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Pay to Play? Campaign Finance and the Incentive Gap in the Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel

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Pay to Play? Campaign Finance and the Incentive Gap in the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel

Neel U. Sukhatme* and Jay Jenkins**

Abstract

For nearly 60 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees felony defendants the right to counsel, regardless of their ability to pay. Yet nearly all criminal procedure scholars agree that indigent defense as practiced today falls far short of its initial promise. These scholars frequently cite a lack of political support, insufficient public funding, and a failure to address instances of inadequate legal representation, among other things, as causes for the underlying systemic dysfunction.

We contend that these conventional critiques are incomplete. Rather, indigent defense systems often fail due to poor design: they do not align publicly funded defense attorneys with their clients’ best interests. This is particularly true when courts appoint private attorneys to represent indigent defendants for a fee, as is done in hundreds of jurisdictions across the United States. We explain how such assignment systems create an “incentive gap” that financially motivates defense attorneys to maximize their caseloads but minimize their efforts.

We then show how campaign finance exacerbates this problem. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that elected trial court judges and criminal defense attorneys regularly engage in “pay to play,” where judges appoint attorneys who donate to their campaigns as counsel for indigent defendants. We find trial judges routinely accept such donations, often as apparent “entry fees” from attorneys who have just become eligible for appointments. These judges, in turn, typically award their donors more than double the cases they award to non-donors, with the average donor attorney earning greater than a 27-fold return on her donation. Indeed, we find indigent defense appointments can be surprisingly lucrative, with many donor attorneys earning tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars across the hundreds of cases assigned to them by their donee judges.

Worse, this apparent quid pro quo between judges and defense attorneys appears to directly harm defendants. We find that defense attorneys who donate to a judge are, if anything, less successful than non-donor attorneys in attaining charge reductions, dismissals, and acquittals, or avoiding prison sentences. We contend donor attorneys might underperform simply because they take on so many more cases from their donee judges, and hence spend less time on each matter.

Our study is the first empirical analysis of how campaign finance distorts criminal trial court decision-making. While our data are from Harris County (Houston), Texas—the nation’s third most populous county—we show that pay to play is probably endemic across that state. Indeed, similar problems likely affect millions of Americans, as trial judges who control indigent defense assignments in many other states—including California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio, among others—accept attorney donations to fund their electoral campaigns. Unless substantial reforms are made to address the corrosive influence of campaign finance on criminal defense, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel will continue to ring hollow for millions of indigent defendants.

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I. Introduction

Were they alive today, Johnny Ray Johnson and Keith Steven Thurmond would be experts on what happens when indigent defendants are not assigned competent counsel. Both were inmates on death row in Harris County, Texas. In 2004, Mr. Johnson’s appointed attorney, Jerome Godinich, missed the deadline to file a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Mr. Godinich claimed a malfunctioning filing machine failed to date-stamp the petition, which he filed after the court had already closed on the deadline date. His client eventually lost on appeal and was executed.¹

Months after the first missed deadline, Mr. Godinich missed the same deadline in Mr. Thurmond’s case. His excuse? The same malfunctioning filing machine. The delay foreclosed a petition from Mr. Thurmond, who was also eventually put to death.²

Sadly, cases like these are not so rare. Although many indigent defense counsel perform admirably for their clients, others have fallen asleep during a client’s capital murder trial,³ neglected to address an inflammatory opening by a prosecutor,⁴ or allowed their client to remain locked up in pre-trial detention for 17 months before investigating facts in a drug possession case in which no drugs were ever found.⁵ There is, unfortunately, no shortage of such horror stories.

More prosaically, public defenders and assigned defense counsel often fail their clients simply because they are spread too thin across too many cases. Many of these attorneys handle hundreds of matters at the same time,⁶ practically precluding them from conducting a focused investigation on any one case or providing truly individualized counsel to any one defendant. So it is no surprise that the vast majority of indigent defendants simply do the most expeditious thing and quickly plead guilty to whatever deal they are offered—often after being encouraged to do so by their own lawyer.

This dynamic has led most criminal procedure scholars and many practicing attorneys to assail the state of indigent defense in America. To illustrate, the Yale Law Journal held a symposium in 2013 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright,⁷ the landmark decision that established a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for all state felony

¹ See Lise Olsen, Slow Paperwork in Death Row Cases Ends Final Appeals for 9, Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2009).
⁴ See id. (describing how an indigent defense attorney said nothing in response to a prosecutor claiming the defendant had bitten a child in a rape and murder case and could be identified through bite marks; the defendant was exonerated 17 years later).
⁶ See, e.g., Steiker, supra note __, at 2696 (noting, e.g., “In Miami-Dade County, Florida, the average felony caseload per lawyer has reached five hundred in recent years due to budget cuts.”).
defendants. The occasion, however, turned out to be more lamentation than celebration, as legal scholars and practitioners pointed out again and again the persistent failures of indigent defense systems across the country.

Most of these critiques rely in some part on a standard narrative that centers on money and power. Critics recognize that while Gideon required states to provide counsel for indigent defendants, this mandate was unfunded. Political actors, in turn, lacked the will to provide the resources necessary to make a poor defendant’s right to counsel more than a symbolic gesture. Combined with a substantial increase in prosecutorial power, as well as the Supreme Court’s reticence to put substantial teeth into the requirement that appointed counsel actually be effective, the manifest failures of indigent defense in America are hardly surprising.

Certainly this standard narrative contains a good bit of truth. But, as we show here, it is incomplete, particularly in the context of assigned counsel systems, in which courts assign private attorneys to represent defendants for a fee. Such systems, which are used in hundreds of jurisdictions across the country, are undoubtedly underfunded on the whole. But that does not mean they are not highly profitable for some. As we show, many defense attorneys make tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in a given year across assignments from a single judge.

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8 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2150 (2012) (“[F]ifty years after Gideon was decided, there is near-universal acceptance of the notion that our system of indigent defense is broken.”); Pamela R. Metzger, Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon To Restrict Defendants’ Invocation of Adversary Procedures, 122 Yale L.J. 2550 (2012) (arguing “the Supreme Court has used Gideon to decrease the protection of Sixth Amendment rights that constitute the core structures of the American adjudicatory process.”)

9 See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 Yale L.J. 2150 (2012); see also Victoria Nourse, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1417 (“Once the darling of the legal academy, criminal procedure has fallen into disrepute.”); see also id. at 1431 (“The importance of the lawyer . . . is not someone to try a case (most cases are never tried), but someone to stand with the individual citizen unaligned to the forces that laid him low and resist claims of the natural and inevitable superiority of government.”).


11 By contrast, a few critiques have cut much deeper. In particular, Paul Butler argues Gideon itself was misguided and has led to more harm than good. He contends that by coating the trial process with a false veneer of objectivity and fairness, the right to counsel might actually obfuscate the system’s true goal of subjugating poor and black people. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176 (2012). As Professor Butler notes, similar arguments have also been made in other areas of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 719 (1992) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) “served to stabilize and legitimate the status quo by creating the illusion of closure and cohesion”); see also William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 3 (2011) (noting that accused persons have fared worse as rights have expanded).

12 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 Yale L.J. 2676, 2680 (2012) (“The Court imposed an unfunded mandate on state governments without any enforcement mechanism, and the Court then undermined the one remedy available to the judiciary, the ability to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”); M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 Yale L.J. 2358 (2012).


Moreover, these attorneys often continue to receive such assignments even after they have been revealed to be woefully incompetent. For example, in the years after Mr. Johnson and Mr. Thurmond were executed, Mr. Godinich was appointed as counsel in state court for hundreds of other felony defendants, continuing to amass a record of inadequate representation during this time. Judges could have appointed other lawyers to these cases. Why did they continue to appoint the same underperforming attorneys?

The proximate cause, we argue, may lie in campaign finance. Mr. Godinich was assigned the majority of his felony cases from one trial court judge, Jim Wallace. Mr. Godinich was also a significant donor to Judge Wallace. Between 2005 and 2014, Mr. Godinich donated on seven occasions a total of $9,000 to Judge Wallace’s electoral campaigns. Between 2004 and 2018, Judge Wallace appointed Mr. Godinich to 1,974 cases, including 5 capital cases. And since 2014, Mr. Godinich has earned at least $872,642.50 from cases before Judge Wallace. Clearly, some indigent defense attorneys are not just scraping by.

While Mr. Godinich is an outlier, the link between campaign finance and indigent defense extends far beyond him. In this Article, we expose this hidden connection. In particular, we present empirical evidence of “pay to play,” where defense attorneys donate to elected judges to obtain or maintain access to indigent defense cases.

We accomplish this by creating the first large-scale database that links trial court campaign contributions with multiple criminal court datasets. Specifically, our data comprise the universe of 290,633 felony cases from January 2005 through May 2018 where defense counsel were assigned and ascertainable in Harris County, the nation’s third most populous county and the home of the City of Houston. While a few recent papers have looked at how campaign donations might influence elected state Supreme Court justices, ours is the first to explore how campaign finance might affect trial court decision-making and criminal case outcomes.

15 See Casey Tolan, She Watched Her Husband Get Sentenced to Death. Now She’s Becoming a Lawyer to Save Him and Others., SPLINTER (Oct. 24, 2016), available at https://splinternews.com/she-watched-her-husband-get-sentenced-to-death-now-she-1793863088 (“Godinich and his second chair attorney didn’t even meet with Juan until just before the trial, and conducted almost no investigation, Yancy said. … at times during jury deliberations, neither of Juan’s lawyers were present while the judge and prosecutors responded to questions from the jury by themselves. Hartwell said that when she confronted Godinich, he told her, ‘I have another trial to take care of.’ (Godinich did not respond to a request for comment.)”)); see also Stephen B. Bright, Independence of Counsel: An Essential Requirement for Competent Counsel and a Working Adversary System, 55 Hous. L. Rev. 853, 869 (2018) (“[Jerome Godinich] was assigned 406 felony cases at the trial level in 2017—more than twice the national standard of 150 felony cases—as well as 8 capital cases, and 7 felony appeals.”) (citations omitted)).

16 We say proximate cause because we recognize, as critical legal studies scholars have argued, that deeper societal problems might be common drivers of all of these phenomena. If indeed “prison is for the poor, and not the rich,” see Butler, supra note __, at 2178, then the whole system of judicial campaign finance might be another system that was created to be indifferent or even hostile to the interests of the poor.

What we find is shocking. Trial judges routinely accept donations from defense attorneys who practice before them. Worse, judges often accept these donations as an apparent “entry fee” from counsel soon after they become eligible for indigent defense appointments. And while donor and non-donor attorneys appear similar in terms of their education and experience, on average, judges assign their donors more than double the number of cases they assign to non-donors. Such assignments are flatly inconsistent with the prescribed rotation or “wheel” assignment system mandated by Texas law.\(^{18}\)

In addition, we find these preferential assignment patterns enable donors to earn on average more than double the total attorneys fees of non-donors. And the total amount of these fees can be quite significant: the average donor earns $31,081 in attorneys fees from her donee judge.\(^{19}\) Put another way, if pay to play exists, then our regression analysis suggests the average defense attorney receives more than a 27-fold “return” on her campaign contributions.\(^{20}\)

More troubling, the apparent quid pro quo that we observe might directly harm indigent defendants. We find that if anything, defense attorneys who donate to judges are less successful than those who don’t in terms of attaining charge reductions, dismissals, and acquittals, or avoiding prison sentences for their clients. These results are not driven solely by observable differences in assigned cases or defendant characteristics, or unobservable differences that remain fixed over time. We suggest that donor attorneys might underperform simply because they take on so many more cases from their donee judges, and hence have less time to spend on each matter.\(^{21}\)

We also present qualitative evidence based on news reports and interviews with practicing attorneys in Texas that suggests the phenomena described here are endemic across the state. Furthermore, we explain why these problems might exist throughout the country, as trial judges in many other states (including California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio, among others) can receive donations from attorneys and control assignments of indigent defense counsel.\(^{22}\)

Some might view our results as yet another nail in the coffin of Gideon—as further proof that America’s grand experiment with indigent defense is a failure, and that societal forces will ensure that it continues to be a failure absent sweeping social and political change. Perhaps this is true. But we argue, more modestly, that our research reveals the more immediate problem is one of misaligned incentives: as practiced today, no one’s interests are truly aligned with those of indigent defendants. Instead, assigned counsel are often financially incentivized to dispose of indigent

\(^{18}\) See infra notes \_\_ and accompanying text.

\(^{19}\) See infra notes \_\_ and accompanying text.

\(^{20}\) To give some perspective on how extraordinary this return is: if you had invested $10,000 in a portfolio that replicated the S&P 500 in March 2009, at the market low during the Great Recession, and sold in July 2019, when the market recently peaked, your portfolio would have grown to $48,708.38—just less than a 5-fold increase. See S&P 500 Periodic Reinvestment Calculator (With Dividends), at https://dqydj.com/sp-500-periodic-reinvestment-calculator-dividends/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2019). Moreover, as we explain later, our return estimates are if anything significantly underestimated, as we have reliable attorney revenue data only from 2014-2018 and not from earlier years. See infra notes \_\_ and accompanying text.

\(^{21}\) See infra notes \_\_ and accompanying text.

\(^{22}\) See infra notes \_\_ and accompanying text.
defense cases as quickly as possible, with as little effort as possible—motives that line up better with zealous prosecutors and docket-conscious judges than with the best interests of poor defendants.

We argue that this “incentive gap” is an underappreciated fault at the heart of the right to counsel. We further explain that while modest reforms to attorney assignment rules and campaign finance regulations might reduce pay to play, they are unlikely on their own to solve the problem or substantially improve the lot of poor defendants absent deeper structural changes that alter attorney incentives.

The next section provides a brief history of indigent defense in the United States, starting before Gideon and moving to present-day. Section III then overviews the three main models of indigent defense in America: assigned counsel, contract, and public defender systems. It further explains how each of these systems creates attorney incentives at odds with those of indigent defendants. This section also provides qualitative evidence on how campaign finance interacts with these assignment systems to further distort attorney incentives and widen the incentive gap.

Section IV turns toward empirics. After describing how the dataset was constructed, the section provides summary statistics, regression specifications, and graphical evidence to show how pay to play is likely influencing indigent defense appointments in Harris County. Section V briefly lays out some policy proposals that seek to eliminate pay to play. It further explains why such proposals are unlikely to be successful or to substantially improve the quality of indigent defense unless they are also accompanied by deeper structural reforms. A short conclusion then follows.

