructed with an eye toward their eventual orderly disposal, and there are no existing processes, equipment, or facilities for safely and expeditiously destroying them, at least not on the scale contemplated by the Ottawa drafters. In these circumstances, it would hardly be prudent for the United States to join the Ottawa Convention until it had developed and at least initiated a suitable destruction procedure – until it had sufficient experience to be confident that it was safely within four years of the finish line.

Section 9: Conclusion

Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty is “the supreme Law of the Land,”\textsuperscript{423} and the president has the obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully

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\textsuperscript{419} Ottawa Convention, supra note __.
\textsuperscript{421} Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 4. The Ottawa Convention does not allow reservations, which could exempt a party from application of the deadline, Id., article 19.
\textsuperscript{422} International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 14 \url{http://www.themonitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf} (estimating that in 2002, the United States was thought to possess 10.4 million landmines, but this inventory may have been significantly reduced).
\textsuperscript{423} U.S. Constitution, article VI.
\end{footnotes}
executed."Successive administrations have conspicuously failed in this duty with respect to the dismantling obligations of the CWC.

At the same time, treaties are the “coin of the realm” in international law, and the United States is the leading practitioner of international agreements, relying upon treaties to pursue its interests in the full range of global affairs, from trade to human rights to environmental protection to war and peace. It hardly makes sense to degrade this vital resource through neglect of our own legal responsibilities.

Iran will likely seek to depict the United States as a “serial violator” of the CWC, stapling together its accusations about U.S. and U.K. handling of the obsolete CW devices uncovered in Iraq in 2003-09 with the complaints about blowing past the April 29, 2012 deadline. There are enough shreds of truth in that characterization that it might have legs; the obvious attempt to deflect attention from Iran’s own violations of the NPT is unmistakable.

In truth, there is no real legal or moral congruence between the U.S. posture regarding the CWC and Iran’s or North Korea’s violation of their obligations to refrain from developing or possessing a nuclear weapons capability. The United States is not being “sneaky,” is not attempting to retain any viable CW military capacity, and has a transparent pathway toward complete (if late) performance of its obligations. The United States is attempting (if poorly)
to conform to the treaty, and is not deliberately defying the will of the international community. The cases, therefore, are more unlike than like; one size of response by the rest of the world would not fit all.

Still, the persistent U.S. and Russian violations of the CWC are not “victimless offenses”; there is significant, if diffuse harm. Proceeding from the aphorism that one should “never let a crisis go to waste,” the United States should use this occasion to model how a good state should behave when it finds itself, unfortunately, in a situation of materially breaching a treaty. A state that wants to reassert its bona fides, wants to retain as much as possible of the respect of its peers, and wants to strain the fabric of international law as little as possible, would not try to dodge responsibility, not minimize the significance of its wrongdoing, and not seek simply to deflect attention. It would forthrightly acknowledge its misjudgments and take its medicine. That would be the tiny silver lining on this otherwise miserable cloud – showing the world how a dignified, law-abiding state attempts to restore its respectability.425

The United States has invoked the “example setting” imagery to good effect elsewhere in arms control. In 2006, when Libya’s notorious Muammar

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425 See Global Security Newswire, NATO Panel Urges Nations to Eradicate All Chemical Arms, October 11, 2011 (NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee urges United States and Russia to destroy their CW stocks “soon,” rejecting a Russian proposal to substitute the term “in due time,” because the committee felt the two largest CW possessing states “should act as positive role models” for other nations).
Gaddafi appeared to abandon decades of quixotic support for terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the George W. Bush Administration welcomed his *volte face* with a cautious embrace. The United States removed Libya from the official roster of state sponsors of terrorism, and restored full diplomatic relations with the country (ending a 30 year hiatus). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced these “tangible results that flow from the historic decisions taken by Libya’s leadership in 2003,” saying that the world was witnessing “the beginning of that country’s re-emergence into the mainstream of the international community.”

