2020

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Stone Monuments and Flexible Laws: Removing Confederate Monuments Through Historic Preservation Laws

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Abstract: This essay is a comment on an article by Jess Phelps and Jessica Owley, Etched in Stone: Historic Preservation Law and Confederate Monuments, published last year by the Florida Law Review. Contrary to their claims, historic preservation law does not seriously impede the removal or contextualization of Confederate memorials. The tangled and toxic heritage they signify does. The law rather creates the context within which parties contend about the meaning and continuing value of these monuments. Preservation law is not so much “etched in stone,” as a living requirement that we collectively, carefully address what remnants of the past to retain and what to discard.

Jess Phelps and Jessica Owley present an informative and useful account of how historic preservation laws might complicate or prevent efforts to remove Confederate monuments.¹ Many lawyers and activists will be grateful for this guidance. However, Phelps and Owley overstate the burden historic preservation laws impose on such removal and ignore the benefits that of the administrative processes they provide. They claim that our preservation laws embody a “relatively frozen approach to cultural protection” and the heritage preservation should not be “etched in stone.” While preservation restrictions should reflect greater cultural dynamism than may be common now, they already facilitate changing perceptions of significant heritage to an impressive extent. Failing to recognize this inadvertently plays into an ignorant and hostile narrative about preservation law as elitist and undemocratic.²

Phelps and Owley discuss a variety of federal, state, and local laws. Of these, the laws that most directly prevent removal of confederate monuments are state statutes directly prohibiting local governments and state instrumentalities, such as state universities, from removing war memorials from public property.³ Despite the specious claims of some sponsors, such preemption legislation cannot be considered to be bona fide preservation law. These statutes lack most of the features of the leading and exemplary preservation laws, which have been enacted at the federal or local levels. They entirely lack any requirements for historical documentation, consultation among experts and affected citizens, or reputable findings of historic or cultural significance. Rather they are political efforts of state legislators to confirm a particular view of the past held by their base supporters.⁴ While Phelps and Owley are right

² For a particularly distressing example of a poorly reasoned diatribe apparently based on complete ignorance of historic preservation law, see Lior Jacob Stahlilevitz, Historic Preservation and Its Even Less Authentic Alternative, in Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys, eds., EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 108 (2017).
⁴ As Professor Bray has shown, such legislation reflects the political divide between rural conservative forces at the state level and more progressive outlooks at the municipal level Zachary Bray, We Are All Growing Old Together: Making Sense of America’s Monument-Protection Laws, 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. ---- (forthcoming 2020).
to include these state monument laws among those that advocates for removal must overcome, it is misleading to list them among preservation laws. From a serious historic preservation perspective, all these state monument statutes should be replaced by laws treating Confederate monuments like any other cultural resource.

Before engaging with the legal issues, a brief discussion of why removal of Confederate monuments usually will not offend the norms of historic preservation may be helpful. The purposes of historic preservation include the conservation of the physical remains of the past that express the significance of past people, events, movements, and places in order to give contemporary people a sense of orientation to and meaning from their cultures and places.\(^5\) Plainly, not every building or structure from the past can or should be saved from the normal processes of decay or replacement. Monuments generally are problematic subjects for preservation. Under the widely influential standards for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, “properties primarily commemorative in nature” normally are not eligible for listing.\(^6\) The reasons for this can be inferred from the other types of resources normally not eligible, such as graves and reconstructed buildings. Such resources are created consciously to shape cultural memory and often reflect biases that promote a fictitious or propagandistic narrative about the subject.\(^7\) In the language of the National Park Service Bulletin explaining the criteria:

> Commemorative properties are designed or constructed after the occurrence of an important historic event or after the life of an important person. They are not directly associated with the event or with the person's productive life, but serve as evidence of a later generation's assessment of the past.\(^8\)

Put more bluntly, monuments do not reliably tell us about the subject being commemorated, but only about the mindset of those promoting the commemoration.

The normal exclusion of a monument from the National Register can be overcome “if design, age, tradition, or symbolic value has invested it with its own exceptional significance”. A clear example of a Civil War monument of exceptional aesthetic significance would be Augustus Saint-Gaudens' 1897 relief sculpture of Colonel Robert Shaw leading the Massachusetts 54th Regiment, the first unit composed of African American troops and white officers, which has been termed “America's greatest

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\(^6\) 36 C.F.R §60.4. Section 106 of the NHPA applies to all properties eligible for listing on the National Register, whether actually listed or not. Thus, the standards for listing are more important than the process for listing. This contrasts with local preservation laws, where properties are not protected unless they are actually designated or listed.