II. The Promise and Failure of Gideon: A Brief History of the Right to Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment

The origins of the right to counsel in the United States begin far before Gideon in 1963. Twelve of the original thirteen colonies declared some form of this right in early versions of their state constitutions, despite English common law denying such a right existed.23 The Supreme Court described this split from the common law in Holden v. Hardy, decided at the turn of the 20th century:

The earlier practice of the common law . . . so far as it deprived him of the assistance of counsel and compulsory process for the attendance of his witnesses, it had not been changed in England. But to the credit of her American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive a doctrine had never obtained a foothold there.24

By the early 20th century, every state “had established the right to have the assistance of counsel similar to that found in the Sixth Amendment”25 at that time and required the appointment of counsel in capital cases.26 Nonetheless, the scope of the right was inconsistent across states, with

26 Id.
one scholar estimating that by the early 1930's approximately half of all states had yet to extend the right to counsel to non-capital cases.27

The calculus on the right to counsel began to shift in 1932 with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Powell v. Alabama*.28 In *Powell*, the Court overturned the conviction of six young men charged with rape on the grounds that they had been denied access to counsel.29 The *Powell* Court found that in capital cases, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right encompassed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.30

This “fundamental fairness” test soon became a part of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court would next apply it in the context of a federal criminal trial in 1938’s *Johnson v. Zerbst*.31 In *Johnson*, two men facing federal counterfeiting charges were denied access to counsel, ultimately being convicted and sentenced.32 In overturning the convictions, the *Johnson* Court definitively established a right to counsel in all federal criminal proceedings.33

Still, the Court was not yet ready to extend the right to counsel further to encompass state proceedings. In *Betts v. Brady*, a defendant charged with a non-capital crime in Maryland state court challenged the court's refusal to appoint him counsel.35 Rather than require counsel to be available for indigent defendants in all state criminal proceedings, the *Betts* Court pointed to the diversity of access to counsel constitutional provisions and statutes as proof that “in the great majority of states, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”36 The *Betts* Court then enumerated a “special circumstances” test as to whether a state had violated a defendant’s due process rights by denying them access to counsel.37

Many state supreme courts and legislatures responded to *Betts* by affirming their support for the right to counsel, and by the late 1950’s, thirty-five states had required counsel be appointed in

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28 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29 *Id.* at 65. After an out-of-state lawyer who had offered to help local counsel refused an appointment to act as counsel for the defendants, the trial judge then appointed all the members of the local bar as counsel but neglected to name an individual lawyer to act in that capacity.
30 *Id.*
31 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
32 *Id.* at 459-60. The District Attorney in the case denied the men’s request for counsel on the grounds that the courts in South Carolina (where the trial occurred) did not appoint counsel unless the defendant was charged with a capital crime.
33 *Id.* at 467 (“Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”).
34 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
35 *Id.* at 456-58.
36 *Id.* at 467.
37 *Id.* at 463-64.
non-capital cases, at least to some degree. This affirmation of the right to counsel belied the Betts Court’s holding that the right was not considered fundamental. And indeed, the Court would revisit that issue just over 20 years later in Gideon v. Wainwright.

In Gideon, just as in Betts, the defendant faced felony charges in state court, this time in Florida. As in Betts, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to provide an attorney when the defendant was unable to hire his own. Reversing their decision in Betts, the Gideon Court unanimously found that the right to counsel was essential to a fair trial in state criminal proceedings, noting: “[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”

Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black framed the issue in terms of resources and incentives for all parties involved, noting that government actions and the behavior of wealthy defendants rendered access to counsel essential for a fair trial:

Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.

Justice Black concluded that the ideals of American government necessitated the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants in state courts:

From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.

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39 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court noted in its decision that 22 states, as amici, argued that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down," and should now be overruled. Id.
40 Id. at 336-37.
41 Id. at 337.
42 Id. at 344.
43 Id.
44 Id.
Gideon was warmly received by the public, inspiring the award-winning book *Gideon's Trumpet.* And in subsequent years, the Court continued to expand the situations in which the right to counsel was deemed necessary, holding that it attaches from the time of indictment to the time of a defendant's first appeal. The Court subsequently extended the right to probation revocation hearings and juvenile delinquency proceedings. Nearly a decade after *Gideon*, the Court ruled that the right to counsel attaches in any criminal case resulting in actual imprisonment, putting to rest many questions about *Gideon*'s scope.

Yet, even the most ardent supporters of *Gideon* acknowledged that significant resources would need to be martialed to ensure the right to counsel was actually robust in practice. In a famous 1965 law review article, Henry Monaghan forewarned the coming tension between the promise of *Gideon* and the practical and logistical problems that might arise: “Gideon's little regiment had no real difficulty in running up its colors, but it is quite apparent that an army—a very large one—must be raised if the victory is to be a lasting one.”

By the time *Gideon’s Trumpet* was turned into a popular television movie starring Henry Fonda in 1980, the shortcomings of that decision had become painfully apparent. Many states had failed to take the steps needed to effectively comply with the ruling. These failures continue today, with many scholars attributing the continued crisis in access to counsel to weaknesses and oversights in *Gideon* itself.

In particular, many scholars argue that a key failure of *Gideon* was that it did not define, let alone mandate, what kind of counsel defendants are entitled to. Neither did it define what states

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45 See Reed, supra note __.
47 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (right to counsel triggered at criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge).
49 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). More recently, the Court has held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be made based on the plea bargaining process. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (defense attorneys have a duty to convey plea bargain offers to defendants); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (prosecutor might be required to reoffer plea if defendant originally rejected it due to ineffective assistance of counsel).
50 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (clarifying that the right to counsel is required whenever a defendant was actually sentenced to prison, but not if a prison sentence was merely authorized under the charging statute); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (suspended prison sentence may not be imposed if defendant lacked an attorney at trial); see also Shaun Ossel-Owusu, *The Sixth Amendment Façade: The Racial Evolution of the Right to Counsel,* 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. __ (2019) (“During this decade, which saw larger criminal procedure reforms, the Court had the most generous approach toward indigent defense.”).
must do to ensure this type of counsel is available for indigent defendants. Put differently, *Gideon* gave states considerable freedom to shirk the large unfunded mandate that the case had created.

These issues were exacerbated by subsequent Court decisions, perhaps most notably *Strickland v. Washington*.*54* There, the Court determined that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can succeed only if there were an initial determination that a defense attorney’s performance was so lacking “that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”*55* Moreover, the defendant must show the ineffectiveness prejudiced him severely enough such that there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the defendant’s case would have been different without the deficient performance of counsel.*56*

Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his *Strickland* dissent that this exacting standard would be hard to meet, since “it is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent.”*57* And he was right: while ineffective assistance of counsel claims are regularly made, they are rarely successful.*58* The end result is that indigent defendants might get stuck with counsel who are not “ineffective,” but whom paying clients would never select.*59*

With ineffective assistance claims largely rendered futile, some sought to remedy the dramatic underfunding of indigent defense through systemic, structural litigation. But the potential for such federal litigation was limited, as federal courts relied on the abstention doctrine to avoid intervening in ongoing state cases.*60* Structural litigation in state courts has been similarly unsuccessful, with courts demanding a showing of prejudice or the existence of a conflict on an

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55 Id. at 687.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 710 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
58 A 2013 analysis found that Supreme Court findings of ineffective assistance of counsel have been virtually non-existent since *Strickland*. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from *Gideon*, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2689 (2013). Professor Chemerinsky was able to identify just two Supreme Court findings of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 25 years following *Gideon*—*Wiggins v. Smith* and *Rompilla v. Beard*, both capital cases. He also noted that the findings in *Wiggins* and *Rompilla* were called into question by the Court’s ruling in *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), which held that evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be presented at federal habeas proceedings. See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that criminal defense attorneys must inform non-citizen defendants of deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
59 As one private criminal defense firm in Texas colorfully (and probably self-servingly) noted on its website, “If you’re appointed a lawyer in a criminal case in Texas, your court-appointed lawyer may be an incompetent hack, or he may be a truly outstanding attorney. Some of the best criminal-defense lawyers in Houston represent indigent defendants . . . By the same token, if you hire a lawyer for a criminal case in Texas, your retained lawyer might be either a fine attorney or a bungler.” See Bennett & Bennett, Court Appointed Lawyers, at https://bennettandbennett.com/about/court-appointed-lawyers/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
individual case-by-case basis from public defenders seeking to remedy funding disparities.\textsuperscript{61} The heightened evidentiary requirements have limited the number of structural indigent defense litigation suits in state courts, with one scholar stating “it is estimated that no more than ten of these suits were filed between 1980 and 2000.”\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{Gideon’s} failures have also been pinned on its inability to change underlying power dynamics and political considerations that adversely affect indigent defendants. In particular, scholars point to asymmetries in monetary support and available resources for prosecutors and indigent defense counsel. Prosecutors work closely with law enforcement agencies, whose job is to investigate in support of prosecution; defense counsel are often left to fend for themselves should they desire to investigate on behalf of their clients.\textsuperscript{63} Prosecutors are afforded large budgets dedicated to investigation; indigent defense attorneys are rarely (if ever) afforded such a luxury.\textsuperscript{64} And some judges rely heavily—perhaps inappropriately—on prosecutors, following their recommendations and even asking prosecutors to write orders for them,\textsuperscript{65} a benefit that is rarely accorded to counsel advocating on behalf of indigent defendants.

The politics of mass incarceration in the decades following \textit{Gideon} have further entrenched the built-in advantages that prosecutors enjoy over defense counsel. While the 1960’s and 1970’s brought only moderate increases in the size of America’s criminal justice system, the “tough-on-crime” 1980’s and 1990’s created a system with an incarceration rate higher than any other industrialized nation.\textsuperscript{66} The demand for indigent defense likewise exploded, financially straining a system that was already starved for resources.

The political battle for indigent defense resources that pitted popular tough-on-crime policies versus poor people accused of crimes was decidedly and expectedly one-sided. As one scholar put it when discussing capital defendants: “The individuals adversely affected by this crisis—those accused of aggravated murder—are the most hated and the least politically powerful in the country, and political actors, including judges, are not highly motivated to make unpopular decisions that would benefit them.”\textsuperscript{67} With political considerations weighing heaviest on publicly elected prosecutors and judges, there was little to gain professionally from insisting on a level playing field.\textsuperscript{68}

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  \item \textsuperscript{61} See Chemerinsky, supra note ___ at 2687 (citing Florida v. Public Defender 12 So. 3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
  \item \textsuperscript{62} See Drinan, supra note ___, at 468.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Id. at 2156. Moreover, discovery is limited in criminal cases, so defendants are also limited in terms of what information they can obtain from prosecutors and what prosecutors are obligated to disclose to defendants. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} See Chemerinsky at 2686 (citing Michelle Alexander, \textit{The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness} (2012)).
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Id. (citing Douglas W. Vick, \textit{Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences}, 43 Burr. L. Rev. 329, 459 (1995)).
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Id. at 2157-58. Some scholarly critiques of \textit{Gideon} also focus on its impact on other criminal procedural rights. See Justin F. Marceau, \textit{Gideon’s Shadow}, 122 YALE L.J. 2482 (2013) (arguing Gideon has been used as a cudgel to curb other procedural rights); Pamela Metzger, \textit{Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon to Restrict Defendants’ Invocation of Adversary Procedures}, 122 YALE L.J. 2550 (demonstrating how Gideon and
\end{itemize}
III. The Incentive Gap in the Right to Counsel

As we have seen, the long history of the right to counsel is largely defined by false hopes and unmet expectations. And as is commonly argued, inadequate funding, tepid political support, and the practical inability of defendants to succeed on most ineffective assistance of counsel claims are important reasons why indigent defense has not evolved in the way that many advocates hoped it would after *Gideon*.

But indigent defense in America doesn’t just suffer from a lack of money or a lack of political support; it also suffers from poor design.\(^{69}\) Indeed, most indigent defense systems are built on a shaky foundation that puts publicly funded defense attorneys at odds with those they are supposed to represent. This incentive gap, in turn, adversely affects the legal representation these defendants receive.\(^{70}\)

In this section, we begin exploring this dynamic. We start by summarizing the different models of indigent defense adopted by various jurisdictions, and then discussing how they distort attorney incentives in different ways. Next, we explain how the relationship between judges and defense attorneys, mediated through the mechanism of campaign finance, exacerbates the incentive gap, thereby further adversely impacting the provision of indigent defense. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence that indigent defense attorneys and trial judges might participate in pay to play in a number of jurisdictions.

A. Background on Indigent Defense Systems

*Gideon* and its progeny famously failed to direct states on how to provide counsel to poor defendants, thereby giving them substantial latitude in crafting indigent defense systems. States are fairly evenly split between administering indigent defense at the local (usually county) level, or at the state level.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{69}\) Strickland have weakened the adversarial process). Others have focused on its failure to adequately protect black defendants. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, *Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel*, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2236 (2013) (arguing the *Gideon* court failed to directly address racial discrimination and this failure portended larger failures to protect the rights of African Americans subject to the Jim Crow system of criminal justice). Still others suggest *Gideon* might actually be counterproductive to the plight of the poor in the justice system. See Butler, *supra* note __, at __ (“Poor people lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice, poor people are losers. Prison is designed for them. This is the real crisis of indigent defense. *Gideon* obscures this reality, and in this sense stands in the way of the political mobilization that will be required to transform criminal justice.”); see also John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, *Gideon Exceptionalism?*, 122 YALE L.J. 2126 (2013) (attempting to reconcile the state of indigent defense in America with the general reverence for *Gideon* by declaring it to be both a “shining city on a hill” . . . and a sham.

\(^{70}\) Of course, these phenomena might be interrelated—for example, some poor design choices in indigent defense systems might be deliberately made by those looking to render the system impotent. And a lack of funding is one way to make sure that poor design leads to worse outcomes.


Jurisdictions also are split among three different models of representation: assigned counsel, contract, and public defender.\textsuperscript{72} Each of these models is commonly used in the United States. Public defender systems are used most often in larger cities, whereas assigned counsel systems are used in the most jurisdictions overall, particularly in rural parts of the country. We describe each of these systems below.