Rice then proceeded to commend Gaddafi’s example as a prototype for other pariah regimes that, she urged, should emulate Libya’s renunciation of policies and practices that violate international legal norms and embrace a new respect for international law, saying, “Just as 2003 marked a turning point for the Libyan people, so, too, could 2006 mark turning points for the peoples of Iran and North Korea. Libya is an important model as nations around the world press for changes in behavior by the Iranian and North Korean regimes – changes that could be vital to international peace and security.”

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427 U.S. Restores Diplomatic Relations with Libya, May 15, 2006, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/2006/06-194EN.shtml. See also Interview with Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter, 34 Arms Control Today No. 3, April 2004 (the United States believes “Libya serves as a good model” for how Iran and North Korea should behave regarding their nuclear weapons programs. The Libya example demonstrates how a country should conduct itself when it wants to abandon illegal arms, re-join the international community, and reap the benefits of greater security and integration); Jonathan B. Tucker, The Rollback of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Program, 16 Nonproliferation Review No. 3, November 2009, p. 379 (“Bush administration officials often pointed to Libya’s WMD rollback as a model for how other proliferators could make a “strategic choice” to shift course and become accepted members of the international community.”)
Beyond that rhetoric, the United States is right to focus attention on treaty compliance, particularly in the security realm. The United States has been the self-appointed leader in monitoring other states' behavior under arms control treaty regimes, publishing detailed assessments of questionable, or flat-out illegal, activities. These have sometimes generated considerable controversy, but holding states to an exacting standard is the right thing to do – and the United States should not allow accusations of hypocrisy, even when they are well-grounded in the CWC experience, to deter it from continuing to press the point. Reciprocity is a key principle in international law and international politics, and the United States must take seriously the assertions of its treaty partners about possible non-compliance.

In the addressing the CWC specifically, in 2005 – before the CWC compliance issue had come to roost in the United States itself -- the Department of State expressed the sentiment with robust clarity:

430 State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 5 (noting “There are processes within the U.S. executive branch that operate to ensure U.S. plans and programs remain consistent with U.S. international obligations….When U.S. treaty partners have raised compliance questions regarding U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to confirm that its actions were in compliance with its treaty obligations.”)
Detecting a violation [of the CWC] is not an end in itself; it is a call to action. Without strict compliance and without the concerted action of all States Party to insist upon strict compliance – and to hold violators accountable for their actions – the national security of all nations will erode and global stability will be undermined.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet: Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm. See also U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Fact Sheet: The United States’ Approach to Verification, Compliance Assessment and Compliance Enforcement, October 1, 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57241.htm (concluding that “Detecting violations is not enough. What really counts is to ensure that there are sufficient consequences to a violation once it has been detected. Only by making violators face consequences for their violations, especially denial of the benefits of their noncompliance, can they be expected to take compliance seriously, and only by enforcing consequences will other would-be violators be deterred. These consequences may be political, economic, or ultimately military, and may be undertaken by international organizations or nations acting individually or together. If arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments are to support the security of all nations, then all nations must respond when confronted with noncompliance.”)

See also Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee concludes “Ultimately, the willingness of state parties to act in the face of noncompliance, more than the sophistication of its inspection provisions or the extent of its data reporting requirements will determine the CWC’s effectiveness. If the political will does not exist to make these agreements important instruments of international policy, they are not worth the paper on which they are written. If the political commitment to action is absent, all of the inspections they mandate are so much unproductive frenzy. If the political strength to take on those who will not abide by the rules has vanished, the penalties have the impact of a mosquito – inconvenient and irritating perhaps, but no deterrent.”)

See also U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, p. 5-9 (stressing the importance of full compliance with arms control treaties as “a bedrock norm of international relations,” and describing the organizations and programs of the U.S. government that are designed to ensure U.S. compliance.)

\footnote{Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/. See also Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, March 26, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university (“For the global response to Iran and North Korea’s intransigence, a new international norm is emerging: Treaties are binding; rules will be enforced; and violations will have consequences.”)}

President Obama put the matter more concisely in his celebrated April 5, 2009 Prague speech, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.”\footnote{Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/. See also Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, March 26, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university (“For the global response to Iran and North Korea’s intransigence, a new international norm is emerging: Treaties are binding; rules will be enforced; and violations will have consequences.”)} That is true, even for the United States.