\(^7\) “But what makes public monuments so interesting is that they constitute highly self-conscious attempts to create a culture that determines what is politically correct – i.e., the honoring of certain persons or causes.” Sanford Levinson, *Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies* 151 (rev. ed. 2018)

Very few Civil War memorials achieve a high level of aesthetic value, and those that do usually can be moved from public prominence without losing their aesthetic significance.\(^9\)

Far more complicated is the assessment of the historic significance of Confederate monuments as expressing the viewpoints of the Southern whites who erected them. Notoriously, Confederate monuments were erected in prominent public locations throughout the South primarily during the period of intensifying Jim Crow subordination of African Americans to convey a heroic “Lost Cause” interpretation of the Civil War and bolster white supremacy.\(^11\) No doubt for some at the time, simple honoring of the sacrifice of former soldiers living and dead played a part in the commemoration movement. Thus, the National Park Bulletin provides an example of a monument eligible for listing: “A late 19th century statue erected on a courthouse square to commemorate Civil War veterans would qualify if it reflects that era's shared perception of the noble character and valor of the veterans and their cause.” But historic scholarship has firmly rooted the rapid spread of Confederate monuments between 1895 and 1930 as part of a renewed push to institutionalize black subordination.\(^12\) And in recent years, zeal for preserving these monuments has been embraced primarily by neo-Confederate organizations, many of which espouse toxic forms of white nationalism. The public demand to remove these monuments today often represents popular efforts by local communities to reject resurgent, sometimes violent claims of white supremacy. Whatever heritage or aesthetic values these monuments may possess are dwarfed by the danger they pose to African Americans, Jews, and community peace. No community should be legally obligated to maintain public monuments supporting contemporary claims of white supremacy.\(^13\) The preservation challenge here is to engage with Confederate monuments in a manner that respects the complex realities of Southern heritage, where, as Faulkner famously wrote: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”\(^14\)

Defenders of Confederate monuments sometimes argue that removal is a denial of history.\(^15\) But this is a gross simplification. The Jim Crow era, the period for which the monuments have historic

\(^{9}\)https://www.nps.gov/saga/learn/historyculture/the-shaw-memorial.htm.

\(^{10}\)The regulations providing the standards for listing on the National register “ordinarily” remove from eligibility “structures that have been moved,” but then except from the exclusion those that are significant primarily for “architectural value,” within which should be included the aesthetic value of a monument. 36 C.F.R. §60.4.


\(^{12}\)Recognizing the centrality of white supremacy to Confederate memorials does not deny that other motives were mixed in many instances. One theme often present in the post-Reconstruction period was “reconciliation” – a joint celebration of white heroism in the Civil War, which ignored slavery as a cause of the war and also the plight of African-Americans in the South. See Michael Kammen, Mystic Cords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture 106-115 (Vintage ed. 1993).

\(^{13}\)“Historic preservation reflects the present as well as the past. Decisions about preservation and presentation of a historic site of central cultural and political significance will always reflect the perspectives of contemporary society, especially those with power.” See J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic Preservation Law, 22 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 203, 268 (2009).

\(^{14}\)William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun

significance, is an important and painful era of history, but these heroic monuments to Confederate leaders are problematic resources for conveying that significance, because they cast a cloak of Romantic glory over the terrible cruelty and injustice of the racial subordination during that time. What continues to be socially necessary, and broadly supported by public opinion, are efforts to tell the truth about the brutal subordination of African Americans during that era, which included thoroughgoing economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, and social humiliation, all enforced through both official and vigilante violence. Commemorative endeavors like the Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama, presenting the legacy of slavery, lynching, and segregation, correct the false heritage tales of the “Lost Cause,” and speak to the continuing need to acknowledge and understand painful aspects of our national history.\(^{16}\) The heritage value of most Confederate monuments can be adequately preserved in museums, where their historical usage and the context of their time can be explained, or in battlefield parks, where they can serve their commemorative function.\(^{17}\)

Let us turn now to consideration the claims of Phelps and Owley that historic preservation laws are an impediment to removal of Confederate monuments. The authors provide a detailed account of the applicability of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA") on the removal of confederate monuments.\(^{18}\) They correctly note that the consultative process of 106 would need to be followed if a federal agency would remove a monument eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places, provide funds for such removal, or permit removal from federal land.\(^{19}\) However, Phelps and Owley cannot identify any case in which Section 106 prevented removal of a monument or even was successfully invoked to delay the removal of such a monument.\(^{20}\) They admit that Section 106 by its terms would never substantively bar removal of any historic property, but express concern that it would subject a federal agency to its procedures and thereby “discourage removal through its requirements for a costly, controversial, and time-consuming process.”\(^{21}\)

A federal administrative process to consider a proposal to remove a monument based on historic research, community consultation, and the weighing of alternatives and mitigation measures

\(^{16}\) Preserving and presenting sites that tell the histories of the struggles and accomplishment formerly marginalized people has become a central effort in the historic preservation field. See, e.g., Summer 2016 Forum Journal: The Full Spectrum of History: Prioritizing Diversity and Inclusion in Preservation, at https://forum.savingplaces.org/viewdocument/summer-2016-forum-jo.