1. Assigned Counsel

Assigned counsel systems rely on private attorneys to represent indigent defendants.\textsuperscript{73} The oldest model is the “Ad Hoc Assigned Counsel” system,\textsuperscript{74} where “appointment of counsel is generally made by the court, without benefit of a formal list or rotation method and without specific qualification criteria for attorneys.”\textsuperscript{75} Popular in smaller, more rural jurisdictions, ad hoc assigned counsel systems are frequently criticized “for fostering patronage and lacking control over the experience level of qualified attorneys.”\textsuperscript{76}

Other iterations of assigned counsel systems address some, but not all, of the ad hoc model’s shortcomings. One such system is sometimes referred to as the “wheel” system, in which “private attorneys, acting as independent contractors and compensated with public funds, are individually appointed from a list of qualified attorneys using a system of rotation to provide legal representation and service to a particular indigent defendant accused of a crime or juvenile offense.”\textsuperscript{77} Wheel and ad hoc assigned counsel systems generally require attorneys to petition the court for any case-related expenses, including funds for investigation, expert witnesses, and other litigation costs. These expenses often requires prior approval from the court and are limited by a maximum, court-determined payout.\textsuperscript{78}

The last distinct form of assigned counsel system is known as a managed or coordinated assigned counsel program. Rather than let the judge select an indigent defense attorney, this decision is left to an independent body, such as “a governmental entity, nonprofit corporation, or bar association operating under a written agreement with a county for the purpose of appointing counsel to indigent defendants.”\textsuperscript{79} Such systems are the rarest of assigned counsel systems, largely due to the additional administrative burdens that accompany them.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at 32.
\textsuperscript{73} Id.
\textsuperscript{74} Id. at 33.
\textsuperscript{75} Id.
\textsuperscript{76} Id.
\textsuperscript{77} \textsc{Tx Indigent Def. Comm.}, \textit{Primer on Managed Assigned Counsel Programs} (Sept. 2017), at http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/57815/tidc_primer2017.pdf, p.3; see also Scott Ehlers, Texas Indigent Defense Commission: “Challenges of Implementing Fair Defense Act Requirements & Indigent Defense Grant Opportunities” (Aug. 10, 2018). As discussed in more detail below, Harris County, Texas, where we conduct our empirical analysis, is supposed to be a “wheel” jurisdiction. \textit{See infra} notes \textsuperscript{78} and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{78} Spangenberg, \textit{supra} note \textsuperscript{76} at 33.
\textsuperscript{79} \textsc{Tx Indigent Def. Comm.}, \textit{Primer on Managed Assigned Counsel Programs}, \textit{supra}.
\textsuperscript{80} See Spangenberg, \textit{supra} note \textsuperscript{76} at 33.
2. Contract Attorneys

Contract programs differ from assigned counsel systems in that the jurisdiction "enters into contracts with private attorneys, law firms, bar associations, or non-profit organizations to provide representation to indigent defendants."\(^{81}\) Still, in practice, many modern contract systems operate like assigned counsel systems, with the most significant difference being that there is no rotation requirement among attorneys in a contract system.\(^{82}\)

An early model of contract attorney systems was the fixed price contract model, where "the contracting lawyer, law firm, or bar association agrees to accept an undetermined number of cases within an agreed upon contract period . . . for a single flat fee."\(^{83}\) In a fixed-price contract model, the contracting entities are responsible for the cost of investigation and expert witnesses in all the cases, even if the caseload in the jurisdiction was higher than expected for the term of the contract.\(^{84}\) Fixed-price contract models are frequently faulted for their failure to take into account the time that the attorney is expected to spend representing indigent clients, the competency of the attorney, the complexity of the case, or the lack of support costs provided to the attorney.\(^{85}\)

Another older model of contract attorney program is known as the fixed-fee-per-case contract model, in which lawyers are paid by the case rather than contracting to provide an unlimited number of cases for a flat fee.\(^{86}\) In this model, funds for investigation, expert witnesses, and support services are all included in the contract.\(^{87}\) Just as with the fixed price model, the fixed-fee-per-case model has been criticized for its lack of quality control.\(^{88}\) Nonetheless, jurisdictions are often willing to overlook the shaky legal and ethical footing of a contract attorney system to reap the benefit of being able to project costs by limiting the amount of money apportioned in each contract.\(^{89}\)

3. Public Defenders

Finally, public defender systems are probably the best-known model of indigent defense provision. Such systems employ staff attorneys who are paid a fixed salary to provide representation to poor defendants.\(^{90}\) More precisely, public defender systems are often defined as "a governmental entity or nonprofit corporation that: 1) operates under written agreement with a county rather than an individual judge or court; 2) uses public funds; and 3) provides legal representation and services to indigent defendants accused of a crime or juvenile offense."\(^{91}\)

\(^{81}\) Id. at 34.
\(^{82}\) Tx INDIGENT DEF. COMM., Primer on Managed Assigned Counsel Programs, supra at 3.
\(^{83}\) Id.
\(^{84}\) Id.
\(^{85}\) Id., citing State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984), where the Arizona Supreme Court found that the fixed-price contract models used in several Arizona Counties were unconstitutional.
\(^{86}\) Id.
\(^{87}\) Id.
\(^{88}\) Id.
\(^{89}\) Id.
\(^{90}\) Spangenberg at 36.
The first public defender program started in Los Angeles in 1913, but the model did not gain widespread popularity until after Gideon and after national studies were published that supported this approach in the 1970's. Unfortunately, the increased demand for indigent defense services beginning in the 1980's means that many public defenders carry overwhelmingly large caseloads, sometimes resulting in ineffective representation.

In addition, some jurisdictions use public defenders alongside assigned counsel or contract attorneys. This might be, for example, because there are insufficient numbers of public defenders who are able to handle the flow of indigent defense cases. In some instances, public defenders handle only a small fraction of such cases; as discussed in more detail below, Harris County, Texas, is an example of one such jurisdiction.

**B. Different Systems, Different Incentives**

Apart from being poor and typically young and male, indigent defendants differ from one another in myriad ways, such as in terms of their backgrounds, criminal histories, employment and family status, risk preferences, and crimes for which they are charged. Still, most defendants, whether poor or not, invariably share some predictable goals. Clearly most would like to avoid a criminal conviction and punishment; failing that, they want to minimize any punishment they receive, whether in terms of prison, probation, or fines. And like most people, indigent defendants would like to avoid pre-trial detention regardless of outcome.

Defense attorneys who represent indigent defendants also share some predictable goals. Some of those goals might align with those of their clients—for example, a desire to win a case or to vindicate the rights of the innocent who are wrongfully accused of a crime. Other goals, however, might not be so compatible. This in turn might open up an “incentive gap” that causes attorneys to behave in ways that are detrimental to their clients.

This incentive gap is shaped by the particular indigent defense system in which attorneys operate. As such, how this system is designed might affect, among other things: how many cases attorneys choose to take on; how much time and resources attorneys spend on each case they are assigned; when and whether an attorney recommends settling a case to a client and on what terms; and the quality of lawyer who chooses to participate in such a system in the first place. We explore these issues in more detail below.

1. **Caseload Incentives for Assigned Counsel and Contract Attorneys**

First, and perhaps most importantly, the design of an indigent defense system can affect attorneys’ incentives when it comes to the size of their caseloads. In all assigned counsel and many

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92 Spangenberg at 36.
93 Id. at 36-37.
94 See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, *How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect Of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes*, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (one in five murder defendants in Philadelphia were randomly assigned a public defender; the rest received assigned counsel).
95 See Schwall, *supra* note __, at 553 (recognizing that “[t]he payment system and related incentive structure can have a major effect on an attorney's behavior, and this impact is somewhat predictable.”).
contract attorney systems, payments to an attorney typically bear some relation to the number of cases that the attorney is assigned. The payment might be, for example, a flat fee for each case that is assigned, a flat fee for each court appearance or day worked on a case, or an hourly fee for time worked on a case. Such systems often include caps on the maximum amount an attorney can be paid on a particular matter.

Consider first a jurisdiction in which an attorney is paid a flat fee for each case he is assigned, as is done in some assigned counsel and contract attorney systems. If the flat fee is too low to justify taking a case—such as, for example, if the attorney has more profitable outside options for her time—then the attorney will choose not to take the case. But if the flat fee is large enough, we can immediately see that the attorney will have an incentive to take on a large number of cases, since each case adds to his revenue without significantly increasing costs. By contrast, working more intensely on any one particular case gives the attorney no additional revenue, since he is being compensated a fixed amount regardless of his effort or the case’s outcome. So we might expect paying attorneys a flat fee per case would push them toward large caseloads for which they exert little effort on any one case. In addition, we might expect attorneys to settle cases quickly, since additional time spent on a case is just wasted from a financial perspective.

Note a paradox that emerges here: on the surface, it might seem that the large number of cases assigned to these attorneys is the primary reason why they are unable to spend much time or exert much effort on any one case. But the real reason these attorneys are overextended is that they have chosen to accept an overload of cases in the first place. In this setting, it is not a lack of funds but the poor design of the indigent defense system itself that is driving the dysfunction.

While the per-case payment scheme might be an obvious example of how a large incentive gap might open up between attorney and client, other payment schemes introduce distortions in less obvious ways. For example, consider when attorneys are paid based on the number of days they spend on a case. This is, for example, how assigned counsel in Harris County, Texas, are paid, as demonstrated in a fee table for an actual case, shown in Figure 1 below. We can see the attorney in this case was paid $125/day for each court appearance, regardless of how long he actually spent in court on the case itself (or regardless of how many other cases he might have handled on those same days). Those five court appearances entitled the attorney to a total of $625 in attorneys fees.

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96 In this example, and the others that follow, assume that the underlying cases are otherwise identical and that an attorney is motivated largely, if not exclusively, by financial gain. That is, the attorney seeks to maximize the total revenue she earns net of costs across all indigent defense cases she takes on. Attorneys in the real world are of course not one-dimensional like this; nonetheless, our empirical analysis suggests attorneys do respond to financial incentives, indicating the profit motive is an important determinant of attorney behavior.

97 This assumes the cost of working on a case goes up linearly as well; if costs increase in a non-linear manner, then the attorney will eventually reach a point where adding an additional case will be more costly than the revenue she earns from it. The general point still holds, however, that the attorney will have an incentive to take on more cases until she reaches that point.
At first glance, a pay-per-day system might seem like it benefits clients, since an attorney has an incentive to spend many days on each case, thereby increasing total wages. Nonetheless, this incentive does not necessarily help a defendant for at least two reasons.

First, like the system where attorneys are paid by the case, attorneys under this system still earn more money if they maximize the number of cases they take on. This, once again, leads to concerns about defense attorneys choosing to accept an excessive workload.

Second, a daily payment system encourages attorneys to “touch” as many case files as possible in a single day, to ensure they are eligible to be paid for that day. But the amount of work they spent on each case might be minimal. The optimal strategy for an attorney seeking to maximize revenues and to minimize effort is to barely do any work on a case on any given day, but to spread this minimal work out over many days. Again, this does not work to the benefit of indigent defendants. In fact, it could even be detrimental to a defendant who is incarcerated while awaiting trial: not only does the attorney have little incentive to spend quality time on a defendant’s case, but now she has an incentive to drag the case out while her client languishes in jail.

An hourly payment system would seem preferable to these two alternatives. Here, an attorney is paid based on the amount of time she spends on a case. There is, at first glance, no incentive to take on more cases—you can spend more time on the same case and earn the same
marginal revenue as you would by taking on a new one. It might even be better to work more on an existing case, since there are fixed costs in picking up a new matter that might make it more onerous than working an additional hour on a case that you’re already familiar with.

Again, in practice, this system does not work as well as one might hope. While in theory an hourly system would incentivize attorneys to put in more effort on a particular case, there are typically caps on what an attorney can charge for that case. Once an attorney reaches that cap, she has little incentive to put in more work on that case and instead gains more revenue by seeking out fresh cases. Hence, in practice, defense attorneys in assigned counsel systems still have incentives to maximize their caseloads even when they are paid by the hour.

2. Caseload Incentives for Public Defenders

One might view these distortions as proof that the best way to provide indigent defense is through a pure public defender system for all indigent defendants. Unlike assigned counsel systems, salaries for a public defender do not depend on the number of cases they are assigned; hence, from a financial perspective, there is no incentive to take on an excessive number of cases. And there is some empirical evidence that suggests public defenders do, in fact, outperform assigned counsel in terms of outcomes for criminal defendants.

Unfortunately, public defenders must deal with a different set of forces that also push their incentives away from those of their clients. While public defenders have no financial incentive to take on additional cases, they often have little control over the number of cases they are assigned. If a public defender’s office is understaffed—as is invariably true in jurisdictions across the United States—then the supply of public defenders is insufficient to meet the influx of indigent criminal defendants who need representation. Faced with a flood of cases, public defenders are forced to apportion their time among those cases. And once again, that creates pressure to dispose of

98 There is some empirical evidence to support this point. See Schwall, supra note __, at ___ (showing that South Carolina attorneys put in less effort after a shift from hourly payments to a flat-fee system).
cases quickly—or at least quicker and with less substantive investigation than if time were not a worry.¹⁰¹

That public defenders are not immune from such time pressures has not gone unnoticed by commentators and scholars.¹⁰² Notably, the American Bar Association (ABA) has addressed the issue head on,¹⁰³ stating explicitly in a report on the matter that “defender organizations, individual defenders, assigned counsel or contractors for services . . . must take such steps as may be appropriate to reduce their pending or projected caseloads, including the refusal of further appointments” when they find accepting new cases or continuing with old cases “will lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of professional obligations.”¹⁰⁴

3. Private Attorneys

Now contrast the incentives of publicly funded attorneys with those of private attorneys—lawyers who represent private-paying clients. The two primary models by which private attorneys are paid are through up-front fees, in which the attorney asks a prospective client to pre-pay for criminal defense representation, and a retainer system in which the client pays money up front into escrow, with funds deducted from the account and transferred to the attorney as she racks up hours on the defendant’s case. The pre-payment model is commonly used for lower stakes or more routine cases; the retainer model is commonly used for more complex criminal cases.

The pre-payment model is like the per-case payment model described for assigned counsel; hence, private counsel have an incentive to take on a large number of cases just like assigned counsel do in that setting. The retainer model does not include this kind of distortion, since the attorney is paid for each hour worked regardless of which case she works on.¹⁰⁵

Private attorneys, like most assigned counsel, have significant control over the number of cases they accept. But unlike assigned counsel, private attorneys do not face the same financial incentives to take on an overwhelming number of cases. This is because private attorneys typically operate in a market with other competing defense attorneys.

¹⁰¹ Worse, some have argued that given this excessive caseload, implicit bias may cause public defenders to “triage” their caseload in ways that hurt stigmatized groups such as black defendants. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013).

¹⁰² Professor David Luban vividly captures the setting in which most public defenders and panel attorneys operate: “a world of lawyers for whom no defense at all, rather than aggressive defense or even desultory defense, is the norm; a world of minuscule acquittal rates; a world where advocacy is rare and defense investigation virtually nonexistent; a world where lawyers spend minutes, rather than hours, with their clients; a world in which individualized scrutiny is replaced by the indifferent mass-processing of interchangeable defendants.” See David Luban, Are Criminal Defendants Different? 91 MICH L. REV. 1729 (1993).


¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., id. Standard 5-5. As noted in its report, the ABA intentionally used the word “must” in referring to the need to take appropriate action when caseloads become excessive, rather than the word “should,” which is used for all of the remaining standards from the same chapter. Id. at 38. ABA Standard 5-5 has largely remained unchanged since it was first issued in 1980, though the issue might be revisited in future ABA releases. Id. at 37

¹⁰⁵ Of course, the attorney might have an incentive to overcharge in this setting by working maximally on tasks that are “easiest,” thereby minimizing effort but that maximizing revenue.
If a private attorney fleeces a client, or attains bad results for him, this might adversely affect her reputation and future clients might be less likely to hire that attorney.\(^{106}\) To the extent the market serves as a disciplining force, it constrains private attorneys from acting too far out of line from their clients’ interest. Since attorneys who are overloaded cannot represent their clients as effectively as those are not, this market force constrains the number of cases that private attorneys are likely to take on.\(^{107}\)

By contrast, no such market force exists to discipline counsel in indigent defense cases, whether assigned, contract, or public defender. Since indigent defendants are told who their lawyer is rather than given the ability to select who should represent them, they are typically at the whim or whomever is chosen by a court or independent body as their representative. And as we shall see below, that attorney might be far from randomly chosen and instead be determined based on financial forces that have little regard for a defendant’s well-being or best interests.

C. The Incentive Gap Magnified: Campaign Finance and Pay to Play

As we have seen, assigned counsel and some contract attorneys have financial incentives to amass large numbers of indigent defense cases in order to maximize their revenues. But this can happen, of course, only if the indigent defense system assigns them those cases in the first place. In theory, we would expect a well-functioning system to limit the number of appointments that assigned counsel can accept. While attorneys would still have incentives to “max out” this limit, if the ceiling is set low enough, then presumably the attorneys would have sufficient time to devote to each of their cases (assuming they were inclined to do this in the first place).

The assignment system fails, however, if counsel can exert control over how many cases they are assigned. And unfortunately, this appears to be happening with regularity in many assigned counsel systems. Anecdotal evidence we have collected suggests indigent defense counsel often “buy” case assignments by providing campaign donations to assigning judges. In this section, we describe this evidence, which comprises news articles and interviews we have conducted with attorneys in Texas and other states. Campaign finance appears to be a tool that magnifies the incentive gap in these jurisdictions.

1. Attorney Donations and Indigent Defense in Texas

Harris County, Texas, has struggled with indigent defense case assignments for over two decades. Then-State Senator Rodney Ellis, now County Commissioner for Precinct 1 in Harris County, notes a common refrain among judges during this time: “Judges who will remain nameless...
still try and tell me that the judge picking the lawyer is better [than a statewide public defender system]. . . because they pick people who are capable. How do you say that with a straight face?"

Attorneys practicing in Harris County echo Ellis’ question about the efficacy and ethics that underlie indigent appointments there. In 2015, Houston criminal defense attorney, Robert Fickman, described one of the ways that attorneys seeking appointments curry favor with the judges who assign them cases:

There’s a certain number of court-appointed lawyers who appear to be appointed primarily for their ability to move the docket. The trade-off is that the judge is appointing Lawyer X to lots of cases, and in return for the appointments, Lawyer X is moving those cases, which meets the judge’s objective.\(^{109}\)

Sometimes the quid pro quo is even more explicit. Drew Willey, a criminal defense attorney who practices in Houston and nearby Galveston County, told us how he witnessed pay to play first hand while working as a new lawyer under a retired judge who took many felony appointments in Harris County:

A few months into working on his cases, [the attorney] told us that he’d be charging us a monthly fee out of our hourly pay to donate to [the] judge’s campaign funds. He said these donations were necessary to keep his lights on and keep allowing him to pay us. Me and one colleague were abhorred enough to speak up. We approached this attorney separately, strongly voicing our opposition to this systematized pay for play conflict. He told me and that one colleague that we were exempt from being charged his donation fee, but continued to make the donations, openly admitting it was so that he could continue to get more appointments in those courts. . . . [After I left his office,] I know the pay for play continued, because that attorney later, in passing, told me that the elections of new judges meant that he "lost" some courts and had to begin donating more to different judges in order to keep getting appointments.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{108}\) See Neena Satija, *How Judicial Conflicts of Interest Are Denying Poor Texans Their Right to an Effective Lawyer*, TEXAS TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2019), at https://www.texastribune.org/2019/08/19/unchecked-power-texas-judges-indigent-defense/, (last visited Sep. 26, 2019). A recent time-use study showed that Texas indigent defense attorneys spend remarkably little time on cases they are assigned. Dottie Carmichael, Austin Clemens, Heather Caspers, Miner P. Marchbanks, Ill, & Steve Wood, *Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads*, TEXAS A&M PUB. POL. RES. INST. (Jan. 2015) (conducting time-use study of Texas indigent defense attorneys and finding the following average disposal times for these classes of cases: Class B misdemeanor (4.7 hours); Class A misdemeanor (7.6 hours); state jail felonies (10.8 hours); third-degree felonies (12.9 hours); second-degree felonies (15.2 hours) and first-degree felonies (22.3 hours)). The report suggested that any of the following would comprise a full-time caseload that attorneys should not exceed: "236 Class B Misdemeanors, 216 Class A Misdemeanors, 174 State Jail Felonies, 144 Third Degree Felonies, 105 Second Degree Felonies, or 77 First Degree Felonies." Id.

\(^{109}\) Emily Deprang, *Poor Judgment*, TEXAS OBS. (Oct. 12, 2015) https://www.texasobserver.org/poor-judgment/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019); see also Bright, *supra* note __, at ___ ("Some judges appear more concerned about cost containment and administrative efficiency than insuring a zealous defense.").

\(^{110}\) Statement of Drew Willey, (Sept. 26, 2019) (on file with authors).
Willey also reports that the prevalence of pay to play adversely affects the quality of representation that indigent defendants receive:

[T]he disparities [in caseloads among attorneys] are too obvious that pay to play is continuing in some very specific courts. This level of corruption leads to human lives being forgotten in jail without anyone to stand up for them. We’ve handled cases in which these overloaded attorneys have not even visited their clients for 6-10 months at a time—pretrial.\(^\text{111}\)

These types of behavior are not limited to Harris County’s felony courts. A 2008 \textit{Houston Chronicle} analysis of the juvenile appointment system found, “A relatively small group of attorneys, some of them old friends and all financial backers of judges handing out work, regularly receives close to half of all the tax-funded appointments to represent the poor in the juvenile courts.”\(^\text{112}\) These concerns continue today, as a recent report indicates that “a handful of private attorneys—some of whom happened to be generous contributors to judges’ campaign coffers—got more than 300 [case assignments]” while “juvenile public defenders received fewer and fewer appointments over several years, so that in 2017 they each had an average load of 140 juvenile cases, which is below the office’s imposed limit of 200 . . .”\(^\text{113}\)

In addition, there have been reports of similar instances of apparent pay to play occurring in other counties across the state. For example, in Bexar County, the fourth most populous county in Texas and home to nearly 2 million people, a recent \textit{San Antonio Express-News} editorial decried the phenomenon of attorneys contributing to judges handing out appointments, calling it “a dynamic that raises inherent questions of fairness in the justice system and undermines public trust.”\(^\text{114}\)

Campaign finance was similarly linked to a dysfunctional indigent defense system in Travis County, home to the state capital of Austin.\(^\text{115}\) When a Travis County judge was asked how a lawyer she appointed to over 400 cases in a year could possibly give his clients a full defense, the judge replied, “That’s a lot of cases . . . Lawyers have a personal responsibility. They know what they can handle. Do we really need to tell a lawyer, ‘Don’t do that’?”\(^\text{116}\)

\(^\text{111}\) Id.
\(^\text{113}\) Satija, \textit{supra} note __.
\(^\text{115}\) See Satija, \textit{supra} note __.
2. Attorney Donations in Trial Courts Elsewhere

In recent years, other states have become increasingly aware that campaign finance might affect their trial courts’ decision-making. Just across the Red River from Texas in Oklahoma, a controversy has emerged over attorneys donating to civil trial court judges that they practice before, with one review showing that the majority of donations to district judge candidates in 2018 came from thousands of individual attorneys. Claiming the system puts judicial candidates in a “weird position,” Oklahoma defense attorney and 2018 district judicial candidate Misty Fields went so far as to send a letter to attorneys in the area “asking for their vote, but not for ‘for public support of any kind.” Her letter notwithstanding, Fields ultimately ended up accepting donations from attorneys, claiming it was a necessary part of the campaign:

I would be remiss to say money doesn’t matter . . . You can only do so much with free social media and you can only knock on so many [doors]. It’s a sad part of it, but you need some money if you want to blanket an area with signs or newspaper ads.

A recent controversy between a prosecutor and a district court judge has exposed how Oklahoma’s criminal trial judges might be at risk as well. In September 2019, prosecutor David Prater publicly requested that District Judge Kendra Coleman recuse herself for failing to disclose her campaign donors, claiming that the judge repeatedly showed favoritism toward donor attorneys.

More generally, Texas’s indigent defense system has been subject to large-scale critiques for decades. In 2000, the nonprofit Texas Appleseed undertook a statewide survey on indigent defense practices. Its final report, released in December 2000, contained 27 findings about Texas’ indigent defense system at the time, including: a “complete absence of uniformity in standards and quality of representation among the indigent defense systems” in the Texas counties surveyed by Appleseed; the “unfettered discretion given to judges over attorney selection and compensation creates the potential and appearance of a conflict of interest”; and “costs per capita for indigent defense were approximately $4.65, making Texas near the bottom of all 50 states for indigent defense funding.”

Following the issuance of Appleseed’s report on indigent defense, released in December 2000 on the eve of the legislative session, the Texas Legislature passed the Fair Defense Act in 2001, which required officials in all Texas counties to adopt written procedures for delivery of indigent defense services in a timely and fair manner. The legislation created a state body to administer policies and funding across the state, the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, which was renamed the Texas Indigent Defense Commission in 2011.

Prior scholarly analysis of the impact of campaign finance on judicial decision-making has focused almost exclusively on the state Supreme Court level. See supra note __ and accompanying text. See also Sue Bell Cobb, I Was Alabama’s Top Judge. I’m Ashamed by What I Had to Do to Get There. POLITICO Mag., March/April 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/judicial-elections-fundraising-115503 (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (lamenting the role campaign finance played in her election to the bench, and admitting, “[T]hose of us seeking judicial office sometimes find ourselves doing things that feel awfully unsavory.”); see also id. (“Donors want clarity, certainty even, that the judicial candidates they support view the world as they do and will rule accordingly. To them, the idea of impartial and fair judges is an abstraction. They want to know that the investments they make by donating money to a candidate will yield favorable results.”).


Id.

Id. Misty Fields would ultimately lose her district court election to Shawn S. Taylor, who got 55.2% of the vote compared to her 44.8%.
their clients in her court. Highlighting the need for public trust in the courts, Mr. Prater condemned the judge’s lack of transparency:

For each day this Court sits in judgment of parties appearing before it, no one—neither the parties, their counsel, nor the public—can be assured that the decisions being rendered have not been influenced by campaign contributions or other circumstances that this Court is actively endeavoring to conceal.

Despite such stories, many Oklahoman attorneys and the judges they donate to remain unconvinced that the system needs to change. For example, George Gibbs, an Oklahoma attorney who donated to a judge before whom he had an open civil case, notes, “Our state judges are more impartial, have better temperaments and are more fair than federal judges. No judge is going to risk their career, their standing and their reputation over a donation.”

Michigan, too, appears to be susceptible to links between campaign finance and trial court decision-making. A 2016 report on Michigan’s indigent defense system found that court-appointed attorneys do very little work on their cases, with records indicating that in nearly a quarter of criminal cases in a three-county area, an indigent criminal defendant met their attorney for the first time at their first court appearance. The same report also found that court-appointed attorneys continued to donate thousands of dollars to the campaigns of circuit court judges. David Carroll, executive director of the Sixth Amendment Center, described how Michigan’s system impacts indigent criminal defendants: “[Indigent defendants] may get a lawyer in name only, because that person has so many cases or has financial conflicts of interest. It’s as if you’re going into court with no lawyer at all.”

These states aren’t the only ones struggling to manage the impact of campaign finance on their trial court systems. In 2004, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants created a comprehensive report on the state of the right to counsel, to commemorate Gideon’s 40th

122 Id.
123 See Brown, supra note __.
125 Id.

It isn't the rich white people who are being dragged through this system...If you cared about 'Brown v. Board of Education' and if you cared about the way we treated minorities in this society and you thought separate but equal was a bad thing, you should care about the criminal justice system because that's where separate and not equal seems to be the pervasive concept.
See Hinkley & Mencarini, supra note __.
anniversary. Relying on the public testimony of attorneys from around the country, the Committee found, “In many localities, the selection and payment of counsel is still under the control of judges or other elected officials instead of an independent authority as recommended by national standards.” It continued:

Accordingly, lawyers must depend on judges to approve their compensation claims, as well as requests for expert or investigative services. Attorneys may be removed from court-appointed lists if they apply for fees considered by judges to be too high, creating a disincentive to spend adequate time on a case. In some places, elected judges award court appointments as favors to attorneys who support their campaigns for reelection.

There is no reason to believe the situation has improved since then. In late 2014, the ABA identified 39 states in which judges are elected, either in partisan, non-partisan or retention elections. Thirty of those states ban judges from personally soliciting funds for campaigns, though many of them allow campaign committees to solicit on their behalf and most allow judges to accept unsolicited funds.

Moreover, many other states that elect trial judges permit judicial candidates to solicit campaign funds, or have bans with significant loopholes that would allow candidates to indirectly receive (and know they have received) donations from attorneys who appear before them. These

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128 Id. at 39.

129 Id. (emphasis added)

130 Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Bar Association in Support of Respondent, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, No. 13-1499, U.S. Supreme Court (brief in support of the Florida Bar, whose ban on personal solicitation by judicial candidates had been challenged as violated the First Amendment) (hereinafter, “ABA Brief”).

131 For example, Alaska judges stand for retention election and are prohibited from personal solicitation, though candidates may create campaign contribution committees, which “are not prohibited from soliciting and accepting reasonable campaign contributions and public support from lawyers.” See Ala. Canon 5(C)(3) (cited in ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 2a-3a). Some states indicate that judges should not be informed who contributed to the campaign committee. See, e.g., Colorado Canon 4.3; Idaho Canon 5(C)(2); Minnesota Rule 4.4(B)(3); New Mexico Rule 21-402(E) (campaign committees, but not judges, may solicit lawyers with matters pending; committee must not disclose source of campaign funds to the candidate). Cf. Louisiana Canon 7(A)(6); id. Comment [2] to Canon 7 (“A judge or judicial candidate is prohibited from personally soliciting or personally accepting campaign contributions, but is not prohibited from knowing the identities of his or her campaign contributors.”).
states include Alabama, California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, and Ohio. Each of these states also relies,

Alabama judges are elected and “strongly discouraged [but not prohibited] from personally soliciting campaign contributions. It is highly recommended that a candidate establish committees of responsible persons to solicit and accept campaign contributions, to manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate’s campaign, and to obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such committees may solicit and accept campaign contributions and public support from lawyers.” See Ala. Canon 7(B)(4)(a) (cited in ABA Brief, Appendix 2a).

