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Tax Now or Tax Never: Political Optionality and the Case for Current-Assessment Tax Reform

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TAX NOW OR TAX NEVER: POLITICAL OPTIONALITY AND THE CASE FOR CURRENT-ASSESSMENT TAX REFORM

DAVID GAMAGE & JOHN R. BROOKS**

The U.S. income tax system is broken. Due to the realization doctrine and taxpayers' consequent ability to defer taxation of gains, taxpayers can easily minimize or avoid the taxation of investment income, a failure that is magnified many times over when considering the ultra-wealthy. As a result, this small group of taxpayers commands an enormous share of national wealth yet pays paltry taxes relative to the economic income their wealth produces—a predicament that this Article condemns as being economically, politically, and socially harmful.

The conventional view among tax law experts has assumed that the problems created by the realization doctrine can be fixed on the back end by adjusting the rules that govern taxation at the time of realization. Specifically, most tax scholars have favored reform proposals that would retain the realization doctrine while aiming to impose taxes in a way that would erase or reduce the financial benefits of deferral. Examples include retrospective capital gains tax reforms, progressive consumption tax reforms, and more incremental reforms such as ending stepped-up basis.

However, this Article argues that these future-assessment reform proposals ignore a crucial additional problem of deferral—political optionality. If there is a many-year or longer gap between when either income is earned or wealth is
accrued and when tax is assessed, then any number of things can happen in the interim to undermine the eventual assessment and collection of tax. This Article explains three sets of pressures that tend to erode future-assessment reforms over time: (1) policy drift and the need for incremental bolstering of tax reforms, (2) the time value of options, and (3) federal budget rules and related political incentives.

By contrast to future-assessment reforms, this Article explains how current-assessment reforms—like wealth tax or accrual-income tax reform proposals—are relatively resistant to these pressures. As this Article demonstrates, both theory and historical experience reveal that future-assessment reforms are fragile and often fail—and that ultra-wealthy taxpayers are well aware of this. Therefore, accounting for the implications of political optionality, only current-assessment reforms are likely to succeed at meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy and fixing the personal tax system.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. tax system does a very poor job of taxing the ultra-wealthy.1 Consider, for example, Larry Ellison—the founder and still largest shareholder of the software company Oracle, whose net worth as of September 2021 was in the neighborhood of $118 billion, making him the seventh-richest person in the world.2 Ellison has used this wealth to, among other things, build a $270 million yacht3 and a $200 million home (one of many),4 and buy the Hawaiian island of Lanai for $300 million.5 Of course, it is not surprising that a person with wealth like that spends it accordingly—except that Ellison famously has sold very little of his Oracle stock.6 And for a long time, he had a base salary of only $1 per year as CEO of Oracle.7 So where does the spending money come from? He fuels this consumption out of a $10 billion personal credit line.8

1. See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2018) (“With these changes, Congress has taken a hammer to a progressive income tax system that was already broken.”); Mark P. Gergen, How To Tax Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (“It is well known that the existing system in the United States for taxing capital income is a mess.”); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 920 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax] (“Taxes on capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary.”). As we will elaborate on in Section I.A, we use the phrase “ultra-wealthy” to refer to households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of wealth in the United States, a group that is estimated to consist of approximately 175,000 households who collectively own between 15% and 20% of national wealth.
Why would one of the richest men in the world take on such debt? Selling just a fraction of his stock would pay for all of his purchases and more. The answer is simple: taxes. At today’s capital gains rates, selling the stock necessary to cover that potential $10 billion of spending would mean cutting a check to the federal government for over $2 billion. Instead, Ellison is taking advantage of one of the most powerful tax avoidance strategies that exists—simply not realizing gain. Ellison, or his estate, will eventually have to pay any borrowed money back. Nevertheless, by deferring any realization of gain until some theoretical future date, Ellison has at least lowered—or likely wiped out entirely—any tax due.

Most Americans predominantly earn wage and salary income, which the U.S. income tax measures reasonably well. By contrast, the ultra-wealthy predominantly earn income that arises from the returns to owning wealth (or that can be made to appear as though it arises from the returns to owning wealth), which the U.S. income tax system measures dreadfully. Because the U.S. income tax system is so bad at reaching the returns to owning wealth, an ultra-wealthy person could, to a first approximation, earn over $10 billion and spend it on islands and yachts without ever paying income tax.

This deep failure of the U.S. income tax system has implications beyond just the windfall for the ultra-wealthy. As we will explain, this state of affairs...
likely violates even the minimal fairness requirement that the personal income tax not be regressive. This state of affairs also harms economic efficiency because the tax-gaming techniques that the ultra-wealthy use to lower their tax burdens are wasteful and economically damaging. Further, this state of affairs undermines both the administrability and the integrity of the entire U.S. tax system, as the tax system struggles to cope with the destructive effects of the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming. In a sense, the problems caused by the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming thus “trickle down,” creating harmful complexity, along with traps for the unwary, that results in inefficiencies and unfairness affecting many ordinary taxpayers.

But why is the U.S. tax system so bad at measuring the economic income of the ultra-wealthy? The chief reason is that the U.S. income tax is realization-based and consequently allows tax on investment income to be deferred. taxpayers have devised techniques, some very simple, some quite complex, for delaying realization of their investment income so that the tax is not owed in the years in which that income is earned or generated but is instead assessed only at some future date or, often, never. As the economist C. Eugene Steuerle has explained, “[most investment] income earned never is taxed at the individual level, in part because assets are often not sold and their gains never subject to income tax, in part because [investment] income benefits from a long list of tax preferences, and in part because of outright evasion.”

17. By “regressive” we mean where the share of a person’s income paid in taxes goes down as income rises, which would be a violation of simple vertical equity. This is in contrast to the typical “progressive” income tax, where the share of income paid in taxes increases as income rises. See, e.g., C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253, 268 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Steuerle, Equal (Tax) Justice].

18. As in prior work, we use the term “gaming” to include legal forms of tax avoidance, illegal forms of tax evasion, and the large category of tax-planning transactions that are neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal. See David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 5 n.18 (2014).


20. We use the terms “investment income” and “returns to owning wealth” interchangeably, using both terms to refer to income that can be characterized as being derived from the returns to owning wealth (as opposed to pure wage and salary income and the like), so that tax on this income can be deferred under the rules of the existing U.S. income tax. We use these terms instead of the more commonly used term “capital income” because the term “capital income” is used in disparate and often inconsistent ways by different tax scholars and tax authorities. In particular, much of the income that qualifies for deferral under the existing income tax falls outside of what economists would typically consider to be “capital income.” See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 62 (2011) (“When structured correctly, founders’ stock allows entrepreneurs to defer paying tax until they sell the stock . . . .”); see also Fleischer, Taxing Partnership Profits, supra note 13, at 3 (“By getting paid in part with carry instead of cash, fund managers defer the tax on income derived from their human capital.”).

Many prominent tax reform proposals would seek to eliminate opportunities for reducing or negating these deferred tax liabilities but retain the realization doctrine. We call these future-assessment tax reform proposals. The conventional thinking motivating these future-assessment reform proposals is that deferral need not be a problem, in and of itself, so long as deferred tax liabilities are eventually taxed at high enough rates to eliminate the tax advantages from deferral. For instance, most of the major income tax reform proposals would operate in this fashion, as would most of the major consumption tax reform proposals, as well as most other proposals for what are sometimes called “retrospective” style tax reforms. The theory is that if any future tax would be the present-value equivalent of a current tax (which today it is not), then the timing of the tax ought to be irrelevant.

As we argue here, however, the assumption that a future-assessed tax could be as effective as a currently-assessed tax is deeply flawed. Instead, to meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy—and thereby start to repair our broken income tax system—current-assessment tax reform is required.

By current assessment we mean any set of rules that actually collects tax in the same time period in which income is earned or accrued, or alternatively, in the same time period as when wealth or spending power is accumulated.

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23. See infra Part III for a discussion of retrospective capital gains tax, progressive consumption tax reform proposals, and more incremental income tax reform proposals like ending stepped-up basis. For other examples of “retrospective"-style tax reforms, see, for example, Greg Leiserson, Taxing Wealth, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE 89, 107–14 (Emily Moss, Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn eds., 2020) (proposing both realization-based accrual tax and realization-based wealth tax reforms); James Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 194 (2015) (proposing a "revenue capital tax"). Perhaps even more important than future-assessment approaches for fundamental tax reforms, many scholars and commentators have argued that it would be better to just incrementally patch the existing income tax by improving compliance and removing major loopholes—especially by removing § 1014’s step-up in basis. But see infra Section III.C.3 (discussing why this approach would likely fail). These more incremental approaches to reform would preserve the realization-based nature of the income tax, and we thus consider these to be future-assessment approaches for reform. That is, even though these reforms might limit deferral somewhat as compared to the status quo and thereby make the income tax slightly less future-assessment oriented, these approaches would still mostly maintain both deferral and the broader future-assessment nature of the income tax, making it appropriate in our view to label these as future-assessment reforms. For examples of such incremental reform proposals, see Natasha Sarin, Lawrence H. Summers & Joe Kupferberg, Tax Reform for Progressivity: A Pragmatic Approach, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE, supra, at 317, 333; David Kamin, How To Tax the Rich, 146 TAX NOTES 119, 124–29 (2015).
Examples include wealth taxes, mark-to-market or other accrual income taxes, and even consumption taxes implemented along with prepayment or withholding mechanisms.

Central to any current-assessment system is the need to value assets at a point prior to sale or other realization, so that any unrealized gain can be measured and taxed. It is partially because of this need for asset valuation that most tax policy scholars and tax reform advocates have disfavored current-assessment reforms. While the realization doctrine has historical roots in outdated notions of what can be considered “income” (conceptually and for purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment), the standard view today is that realization is a “necessary evil” because it is difficult to do annual valuations of relatively illiquid assets, such as shares in private corporations, partnership interests, real estate, and artwork.

These valuation and related problems present real and difficult challenges. However, these challenges are surmountable, especially with regard to current-

24. A wealth tax, of course, does not tax income per se. But most proposals for annual wealth taxes would tax an amount less than the average returns to wealth, and thus can be seen as a way for the government to share in those returns as they accrue. This can be distinguished from one-time confiscatory taxes, such as a well-functioning estate tax.

25. A “mark-to-market” tax system would include in income (or loss) all increases (or decreases) in the value of assets held during the taxing period, regardless of whether those gains were realized through a sale or exchange.