\(^{17}\) Communities may successfully contextualize and preserve Confederate monuments in a way that places the Lost Cause ideology in a useful contemporary perspective. Arguably, Richmond Virginia has achieved that by placing in a prominent public location near its Confederate monuments, Kehinde Wiley’s bronze statue of a contemporary African American man in an heroic pose on horseback. See Gregory S. Schneider, In the Capital of the Confederacy, a New Monument and a Chance to Change the Narrative, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/in-the-capital-of-the-confederacy-a-new-monument-and-a-chance-to-change-the-narrative/2019/12/10/92c77468-1b6c-11ea-b4c1-0d0d91b60d9e_story.html. My comments in support of communities that want to remove Confederate monuments do not impugn inclusive decisions to create context rather than remove statues.

\(^{18}\) 54 U.S.C §

\(^{19}\) Etched in Stone at 641-50.

\(^{20}\) The National Environmental Policy Act would have an even more tangential application to confederate monuments because it applies only to “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” This presents an even higher threshold for a full review than does the NHPA threshold of a federal undertaking.

\(^{21}\) Etched in Stone at 650
likely would have substantial social value. Removal of confederate monuments is contentious because different people have radically different views of what the monuments signify. As discussed above, for proponents of removal, most such monuments primarily express a yearning to maintain white supremacy, but for defenders they may primarily commemorate the blood sacrifice of their ancestors, for a cause that an even smaller group believe to have been a noble attempt to maintain state sovereignty. The gulf between these narratives cries out for a civil and informed dialogue. Section 106 provides a public pathway for ascertaining facts about the erection of a particular monument, the clarification and critique of perspectives, and the search for acceptable mitigation. A historic preservation law with this potential, which at the end of the day will not constrain a federal agency’s choice of action, deserve commendation rather than criticism. How else can we collectively consider the significance and curate the physical remains of a contentious and racist history?

Sadly, some defenders of the monuments embrace explicitly the white supremacy ideology frequently inextricable from nostalgia for the Confederacy. Indeed, it has been the public celebration of Confederate monuments by persons chanting racist sentiments that have made retention of many such monuments intolerable. While local governments must respect the First Amendment rights of such deluded persons, a subject beyond the scope of this brief Comment, no local government must retain monuments expressing a destructive racist ideology. Removal of public monuments from public spaces does not violate the First Amendment, because it would constitute government speech and not prohibit the speech of any private person.

One place where the NHPA might discourage removal of Confederate monuments would be battlefield parks administered by the National Park Service (“NPS”). Many Civil War battlefields are listed as historic districts on the National Register and, since the historic monuments are on federal land, Section 106 surely would apply if removal were proposed. The NPS likely would resist removal of historic Confederate memorials from its battlefield parks to protect the heritage value of the public honoring of the soldiers engaged. In such a case, the determining factor would be the NPS’s sense of its mission the agency, although the decision would emerge from the Section 106 process. As noted above, Section 106 does not provide substantive protection to historic resources, only a process requiring study and consultation. Nonetheless, retention of most Confederate monuments on battlefield park sites seems appropriate. Civil War battlefields are very different from urban parks or courthouse squares. They do not directly address contemporary civic life. They provide interpretative context about both the Civil War and monuments for both armies. At Gettysburg, for example, exhibits in the Visitor Center explain both the centrality of slavery to the War and the motives of those who erected monuments. This is a location where the cultural and commemorative significance of Confederate monuments can be considered with the most benefit and least harm.

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25 See Byrne, Hallowed Ground, supra note 13, at 238-39.
In theory, local preservation laws pose a more complete barrier to removal of Confederate monuments. As Phelps and Owley explain, many local preservation ordinances bar or delay demolition and restrict the alteration, including relocation, of a designated landmark or structure contributing to a designated historic district. Thus, a historic preservation board or local legislature operating under such an ordinance could designate a statue of a Confederate soldier as a historic landmark in order to prevent its otherwise lawful removal. Such a monument would also receive legal protection against demolition if it is within a historic district, such as a courthouse square or residential neighborhood, and if it was erected there within the district’s period of significance.