Cal. Canon 5(b)(4) (emphasis added) provides:

In judicial elections, judges may solicit campaign contributions or endorsements for their own campaigns or for other judges and attorneys who are candidates for judicial office. Judges are permitted to solicit such contributions and endorsements from anyone, including attorneys and other judges, except that a judge shall not solicit campaign contributions or endorsements from California state court commissioners, referees, court-appointed arbitrators, hearing officers, and retired judges serving in the Assigned Judges Program, or from California state court personnel. In soliciting campaign contributions or endorsements, a judge shall not use the prestige of judicial office in a manner that would reasonably be perceived as coercive.

Id. See also ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 4a.

“Georgia judges are elected in non-partisan elections and may personally solicit campaign contributions and publicly stated support.” See ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 6a. But see Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (encouraging judges to establish campaign committees).

A judicial district may choose to have elected trial judges, and judges may solicit campaign contributions. See ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 8a (noting Kansas’s prohibition on personally soliciting campaign contributions was struck down in Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122-JAR, 2008 WL 8906379 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2008)).

Kentucky elects judges in non-partisan elections, and the Sixth Circuit previously found Kentucky’s solicitation clause unconstitutional. See ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 8a (citing In Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010)).

“Trial court judges are elected in non-partisan elections. The Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit candidates from personally soliciting or accepting contributions.” See ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 9a.

Missouri judges face retention elections. Missouri Rule 2-4.2(B) states: “[W]hile candidate[s] shall not solicit in person campaign funds from persons likely to appear before the judge[, they] may make a written campaign solicitation for campaign funds of any person or group, including any person or group likely to appear before the judge.” See also ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 11a.

Montana judges are elected in non-partisan elections and not prohibited from personally soliciting campaign contributions. See ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 12a.

Nevada judges are elected in Nevada in nonpartisan elections. Nevada Rule 4.2(B)(4) permits judges who are opposed in an election to personally solicit and accept campaign contributions. See also ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 12a.

Judges are elected in publicly funded, non-partisan elections in North Carolina. Canon 7(B)(4) states a judge or candidate may “personally solicit campaign funds and request public support from anyone for his own campaign or, alternatively, and in addition thereto, authorize or establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the solicitation and expenditure of campaign funds.” See also ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 14a.

Judicial candidates in general elections are placed on a non-partisan ballot in Ohio. The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits candidates and judges from personally soliciting campaign contributions in Rule 4.4(A), but numerous exceptions to this rule would make it easy for attorneys who wish to donate to do so. For example, Ohio permits a judicial candidate to make “a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of twenty or more individuals,” “sign letters soliciting campaign contributions if the letters are for distribution by the judicial candidate’s campaign committee and the letters direct contributions to be sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial candidate,” and “make a general request for campaign contributions via an electronic communication that is in text format if contributions are directed to be
at least to some extent, on assigned counsel systems.143 Hence, when considering this list of states in addition to Texas, Oklahoma, and Michigan,144 we can see campaign finance might increase the gap between attorney and defendant interests in judicial systems across multiple states, collectively home to tens of millions of Americans.

IV. The Incentive Gap and Pay to Play: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Finance and Indigent Defense in Harris County, Texas

In this section, we provide empirical support for the claim that campaign finance exacerbates the incentive gap in the right to counsel. Using detailed data from Harris County, Texas, we empirically analyze the relationship between attorney donations to elected judges and appointments to indigent defense cases. Our results are strongly consistent with the qualitative evidence we presented above: judges appoint their donors to a disproportionate number of cases, consistent with a system in which pay to play occurs with regularity. Moreover, if anything, donor attorneys appear to underperform for their clients relative to non-donors, even after controlling for case and defendant characteristics.

We begin by explaining in detail how judicial elections and court appointments work in Harris County. Next, we describe how we constructed our linked dataset, which is the first large-scale dataset that connects criminal court data with donations to trial court judges. We then jump into the empirics.

A. Background on Harris County

1. Courts and Judicial Elections

The State of Texas has 254 counties, more than any other state. This translates into 252 County Courts of Law that primarily handle misdemeanor offenses in 92 counties and 450 District Courts for felony offenses. Texas’s court system is said to be “designed to discourage the

sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial candidate.” See also ABA Brief, supra note __, at Appendix 15a.

143 For instance, consider California. See, e.g., Gidennonat50.org, California, at: http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/california/#state-independence (“California provides very little funding and almost no oversight over right to counsel services at all levels: trial and appellate . . . . Most smaller, rural counties provide services through flat-fee contracts with private firms or with individual attorneys for primary and for conflict services. There is no oversight board for any trial-level system in any California county. With a few notable exceptions, most right to counsel systems are overseen by the county’s legislative board.”).

144 Interestingly, both Oklahoma and Michigan appear to have judicial ethics codes that prohibit judges from personally soliciting campaign contributions. See Oklahoma Rule 4.1(A)(8); Michigan Canon 7(B)(2)(a); compare with Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4(D)(1) (permits judges to solicit “funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by law.”). That media reports suggest that judges, in fact, do receive campaign contributions from attorneys who practice in their court calls into question the efficacy of such bans in terms of preventing pay to play.


146 Id.
accumulation of power,"¹⁴⁷ resulting in a system with "numerous elected officials at every level, for every branch, [that has] shaped the state's unstructured approach to indigent defense."¹⁴⁸

Our data come from Harris County, home to over 4.65 million people and the third most populous county in the United States.¹⁴⁹ The county comprises all of the City of Houston and a few major suburbs, most notably Pasadena, Texas. Here we focus on the 22 District Criminal Courts located in Harris County, which handle all state felony cases.

Like all judges in Texas,¹⁵⁰ Harris County district judges are elected. They serve four-year terms, with roughly half elected in November of off-presidential election years (e.g., 2002, 2006, etc.) and the other half elected in November of presidential election years (e.g., 2004, 2008, etc.). District judges take office on January 1 of the year following an election.

Typically, judicial elections in Harris County are not uncontested; rather, there is a party primary followed by a partisan general election, with one Democrat running against one Republican. In the early 2000s, Republicans controlled most of the judicial seats in Harris County. Beginning in 2008, however, Democrats found more electoral success in judicial elections as the county shifted politically toward the left. At any rate, there have been a fair number of close general elections in Harris County throughout the early part of this century.

Campaign finance has also been an integral part of the judicial landscape in Texas for decades. In 1980, Texas was the first state with a judicial race that cost over one million dollars, and the 12 candidates in the 1988 Supreme Court elections raised $12 million in total.¹⁵¹ The seven winning candidates for the Texas Supreme Court from 1992-1997 each raised an average of $1.3 million, with more than 40% of those funds "contributed by parties or lawyers with cases before the court or by contributors linked to those parties."¹⁵² As we show below, Harris County district judges also actively raise money for their campaigns, often from attorneys who practice before them.¹⁵³

2. Indigent Defense

Like most of Texas and many other states, Harris County relies primarily on assigned counsel to provide indigent defense, where judges are supposed to distribute cases to attorneys via a “wheel”

¹⁴⁷ Fabelo, Harris County Public Defender Survey, at 9.
¹⁴⁸ Fabelo at 9.
¹⁴⁹ See United States Census Bureau, American Fact Finder, available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (population estimate for Harris County as of July 1, 2018, is 4,698,619)
¹⁵⁰ Texas has had partisan election of judges at all levels of courts since 1876. See Judicial Selection in the States: Texas, National Center for State Courts, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=TX
¹⁵¹ Id.
¹⁵² Id.
¹⁵³ See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
that rotates through a list of eligible lawyers. Figure 2 below shows how prevalent such systems are in Texas, as counties that are colored blue rely solely on assigned counsel for indigent defense cases.

Ten counties are colored green, which means they also have public defender’s offices. This is misleading, however, because public defenders might handle only a small fraction of indigent defense cases in a county. This is true, for example, in Harris County, which is the large green county in the southeast corner of the state. Although the county created a public defender’s office in 2012, the Harris County Public Defender handles less than 3% of the cases in our sample. Moreover, these public defenders are simply treated as additional attorneys to be added to the “wheel.” Hence for all practical purposes, Harris County relies almost exclusively on assigned private attorneys for indigent defense.

154 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. Currently, to be added to the master list of eligible attorneys, licensed Texas attorneys who are in good standing must have at least two years of criminal law practice experience, pass a certification test (or be board certified in criminal law), and satisfy certain continuing legal education requirements. To be assigned third-degree felonies the attorney must have “t[ried to verdict at least three (3) felony jury trials as lead counsel.” To be assigned second-degree felonies, s/he must have “[p]racticed criminal law for at least four (4) years and tried to verdict at least four (4) felony jury trials as lead counsel.” And to be assigned first-degree felonies, the attorney must have “[p]racticed criminal law for at least five (5) years, tried to verdict at least eight (8) felony jury trials as lead counsel and been accepted as competent to receive first-degree appointments by a majority of the district judges.” The attorney must also “[e]xhibit proficiency and commitment to providing quality representation to criminal defendants [and] [d]emonstrate professionalism and reliability when providing representation to criminal defendants.” Finally, the attorney must be voted on to the master list in by a majority of district court judges. See Quick Guide, Minimum Requirements—Harris County District Courts, at https://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/0/FDAMS/2017/quickGuide.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).

According to a local defense attorney, testing requirements were not always present and were added after counsel assignments in Harris County came under increased scrutiny. See Murray Newman, Too Much for Too Few, Life at the Harris County Criminal Justice Center (Jan. 26, 2013), at http://harriscountycriminaljustice.blogspot.com/2013/01/too-much-for-too-few.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).

156 This number has been increasing over time; our data show that the Harris County Public Defender handled just over 5% of the felony cases in 2017.
157 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Gideonat50.org, Texas, at: http://gideonat50.org/in-your-state/texas/#state-independence (“The vast majority of Texas indigent defense representation, even in those jurisdictions that have a public defender office, is provided by appointed attorneys.”).
Figure 2

B. Construction of the Data

To analyze how campaign contributions might relate to indigent defense case assignments, we connect a number of different datasets. Specifically, we combine six types of data from Harris County: (1) criminal cases and their outcomes; (2) judicial elections; (3) campaign contributions to judicial candidates; (4) annual revenue earned by attorneys for indigent defense appointments; (5) attorney eligibility for indigent defense appointments; and (6) attorney bar information. Figure 3 below summarizes the relevant information in these datasets and how we link them together.
Our central dataset is our criminal cases/outcomes dataset, obtained from the Harris County District Clerk (HCC). We focus on felony cases in the dataset, which comprise the universe of all such cases disposed in Harris County District Court from January 2005 through May 2018. The dataset includes information on all indigent defense counsel appointments made by district judges during that time period, as well as the characteristics of the cases to which they were assigned. In particular, the HCC dataset includes the full name and an identifier for the appointed attorney as well as the appointment type (Public Defender, Appointed Attorney, Hired Attorney); the defendant’s full name, sex, age, race, and address; and case characteristics like the offense level and degree, sentence type and sentence duration, and filing and disposition dates.

We combine these data with a dataset on Harris County judicial elections, provided by the Texas Secretary of State. While the HCC case data do not include the name of the presiding district judge, we can identify this information by looking at electoral outcomes for district court races and

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The identifier is a System Person Number (SPN), used to identify the individual throughout the dataset. We were able to convert the SPN number into the corresponding attorney bar number, which allowed us to merge with attorney-related data in other datasets.
identifying each judge’s electoral history. Hence, by merging these data, we can precisely identify which judge appointed counsel in an indigent defense case.\textsuperscript{160}

Next, we connect the data to campaign contributions data, provided by the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC). This dataset encompasses all political contributions to district court candidates in Texas from 2004 to 2016.\textsuperscript{161} The TEC dataset includes information on contribution dates and amounts, along with self-reported identifying information from contributors such as occupation, employer, and zip code.\textsuperscript{162} This information lets us supplement the cases database with identifiers for attorneys who have contributed to the appointing judge, which might happen before, during, or after the judge’s tenure.\textsuperscript{163}

The fourth dataset we connect are payments made by the State of Texas to appointed attorneys. This information is tracked by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC), and is comprehensive and accurate for 2014 to 2018.\textsuperscript{164} The TIDC data include information on how much each attorney earned in total from each court (i.e., each judge) during each fiscal year 2014-2018.

\textsuperscript{160} We also know which judicial candidates received donations from eligible attorneys but failed to be elected. In related work, we are conducting a regression discontinuity design to measure the effect of donations on appointments. See David S. Lee and Thomas Lemieux, \textit{Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics}, 48 J. Econ Lit. 281 (2010). In particular, we can causally estimate the impact of donation by comparing case appointments for attorneys who donated to judicial candidates who barely won an election versus case assignments for attorneys who donated to candidates who barely lost.

\textsuperscript{161} Contributions data prior to 2004 are not particularly accurate and are hence excluded from our data. As a consequence, we might underestimate the number of contributions received by judges who held office prior to 2005.

\textsuperscript{162} Some attorney contributors list themselves using the name of their private practice (e.g., John Doe might donate as “Law Offices of John Doe”). If a law firm has just one named partner, we assign that contribution to the named partner. When a law firm has more than one named partner, or it is unclear who the main partner is, we do not assign such contribution to any attorney (i.e. contributions under the name of “The Law Firm of John Doe” were attributed to John Doe, while contributions from “Do, Re, Mi and Associates” are not attributable to anyone). Since we cannot capture these donations, we likely underestimate the number of donations from attorneys to judges in our sample.

In addition, in 81 instances, matched attorneys contributed jointly with their spouses or someone else. In all of these cases, only one of the names in the pair matched to someone in the list of appointed attorneys. We drop the unmatched contributor name off our list of contributors and attribute the whole donation amount to the appointed attorney.

\textsuperscript{163} Matching the contributors in the TEC dataset to the attorneys in the HCC dataset is not easy. This is in part because the TEC lacks any unique identifier for political contributors, and does provide other identifying data like mailing address and employer. We take advantage of the name variation in the HCC dataset to identify different ways that attorneys might list their names for contribution purposes. We use these names to look for political contributions made by attorneys who have been appointed at least once in any district court in Harris County. For attorneys unmatched by their exact listed name, we do a second round of matching using fuzzy matches between unmatched attorney names and contributor names using the Stata function \textit{matchit} to compare each name with the neighborhood of the subsequent 5 unmatched names in alphabetical order. After that we look at the matches suggested and keep the suggestion only if the similarity is above a certain threshold (.85). Finally, we manually audit the data to confirm the matches we have made are not false positives and to search for matches we may have missed.

\textsuperscript{164} Note we could obtain reliably accurate revenue only for fiscal years 2014-2018, but our donation data stretch from 2004-2018. Hence, the actual return on investment might be significantly higher than what we estimate here; our estimate is likely only a floor on the real return rate.
The TIDC data do not provide granular detail as to specific attorney payments (e.g., payments made based on the number of days an attorney appeared in court or worked on a case outside of court). The data do, however, include attorney bar numbers, which allows us to accurately merge the revenue data with our cases database. Hence, the HCC case data can be connected with both attorney contributions data and attorney revenue data. This allows us to estimate a “return on investment” for donors. That is, if pay to play exists, we can estimate the revenue that donor attorneys received for each dollar they contributed.