27. For an explanation of progressive consumption taxes, see infra Section III.B.2.


29. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, 58 NORMOS 261, 262 (2017) (“Not only is an annual wealth tax susceptible to constitutional challenges, for example, but such a tax would be hobbled by valuation issues.”); Kamin, supra note 23, at 123 (“The problem—one of several long-standing objections to mark-to-market accounting and annual wealth taxes—is valuation.”); James R. Repetti, It's All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (“[V]aluation, which is the major difficulty in achieving an ideal income tax that periodically measures accretions to wealth is also the major difficulty in achieving an ideal wealth tax.”).

30. “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For issues with what constitutes “income” for these purposes, see, for example, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–09 (1920); John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 253, 268 (2018) [hereinafter Brooks, Definitions of Income]; Edwin R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 517, 518 (1919).

31. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (1998) (“[Realization] is typically justified as a necessary evil, in that alternatives—such as taxing unrealized gains . . . are not administrable or politically feasible.”).
assessment reforms targeted at only the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, recent scholarly and law-reform work shows how current-assessment reforms can be designed to be superior at valuation as compared to the existing U.S. income tax.\footnote{32} In any case, there are a number of prior proposals that we think would do a sufficiently decent job of mitigating these challenges while enacting reasonably effective current-assessment reforms.\footnote{33} The point being that solutions to these problems exist, even if these solutions are not perfect. These proposals have different strengths and weaknesses, and fully evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the various existing proposals for current-assessment reforms is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article argues that we should adopt one of these proposals, or else develop better ones, because a current-assessment reform is necessary to fix our broken income tax. We must tax now, or else risk taxing never.

Current-assessment tax reform is needed because the U.S. political system is not up to the task of maintaining a system for sufficiently taxing deferred tax liabilities for long enough to adequately collect such tax. Allowing an extended time between passing a reform and actually collecting tax opens up too many opportunities for administrative maneuvering, for the development of new avoidance techniques, for a change in fundamental economic conditions, or for simply waiting for a change in political power.\footnote{34}

Put another way, it is entirely plausible that a new governing coalition could be elected at some point in the coming years with sufficient votes to enact a major tax reform with the goal of fixing how the existing tax system is broken


\footnote{34} \textit{See infra} Part III.
with respect to the ultra-wealthy. But if this reform is a future-assessment reform, it is implausible to expect that this coalition would remain in power long enough, while maintaining sufficient commitment to bolstering its tax reform throughout, to prevent new opportunities from emerging in the future for taxpayers to negate or reduce their deferred tax liabilities. We argue that the most likely outcome is an incremental weakening of the reform in the face of these forces, perhaps culminating in outright repeal after a shift in political power. And this process is made easier because a future-assessment reform that has yet to collect much revenue is distinctly disadvantaged politically and budgetarily.

To clarify this argument, we distinguish here between two benefits of deferral. Almost universally when the prior literature has referred to the tax benefit of deferral, that literature has considered only the benefits baked into existing law. These include, for example, taking advantage of the time value of money by delaying realization or waiting for the § 1014 step-up in basis, which wipes out all predeath gains when assets are passed to heirs. But the literature has mostly ignored a second benefit of deferral for wealthy taxpayers, which we refer to as the political-optionality benefit of deferral. In short, deferring the point at which the law imposes tax gives taxpayers time and opportunity to wait for the law to weaken or change—and even to lobby for such a change.

History shows time and again that ultra-wealthy taxpayers are well aware of the limits of the U.S. political system and can thus be expected to defer their tax liabilities while waiting for future opportunities to permanently negate or reduce their deferred tax liabilities. Thus, it is not enough to continue to rely on realization to trigger taxation in the future while hoping to impose a present-value equivalent tax at that time. Unless some as-of-yet unknown mechanism can be created to stop taxpayers from reducing or negating deferred tax

35. See infra Section III.A.1.
36. See infra Section III.A.3.
38. See infra Section III.C.3.
39. Important exceptions to this oversight in the literature include David Kamin & Jason S. Oh, The Effects of Capital Gains Rate Uncertainty on Realization 32–33 (UCLA Sch. of L., Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 19-06, 2019), and Daniel Hemel, Taxing Wealth in an Uncertain World, 72 NAT’L TAX J. 755, 768–69 (2019) [hereinafter Hemel, Taxing Wealth]. We have been aided in this project by these papers and our conversations with the authors. As we will elaborate on in Part III, portions of our arguments in this project generalize and extend similar ideas developed previously by Kamin and Oh. Hemel’s Taxing Wealth, which was written at the same time as early drafts of this Article, also has some overlaps. That said, this Article departs from these papers and the prior literature by developing a more comprehensive theoretical and normative case for how and why political optionality infects tax policy and motivates the case for current-assessment tax reforms.
40. See infra Section III.C.
liabilities in the future, no tax reform that permits deferral will succeed at fixing how the personal tax system is broken.

This Article explains three sets of pressures that tend to undermine future-assessment reforms over time, but that current-assessment reforms are relatively resistant to. The first set of pressures arises from policy drift and the need for incremental bolstering of major tax reforms.\textsuperscript{41} As this Article elaborates, the nature of tax politics creates asymmetric pressures that tend to push toward undermining tax reforms—especially reforms targeted at the ultra-wealthy. Consequently, it is crucial that as many key mechanics of a major tax reform as possible be implemented at or immediately following the time of the reform’s enactment, while the initial reform coalition still retains its strength and commitment to the reform. Because future-assessment reforms put off the actual assessment and collection of tax, such reforms also put off the time when key administrative decisions and technical corrections are made. This makes it dramatically more likely that the reform will be substantially undermined over time.

The second set of pressures arises from the time value of options.\textsuperscript{42} Future-assessment reforms give taxpayers the choice of when to realize their tax liabilities—when to exercise the option value of deciding in which future political regime a deferred tax liability will be realized, assessed, and paid. This creates strong incentives for ultra-wealthy taxpayers both to wait for future legal or political changes (favorable to them) and to lobby and exert other political pressures in the hopes of creating such future changes.

The third set of pressures arises from federal budget rules and resulting political incentives.\textsuperscript{43} For federal budget scoring purposes, much of the tax revenue that might theoretically be raised by a future-assessment tax reform will show up outside of the budget window. This makes it much more politically difficult to legislatively bolster and strengthen such reforms while making it much easier politically to legislatively weaken such reforms.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I further clarifies how the existing U.S. income tax system is broken. Part II argues that this brokenness creates serious unfairness and inefficiencies that weaken the entire existing tax system and that motivate our call for reform. Finally, Part III explains the three sets of pressures that tend to undermine future-assessment reforms—pressures that current-assessment reforms are relatively resistant to—developing these explanations based on theory and an examination of specific future-assessment reform proposals as well as the history of prior reform attempts.

\textsuperscript{41} See infra Section III.A.1.
\textsuperscript{42} See infra Section III.A.2.
\textsuperscript{43} See infra Section III.A.3.
I. THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM IS BROKEN

A central motivation of this Article is that taxation of the ultra-wealthy is both necessary and currently inadequate, and that this failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is a systemic problem that undermines the overall income tax system. The problem is not merely that some rich people get marginally richer. Rather, the manner in which the tax system benefits the ultra-wealthy reveals core problems and threatens the integrity of the tax system itself.44

In this part we begin with a description of the ultra-wealthy and the nature of their income and wealth. The key point is that “[t]hey are different from you and me”45 in the ways that they earn income and acquire wealth, and therefore how they interact with the tax system. Based on those differences, we then turn to how the income tax system is broken. The income tax system does a reasonably good job of taxing income in the forms of wages and salaries but does a very poor job of reaching investment income.46 (Readers already familiar with how investment income is currently only scantily taxed may wish to skip or skim Part I.)

A. Who Are the Ultra-Wealthy?

The focus of this Article is on the taxation of a particular subgroup of American taxpayers that we label as the “ultra-wealthy.”47 By this we mean tax
households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of wealth in the United States. This is, to be clear, a relatively small group—approximately 235,000 individuals or 175,000 tax households—though they collectively own as much as $12 trillion in wealth.

So, who are they and what does their financial picture look like? We should say at the outset that comprehensive and reliable data on wealth distribution is thinner than for income. Much of the information we have is from government surveys, which have some weakness in tracking some forms of privately held wealth and attributing them to individuals. That said, we can still know to a reasonably high degree of certainty that certain types of wealth are held by the class as a whole, even if we cannot assign it to particular individuals.

In a recent paper, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, two of the leading economists studying income and wealth inequality, use a range of methodologies to estimate that these 175,000 households in 2019 owned between 12% and 14% of national wealth, with a minimum wealth of at least $28 million per household. Because these levels are estimated using a variety of methods, including estate tax data, the Survey of Consumer Finances (“SCF”),

successful taxation of the ultra-wealthy requires use of a current-assessment mechanism (as we will argue in Part III).

48. Over time, the top taxpayers by wealth will roughly correspond to the top taxpayers by income, but income-based measurements tend to fluctuate more over time as compared to wealth-based measurements. Thus, the top taxpayers by income in any particular year will correspond less with the top taxpayers by wealth as compared to considering the top taxpayers by income across a longer time frame.


52. Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 460 tbl.2. Although there has been some debate about other estimates made by Saez and Zucman, most notably their revenue estimates for wealth tax proposals and their estimates for the overall distributional incidence of the entire tax system, see infra notes 72 & 113–14, their estimates that we report above seem to be in a similar range to corresponding estimates made by other notable economists. For instance, Smith et al. report that there are approximately 238,700 individuals in the top 0.1%, and that these individuals control approximately 14.3% of national wealth, with a minimum wealth of approximately $14 million per individual. Smith et al., supra note 49, at 68 tbl.1.
and the Forbes 400 list, we cannot say precisely what the income composition of this group is. But we can instead look at the 0.1% of households in terms of income, which is likely to have substantial overlap with the top 0.1% of wealth-holders. For this group, the largest single income component is capital gains, and the combination of capital gains, business income, and other forms of investment income (like interest and dividends) make up roughly 70–75% of their total income.\textsuperscript{55}

The balance of wage income and investment income in the earnings of the ultra-wealthy has varied over time. In the last period of dramatic wealth and income inequality, the 1920s, salaries made up an even smaller share of the income of the ultra-wealthy than today.\textsuperscript{56} In the immediate post-World War II period, investment and business income were relatively low, and so salary income made up a larger relative share of income.\textsuperscript{57} When inequality started to grow again in the late 1970s and 1980s, salary income was a big driver, leading some researchers to speculate that “superstars”—those who could demand huge payments for their skills, such as athletes, actors, and CEOs—were driving the increase in inequality.\textsuperscript{58} In recent decades, however, financial investment income, especially capital gains, has returned with a vengeance. Today we can comfortably say that the vast majority of the income of this ultra-wealthy group is earned from their financial capital rather than their human capital.\textsuperscript{59}

If we narrow further to examine the top 0.01% of wealth-holders, these 17,500 households own wealth of at least $190 million per household, with an average wealth of around $365 million.\textsuperscript{60} Saez and Zucman estimate using SCF data that the reported income of this group averages $11.6 million annually, but

\textsuperscript{53} Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 50, at 460–61 tbl.2.