However, incidents of local preservation laws protecting Confederate monuments seem rare or non-existent. In the one example Phelps and Owley cite, the Rockville, Maryland preservation commission permitted removal of a more than 100 year old statue of a Confederate soldier located within a historic district. The Rockville, Maryland preservation commission ruled that the statue did not contribute to the significance of the historic courthouse grounds, because it had been moved to the courthouse grounds only in 1971. The case seems to illustrate that preservation commissions can find grounds within their local law upon which to sanction removal of offensive monuments. The authors minimize the ease with which removal complied with local historic preservation laws by stressing that the fact of recent placement would be rare.

But there are a host of other reasons why local historic preservation laws have not and normally will not bar removal of Confederate monuments. First, statues are not often individually designated for historic protection. Unless a property is designated individually or as part of a historic district, local preservation laws do not protect it. This is in contrast to Section 106 of the NHPA, which applies to any property eligible for listing on the National Register, whether actually listed or not. Local commissions and legislative councils, who usually share designation roles in local laws, have discretion not to designate any property otherwise eligible. Local commissions would share the concerns expressed in the National Register standards for designating “properties primarily commemorative in nature,” but also may well respond to the desire of their constituents not to protect monuments with a racist provenance. Second, local governments already own or have jurisdiction over the most sensitive Confederate monuments, which are located conspicuously in public parks or the grounds of public

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26 Etched in Stone at 668-71.
27 Historic districts typically have established periods of significance specifying the time period when the properties that give significance to the district were built. Any individual property within the district built after the period of significance is not protected.
28 Etched in Stone at 669-70.
29 Id., at 670.
30 This discussion focuses on traditional local historic district ordinances, which strictly regulate demolition or alteration of historic resources. Recent innovations in preservation law, such as conservation districts or form-based coding, such as the path breaking approach in Hartford, Connecticut, promote neighborhood identity without restricting demolition. See National Trust for Historic Preservation, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: Planning and Administrative Practices (2018), at file:///C:/Users/byrne/Downloads/National%20Trust%20_Conservation%20Overlay_Detroit.pdf; Sara Bronin, Rezoning the Post-Industrial Hartford, 31 Property and Probate 44 (2017).
31 Bronin and Byrne, supra, at 91.
32 Federal agencies complying with Section 106 must survey the area likely to be affected by its undertaking to discover properties that may be eligible for listing on the National Register. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(b).
buildings. Local governments may feel that they need not designate properties they already control, because public properties are not threatened by commercial real estate development pressures.

Third, many communities never get to the point of considering whether their local laws permit removal of a Confederate memorial because other factors prevent reaching the legal question. Of course, state statutes prohibiting removal of Confederate monuments prevent local governments from exercising their local preservation laws. Virginia recently repealed its 1904 prohibitory law with one authorizing local governments to "remove, relocate, contextualize or cover" Confederate memorials. Cities such as Norfolk, Richmond, and Charlottesville previously have either decided to or seriously studied removing Confederate memorials, so now may we may have a chance to test whether their local preservation laws deter what seems to be a strong desire to act.

Some local communities never test their local preservation ordinance because they cannot reach a firm political decision. This may reflect a political stalemate between those repulsed by the monuments and those wishing to retain them. But it just as well may result from practical concerns such as overlapping authority over the memorial or site, costs concerns, and an inability to persuade any acceptable party to take custody of the monument. In the Rockville, Maryland case discussed by Phelps and Owley, the City refused to take possession of the "Johnny Reb" statue from Montgomery County because it lacked a suitable site for the 18 foot tall and 11,000 pound statue, and did not want to bear ongoing costs of upkeep and security. Eventually, the County offered the statue on Craigslist and it was acquired by a private ferry operator who appears to be a neo-Confederate enthusiast, an embarrassing outcome for the County. Few reputable entities seek to possess Confederate monuments. In short, all sorts of practical concerns can prevent a locality from agreeing on an acceptable plan of removal regardless of its leeway under its local preservation law.

Finally, once a local government decides to remove a memorial it has ample authority to do so, regardless of its preservation law. Local preservation laws can be superseded by subsequent local legislation. Many local governments keep political control over the designation process, but even if that decision is largely delegated to a historical preservation commission, exceptions can be made by legislation. In many cases, legislation will be required to remove the memorial because it must be disposed of, contracts let to remove, transport, and install it, and funds appropriated. Pertinent legislation can easily provide that the local preservation law shall be no impediment to the project. Preservationists understandably dislike ad hoc legislative exceptions to existing protections, but Confederate monuments already are in a class by themselves.