Fifth, we connect our data to information on attorneys who are appointed to cases in the district court, as compiled by the State Bar of Texas.¹⁶⁵ This dataset includes demographic information on attorneys, including when the attorney obtained their legal license in Texas and what law school they attended.¹⁶⁶ We also obtain this information for all judges in our dataset, allowing us to test whether certain social networks (e.g., an attorney or judge attended the same law school or are approximately the same age) might be driving results.

Finally, we combine all these data with information on when attorneys applied for approval as indigent defense counsel, obtained from the Harris County District Court. As discussed in more detail below, we can see whether attorney donations were correlated with their addition to the list of eligible indigent defense counsel. For example, if pay to play exists, we might expect to see an attorney would donate to a judge when she applies for or is approved to be added to the list of attorneys eligible to receive indigent defense appointments.

C. Summary Statistics

1. Cases and Contributions

Together, these datasets enable us to shed light on the relationships between Harris County district court judges and indigent defense counsel. Table 1 provides some summary statistics on our final data.¹⁶⁷ We cover the universe of 290,633 felony cases¹⁶⁸ in which indigent defense counsel were assigned and ascertainable in Harris County between January 2005 and May 2018, spread over all 22 district courts. There were 45 different judges who assigned counsel in these cases.

¹⁶⁵ We thank Kyle Rozema for providing us with the Texas bar data. See Kyle Rozema, Lawyer Misconduct in America (working paper, 2019).
¹⁶⁶ We also merge this dataset with data from U.S. News and World Report, which provides an annually updated, widely followed list of law school rankings. This allows us to compare the law schools attended by donor and non-donor attorneys.
¹⁶⁷ Our final dataset does not include information on 90 cases for which we were unable to match the attorney to a lawyer listed in state bar attorney rolls. It also does not include 35 cases in which the listed defense attorney was identical to the judge in the case. These discrepancies are likely due to minor clerical errors in the cases dataset.
¹⁶⁸ Harris County assigns a unique case number to each charged offense, even if they are actually part of the same case. This might occur, for example, if a prosecutor charges a defendant for one crime, then dismisses those charges completely and charges for a different crime later. To account for such scenarios, we treated different case numbers as part of the same case if the two case numbers involved the same attorney, court, and defendant identifier, as well as sharing either the same filing date or the same disposition date. Our results remain robust to different aggregation methods, or if we instead conduct the same analysis at the charge-level rather than the case-level. Moreover, the vast majority of cases (87.47%) in our sample involved just one charged offense.
vast majority of the cases (97.30%) were assigned to private attorneys; the remainder were assigned to a public defender.  

Attorneys who practiced before these judges also donated money to those judges. In particular, we see that from 2004-2018, Harris County district court judges received a total of $622,917 over 1,841 donations from attorneys who practiced at some point before those judges. These donations were relatively modest in size: the average donation was $338.36, with donations rarely exceeding $1,500.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Summary Statistics on Cases and Contributions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Felony cases with appointments: 2005 – 2018</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number cases/attys: 290,633 cases, 772 attys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appt. private attorneys 282,780 cases, 747 attys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appt. public defenders 7,853 cases, 66 attys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of courts 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of judges 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of gen. elections 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Campaign contributions: 2002 – 2018**                  |
| Total # donations: all appt. attys to all judges 1,841   |
| Total donation amt: all appt. attys to all judges $622,917|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution amounts for appointed attys</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
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| 1%   | $50  |
| 10%  | $100 |
| 25%  | $150 |
| 50%  | $250 |
| 75%  | $500 |
| 95%  | $1,000 |
| 99%  | $1,500 |

Next, we examine case and attorney characteristics, both in the aggregate as well as split out by donor and non-donor attorneys. Table 2 summarizes these data below. Of the 772 attorneys who were assigned at least one indigent defense case between 2004-2018, 25.65% (198) donated to at least one Harris County district court judge (or candidate who was elected judge) during our sample time frame.

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169 Because public defenders are also assigned to the “wheel” system and are treated as attorneys to be appointed in cases, we include them in our analysis below. However, our results are substantially the same if we exclude them instead.

170 While our case data begin in 2005, we include donations data from 2004 onward since judges who began their terms in 2005 ran for election in 2004.

171 The smallest donation in the sample was $25; the largest was $5,000.
Donors and non-donors were assigned similar types of cases, though donors on average handled slightly more serious felonies. For example, first-degree felonies make up a slightly higher share of donor cases (6.88%) as compared to non-donor cases (6.13%). And state jail felonies—which are the least severe class of felony in Texas—make up 52.35% and 53.67% of all cases for donors and non-donors, respectively.

The demographic characteristics of defendants assigned to donors and non-donors are also quite similar. Donors were slightly less likely to represent white defendants relative to non-donors (43.72% versus 46.33%), and both groups were very similar in terms of their clients' gender (just under 80% male for both) and age (average age of about 33 for both).

Finally, donor and non-donor attorneys are relatively similar in terms of their educational and experiential background. The average law school ranking of an assigned attorney in our sample is 116.35; donor attorneys attended slightly better-ranked law schools (average of 107.43) relative to non-donors (average of 118.60). They also have more experience, as measured by years between the attorney’s admission to the Texas bar and the filing date of a case (25.36 versus 21.09 years).

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172 Even though the magnitude of most differences between donor and non-donor groups in Table 2 is small, they are statistically significant at the 5% level, with the exception of defendant age and gender. This is due to the large sample size we have here, which lets us detect even small differences across groups.

173 Offense level was missing in 4,092 cases (1.41% of the total sample). Those cases have been excluded from the data when tabulating the percentages in Table 2.
2. Donations, Appointments, and Revenues

As described above, there are only slight measurable differences in the types of cases and types of defendants assigned to donor and non-donor indigent defense counsel. Donor and non-donor defense counsel also appear largely similar in terms of their educational and experiential background.

By contrast, there are stark differences between donor and non-donor attorneys in terms of the number of cases assigned to them by donee judges, as well as the fees they earned from such cases. This is clear from Table 3 below, which shows summary statistics on appointed cases and received revenues across all attorneys, as well as split out between donors and non-donors.

| Table 3: Donors v. Non-Donors – Cases Appointed and Revenues (2004-2018) |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Number of attorneys                     | All        | Donor      | Non-Donor  |
| --                                 | 772        | 198 (25.65%)| 574 (74.35%)|
| Cases Appointed: Any Donation a      | --         | 152,200 (52.37%)| 138,433 (47.63%)|
| Cases Appointed: Donate Appt. Judge b | --         | 58,588 (20.16%)| 232,045 (79.84%)|
| Avg. case pendency (days) b          | 105.77     | 108.77     | 105.02     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney – Judge Pairs b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observed Pairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Revenue by Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. # Cases Assigned Per Pair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a “Donor” = 1 if attorney contributed at least once to some judge during the sample period
b “Donor” = 1 if attorney contributed at least once to the assigning judge during the sample period

As noted previously, over one-quarter of assigned attorneys contributed to at least one judge within our sample period. But these donor attorneys were assigned over half (52.37%) of the cases in our sample. Moreover, 20.16% of all cases in which a judge assigned indigent defense counsel involved an attorney who donated at some point to that specific judge.

The disparity in case assignment between donor and non-donor attorneys becomes clearer when we look at attorney-judge pairings—that is, unique pairings between judges and attorneys who were assigned at least one indigent defense case in our sample period. Out of 10,723 attorney-judge pairings in our sample, 1,107 (10.32%) involved an attorney who at some point donated to that judge.

On average, an attorney in an attorney-judge pairing was assigned 27.10 indigent defense cases from that judge and earned $16,300 in indigent defense fees for those cases, which yields an average of $601.48 per case. This shows us how indigent defense cases can be surprisingly lucrative if, as often occurs, an attorney spends just one or two days in total on each case she is assigned.174

We can also see that an average non-donor attorney was assigned slightly fewer cases—24.13 cases, with earnings of $13,992 (an average per case of $579.86). By contrast, the average donor was assigned more than twice the number of cases by that judge, and earned more than twice

174 To illustrate, an attorney who handles one such case each day and works 200 days a year would earn $120,296.
the revenue on those cases relative to the average non-donor—52.93 cases and $31,081 in revenues. Donors earn approximately the same as non-donors per case ($587.21), which suggests their additional revenue comes from the additional cases they are assigned, not from additional revenue per case assigned.

We can more easily show these differences between donors and non-donors graphically, as depicted in the histograms in Figure 4 below. As before, these graphs look at unique attorney-judge pairs. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the natural log of cases assigned to attorneys who donated to the appointing judge. The gray bars show the distribution of cases assigned to non-donor attorneys; the white bars show the distribution of cases assigned to donors. As is apparent, the white distribution is shifted to the right relative to the gray distribution. This means that donor attorneys were assigned more cases than non-donor attorneys.\footnote{It is common to take the natural log of variables that are positive and highly skewed (i.e., have a few entries that are very large relative to others). Often this includes revenue or income, or count variables such as number of cases. For display purposes, logging variables also compresses the histogram into a more reasonable range. At any rate, the results are very similar in graphs in which the standard count rather than the natural log is used.}

\textbf{Figure 4: Appointments and Revenues for Donor v. Non-Donor Attorneys}

This relationship is even more apparent when you look at revenue. The right panel of Figure 4 below shows log revenue for donor attorneys (in white) versus log revenue for non-donors (in gray). Once again, we can see the distribution for donor attorneys is clearly shifted to the right—that is, attorneys who donated to a judge received more revenue than attorneys who did not donate to any judge.

\footnote{Note that when we compare how many cases a judge assigned to donor attorneys versus non-donor attorneys, we are comparing among the class of attorneys who appeared at least once before that judge. Hence, our results are not just a product of the judge simply being unaware of the non-donor attorneys; the judge did in fact appoint each of the non-donor attorneys at least once during our sample period, and hence, presumably knew who they were and could have appointed them more times.}
D. Pay to Play: Regressions and Graphical Evidence

1. Donations, Appointments, and Revenues

The summary data show clear differences in assignment patterns to donors and non-donors: in particular, donee judges assign twice the number of cases to their donors relative to non-donors. Still, we might believe such results are explained by differences, either observable or unobservable, across attorneys or judges.

To illustrate how this might happen, suppose that donors are just *better* attorneys. Then maybe it makes sense for judges to award them more cases, not because they are donors but because they are simply higher quality lawyers. Indeed, perhaps attorneys who can afford to give donations are implicitly demonstrating, through their wealth, their legal prowess. If this were true, we might expect the donor group to comprise more successful attorneys who “deserve” more appointments.

We can show this is an unlikely explanation in a few different ways. To begin, we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, which allows us to control for attorney- or judge-specific factors. Tables 4 and 5 present these results below, which show observations for all attorney-judge pairs in which a judge assigned at least one case to an attorney during our sample period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Cases: Appointed by Donee Judge</th>
<th>Revenue: From Cases with Donee Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>28.79***</td>
<td>28.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.05)</td>
<td>(6.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,723</td>
<td>10,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Atty Ctrl</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Atty FE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: This table presents OLS regressions for all felony cases with indigent defense appointments in Harris County, Texas, from 2004-2018, at the attorney-judge pair level. The outcome variable in cols. (1)-(3) is total cases assigned by a judge to an attorney; in cols. (4)-(6), it is total revenue earned by an attorney across all cases assigned by a judge. "Donor" is a dummy variable for whether an attorney ever donated to the judge in the pairing. Cols. (2) and (5) include controls for attorney and judge characteristics as specified in the text. Cols. (3) and (6) include both attorney and judge fixed effects. All specifications include a constant variable control. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in cols. (1) and (4) and clustered at the judge-level elsewhere. *** = significant at 1% level.

177 We obtain similar results if instead we use logistic regressions for specifications with binary outcome variables.
178 We cannot rule out that time-varying, unobservable differences across donor and non-donor cases are driving the differences in case assignment or revenues that we see here. But we doubt this is the case, given the size of these differences and how closely they hew to donation practices, as we discuss in more detail below.
In Table 4, the key regressor of interest in all columns is “Donor”, a dummy variable (i.e., 0/1 variable) that =1 when the attorney was a contributor to the judge and =0 when the attorney was never a contributor. The outcome variable in columns (1)-(3) is the total number of indigent defense cases assigned by a particular judge to a particular attorney. In columns (4)-(6), the outcome variable is total fees earned by an attorney across all indigent defense cases assigned by a particular judge.\textsuperscript{179}

Column (1) presents the most parsimonious specification, with no controls. The coefficient for “Donor” is 28.79, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that donors on average were assigned over 28 more cases by their donee judges relative to non-donors. Column (4) translates this into dollars, as it presents the same specification but with total revenues as the outcome variable. Here, we can see donors to an assigning judge earn on average about $17,089 more than non-donor attorneys.

The remaining columns introduce a variety of controls for attorney or judge characteristics. Columns (2) and (5) capture observable differences across attorneys and judges, as they include separate controls for number of years since admission to the Texas bar for the attorney and the judge;\textsuperscript{180} controls for law schools attended by the attorney and the judge;\textsuperscript{181} a dummy variable for whether the attorney ever served as a public defender; and a dummy variable for whether the attorney and the judge attended the same law school.\textsuperscript{182}

Columns (3) and (6) capture unobservable, time-invariant differences across attorneys and judges. They accomplish this by including fixed effects for attorneys (i.e., controls that should capture time-invariant attorney-specific behavior) and fixed effects for judges (i.e., controls that should capture time-invariant judge-specific behavior).

Notably, controlling for these differences does not change the results in any substantial way. Whether we add controls for observable differences in attorneys and judges (as in columns (2) and (5)), or we add in judge- and attorney-fixed effects (as in columns (3) and (6)), the coefficient remains roughly similar in magnitude and maintains its statistical significance.

We now turn to Table 5, which is identical to Table 4 except now the regressor of interest is “Total Donated,” which is the total dollar amount that an attorney has ever donated to a judge over

\textsuperscript{179} Note that we have fewer judge-attorney pairs in these columns because we only have revenue data from TIDC for 2014 to 2018. See supra note ___ and accompanying text. If anything, that suggests our estimates of revenues earned are underestimated, since we only have an estimate of the fees earned by attorneys during those years and cannot measure fees earned prior to 2014. So indigent defense work is likely significantly more profitable than we show here.

\textsuperscript{180} In addition to proxying for a judge’s legal experience, this variable indirectly captures whether the judge is of a similar age as an attorney. This might matter, for example, if we think that judges and attorneys who are similar in age are more likely to be friends, and that it is this friendship rather than campaign donations that are driving the results here.