\textsuperscript{54} Many of the people with the highest amounts of wealth will correspondingly also have some of the highest amounts of income.


\textsuperscript{56} See Atkinson et al., supra note 55, at 8 fig.3.

\textsuperscript{57} See id. at 8 fig.3, 43–45.


\textsuperscript{59} To be clear, portions of measured capital gains and returns to wealth holdings may result at least in part from these taxpayers’ labor efforts (think, for instance, of a superstar investor like Warren Buffett skillfully selecting stocks). Nevertheless, the key point for our purposes is that most of the economic income of the ultra-wealthy is earned in forms that our existing tax system deals with very poorly, rather than in the form of salaries and wages which our existing tax system deals with quite successfully.

they say that is underreported by about 50% given typical returns on wealth. 61 We can safely assume that all or nearly all of the underreported income is from investment, given typical avoidance and evasion strategies. Moreover, given these wealth levels, we can reasonably assume that the income generated by that wealth swamps whatever these taxpayers might be earning from salary or wages. 62

Ultimately, then, the story of the ultra-wealthy is a story of (a) enormous holdings of wealth and (b) the dominance of income from that wealth—that is, investment income—over income from salaries and wages. These first-order facts make the ultra-wealthy different from the vast majority of taxpayers, who generally have low or even negative wealth and who earn virtually all of their income from salaries and wages. 63

This difference supports our focusing this Article on the ultra-wealthy. Again, the existing income tax does a reasonable job at taxing income from salaries and wages (covering most of the income earned by most taxpayers outside of the ultra-wealthy). By contrast, the existing income tax is broken when it comes to taxing the investment income that composes most of the economic income earned by the ultra-wealthy.

B. How the Income Tax System Is Broken

The income tax system is broken because it relies on realization—that is, that most income from the appreciation of assets is only taxed when it is realized through a sale or exchange of those assets. For most taxpayers, realization is of little import since they have few appreciated assets, and what they have is already shielded from taxation anyway. 64 But for the ultra-wealthy, whose income comes via the accumulation of financial assets, realization is central.

Because of the realization-based nature of the income tax, the ultra-wealthy—though not only them—can take advantage of tax planning strategies that defer and then reduce, or even wipe out, the personal-level tax on investment income. Some strategies for accomplishing this are sophisticated and aggressive, especially the use of offshore funds. 65 But even relatively simple

61. Id. at 465 tbl.3.
62. Even a relatively modest 3% return on wealth of $365 million would generate $10,950,000 of income in a year. Only in extreme cases does labor income approach that level.
63. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 4.
64. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(a) (exempting, inter alia, qualified pension plans from taxation); id. § 121 (excluding from gross income up to $500,000 of gain from the sale of a principal residence).
65. For a relatively easy-to-understand explanation of how this works, see Matt Levine, Taxes, Hedge Funds and an Incident, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-30/taxes-hedge-funds-and-an-incident [https://perma.cc/QD3B-6HM3 (dark archive)] (“That’s the basic idea of the ‘income defense industry,’ just finding places to point money-generating machines that won’t generate present taxation. That’s how the Bermuda-
strategies can be very effective. We describe these below to illustrate that the income tax system’s failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is based not (only) on obscure financial engineering, but rather on basic, core features of the income tax system that have been with us for over 100 years.

1. Strategy 1: Defer Realization of Gains

The simplest strategy of all is to simply not sell any appreciated assets—and to thereby not realize any taxable investment income from those assets—at least for a time.\(^{66}\) The income tax applies only to realized gains,\(^ {67}\) and so avoiding realization means avoiding tax on that investment income. To be clear, the appreciation in an asset is economic income regardless of whether the asset is sold or not.\(^ {68}\) But because the income tax only recognizes the income upon a sale, reported investment income (and resultant taxes collected) dramatically understates the amount of true economic income taxpayers derive from investment.\(^ {69}\) Even though market investment returns are generally in the range of 7–8% (and likely higher for the ultra-wealthy),\(^ {70}\) reported taxable returns of the ultra-wealthy are around 1–2%.\(^ {71}\) We can thus estimate that most ultra-

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66. Investment income can also come from dividends, interest, and similar payments that do not benefit from the realization rule. However, dividends in particular are increasingly out of favor. Many corporations have replaced dividends with stock buybacks, as stock buybacks allow a corporation to effectively distribute corporate-level earnings to shareholders while triggering less shareholder-level tax. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Gregg D. Polsky, There’s a Problem with Buybacks, but It’s Not What Senators Think, 162 TAX NOTES 765, 766–67 (2019). There are also nontax corporate finance reasons to favor buybacks. See Alex Edmans, The Case for Stock Buybacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-stock-buybacks (https://perma.cc/AB6E-BHJ5 (staff-uploaded, dark archive)).

67. Gross income includes “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” I.R.C. § 61(a)(3). “Gains” are the excess of the amount “realized from the sale or disposition of the property” over the adjusted basis of the property. Id. § 1001(a)–(b) (emphasis added).

68. See, e.g., HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).

69. As is typical in the academic tax literature, we use the terms “true” income, “real” income, and “economic” income—all interchangeably—to refer to Haig-Simons income (which includes unrealized appreciation). For elaboration on Haig-Simons income, see McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 314–16.

70. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Government Transfers and Wealth Inequality, MILKEN INST. REV. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/taxes-government-transfers-and-wealth-inequality [https://perma.cc/S2A3-53KF] (“The tendency to accrue capital gains but not expose them to taxation is especially relevant for those who accumulate great wealth. On average, they (or some ancestor) became rich by performing two somewhat uncommon acts. First, they saved (or invested through borrowed dollars) a much larger than average share of their income. Second, they achieved returns on their net investments that were well in excess of the average real rate of return of 6 or 7 percent enjoyed by the typical stock investor.”).

wealthy taxpayers only ever realize less than a quarter of their true investment income as taxable income.\textsuperscript{72}

Moreover, it is well-understood by tax scholars, analysts, and others—including the ultra-wealthy themselves—that even just deferring the realization of investment income lowers the effective tax rate on that income. This is because deferring tax on investment income allows the taxpayer to keep and continue to earn returns on what would otherwise have been the taxes paid.\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, even to the extent that a taxpayer eventually does pay tax, she still keeps the after-tax profits from that interim investment—the taxpayer literally can generate additional after-tax income just by deferring tax payments.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} See id. at 352 ("Consider individuals who received a 7 percent real return (and even higher nominal return) on their capital in the long term. Assume that for tax purposes they are among the majority shown here who reported taxable income of only 2 percent or less."). For a discussion of the anecdotal and more inferential evidence supporting this estimate, see McCaffery, \textit{Taxing Wealth Seriously}, supra note 15, at 329–31. Using more conservative assumptions, Saez and Zucman estimate that "top wealth holders have a fiscal income that is about or slightly less than half of their true economic income (defined as wealth times the average macroeconomic return to wealth)." Saez & Zucman, \textit{supra note 50}, at 466. This estimate is larger than the two-sevenths estimate from Bourne et al., \textit{supra note 71}, at 336, both because Saez and Zucman use more conservative estimates for the share of wealth reported as taxable income and because they then multiply this by "the average macroeconomic return to wealth" (which is lower than the 7 percent real return estimate used by Bourne et al.). Saez & Zucman, \textit{Progressive Wealth Taxation}, \textit{supra note 50}, at 466. Because Saez and Zucman purposefully err on the side of caution in the sense of biasing their estimates to the low end of the plausible range, we think the Bourne et al. estimates are probably more accurate, but this difference is not especially important for this Article’s purposes. See Steuerle, \textit{Individuals Pay Very Little}, \textit{supra note 15} ("The Bourne et al. estimates are similar to what I found in a study covering the more inflationary 1970s. In yet another study, I found that a select group of owners of businesses and farms subject to estate tax reported even lower taxable returns. And in a book published in the early 1980s, I showed how net income from capital reported on all individual tax returns was less than one-third of total capital income in the economy. Keep in mind, regardless of what they report on tax returns, top wealth holders often achieve very high actual returns on their assets. The merely wealthy commonly earn stock market returns of 7 to 10 percent per year, while truly rich investors often attained that status by earning even more. Warren Buffett revealed in one income tax return that he recognized only about 1/50th of 1 percent of his wealth as taxable income even though his primary asset, Berkshire-Hathaway stock, had been earning about 10 percent annually.").

\textsuperscript{73} To see this simply, suppose a person has some income in Year 1 that would generate a tax $T$ if paid in Year 1. If instead, the person could defer paying $T$ until Year 2, that would be the present value equivalent of $T / (1 + r)$ in Year 1, where $r$ is the standard discount rate (a risk-free rate of return). The intuition is that the person could invest $T / (1 + r)$ in Year 1 to generate $T$ in Year 2 and then pay the tax owed. If the person could defer paying the tax for $n$ years, the present value of the tax becomes $T / (1 + r)^n$, and thus approaches zero as $n$ gets larger. For example, if the Year 1 tax would have been $100$, but can be deferred for 20 years, and the discount rate is 5\%, the present value of the tax becomes just $38$—a person only needs to set aside $38$ in Year 1 rather than $100$.

\textsuperscript{74} Continuing the example in the prior footnote, another way to see the intuition is that the $100 of deferred tax could grow to $265$ in 20 years if invested at a 5\% return. In 20 years, the person would still have to pay the original $100 tax, plus a share of the $165 in growth—but they would still be left with $165(1 - r)$ after taxes.
2. Strategy 2: Never Realize Gains

Deferring gains generates a tidy return for owners of wealth even if eventually a gain is realized and taxes are fully paid. But we can go further, following not selling with never selling—that is, passing appreciated assets to heirs at death. At that point, § 1014 of the tax code allows a “step-up” in basis to the assets’ fair market values. This wipes out any unrealized, built-in gain in the assets when they pass to the taxpayer’s heirs. For the ultra-wealthy, who often do not consume more than a small fraction of their wealth during their lifetimes, this is especially important—the tax law essentially subsidizes the accumulation of large, dynastic wealth. In theory, the estate tax was intended to mitigate this, by taxing the transfer of wealth at death. But sophisticated estate planning techniques and political erosion of the tax itself means that the estate tax today is just something else to be planned around, with minimal impact on wealth accumulation.