Phelps and Owley mention the Washington, DC, provision by which the "Mayor’s Agent" can authorize the demolition or removal of landmark or contributing property to a historic district when necessary to construct a project of "special merit." Removing a designated monument offensive to many citizens as an expression of white supremacy might be found to meet the standard for a special

36 D.C. Code §6-1104(e).
merit, which is defined as “plan or building having significant benefits to the District of Columbia or to the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land planning, or social or other benefits having a high priority for community services.” 37 However, there never has been a case where special merit has been found solely though elimination. Such a removal would qualify most easily if a statute of, say, former Confederate General Albert Pike was replaced by a statue of an honored former DC resident such as Frederick Douglass. 38 While this replacement could be accomplished by statute, 39 proceeding though the Special Merit process would generate an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact, which would be educational and address the competing narratives of local heritage. While few local historic preservation ordinances contain special merit provisions, all should. 40

Phelps and Owley also provide a careful analysis of the role of conservation and preservation easements in preventing or complicating the removal of Confederate monuments, as one would expect from two of the leading scholars of conservation easement law. They circumscribe the issue when they state that they suggest that “making donation of a conservation easement solely protecting a Confederate monument [would] be an unlikely occurrence.” 41 They also recognize that easement holders and property owners have flexibility to amend protective easements, even if doing so requires careful lawyering, and that third parties generally lack standing to object. 42

They do explore two situations where modifying a historic preservation easement would be more complicated. First, they consider Confederate monuments on privately-owned battlefields protected by a conservation easement. They note that it would “present a very real challenge to conservation easement-holders who have to balance and assess whether additional interpretation, modification, or removal of the monument is barred under the terms of the easement.” 43 Careful and creative interpretation of such an easement, however, does not seem like an undue hardship for a non-profit battlefield land trust, the usual easement holder. More broadly, a land trust’s decision does not affect today’s civic life to any degree comparable to a municipality, because there is no government affirmation behind the monument. 44 Finally, as argued above, rural battlefields telling the story of important battles and containing memorial to both armies seem the best or least bad location for Confederate monuments. 45

Second, the authors describe the more complex situation where Baltimore’s mayor removed several Confederate monuments subject to easements held by the Maryland Historic Trust (“MHT”), a

37 Id. §1102(11).
40 GMU article
41 Etched in Stone at 680.
42 Id., at 684-85. Admittedly, property owners would not easily agree to modify and easement if it endangered an earlier tax deduction for a charitable contribution of land.
43 Id., at 682.
44 Private land trusts have First Amendment rights to determine their messages that also differentiate them from government sponsors of monuments.
45 The position of the American Battlefield Trust in support of retaining monuments is given here: https://www.battlefields.org/letter-protect-our-battlefield-monuments.
state agency. MHT took the easements in 1984 as the result of its funding maintenance of the statues, which stood on public land. The mayor acted without MHT consent, which violates the terms of the easement. This case is far more sensitive than any battlefield case, because the statues stood on public land in a city roiled by racial unrest. Phelps and Owley properly indicate the legal troubles that could emerge from this mix, but risk appearing naïve in concluding that Baltimore has been “fortunate” that neither MHT nor the state attorney general has legally challenged the removal.46 No Maryland official wants to exercise their legal authority to force Baltimore to remount monuments rejected by the overwhelming sentiment of Baltimore citizens.47 The continuing problem with these monuments is that no one wants to take possession of them: they remain “hidden from the public inside a small pen made of Jersey barriers.”48

Conclusion

Historic preservation law does not seriously impede the removal or contextualization of Confederate memorials. The tangled and toxic heritage they signify does. The law may create the context within which parties contend about the meaning and continuing value of these monuments. Preservation law has many gaskets through which the vile humors of our past can be dissipated. Phelps and Owley gave a useful account of the machinery of preservation but do not fully credit the extent to which in application it permits people today to shape the heritage needed to foster the contemporary culture we aspire to. Preservation law is not so much “etched in stone,” as a living requirement that we collectively, carefully address what remnants of the past to retain and what to discard.

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46 Etched in Stone at 684-85.
48 Colin Campbell, Baltimore’s Confederate statues were removed in the dead of night. 2 years later, they languish on a city lot, Bal. Sun, Sept. 26, 2019, at https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-confederate-monuments-20190926-3ionc4ekhrdllpp72uld7npzdm-story.html. Reports that MHT is continuing to require Balto to report on status of he monuments.