\textsuperscript{181} These are “fixed effects” for law school (i.e., separate dummy variables added for each separate law school attended by an attorney in our sample). We obtain similar results if we instead include law school ranking as a control.

\textsuperscript{182} Along with the experience variable, the “same law school” dummy might capture a social “network effect”—for example, if a judge who went to The University of Texas at Austin is biased toward UT graduates, then this dummy variable would capture that effect.
time. Column (1) again presents the most parsimonious specification, with no controls. The coefficient in column (1) is 0.064, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that every dollar donated by an attorney to a judge is associated with 0.064 additional cases assigned to that attorney. If we interpret this within a “pay-to-play” context, then $1/0.064 = $15.63 is the price for an attorney to “buy” a single case from a judge.

Similarly, column (4) presents the same specification but with total revenues as the outcome variable. Here, we can see that each dollar contributed from an attorney to a judge on average results in $27.95 in fees from that judge. Within a pay-to-play context, this can be interpreted as a “return on investment”—a $1 donation yields by an attorney yields $27.95 in revenues.

Like Table 4, the addition of attorney- or judge-level controls in columns (2) and (5) or fixed effects in columns (3) and (6) do not substantially impact the results. They remain approximately the same magnitude and are highly statistically significant. Once again, this suggests that systematic differences between donor and non-donor attorneys, such as differences in their experience or education, are not driving our results here.

2. Comparisons Within the Donor Class

Still, one might wonder whether our results can be explained by some difference between donors and non-donors that cannot be easily captured by regression controls. One way to address this claim is to focus only on the sample of donors and see whether our results remain.

Specifically, we can exploit the fact that a donor typically only contributes to some, but not all, of the judges she appears before. Therefore, if we limit our sample only to attorneys who donated to at least one judge, a natural comparison is to see whether donors received more case assignments from their donee judges relative to judges to whom they did not donate. If so, that would suggest there is something specific in the judge-donor relationship, rather than something special about the donor herself, that is causing the judge to assign more cases to that attorney.
Once again, graphs can dramatically illustrate our results. Figure 5 below limits our sample only to attorneys who donated to at least one judge during our sample period of 2004-2018. Like Figure 4, the histogram on the left shows the natural log of cases, and the histogram on the right shows the natural log of revenues. The white bars again represent attorney-judge pairs in which the attorney donated to that judge. The gray bars now show attorney-judge pairs in which the attorney did not donate to that judge, but s/he did donate to some other judge.

As is plain, the white distribution is once again shifted to the right for both the cases and revenues graphs. In other words, attorneys in the “donor class” received significantly more cases (and earned significantly more revenue) from their donee judges relative to other judges to whom they did not donate. This implies there is nothing “special” about donor attorneys themselves that earned them additional case assignments. Rather, there is something specific to the donor-judge relationship that is driving that result, since only judges to whom attorneys donated seem to assign them a disproportionate number of cases.\footnote{\textsuperscript{183} We can also run the same regression analysis as we did earlier, but this time limited to attorneys who donated to at least one judge. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 present this analysis, with Table A.1 presenting the same specifications as Table 4, and Table A.2 presenting the same specifications as Table 5. We can see that all of the regression coefficients remain highly significant and are similar in magnitude as in the previous tables. This once again shows that attorney- or judge-level differences do not seem to be driving our results. In addition, we can compare attorneys who donated more than one time to a judge (“multiple donors”) with attorneys who never donated or donated just once to the judge. If pay to play is occurring, one might expect that multiple donors would be assigned more cases and earn more revenues as compared to non-donors and single-time donors. This is, in fact, what we find. In Appendix Table A.3, we see that multiple donors are on average assigned between 35.86 and 40.03 more cases, and earn between $17,361 and $23,979 more revenue, than non-donors and single-time donors to a judge. Appendix Table A.4 presents similar results when we limit our sample just to attorneys who donated to at least one judge in our sample.}
3. Donation Timing and “Entry Fees”

So far, we have shown that donors attorneys are assigned more cases (and earn more revenue) than non-donors, and that attorneys who donate receive more cases (and earn more revenue) from their donee judges relative to other judges to whom they did not donate. Given our controls, we also know these donation patterns cannot be explained by observable differences across attorneys or judges, such as where they attended law school, the ranking of the law school, or the years of practice experience they might have. It also cannot be easily explained by some “social network” arguments, such as an alumni connection to a particular school that both judges and attorneys attended, or similarities in age or years of experience. Moreover, it cannot be explained by unobservable differences across attorneys and judges that remain fixed over time. All of these results are consistent with a system in which pay to play is rampant, as our anecdotal evidence suggested.

Still, we can go further. Another approach we can use to get more evidence of pay to play is by exploiting the timing of donations relative to appointments. As noted above, a prerequisite for appointment as indigent defense counsel is getting added to a list of eligible attorneys. If pay to play is occurring, one might expect donors to give their donations either just before or soon after they become eligible to receive cases. One could view this type of donation as an “entry fee” that attorneys must pay judges in order to receive appointments.

Since we know when counsel became eligible to be assigned cases, and we know when they gave their first donation to a judge, we can test whether in fact this is true. Figure 6 below graphically displays our results as a histogram. It tracks the difference in years between when an attorney first donated to a judge, and when she first became eligible to be appointed as indigent defense counsel.\(^{184}\) A negative value means that the attorney donated prior to becoming eligible to receive cases; a positive value means that she donated after gaining eligibility. A zero value means the attorney donated in precisely the same year she became eligible to receive cases. If an attorney donated in an election year, then a value of 0, 1, 2, or 3 means that the attorney received her first appointment from that judge in the four-year term following that donation.

\(^{184}\) In Figure 6, we limit our sample of attorney-judge pairs to judges who were elected in 2008 or later and attorneys who became eligible for appointment in 2008 or later. This prevents data censoring issues that might skew the graph, since we do not have donation data prior to 2004, and we do not know the exact year when attorneys who were eligible for appointment in 2005 actually became eligible in the first place. The same general trends typically hold, however, even if we limit our sample in other ways.
If donations and appointments were completely unrelated, we might expect to see a uniform distribution—that is, a relatively flat graph from left to right. But that is clearly not what we see here. This graph is peaked at 0, and the majority of the distribution is just to the right. This means most attorneys who donated to a judge first donated soon after they became eligible to receive appointments from that judge. In fact, in over half (54.7%) of all attorney-judge pairs in which the attorney donated to the judge, the first donation to the judge occurred between 0 and 3 years following the year the attorney became eligible to be assigned indigent defense counsel cases.

If we also include donations that occurred in the year prior to eligibility—which would be a plausible time to donate if one wants to pay to play, since an attorney must be voted in by a majority of judges before she is placed on the eligible list—then the percentage of relevant attorney-judge pairs jumps to 62.6%. These facts are again consistent with pay-to-play, where newly-eligible or soon-to-be-eligible attorneys pay an “entry fee” to start receiving cases from that judge.

4. Case Outcomes

We might be less troubled by the differences in revenue and case assignment that we observe if donors consistently achieve better outcomes for their clients relative to non-donors. Indeed, this story is not completely implausible—if “pay to play” is occurring, then perhaps the attorneys who pay are buying better results for their clients.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{185} See supra note __.
\textsuperscript{186} See supra note __ (noting accusation from Oklahoma district attorney that a judge was partial toward defense attorneys who donated to her campaign).
The data, however, provide no evidence to suggest this is true. Table 6 below shows summary statistics that compare whether donors and non-donors achieve various positive outcomes for their clients. We define an outcome as “good” (Good outcome = 1) if a charge is dismissed or reduced, or the defendant is acquitted; and an outcome as “not good” (Good outcome = 0) if the defendant is convicted or pleads guilty or no contest. By this metric, non-donor attorneys do slightly better than donors (37.45% v. 37.01%, respectively). Defendants represented by non-donors are also less likely to end up in the Texas Department of Corrections (16.53% and 17.97% for non-donors and donors, respectively) and receive shorter prison or jail sentences on average (663.24 and 767.74 days for non-donors and donors, respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Donors v. Non-Donors – Case Outcomes (2004-2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of attorneys(^a) &amp; 772 &amp; 198 (25.65%) &amp; 574 (74.35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Appointed: Any Donation(^a) &amp; -- &amp; 152,200 (52.37%) &amp; 138,433 (47.63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Appointed: Donate Appt. Judge(^b) &amp; -- &amp; 58,588 (20.16%) &amp; 232,045 (79.84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. case pendency (days)(^b) &amp; 105.77 &amp; 108.77 &amp; 105.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good outcome(^d) &amp; 37.36% &amp; 37.01% &amp; 37.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Dept. of Corrections &amp; 16.82% &amp; 17.97% &amp; 16.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris County Jail &amp; 28.02% &amp; 25.52% &amp; 28.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Jail &amp; 19.64% &amp; 19.69% &amp; 19.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean prison/jail time (days) &amp; 684.11 &amp; 767.74 &amp; 663.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) “Donor” = 1 if attorney contributed at least once to some judge during the sample period
\(^b\) “Donor” = 1 if attorney contributed at least once to the assigning judge during the sample period
\(^c\) All outcomes defined at the individual charge level
\(^d\) “Good” = 1 if charges dismissed or reduced, or defendant acquitted or found not guilty; = 0 if defendant found or pled guilty or no contest

A reasonable concern is that these slight differences in outcomes might be driven by differences in case or defendant characteristics. Based on what we can observe, however, this does not seem to be true either. We can control for various case and defendant characteristics through an ordinary least squares regression analysis, as we present in Table 7 below.

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\(^{187}\) We conduct our analysis here at the charge level, since whether a defendant is convicted or acquitted and what the sentence he receives is determined at that level. Nonetheless, our results remain similar if we aggregate up to the case level instead.

\(^{188}\) We can determine whether charges are reduced by comparing the offense level in the complaint (e.g., 1st degree felony, 2nd degree felony, etc.) and the offense level when the case was disposed.

\(^{189}\) Some outcomes are ambiguous whether they are good or bad; we exclude those charges when defining this variable. For example, it is ambiguous whether an outcome is good when the case is dismissed because the defendant died or when the defendant was convicted on another charge.
The outcome variable in columns (1)-(2) is a dummy variable whether the attorney achieves a “good” outcome as defined earlier. In columns (3)-(4), the outcome is a dummy variable for whether the defendant receives a term of imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections, which is typically where most substantial prison sentences are served. And in columns (5)-(6), the outcome variable is the sentence of jail or imprisonment received for a charge. Odd-numbered columns include controls for whether a defense attorney is a public defender and for the type of crime charged; even-numbered columns also include dummy variables for whether a defendant was white or female; a control for the defendant’s age; and fixed effects for the judge in the case.

We can see that generally speaking, attorneys who have donated to some judge perform worse than those who are non-donors. If anything, donor attorneys appear between 0.05 and 0.44

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Notes: This table presents OLS regressions of case outcomes on attorney, defendant, and case characteristics. “Donor Somewhere” is a dummy variable for whether an attorney ever donated to some judge in the sample. “Good Outcome” = 1 if case is dismissed, defendant is acquitted, or charges are reduced; = 0 if defendant is convicted or pleads guilty or no contest. “Sentenced TDC” = 1 if defendant received a prison sentence in the Texas Department of Corrections, = 0 otherwise. Coefficients for “Good Outcome” and “Sentenced TDC” are inflated by 100 to put in percentage point terms. “Any Jail/Prison Term” = max sentence across TDC, Harris County Jail or state jail. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in odd-numbered columns and clustered at the judge-level in even-numbered columns. *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level.

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190 Because outcomes depend so heavily on the type of crime that is charged, we include as a control the type of offense charged even in our base specifications. We can distinguish between 631 different charged crimes, often split quite finely. For example, within the narrow category of “trademark counterfeiting”, we can distinguish between 5 different classes based on the amount of the offense.
percentage points less likely to obtain a good outcome, though the results are not always statistically significant.\textsuperscript{191} Donors are between 0.57 and 0.75 percentage points more likely to have a client who is sentenced to a term in the Texas Department of Corrections. And defendants represented by donors receive jail or prison sentences that are between 18.32 and 33.71 days longer than non-donor defendants.

Of course these results should be taken with a grain of salt. It is possible that unobservable differences across cases are driving the slightly worse outcomes we see for donor attorneys. Nonetheless, it would be hard to conclude, based on this evidence, that the opposite holds true—that donor attorneys are in fact doing significantly better on the whole than their non-donor counterparts. If anything, donors appear to be underachieving for their clients relative to non-donors. This is what we should probably expect, given the significant additional caseload that donors choose to take on.\textsuperscript{192}

V. The Pervasiveness of the Incentive Gap: Campaign Finance and Other Reforms

The apparent prevalence of pay to play, as revealed by our quantitative and qualitative analysis, is troubling. In part this is because a system in which attorneys buy cases from judges runs counter to common notions of legal ethics and justice. And in part it is because, as we have shown, donor attorneys seem to underperform for their clients relative to non-donors.

But perhaps most discomforting is that pay to play lays bare the core dysfunction in the right to counsel: that many of those who are assigned to represent indigent defendants really do not share their clients’ interests. More concisely, pay to play is just a symptom of the incentive gap.

The centrality and pervasiveness of the incentive gap suggests that minor changes to campaign finance laws or case assignment rules will not eliminate pay to play. And even more importantly, such minimal reforms are unlikely to significantly improve the quality of representation for indigent defendants. This is because reforms that solely target pay to play do not necessarily reduce assigned counsel’s core incentives to seek out as many cases as possible, and to work minimally on each case they are assigned. So long as the incentive gap remains, attorneys and judges are likely to find ways around such reforms.

These problems become apparent when we start looking more closely at some plausible reforms that target pay to play. For example, consider a reform that would prohibit donee judges from appointing their donors as counsel,\textsuperscript{193} if not permanently then for at least some time period following a contribution (e.g., until an intervening election cycle has passed). Such a rule might reduce the incidence of pay to play, as judicial donations might now cost attorneys potential revenue

\textsuperscript{191} Since about 37% of all defendants receive a good outcome, this translates into between about 0.14% to 1.19% difference between donors and non-donors.

\textsuperscript{192} One possible counterargument is that since the outcome differential is relatively small between donors and non-donors, perhaps donors would actually do better than non-donors if they were not assigned so many more cases. Even if this is true, however, and donor attorneys are “better” in this sense, the current system in which donors receive a disproportionate number of cases seems likely to be suboptimal.

\textsuperscript{193} Alternatively, this same rule could be configured from the perspective of the assigned attorney: ethics rules could prohibit him from seeking or accepting a case assignment from a judge to whom he has donated.
in future indigent defense cases.\textsuperscript{194} But it would not address situations in which attorney appointments precede donations, which is something we observe in our data and which might become more prevalent if such a reform is enacted. Hence, attorneys and judges might still conduct pay to play by tacitly agreeing to transact in cases first and in donations later.