3. Strategy 3: Consume from Untaxed Gains

But what about the share of wealth that a taxpayer does consume during her lifetime, and thus cannot be passed to heirs? Again, there are relatively simple strategies to reduce or negate the effective tax on any investment income that is used to fund consumption. To begin with, the taxpayer could engage in “tax-loss harvesting,” which simply means offsetting any realized gains with realized losses, so as to reduce or negate the net capital gains tax. For a wealthy taxpayer with a diverse portfolio, there will likely always be at least some losses to selectively realize, even when the portfolio as a whole is well in the black. Due to advances in financial technology and the rise of “robo-advisers,” these strategies are now widely available and used even by retail investors.

Going further, the taxpayer can engage in what Edward McCaffery has called the “buy, borrow, die” strategy. If an ultra-wealthy taxpayer needs more money to fund consumption than can be generated through tax-loss harvesting,
she can simply borrow that money, pledging the appreciated assets that she earlier bought (or created). This borrowing typically comes at some cost, but at current interest rates (especially from a bank that is probably very happy to have other business from the ultra-wealthy and their businesses), that cost can be very low, especially relative to the tax cost of realization. Moreover, the debt can then later be paid back after death by selling assets that can be sold at that time—thanks to §1014—without generating any taxable income.\textsuperscript{82} The overall result is a complete negation of all income tax on investment income, even if that income is transformed into cash to fund consumption.

4. Other Strategies

Section 1014 and its step-up in basis at death are not the only way to wipe out tax on investment income entirely. Another major tool is the ability to take a tax deduction for the full appreciated value of assets donated to charity—including to the taxpayer’s private foundation—without having to realize any capital gain on those assets.\textsuperscript{83} Of course, in this case the wealth also leaves the person’s hands as a legal matter. But if the cash is held by a private foundation the donor can still spend that wealth on the matters and issues they care about\textsuperscript{84} without ever paying any income tax on that wealth as it accumulated. Moreover, by combining this strategy with valuation-based gaming, many ultra-wealthy taxpayers succeed in cancelling out tax on much larger amounts of income than just the assets donated to charity.\textsuperscript{85}

The strategies go on and can become much more sophisticated, and often more aggressive, sometimes crossing the line to become outright tax evasion, for example through marketed tax shelters and the like.\textsuperscript{86} Essentially, all of these strategies rely on deferral in one way or another—devising techniques for the ultra-wealthy to defer realizing net capital gains, and ideally to defer any realization enough into the future that any gain can ultimately be wiped out through mechanisms such as §1014.

\textsuperscript{82} See supra Section I.B.2.
\textsuperscript{83} I.R.C. § 170(a), (e).
\textsuperscript{84} For example, for gifts to colleges the donor previously attended; gifts to colleges their children currently attend; recreational, conservational, or artistic activities they enjoy; or for political, social, or religious causes they support.
\textsuperscript{85} See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 275, 281–84 (2013).
\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 365 (2014) [hereinafter Gamage, The Case for Taxing] (“There are numerous variations on these sorts of distortionary responses, and they can often be very complicated—especially when the responses take advantage of partnership tax rules or the rules governing the taxation of financial products.”); Del Wright Jr., Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products To Bedevil the IRS (and How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 611–13 (2013) (discussing the recent history of tax shelters, other very aggressive tax planning strategies employed by the ultra-wealthy, and the difficulties the IRS has faced in policing such shelters and strategies).
To be clear, strategies for negating tax on investment income are not limited to the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, many banks and investment advisors now market securities-backed investment credit lines to the merely rich as well, to make the "buy, borrow, die" strategy explained above more accessible. But what separates the ultra-wealthy for our purposes is not just that they have access to particularly sophisticated investment and tax strategies (though they do), but rather the overwhelming dominance of investment income as a share of their total income. This fact makes even these plain-vanilla strategies especially powerful and dramatically lowers the effective tax rate on the total income of the ultra-wealthy.

Ironically, the ability for taxpayers to easily reduce the amount of their investment income subject to tax is also the primary justification for why we have lower tax rates on capital gains than on ordinary income. If the tax rate were higher, taxpayers would be expected to engage in even more tax planning and realize even fewer gains, such that tax revenue could drop. Due to these preferential rates, average tax rates on reported income of the top 0.01% are actually lower than they are for the next richest cohort, and this is before we even account for the tax benefit of using deferral to avoid reporting other income.

Therefore, one advantage of investment income begets a second advantage, compounding the preferences for the ultra-wealthy. As we will elaborate on below, this is a key factor in understanding how the personal income tax system is broken. The tax strategies that the ultra-wealthy use undermine the integrity and administrability of the entire tax system as it applies to ordinary taxpayers. And at the end of the day, this all flows back to realization and the ability to defer taxation of investment income. To

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88. See supra note 73.

89. See, e.g., Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 14 (“That is, above a tax rate on capital gains of roughly 30 percent, the Treasury would begin to lose revenues because taxpayers would respond by deferring realizing gains for much longer periods of time.”); McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 331–33.

meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy, we must thus counteract this “Achilles’ heel” of the tax system—we must end realization. 91

II. THE HIGH COSTS OF FAVORING THE ULTRA-WEALTHY

In Part I we explained how a basic feature of the U.S. income tax—its reliance on realization for the taxation of investment income—facilitates tax planning strategies that use deferral to lower, and often erase, the amount of that tax. In Part III, we will explain why sustainably ending deferral requires a current-assessment reform, that is, one that imposes tax now, rather than a future equivalent. But first, we explain here in more detail why the problems of deferral and favoring the ultra-wealthy are not just matters of simple fairness, but rather implicate the integrity of the entire tax system. In other words, even if we agree that the income tax system is broken, how broken is it?

Here we discuss ways in which the realization doctrine and deferral create harmful consequences for the tax system as a whole. In explaining these consequences, we also lay the groundwork for why a current-assessment reform is required. In particular, we discuss below how the realization doctrine leads to substantially lower tax revenue, unfairness and injustice in the relative treatment of different groups of taxpayers, economic inefficiency and waste, and tax system complexity and unadministrability. In broad strokes, these are the core failings of the entire tax system, and they can each be connected back to the realization doctrine and the resulting favoring of the ultra-wealthy.

A. Lost Tax Revenues

We begin with the simple math. For many years, scholars have been predicting that the U.S. government would need “substantially higher levels of tax revenues” even just to fund ongoing government operations. 92 These needs have been exacerbated by the reduced revenue and increased spending brought on by the recent economic downturn initiated by the coronavirus pandemic. 93 A number of reforms have been proposed to raise revenue—including especially


a Value Added Tax, which the United States is the only major industrialized country to lack. But large amounts of tax revenue could also come just from imposing tax on the ultra-wealthy commensurate with their levels of true income and wealth.

As explained above, most of the income of the ultra-wealthy is derived from their wealth holdings and, as we have described, the U.S. tax system does a very poor job of taxing that income. The combination of the ability to defer reporting income from their wealth holdings plus low statutory rates on the income that is reported means very low effective tax rates on the ultra-wealthy, well below what they pay on their income for wages and salaries. If, alternatively, the ultra-wealthy’s investment income was to be taxed at the same effective tax rates as their wage and salary income, how much additional tax revenue would that raise?

As a starting point, Lily Batchelder and David Kamin estimate that a 2% wealth tax on the top 0.1% of tax households would raise $1.9–3.3 trillion over ten years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance. If expanded to the top 1%, this wealth tax could raise $3.5–6.7 trillion. For context, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) projects that the entire existing personal income tax will raise approximately $24.4 trillion over that same period, and that the entire existing corporate income tax will raise approximately $3.6 trillion. Thus, a well-designed wealth tax could potentially increase revenues by more than the entire existing corporate income tax.

Key, however, is that the tax be well designed. More limited reforms would fall short. For instance, Batchelder and Kamin estimate that a combined package of eliminating stepped-up basis, taxing accrued capital gains at death, and hiking the capital gains and qualified dividends tax rate to 28% would raise only $290 billion over ten years. And they estimate that hiking the top ordinary income tax rate on income over $10 million from 37% to 70% (a near doubling of the top rate) would raise at most $320 billion over the same period.

94. A value-added tax is a consumption tax that is collected incrementally on the “value added” at each stage of production, distribution, and sale of a good or service. It is like a sales tax in being borne by the ultimate consumer of the good, but differs in that a sales tax is collected in one lump sum at sale rather than partially at each stage in the supply chain. See OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS 2020: VAT/GST AND EXCISE RATES, TRENDS AND POLICY ISSUES § 1.1.1 (2020), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/152def2d-en/_csp_=c74456d46ecc7b2f6fd33525b003633ec&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book [https://perma.cc/UX5U-U2Y7] (noting that 170 countries have a VAT).

95. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 13 tbl.3.

96. Id.


98. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 10 tbl.2, 13 (noting that the two estimates differ because the first is by comparison to current law and the second to current policy).
Batchelder and Kamin also estimate that a partial mark-to-market tax on
publicly-traded securities, combined with a retrospective capital gains tax on
other assets, on the top 0.1% of taxpayers would raise $0.6–1 trillion over ten
years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance (and $1.7–2.8 trillion if
expanded to the top 1%).99 As we will discuss in Part III, we consider these
reform packages to be flawed designs for mark-to-market style tax reforms
because they involve future assessment, in this case the retrospective capital gains
tax component.100 Because “publicly-traded assets represent only about one-fifth
of assets held by the top 1 percent,”101 relatively little tax would be currently
assessed, which partially explains why their revenue estimates are less than
those above for a full current-assessment wealth tax reform. Nevertheless, even
if we view their estimates as just lower bounds on the revenue potential from a
better-designed current-assessment reform, Batchelder and Kamin’s estimates
still imply that the revenue potential from a well-designed current-assessment
reform would be large.

B. Real and Perceived Unfairness

The current failure to effectively tax the ultra-wealthy also violates basic
fairness norms. First, this violates “vertical equity” principles, since the
effective tax rates paid by the ultra-wealthy are likely less than the effective tax
rates paid by the next richest taxpayers. Second, this violates “horizontal equity”
principles since the tax rates on the types of income earned by the ultra-wealthy,
namely income generated by their wealth, are less than for other types of
income, namely wage and salary income, even if earned by similarly wealthy
individuals. Moreover, because these tax benefits are in part a function of tax
planning, the most aggressive tax planners are rewarded with lower rates, even
if they have the same income as other taxpayers.

1. Vertical Equity

We take it as given that vertical equity demands that income taxes on
individuals and households should be progressive or, at a minimum,
proportional.102 We have already shown that effective tax rates on the true
economic income of the ultra-wealthy (including unreported income) are quite
low, substantially lower than the effective tax rates paid by those who have a

99. Id.
100. See infra Part III.
102. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1222
(1989) (“Exactly what constitutes vertical equity is the subject of some dispute, with proportional and
progressive tax systems being the principal competing conceptions.”); Steuerle, Equal (Tax) Justice,
supra note 17, at 268 (noting that a “progressive” tax is one where the share of income paid in taxes
increases as a taxpayer’s income increases; a proportional tax is one where each taxpayer pays the same
proportion of income in taxes regardless of their income).
larger share of wage and salary income.\textsuperscript{103} But this is not the end of the analysis, since to truly judge the progressivity of the tax system, we may wish to also consider the effects of other taxes, especially corporate and payroll taxes.

Some of the investment income that benefits from the tax strategies described in Part I may be subject to business-level taxes, especially the corporate income tax, and that arguably ought to be considered in assessing the overall level of tax paid by the ultra-wealthy.\textsuperscript{104} Doing so has the potential to change the analysis. In a simplistic model, today’s statutory corporate income tax rate and statutory personal capital gains tax rate together yield a combined 37% rate on shareholder income earned through a corporation, almost equal to the top statutory rate on ordinary wage and salary income.\textsuperscript{105} If that were the end of the analysis, the income of the ultra-wealthy might not appear to be preferred after all.

But corporations, particularly large multinationals, have become very skilled at lowering their effective tax rates, sometimes to 0%, despite often earning large accounting profits.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, at least a portion of the burden of the corporate income tax is borne by other stakeholders in a corporate enterprise, especially by workers.\textsuperscript{107}

In addition, the effective tax rates on income invested through other types of entities and on other types of investments are often much lower. For instance, real estate investments, through the use of accelerated depreciation

\textsuperscript{103} See supra Section I.B.

\textsuperscript{104} For instance, if an individual taxpayer invests in the stock of a publicly traded corporation subject to the corporate income tax, the income earned at the corporate level may be subject to the corporate-level income tax, thereby reducing the individual taxpayer’s (unrealized) gains.

\textsuperscript{105} If a corporation earned profits of $x$, it could distribute 0.79$x$ after taxes. After paying the 20% tax on dividends, an individual shareholder would have 0.632$x$, specifically, an effective tax rate of 36.8% on the corporate profits. Alternatively, expanding this calculation to include the impact of SECA and NIIT taxes yields a top all-in rate on income earned through a corporation of 39.8%, as compared to a top all-in rate of 40.8% on wage and salary income. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5–6, for the details behind these calculations.

\textsuperscript{106} According to the CBO, the effective corporate tax rate in the United States in 2012 was 18.6%, at a time when the statutory rate for larger corporations was 39%—implying that the average corporation can cut the statutory rate nearly in half through planning. CBO, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES 17 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52419-internationaltaxratecomp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HUM-LB3F].

\textsuperscript{107} Estimates vary, but a typical assumption is that about a quarter of the corporate tax is borne by labor, creditors, customers, and others, through effects such as decreasing labor productivity and thus lowering wages or using market power to pass taxes through to consumers. For instance, the Joint Committee on Taxation and the CBO assume in their models that 25% of the corporate tax burden is on labor. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-14-13, MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES ON BUSINESS INCOME 4 (2013); CBO, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES, 2008 AND 2009, at 17 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43373-06-11-householdincomeandfedtaxes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B3C-CJRG].
and debt financing, can typically achieve very low or even negative effective tax rates.\footnote{108 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Private Advantage of Money-Losing Investments Under Cut-Rate Capital Gains, 55 TAX NOTES 1125, 1129 (1992).} Also, much pass-through income is now entitled to the new 20% deduction for qualified business income.\footnote{109 See I.R.C. § 199A.} And, as discussed, by deferring realization of income at the individual level, taxpayers can compound these benefits before finally realizing taxable income.

Furthermore, if we are to take account of the corporate income tax, which most analysts consider to be at least somewhat progressive,\footnote{110 See BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, TAX POL’Y CTR., CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRESSIVITY 1 (2009), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001349-Corporate-Tax-Incidence-and-Its-Implications-for-Progressivity.PDF [https://perma.cc/3STN-8KSM].} then arguably we should also include payroll taxes and state and local taxes, which most analysts think are more regressive.\footnote{111 There are real questions about whether and to what extent any of these other forms of taxation should be accounted for—including for the corporate income tax, which arguably mostly just reaches excess returns at the corporate level. However, a thorough discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article.} Recent research by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman examines a broad set of tax burdens and concludes that the all-in effective tax rate on the richest 400 households may actually be lower than the tax rate paid by households in the bottom half of the income distribution,\footnote{112 EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY, at xi (2019); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Opinion, How To Tax Our Way Back to Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2M7DK6C [https://perma.cc/R7YC-DWUQ (dark archive)].} even without fully accounting for unrealized capital gains.\footnote{113 Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Risking the Wraith of 900 Billionaires, 165 TAX NOTES FED. 398, 401–02 (2019) (explaining why Saez and Zucman’s estimates do not fully account for unrealized gains).} Their finding is disputed,\footnote{114 See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Are US Billionaires Really Paying a Lower Tax Rate than Working People? Probably Not., FORBES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2019/10/11/are-us-billionaires-really-paying-a-lower-tax-rate-than-working-people-probably-not [https://perma.cc/8UU9-7HAD].} but even if the overall tax system turns out to be somewhat progressive with respect to \textit{reported} income, we still need to assess the dramatic benefits from \textit{unrealized} gains. This is especially true when considering the sort of dynastic wealth that can take advantage of the step-up in basis and “buy, borrow, die” strategy. In all likelihood, that pushes the tax system back into regressive territory.

2. Horizontal Equity

The vertical equity analysis above is not free from doubt, however. It is difficult to conclusively determine whether the tax system as a whole is progressive, proportional, or regressive—especially with respect to the ultra-
wealthy. This is because of uncertainty about the distributional incidence of business-level taxes,\textsuperscript{115} because there is no clear dividing line between what should be considered part of the tax system as opposed to a part of other governmental programs,\textsuperscript{116} because of the difficulty of estimating the long-term magnitude of unrealized capital gains with any precision,\textsuperscript{117} and because of other murky methodological issues.\textsuperscript{118} Regardless, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the tax system as a whole might be progressive with respect to the ultra-wealthy because of the corporate income tax, this does not imply the absence of substantial fairness violations. Even in this scenario, the treatment of investment income would still raise troubling issues of horizontal equity, specifically, the requirement that like taxpayers be treated alike.\textsuperscript{119}

Effective tax rates on different forms of investment income differ wildly, with corporate equity investments potentially being taxed at relatively high effective rates (at least absent tax gaming) but with many other forms of investment income being taxed at much lower or even negative effective rates.\textsuperscript{120} Batchelder and Kamin show that the present value of the top possible marginal tax rates vary for a select set of common investment strategies from a high of 40.8% to a low of 0%.\textsuperscript{121} Similarly, the Tax Foundation, a conservative think tank, estimated that—prior to the 2017 tax overhaul—the effective tax rates on investment income varied from as high as 38% (for some corporate equity) to as low as negative 6% (for some corporate debt), depending on how the investments were structured.\textsuperscript{122}

In addition to causing the efficiency and economic-distortion harms that we will elaborate on below, this wide variance in effective tax rates on different forms of investment income results in a prima facie violation of horizontal equity.

\textsuperscript{115} See Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, JCX-14-13, Modeling the Distribution of Taxes on Business Income 1 (2013).

\textsuperscript{116} See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This: How Government Should Spend Our Money (2016) [hereinafter Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This] (urging scholars and others to consider complete fiscal systems, not tax systems alone); Brooks, Definitions of Income, supra note 30, at 270–74 (discussing the mutability of the income concept, especially when considering government benefits).

\textsuperscript{117} See Sullivan, supra note 113, at 401–02.

\textsuperscript{118} See, e.g., McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 15, at 329–30 (discussing the sparse data on unrealized capital gains).


\textsuperscript{120} See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{121} Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5–7.

\textsuperscript{122} Alan Cole, Tax Found., Interest Deductibility - Issues and Reforms 4 (2017) ("Debt-financed corporate capital has an effective rate of negative 6 percent, 44 percentage points lower than the rate on equity-financed corporate capital."). These estimates were made prior to the 2017 tax overhaul, which reduced the statutory corporate income tax rate and thereby reduced the effective tax rate on corporate equity investment, so these estimates should not be taken as current but rather just as further indication of the wide disparity in the effective tax rates on different forms of investment.
equity. That is, even if we grant for the sake of argument that the corporate income tax might make the tax system as a whole progressive with respect to the ultra-wealthy as a group, the widely different effective tax rates on different forms of investment income creates wide disparities in the effective tax rates facing individual members of the ultra-wealthy. This in turn means that a substantial number of ultra-wealthy taxpayers—those less exposed to the corporate tax—would almost certainly face very low effective-average tax rates from all sources combined, even if others pay much more.\textsuperscript{123} As Batchelder and Kamin explain, “[i]t also means that, among the wealthy, the most aggressive tax planners are rewarded, while those who follow the letter and spirit of the law are penalized. Heirs to large fortunes are taxed especially lightly.”\textsuperscript{124} No matter how we slice it, the tax treatment of investment income is riddled with unfairness and injustice.

3. The Consequences of Perceived and Real Unfairness

The prior two subsections detailed the unfairness of providing tax preferences for the type of income earned by the ultra-wealthy—namely investment income—and also the wide disparity in the tax treatment of different forms of investment income. We believe this case is solid, almost inarguably so. But some may still push back, perhaps even by questioning the utility of thinking of “fairness” as a valid norm for policymaking (at least when considering more than just the setting of tax rates).\textsuperscript{125} We address below other critiques more rooted in economic and administrative consequences. But first, it is important to note that the public’s perception of unfairness may be as or

\textsuperscript{123} Recently released reports by ProPublica, based on leaked tax return information, further document that famous billionaires do indeed face very low effective-average tax rates on their true income. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Jeff Ernsthausen & Paul Kiel, \textit{The Secret IRS Files: Trove of Never-Before-Seen Records Reveal How the Wealthiest Avoid Income Tax}, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021), \url{https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-revealing-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax} (reporting that Warren Buffett paid a “true tax rate” of 0.10%, Jeff Bezos paid 1.1%, Michael Bloomberg paid 1.3%, and Elon Musk paid 3.27%); Paul Kiel, Jeff Ernsthausen & Jesse Eisinger, \textit{You May Be Paying a Higher Tax Rate than a Billionaire}, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021), \url{https://www.propublica.org/article/you-may-be-paying-a-higher-tax-rate-than-a-billionaire} (reporting that Warren Buffett paid a “true tax rate” of 0.10%, Jeff Bezos paid 1.1%, Michael Bloomberg paid 1.3%, and Elon Musk paid 3.27%); Paul Kiel, Jeff Ernsthausen & Jesse Eisinger, \textit{You May Be Paying a Higher Tax Rate than a Billionaire}, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021), \url{https://www.propublica.org/article/you-may-be-paying-a-higher-tax-rate-than-a-billionaire} (reporting that Warren Buffett paid a “true tax rate” of 0.10%, Jeff Bezos paid 1.1%, Michael Bloomberg paid 1.3%, and Elon Musk paid 3.27%).