More substantial reforms could further reduce judges’ discretion to assign indigent defense cases. Mandatory rotation policies, in which judges are supposed to assign attorneys from a rotating “wheel,” are an example of such an approach.\textsuperscript{195} Putting aside whether such a system is optimal or best serves defendants’ interests—there is no reason to believe, for example, that an even split of cases across all eligible attorneys is necessarily ideal—our empirical results suggest such systems are honored more in the breach. Harris County criminal court judges are supposed to follow a wheel assignment system, but as we have seen, they often distribute cases highly unevenly across eligible attorneys.

One might go further and remove the case assignment power from judges altogether. Some jurisdictions already have such managed assigned counsel systems, which place the assignment power with an independent commission or entity.\textsuperscript{196} But these systems face numerous political\textsuperscript{197} and practical obstacles that can limit their effectiveness in practice. For example, Travis County, Texas (home of the City of Austin), created an independent agency to oversee indigent defense in 2015. But cases there have continued to be assigned in a grossly uneven manner across assigned counsel.\textsuperscript{198}

Moreover, even if trial judges are divested of the power to assign indigent defense cases, they could find other ways to reward their donors. For example, if attorney requests for out-of-court case preparation expenses and expert opinions must ultimately be approved by the judge—as is often the case—then a judge would still have the opportunity to be more generous with her donors than with non-donors in granting such requests.

Instead of focusing on attorney appointments, policymakers might instead target pay to play through campaign finance reform. For example, policymakers could prohibit judges from personally

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\textsuperscript{194} Relatedly, it would have the positive secondary effect of disincentivizing attorneys from donating to a judge before whom they might want to practice in the future.

\textsuperscript{195} See supra notes \_ and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{196} See supra notes \_ and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{197} Texas provides a case in point. In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed a bill to create a statewide managed assigned counsel system, but the bill was subsequently vetoed by then-Governor George W. Bush, who stated:

\begin{quote}
Senate Bill No. 247 proposes a drastic change in the way indigent criminal defendants are assigned counsel. While well-intentioned, the effect of the bill is likely to be neither better representation for indigents nor a more efficient administration of justice. The bill inappropriately takes appointment authority away from judges, who are better able to assess the quality of legal representation, and gives it to county officials. The bill creates the potential for counties to set up a new layer of bureaucracy that could result in increased backlogs and decreased court efficiency.
\end{quote}

Gov. George W. Bush Veto of SB 247, June 20, 1999. Bush’s statement points out some of the political challenges of taking away the appointment power from state judges.

\textsuperscript{198} See Neena Satija, \textit{Travis County Overhauled Legal Representation for the Poor, But Lawyers Are Still Overwhelmed}, Texas Trib. (Apr. 26, 2018) (noting that one attorney was assigned 349 felony and 434 misdemeanor cases in 2017).
soliciting donations from practicing attorneys. Such an approach would likely pass constitutional muster following the Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision in *Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar*, 199 in which the Court applied strict scrutiny and upheld a Florida ethics rule that banned judicial candidates from personally soliciting any campaign funds. 201 The Court found that the state had a compelling governmental interest “in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” and that the solicitation ban was narrowly tailored toward that interest. 203 A restriction that merely prohibited judicial candidates from soliciting funds from practicing attorneys would be narrower in scope than the Florida ban and would thus be presumptively constitutional.

Yet, such a ban would not necessarily eliminate pay to play. Unless the ban also applied to judicial campaign committees, attorneys could funnel money indirectly into judges’ coffers. And a judge would still know which attorneys supported his candidacy by seeing who donated to the committee—hence the judge could still reward those attorneys with case assignments. 205 This loophole might lead one to wonder to what extent a Florida-style ban is really more about form than substance. 206

Of course, one might extend the solicitation ban beyond what was considered in *Williams-Yulee*, and instead prohibit judges from soliciting practicing attorneys either personally or via their campaign committees. But given that the Roberts’ Court has otherwise consistently invalidated

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200 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer argued that a less exacting standard should apply for judicial elections. See *id.* at __. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dissent from majority opinion holding that Minnesota’s “announce clauses” that prohibit judicial candidates from stating their views on issues was unconstitutional)). The dissent agreed with the other justices in the majority that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. See *id.*
201 *Id.*
202 *Id.*
203 In so finding, the Court relied in part on the fact that the Florida law allowed candidates to set up campaign committees to solicit donations. See *id.*
204 Note that Texas does not appear to have any such ban. See Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6D(1) (emphasis added):

> A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of the judicial duties, exploit his or her judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves. *This limitation does not prohibit either a judge or candidate from soliciting funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by state law.*

205 As noted earlier, some states allow campaign committees to solicit donations but prohibit the committees from divulging the names of donors to candidates. See *supra* note __. Of course, a donor attorney could still presumably announce to the judge that she in fact did make such a donation, thereby side-stepping such a rule.
206 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, *Supreme Court Upholds Ban on Judicial Candidates Soliciting Campaign Contributions—even Via Mass Mailings*, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2015) (concluding ban might have an impact in limiting context of face-to-face personal solicitations, which might be different if conducted by a judicial candidate vis a vis a representative of her campaign committee).
restrictions on campaign finance, and that any such regulation would be reviewed under strict scrutiny, it is unclear whether these additional limitations would be found to be constitutional.

Moreover, a ban on solicitations from a campaign committee would not touch unsolicited contributions from attorneys. The identity of judicial candidates is common knowledge; hence, an attorney could simply send an unsolicited check directly to a candidate as a campaign donation. Such a donation would comply with state campaign laws so long as it did not exceed rules regulating contribution limits.

These examples all illustrate the practical difficulties of eliminating pay to play in assigned counsel systems. The fundamental problem is that judges and attorneys want to transact with one another, even after reforms like those described above are enacted. Put differently, there are still gains from trade between judges, who can provide income to attorneys, and attorneys, who can provide financial and political support to judges. As such, these parties have strong incentives to circumvent restrictions on contributions or case assignments.

More importantly, even if pay to play is eliminated, this will not necessarily improve the quality of representation for poor defendants. Many indigent defense attorneys maintain outside dockets, with paying clients. Given what our research reveals about the financial motivations of many assigned counsel, it is unrealistic to believe these attorneys would devote as much time and effort to their indigent clients as they would to their paying ones if there are no reputational or financial gains from doing so. Indeed, a recent empirical analysis suggests that court-appointed attorneys in San Antonio, Texas, generally obtain worse outcomes for their indigent clients relative to their paying clients, even after controlling for differences in case characteristics. Hence, the incentive gap will continue to plague indigent defendants so long as assigned counsel have incentives to shirk on the effort they expend on such cases.

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208 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.

209 Another more radical approach would be to eliminate popular election of judges altogether. As of 2015, 39 out of 50 states had some form of judicial election (either partisan, non-partisan or retention elections). See ABA Brief, supra note ___. Eliminating popularly elected judges would eliminate the need for campaign funds and the possibility of pay to play. Still, such an approach would still not eliminate the incentive gap. See infra Section V.B.

210 See Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman & Emily Owens, Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense, NBER Working Paper No. 24,579 (May 2018) (finding that case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases drive these results); see also id. at 3 (finding that "attorneys resolve their assigned cases 13% faster than their retained cases, consistent with reduced effort.").
VI. Conclusion

"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."\textsuperscript{211} Despite this pronouncement by the Supreme Court, made in the decade prior to \textit{Gideon v. Wainwright}, indigent defendants still face a system in which their interests are regularly brushed aside by those who are supposed to represent them. As we have shown, this phenomenon is caused at least in part by poor design: indigent defense systems often create financial incentives for counsel that are at odds with their client’s best interests.

We illustrate the incentive gap by empirically linking, for the first time, trial court campaign contributions with criminal court data. We find that attorneys regularly donate to trial court judges before whom they appear. These contributions often look like “entry fees” from attorneys who have recently become eligible for indigent defense appointments. Judges, in turn, appoint donor attorneys to over twice as many indigent defense cases as non-donor attorneys, with donors often earning tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenues. Importantly, our results are not driven by unobservable differences between donors and non-donors: only judges to whom attorneys donated assign them a disproportionate number of cases.

In addition, we find that donor attorneys in our sample are, if anything, less successful than non-donor attorneys in achieving charge reductions, dismissals, or acquittals, and in avoiding prison sentences for their clients. These differences are not caused solely by observable differences in defendant or case characteristics, or by unobservable time-invariant differences. We suggest donor attorneys might do worse for their clients simply because they have so many more cases assigned to them.

Moreover, the phenomenon we identify here is likely widespread. While our data are from Harris County (Houston), Texas—the nation’s third most populous county—qualitative evidence we have collected suggests pay to play exists throughout Texas. In fact, pay to play might affect millions of Americans in other states, such as California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio, among others, which also permit attorneys to contribute to judges who control indigent defense appointments.

The apparent prevalence of pay to play in our criminal courts should be a wake-up call about the state of indigent defense in America, and the corrosive influence of money in the judiciary. Our assigned counsel system has failed to align the interests of defense attorneys with those of their clients. Until we eliminate this incentive gap,\textsuperscript{212} the promise of \textit{Gideon} will remain out of reach.

\textsuperscript{211} See \textit{Griffin v. Illinois}, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion).

\textsuperscript{212} A complete analysis of how we might eliminate the incentive gap is unfortunately well beyond the space limitations of the present article. It is, however, something we explore in detail in a companion piece. See Neel U. Sukhatme & Jay Jenkins, \textit{Eliminating the Incentive Gap and Pay to Play in the Right to Counsel: Public Defenders, Caseload Limits and Contingent Fees in Criminal Defense}. There we examine possible ways to eliminate the incentive gap such as by expanding public defender networks, imposing mandatory caseload limits on defense attorneys, and adopting contingency fee payments in assigned counsel and contract attorney cases. We argue that reforms such as these would alter attorney and judicial incentives in meaningful ways that would help indigent defendants.
Appendix

Table A.1: Cases Assigned / Revenue Earned for Donors to Assigning Judge v. Donors to Another Judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Cases: Appointed by Donee Judge</th>
<th>Revenue: From Cases with Donee Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>29.98*** (4.06) 30.21*** (7.22) 33.82*** (6.62)</td>
<td>17,182*** (2,471) 16,379*** (3,329) 14,155*** (2,667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,186 5,186 5,186</td>
<td>2,569 2,569 2,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.02 0.03 0.10</td>
<td>0.03 0.06 0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, AtttyCtrls</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Attty FEs</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents OLS regressions for all felony cases with indigent defense appointments in Harris County, Texas, from 2004-2018, at the attorney-judge pair level. The sample is limited to attorneys who contributed to at least one judge during the sample period. The outcome variable in cols. (1)-(3) is total cases assigned by a judge to an attorney; in cols. (4)-(6), it is total revenue earned by an attorney across all cases assigned by a judge. "Donor" is a dummy variable for whether an attorney ever donated to a judge. Cols. (2) and (5) include controls for attorney and judge characteristics as specified in the text. Cols. (3) and (6) include both attorney and judge fixed effects. All specifications include a constant variable control. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in cols. (1) and (4) and clustered at the judge-level elsewhere. *** = significant at 1% level.

Table A.2: Cases Assigned / Revenue Earned for Each Dollar Donated to Assigning Judge (Limited to Attys Who Donated to Some Judge)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Cases: Appointed by Donee Judge</th>
<th>Revenue: From Cases with Donee Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Donated</td>
<td>0.065*** (0.020) 0.068*** (0.020) 0.074*** (0.020)</td>
<td>28.02*** (9.37) 29.48*** (6.83) 28.30*** (5.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,186 5,186 5,186</td>
<td>2,569 2,569 2,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.12 0.13 0.20</td>
<td>0.15 0.17 0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, AtttyCtrls</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Attty FEs</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents OLS regressions for all felony cases with indigent defense appointments in Harris County, Texas, from 2004-2018, at the attorney-judge pair level. The sample is limited to attorneys who contributed to at least one judge during the sample period. The outcome variable in cols. (1)-(3) is total cases assigned by a judge to an attorney; in cols. (4)-(6), it is total revenue earned by an attorney across all cases assigned by a judge. "Total Donated" is the total dollar amount ever donated from an attorney to a judge. Cols. (2) and (5) include controls for attorney and judge characteristics as specified in the text. Cols. (3) and (6) include both attorney and judge fixed effects. All specifications include a constant variable control. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in cols. (1) and (4) and clustered at the judge-level elsewhere. *** = significant at 1% level.
Table A.3: Cases Assigned / Revenue Earned for Attys Who Donated Multiple Times to an Assigning Judge v. Single Donors or Non-Donors to that Judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Cases: Appointed by Donee Judge</th>
<th>Revenue: From Cases with Donee Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Donor</td>
<td>37.66*** 35.86*** 40.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.97) (13.18) (13.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,723 10,723 10,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.00 0.03 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, AttyCtrls</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Atty FEs</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents OLS regressions for all felony cases with indigent defense appointments in Harris County, Texas, from 2004-2018, at the attorney-judge pair level. The outcome variable in cols. (1)-(3) is total cases assigned by a judge to an attorney; in cols. (4)-(6), it is total revenue earned by an attorney across all cases assigned by a judge. "Multiple Donor" is a dummy variable that =1 if an attorney donated >=2 times to a judge; =0 for 0 or 1 donations. Cols. (2) and (5) include controls for attorney and judge characteristics as specified in the text. Cols. (3) and (6) include both attorney and judge fixed effects. All specifications include a constant variable control. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in cols. (1) and (4) and clustered at the judge-level elsewhere. *** = significant at 1% level.

Table A.4: Cases Assigned / Revenue Earned for Attys Who Donated Multiple Times to an Assigning Judge v. Other Donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Cases: Appointed by Donee Judge</th>
<th>Revenue: From Cases with Donee Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Donor</td>
<td>36.92*** 37.29** 40.72***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.98) (14.10) (12.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,186 5,186 5,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.01 0.03 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, AttyCtrls</td>
<td>NO YES NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge, Atty FEs</td>
<td>NO NO YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for all felony cases with indigent defense appointments in Harris County, Texas, from 2004-2018, at the attorney-judge pair level. The sample is limited to attorneys who contributed to at least one judge during the sample period. The outcome variable in cols. (1)-(3) is total cases assigned by a judge to an attorney; in cols. (4)-(6), it is total revenue earned by an attorney across all cases assigned by a judge. "Multiple Donor" is a dummy variable that =1 if an attorney donated multiple times to a judge; =0 for 0 or 1 donations. Cols. (2) and (5) include controls for attorney and judge characteristics as specified in the text. Cols. (3) and (6) include both attorney and judge fixed effects. All specifications include a constant variable control. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust in cols. (1) and (4) and clustered at the judge-level elsewhere. *** = significant at 1% level.