\textsuperscript{124} Batchelder & Kamin, \textit{ supra} note 12, at 8.

even more important than a rigorous demonstration of unfairness itself. Further, the existence of unfairness can have serious negative social and political repercussions.

If the public believes that the income tax system is biased against ordinary people and in favor of the ultra-wealthy, this may have very real consequences. And indeed, there is reason to infer that the public’s awareness of how the income tax fails with respect to the ultra-wealthy may actually be undermining perceptions of fairness, potentially harming both the public’s faith in the overall tax system and associated tax morale and likely also affecting views of the overall fairness of our economic and political system. For example, as Benjamín Friedman, among others, has argued, cultural breakdown and the rise of populism can often be connected to periods where masses of people felt that they did not share in a society’s prosperity and when they feared that their children would be worse off than themselves.

126. For instance, we think it is reasonable to infer that taxpayers “are more likely to comply voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax” the more that taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent. Yair Listokin & David M Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 180 (2013). We similarly think it is reasonable to infer negative real consequences if taxpayers think that the tax system is unfair and biased against ordinary people. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 80–85 (2003) (arguing that tax compliance behavior derives in part from reciprocity norms that are in turn influenced by beliefs as to whether others also comply and as to whether the tax system is fair overall).

127. Joseph Chamie, America’s Taxes—Complex, Incomprehensible, and Unfair, HILL (July 27, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/564959-americas-taxes-complex-incomprehensible-and-unfair [https://perma.cc/4827-HCVF] (“One national survey found that a majority of Americans, about 56 percent, including similar shares of Democrats and Republicans, view the tax system as unfair. An even larger proportion, 60 percent, felt that some corporations and wealthy people don’t pay their fair share of taxes.”).

128. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1484–99 (2003) (explaining that improving enforcement can increase revenues from voluntary compliance by bolstering compliance norms, in part because when taxpayers think that others are getting away with cheating or otherwise not paying their fair share this can undermine compliance norms); Kahan, supra note 126, at 81 (“These are exactly the factors one would expect to influence tax compliance were individuals behaving like moral and emotional reciprocators. An emotional and moral reciprocator wants to understand herself and be understood by others as fair, but she loathes being taken advantage of. With tax collection as with other collective-action settings, the extent to which others appear to be contributing to the good in question determines which of these sensibilities comes into play.”); Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. Econ. PERSPS. 149, 157 (2014) (“A number of studies have documented positive correlations between survey measures of institutional quality, trust in government, and satisfaction with public services and survey measures of tax morale . . . .”).


Moreover, even if one is still skeptical of the moral case for taxing the ultra-wealthy more, there are secondary consequences of a system that allows the ultra-wealthy to continue to accumulate wealth rapidly while paying minimal tax. For example, having extreme concentrations of wealth affects how and what kind of financial, economic, and investment decisions get made and also affects politics and political influence. There is little doubt at this point that money has an enormous influence in politics, and when that money is concentrated in the hands of relatively few people, it can have negative effects on democracy, even to the degree of threatening our country’s democratic legitimacy.

Finally, the income tax is directly implicated in racial injustice. As Palma Strand and Nicholas Mirkay—among many others—have explained, the federal income tax operates “directly to increase wealth inequality, deepening pre-existing historically-based racial wealth disparities.” Specifically, by heavily taxing wage and salary incomes and only lightly taxing the returns to owning wealth, the tax system obstructs historically disadvantaged groups from building wealth and economic power while protecting the comparative economic power of historically advantaged groups that started accumulating wealth during more illiberal periods.

The connections between tax unfairness and racial injustice are deep and deserving of more in-depth and elaborate discussion than we can offer in this Article. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that the ways in which the


133. See, e.g., Jeremy Bearer Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2019) (listing studies finding that tax policies have disparate racial outcomes); Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 329 (2009) (“[B]lack homeowners will not benefit as much as white homeowners from the tax provisions that exclude from income gain on the sale of their homes.”).


135. See id. at 279.

136. For some other relevant prior work on this topic, see generally Dorothy A. Brown, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—and
income tax aggravates racial wealth injustices represent further concrete harmful consequences of the unfairness engendered by the broken nature of the existing income tax system.

C. Economic Inefficiency and Waste

Above, we noted the wide disparities in the effective tax rates facing different types of income and investment strategies, and we argued that this results in both revenue loss and prima facie fairness violations. We will now explain how this also causes inefficiencies and economic waste. In particular, we address the welfare costs associated with the choice to raise a relatively greater share of revenue from wage and salary income versus investment income. We also discuss the related welfare costs of allowing taxpayers to use tax-gaming strategies to opt into lower effective tax rates. (These two points are related to the issues raised in the prior two sections on lost tax revenue and unfairness, respectively, but are nonetheless distinct analytically.)

First, note that if an additional dollar of tax revenue is needed, it is most efficient—from a welfare-economics perspective—to raise it from the source with the lowest marginal utility of wealth. That is, if the government wants $1,000 more in tax revenue, it will have lower social cost to raise it from Bill Gates rather than from Bill Gates’s gardener. Taxing Gates an additional $1,000 will have almost zero utility cost to Gates but could meaningfully affect the utility, or well-being, of the gardener.

Extending this point, the policy choice to lightly tax investment income implies a choice to more heavily tax labor income from wages and salaries, at least if we hold the size of government and level of tax revenue constant. As we have already explained, investment income is highly concentrated in the ultra-wealthy. As a result, taxing wage and salary income more than investment income means, on average, taxing those with higher marginal utility of wealth rather than those with lower marginal utility, thus generating unnecessary economic inefficiency and loss of social welfare.

HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021) (explaining racial biases in the income tax system); Andrew T. Hayashi, Dynamic Property Taxes and Racial Gentrification, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2021) (explaining racial biases in property tax systems); Bearer-Friend, supra note 133 (discussing racial biases and related issues in taxation).


139. One can argue with the assumption of zero marginal utility of wealth for the ultra-wealthy, in part because it may contradict the observed degree of effort many ultra-wealthy put into increasing their wealth even more. A full accounting of the psychology of the ultra-wealthy is beyond the scope of this Article, but we can note a few things. First, there are a number of other utility benefits that flow from work, especially in prestigious positions or professions. See Dan Ariely, Emir Kamenica & Dražen Prelec, Man’s Search for Meaning: The Case of Legos, 67 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 671, 676 (2008).
Second, recall the range of effective tax rates on different types of income. The current top all-in effective federal tax rate is 40.8% for wage and salary income reported on a W-2 and 39.8% for income that is first fully subject to the corporate income tax and is then also fully taxed at the personal level at the top capital gains rate (plus the net investment income ("NIIT") surtax rate). The current top all-in effective federal tax rate is 23.8% for pass-through or other noncorporate investment income that is characterized as long-term capital gains, and 20% if this income takes advantage of loopholes to avoid the 3.8% NIIT and Self-Employment Contributions Act ("SECA") surtaxes.

But these effective rates can become 0% if realization is deferred until after death (taking advantage of a stepped-up basis) or if other strategies are used to eliminate the deferred tax on unrealized gains (such as if profits are shifted to tax havens in a manner that avoids the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income ("GILTI") tax). And commonly used tax-gaming techniques can reduce these top effective tax rates further, often yielding negative effective tax rates. Thus, standard tax-planning strategies can yield tax savings of between twenty and forty cents on the pretax dollar, and maybe more.

In light of this, what stops wealthy taxpayers from using strategies like "buy, borrow, die" even more than they currently do, so as to wipe out all personal-level tax on investment income (rather than stopping after just eliminating most of this tax)? Why do the ultra-wealthy pay any tax at all?

Second, those who work hard primarily just to increase their wealth may see it as more of a "scorecard" in the game of life, so that ordinal ranking is more important than cardinal amounts. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WEIGHING THE COST OF EXCESS (2010) (arguing that humans are motivated to earn and consume because of relative social position, even though doing so increases measures of unhappiness). Third, to the extent some ultra-wealthy go out of their way to avoid taxes, it could also be that this group is particularly opposed to taxation qua taxation and so an appropriation of wealth through the tax system might cause excessive utility loss relative to other kinds of wealth declines. See KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS, supra note 116, at 4. Ultimately, these are empirical questions that might be interesting to answer but which are not a first-order concern—that is, a benevolent social planner ought not to care too much about a utility loss from this small group of ultra-wealthy taxpayers, particularly if the planner’s "welfare weights" transfer to the least well-off, as most analysts assume. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Generalized Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 24, 41 tbl.2 (2016) (showing a "social welfare weight" of nearly zero for the highest income group); Diamond & Saez, supra note 138, at 168–69.

140. Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 7 fig.2. Taxing corporate income once at 21% when earned by the corporation and again at a combined capital gains and NIIT tax rate of 23.8% when distributed to shareholders implies a combined effective tax rate of 39.8%. See id. at 5–6, 7 fig.2.


142. See supra note 10; Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 12, at 5 fig.2.

143. See supra note 78, at 586.
The catch is that these tax-gaming strategies come at a cost, and these costs generally increase as the strategies get more complicated and aggressive to cover more economic income. Examples of these costs of tax planning include lower liquidity, the costs of borrowing, transaction costs of tax-loss harvesting, deviation from taxpayers’ risk-reduction and diversification preferences, the excessive complexity of more sophisticated forms of tax gaming, and the cost to businesses from using inefficient capital structures in order to generate tax savings.

As Steuerle explained in his seminal book on the topic, “insofar as [investment] income is concerned, the individual income tax is primarily a discretionary tax.” As a result, at least with respect to the investment income of the wealthy, the income tax is effectively just a tax on the choice not to bear the financial costs of certain avoidance strategies, so that “the discretionary income tax on [investment] income is a tax on liquidity, risk reduction, and diversification rather than a tax on income.”

The key takeaway here is that tax gaming typically involves real economic costs, and, at the margin, these costs should generally approach the effective marginal tax rates. While incurring these costs may be rational for individual taxpayers, it is exceedingly wasteful to an economy as a whole. In other words, the productive potential of the overall economy is diminished because scarce resources are devoted to tax gaming at the expense of productive investment and business activity.

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146. Because these strategies often require not realizing gains and instead keeping profits invested in illiquid assets.
147. Because Larry Ellison-style credit lines charge interest.
149. Id.
150. Common examples of this include greater use of debt financing for tax purposes, when equity would be better for business purposes, or designing organizational structures, supply chains, and the like, through low-tax jurisdictions in a manner that increases business and organizational costs in order to generate tax savings. See Gergen, supra note 1, at 29–30 (“It is insane to encourage talented people with useful skills to create complicated financial vehicles that serve no purpose other than avoiding . . . tax.”).
151. STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLATION, supra note 148, at 18.
152. Id. at 19. We would add lack of complexity to Steuerle’s list, as we view the excessive complexity of tax-motivated investment strategies as perhaps the largest form of economic waste because this complexity interferes with designing investment and business strategies so as to maximize economic productivity and related pretax returns.
D. Complexity and Uncertainty in the Tax System

Perhaps even more troublesome than the other sorts of harmful consequences explained above, the manner in which the personal income tax is broken and readily exploited by the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming undermines the administrability and integrity of the entire tax system. Fully explaining how and why this is the case is beyond the scope of this Article. But the key point is that the realization doctrine—along with the corresponding capital gains preference and the rules limiting the use of loss deductions—generates the lion’s share of legal complexity and uncertainty in the income tax system, ultimately undermining the tax system itself.¹⁵⁵

As noted above, because the realization doctrine makes deferring capital gain trivial, it is generally believed that a preferential rate on capital gain income is needed to reduce that disincentive to realize gains.¹⁵⁶ This then creates a need to distinguish capital gains and capital losses from ordinary income and ordinary losses, and that task is a major source of uncertainty and confusion in the tax law.¹⁵⁷ For instance, with respect to the important category of real estate transactions, a federal judge famously proclaimed it to be a “truism” that “[i]f a client asks you in any but an extreme case whether, in your opinion, his sale will result in capital gain, your answer should probably be, ‘I don’t know, and no one else in town can tell you.’”¹⁵⁸

The muddled state of the law on distinguishing ordinary income and capital gains motivates wasteful tax planning and creates large compliance burdens and traps for the unwary—including for small businesses and other

¹⁵⁵. See, e.g., Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, supra note 28, at 123–24; Ilan Benshalom & Kendra Stead, Realization and Progressivity, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 43, 47 (2011) (“[M]ost of the income tax’s shortcomings are a direct result of the realization requirement.”); id. at 51–52 (“[A]ny realization-based income tax regime needs loss-limitation rules to protect its revenue base against strategic trading. . . . As difficult as these issues are, the above examples are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of realization’s costs.”); Funding Our Nation’s Priorities: Reforming the Tax Code’s Advantageous Treatment of the Wealthy: Hearing Before the H. Ways & Means Subcomm., 117th Cong. 2–9 (2021) (statement of Chye-Ching Huang, Executive Director of NYU School of Law Tax Law Center) (explaining how “the menu of tax breaks for income from wealth leads to wasteful tax avoidance, sheltering, and even evasion”).

¹⁵⁶. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.


more ordinary taxpayers (as opposed to just the ultra-wealthy).159 As Reuven Avi-Yonah and Dmitry Zelik have explained, “a lot of the complexity of the current tax code results from attempts to block taxpayers from converting ordinary income to capital gains . . . and from the limitations on offsetting ordinary losses against capital gains, which has resulted in transactions designed to create artificial capital losses . . .”160

Indeed, these harmful consequences are so severe that Avi-Yonah and Zelik argue that, if it is not possible to adopt a current-assessment reform to replace realization, we should abandon the goal of increasing progressivity at the top and instead make the top tax rate 28% for both ordinary income and capital gains.161 This is because, they argue, 28% is the maximum rate that can be imposed on capital gains in a realization-based system and because the harms that result from the capital gains preference are so damaging as to make it not worth taxing ordinary income at a higher rate.162 In their framing, our only choices in a realization-based system are to either retain the preferential capital gains rate or slash the top rates on ordinary income. Despite their preference for “higher rates on the rich,” they “have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we are indeed trapped by our capital gains, that the current rate structure is indefensible in practice, and that we should revert to an overall rate of 28% for all income.”163

For a related example, consider the difficulties of distinguishing between when payments from businesses to investors should be considered returns to investment as opposed to wages or other disguised payments for labor or services.164 Under current law, the personal capital gains preference and the various surtaxes like SECA and NIIT mean that the way payments from businesses to investors are characterized can yield quite different personal-level

159. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 157, at 40; Nitti, supra note 158; Len Burman, Mitt Romney’s Teachable Moment on Capital Gains, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012, 6:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leonardburman/2012/01/18/mitt-romneys-teachable-moment-on-capital-gains/?sh=224cf1787a4e [https://perma.cc/4DSU-W2TF] (“T[axing] capital gains at much lower rates than other income creates a ginormous loophole that leads to a tremendous amount of inefficient tax shelter activity. Virtually every individual income tax shelter is devoted to converting fully taxed income into capital gains. . . . With that kind of payoff, there is a whole industry devoted to inventing schemes to generate current deductions to shelter the wages and ultimately recoup it years later as lightly taxed gains. These shelter schemes entail inefficiency . . .”).


163. Id.

tax consequences.\textsuperscript{165} This results in widespread tax gaming and major inefficiencies and inequities.\textsuperscript{166}

It is not an exaggeration therefore to say that the realization doctrine—along with the corresponding capital gains preference and the rules limiting the use of loss deductions—greatly harms the integrity and functioning of the overall tax system. In addition to opening the door to tax preferences that benefit the ultra-wealthy, the realization doctrine leads to excessive and unnecessary legal complexity and uncertainty affecting many more ordinary taxpayers. In the next part, we explain why current-assessment reform is required to effectively tax the ultra-wealthy, but it is an additional benefit that these reforms would also either lessen or eliminate the need for a capital gains preference (and related anti-abuse rules) by reducing the ability of taxpayers to time the realization of gains.

\section*{III. The Need for Current-Assessment Tax Reform}

The previous two parts explained how the realization doctrine and the availability of deferral have fundamentally broken our income tax system, particular with respect to its treatment of the ultra-wealthy, as well as explained some of the harmful consequences of that failure. The clear solution is to end—or at least greatly limit—deferral. But how?

With certain notable exceptions,\textsuperscript{167} the prior literature has mostly embraced reforms that would seek to lessen or end the financial benefits of deferral while still fully or partially retaining the realization doctrine—specifically, these reforms would generally not assess tax until a gain is realized through a sale or exchange.\textsuperscript{168} For example, such a reform might postpone the assessment of tax on illiquid assets, such as shares in privately held firms, but would impose at that time an interest charge to offset the benefits of deferring the assessment until those shares are sold.\textsuperscript{169}

We argue here, however, that such future-assessment reforms are insufficient. To truly repair the personal tax system and meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy on their economic income (or on any alternative comprehensive

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., Richard Winchester, Carried Interest for the Common Man, 142 TAX NOTES 1250, 1255 (2014) [hereinafter Winchester, Carried Interest]; Winchester, Working for Free, supra note 164, at 248.

\textsuperscript{166} Winchester, Carried Interest, supra note 165, at 1257–58.

\textsuperscript{167} See supra notes 32–33.

\textsuperscript{168} See Benshalom & Stead, supra note 155, at 47 (describing a “consensus” among scholars that reforms should continue to tax “at least some assets . . . only upon realization”).

\textsuperscript{169} For instance, the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Ron Wyden, proposed a reform of this sort in 2019. See generally RON WYDEN, SENATE FIN. COMM., TREAT WEALTH LIKE WAGES (2019), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Treat%20Wealth%20Like%20Wages%20RM %20Wyden.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QX9-LFZX]. We explain why this sort of partial future-assessment reform (on its own) is unlikely to succeed at sustainably fixing the personal tax system. See infra Section III.B.1.
measure of well-being or ability to pay), a current-assessment reform is needed. That is, we need a reform that would assess and impose tax on a periodic basis as economic income accrues (or, alternatively, as wealth or spending power accumulates), rather than attempting to tax at some future date that may never actually occur.

Section III.A below elaborates on our theory for the necessity of a current-assessment reform. The key insight is that, although a future-assessment reform might theoretically cancel out the financial benefits of deferral under existing law, it is powerless against the effects of future political shifts. As a simple example of this point, consider that if a future-assessment reform is put in place, but a later political coalition repeals it before any gains are actually realized, it will have accomplished nothing.

To clarify the difference between current-assessment and future-assessment reforms, and why current assessment is superior, Section III.B discusses two leading future-assessment reforms—retrospective capital gains taxation and progressive consumption taxation.

Section III.C then explores several prior real-world examples of the difficulties posed by political shifts. This review illustrates the centrality of political optionality to tax politics. Time and again, taxpayers have managed to undermine future-assessed taxes, and there is every reason to expect that this will generally be the fate of future-assessment tax reforms.

A. Current Assessment: Tax Now or Tax Never

We argue that meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy, and thereby beginning to repair our tax system, requires reform that is sufficiently robust against the possibility of future erosion, attack, or repeal. In particular, any reform must not rely on tomorrow’s Congress or executive agencies to ensure meaningful taxation of today’s income or wealth accumulations. In other words, what is needed is a current-assessment reform—we must tax now, not later.

To sketch out our approach, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that a political coalition enacts a reform with the goal of successfully taxing the ultra-wealthy. Further suppose that this reform will take effect across two time periods. In the first period, some economic income is earned, perhaps by appreciation in the value of an asset. In the second period, a tax is imposed on that first-period income which is the present-value equivalent of the first-period tax had it been imposed. What happens by the time we reach the second period?

There are essentially three possibilities. First is that the original reform coalition both remains in power and remains fully committed to bolstering the reform. As a result, this coalition is able to fend off political attacks against the reform while passing any necessary follow-up legislation or taking other necessary follow-up actions to reinforce the reform, as policymakers start to
observe both the efficacy of the reform itself as well as taxpayer responses to it, many of which will likely have been unanticipated at the time of the initial enactment.

A second possibility is that there is a complete shift to an opposing political coalition, and the new coalition then either fully repeals the reform or replaces it with a new regime that is more favorable to its supporters.

The third possibility is that we could end up somewhere in the middle, with the original reform coalition either weakened or less committed to bolstering its initial reform but with that original coalition retaining enough power and commitment to block its reform from being completely repealed or replaced. In this case, full repeal of the original reform is unlikely, but equally unlikely is the incremental maintenance and adjustment that is required to make the original reform operate effectively.

Our observation from past reforms, both tax and nontax, is that the probability of the second and third possibilities together greatly outweighs the probability of the first. Indeed, we believe that the most likely outcome by far is the third possibility—a gradual erosion of the reform due to neglect because the original coalition is too weak to bring necessary incremental reforms in the face of taxpayer innovation, changing economic circumstances, and experience with the actual effects of the law.

If this is the case, then there is a significant likelihood that any tax actually imposed in the second period will not in fact be the present-value equivalent of tax in the first period, even if that was the way the law was written. This becomes increasingly likely as the length of time increases between the first and second periods. Of course, this outcome would obviously follow from a full repeal of the initial reform. But more likely is that the initial reform would just be eroded somehow—by taxpayers devising strategies in the interim period to game around the law; by economic conditions changing so that the assumptions underlying the initial reform no longer hold and in a manner that erodes the initial reform; by relatively minor changes to the initial law, well short of full repeal, that nevertheless undermine its intended effects, such as rate changes or new exemptions; by critical errors in the original law going uncorrected; by subsequent administrative rulings or court decisions that undermine the reform; and so forth. While some tax may still be collected in the second period, the effective tax rates may be so reduced as to make deferral still very rewarding.

Exacerbating all of this, sophisticated taxpayers can often anticipate and even influence the likelihood of these (favorable to them) outcomes. There is an option value to waiting, and for the ultra-wealthy, even minor erosions in the law could generate a huge return to deferral. The clear conclusion therefore is that reforms that rely on the imposition of tax in the second period are

170. See infra Section III.C.
inferior to those that impose tax in the first period—current assessment. Choosing to tax later risks taxing never.

To fill out and formalize the theory, we need to introduce a few terms and concepts. We have already distinguished a current-assessment reform from a future-assessment reform. For purposes of our argument, we assume that either reform as drafted would impose the same present-value equivalent tax (in financial terms). The key difference is the timing of that assessment—tax now or tax later.

In considering the benefits of deferral—of waiting—the prior literature mostly just considers what we label as the existing-law benefits of deferral—that is, the benefits that are encoded into existing law. These existing-law benefits of deferral can be further broken down into time-value benefits (the financial benefits of deferring tax liabilities due to the time value of money) and loophole benefits (the ways under current law that taxpayers can reduce or completely wipe out deferred tax liabilities, such as § 1014’s step-up in basis on death). Most leading reform proposals aim to eliminate one or both of those benefits.171

But there is another benefit of deferral: the ability to wait for favorable legal or political change. We label this the political-optionality benefit of deferral. If there is some chance that a reform could erode or be repealed in the future—and, with future-assessment reforms, there always is—then there will still be incentives to defer realization of gain, even if the tax on that gain would be the present-value equivalent of a current tax, were it to be assessed. In other words, if there is some nonzero probability of a taxpayer-favorable future legal change, then this lowers the expected value of that future tax below the present-value equivalent. Put yet another way, options have real value, as any financial professional would tell you, and the possibility of future legal change gives the ultra-wealthy that option for free.172 Both historical experience and political theory strongly imply that the ultra-wealthy are likely to take advantage of options to defer their tax liabilities so as to then wait for more favorable political or legal changes.

To be sure, current-assessment reforms are also at risk of future erosion or repeal, and there is no guarantee that future political change will be favorable to the ultra-wealthy. But institutional, political, and economic realities all put a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the ultra-wealthy when it comes to future-assessment reforms, thus giving political optionality a positive value. Of course,

171. With respect to loophole benefits, this has mostly consisted of calling for the end of existing loopholes like § 1014. With respect to time-value benefits, the prior literature has proposed reforms that would eliminate time-value benefits by taxing deferred liabilities upon realization, such as by imposing an interest charge to offset the time-value benefits. See supra note 23.

172. Or almost free—other costs, like costs of borrowing or of nondiversification are real, but relatively minor (inframarginally) relative to the tax benefits. See Steuerle, Individuals Pay Very Little, supra note 15.
it is theoretically possible that a current-assessment reform could be reversed in the future, along with taxpayers then being given refunds for any tax previously paid. However, as we will explain, this is dramatically less likely to occur as compared to a future-assessment reform being eroded or terminated prior to the assessment of tax. We will now proceed to elaborate on three sets of pressures that all add up to creating large political-optionality benefits with respect to future-assessment reforms.

1. Policy Drift and the Need for Incremental Bolstering

The standard view of the U.S. federal legislative process is that it features a heavy status-quo bias—that is, major policy reform of any kind is extremely difficult. The typical explanation for this is that the U.S. system features a high number of “veto” or “pivot” points. Specifically, in order for legislation to be enacted, the legislation must overcome a number of hurdles. For example, at various points in the legislative process, the House Speaker, the median House Member, the Senate Majority Leader, the 60th Senator, the President, and the 34th Senator and 146th House Member (for overcoming a Presidential veto) all could have the power to stop a piece of legislation. Because these individuals may occupy very different points on the ideological spectrum, designing a major reform that can overcome all of the pivots is exceedingly difficult to accomplish.

Moreover, a reform that can overcome all of these veto points is likely to be somewhat unstable. As Jason Oh has argued, if a large reform package is a product of negotiation and compromise, it may contain individual policies that would not have had sufficient support to pass on their own—that are only passed because of political horse-trading. However, if those policies can be legislatively decoupled after passage, then one or more of them is at risk of repeal or change, even if the other parts of the reform stay in place.


This helps to explain why the United States typically experiences policy drift—that is, why legislated policies tend to evolve somewhat organically over time, often without clear action by legislators. This sort of policy drift can take a number of forms, which are worth isolating for clarity.

First, there is the sort of incremental repeal that Oh explains—whereby legislators might find sufficient support to make small changes that serve to partially undermine a larger reform package. For a concrete example, consider the “Cadillac” tax passed as part of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—an excise tax on expensive health care plans. The Cadillac tax was included for two reasons. First, the tax was intended to try to offset the tax benefit of the exclusion for employer-provided health care by clawing back the tax benefit of the exclusion for the highest earners, and thereby perhaps also helping to lower health care costs generally. Second, the tax was a revenue-raiser to ensure that the ACA got a favorable budget score from the CBO. For both of these reasons, it was meant to be an important part of the original compromise of the ACA. Yet, the Cadillac tax was repealed before it ever took effect. Once the tax could be peeled off from the full ACA, it became unpopular and unstable, and, as a result, subject to incremental erosion and then repeal. Compared to the original design of the ACA, that repeal had the effect of shifting the costs of the ACA away from the relatively well-off taxpayers who tend to have these sorts of high-value health plans.

Second, a legislated policy might remain static but with the underlying economic or other conditions then changing in a manner that impacts the policy’s effectiveness. This second dynamic is especially likely to occur in the context of distributional policies, tax or otherwise, and to gradually undermine the distributional impact of such policies. As we discuss below, this is a key aspect of the story of stepped-up basis—a policy that had some logic in 1921 when the estate tax and the income tax mostly re


179. Indeed, as early as 2012, it was fully predictable—and was indeed so predicted—that Congress would likely repeal the Cadillac tax before it would ever go into effect. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 686 (2012) (“The Cadillac excise tax is not scheduled to go into effect until 2018, however, and there is reason to doubt whether Congress and the President will allow the provision to go into effect at that time.”) (footnotes omitted).

then remained in place even as other policy changes and developments later destroyed that logic.

Third, policy drift can occur in the form of bureaucratic drift—where the legislation itself remains static but with regulators and others in federal agencies acting to affect the resulting policy in other ways. For example, the favorable tax treatment of carried interest is in large part a result of a series of incremental administrative rulings by the IRS. In most cases, regulators’ ability to move policy is real but limited. Major reform is unlikely to come from only an executive agency, but smaller changes are possible and are often unlikely to be checked by Congress. And such smaller changes can have the effect of opening the door to tax gaming that substantially undermines the original legislative purposes. This is because stopping this sort of bureaucratic drift may require Congress to pass new legislation (which, for the reasons discussed above, is unlikely), individuals to engage in successful litigation (which is risky, expensive, and delayed), or voters to change the party controlling the presidency.

Fourth, policy drift can also occur in the form of judicial decisions. For example, Daniel Hemel and Robert Lord have explained how the Tax Court’s decision in Grieve v. Commissioner has enabled ultra-wealthy taxpayers to “use family-controlled entities to significantly reduce transfer tax liabilities.” Of course, judicial decisions that erode tax legislation (like Grieve) can usually be overturned by subsequent acts of Congress. However, this again requires Congress to pass new legislation—which is unlikely to happen for all the reasons discussed above.

Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, policy drift can occur through legislative and administrative agency inaction—through failure to prevent new forms of tax gaming, what Sloan Speck calls “[tax] planning drift.” As Speck explains, this form of drift is especially likely to have distributional consequences favoring the ultra-wealthy because the “beneficiaries of planning drift have the means, opportunity, and inclination to engage experts to render

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182. See Fleischer, Taxing Partnership Profits, supra note 13, at 8–15; see also infra note 191 and accompanying text.
183. 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175 (2020).
legal advice,” with the result that “those who do not engage such experts suffer, in a relative sense.”

On its own, this story of status-quo bias and policy drift does not necessarily indicate which way a policy will drift. If drift were random, it might be just as likely for the original reform to become stronger, rather than weaker. Alas, history and theory suggest otherwise, particularly in the case of policies—tax and nontax—that focus on issues related to inequality and distribution. Because distributional policies typically have concentrated harms (on the wealthiest) but diffuse benefits (on the rest of the population), the political pressures tend to favor the wealthy and thus produce lopsided outcomes. We should therefore expect that both acts and failures to act will generally be more likely to benefit the already well-off at the expense of the less well-off.

Moreover, policy drift in favor of the wealthiest is especially likely the more that important aspects of the policies in question are too complicated to be well understood by the general voting public or communicated to the voting public via mass media. The history of U.S. tax administration is rife with examples of important but complicated details of the tax system drifting in a manner that favors the wealthiest. Some of these examples include Congress legislating such changes, but many examples are based on regulators at Treasury or IRS revising interpretations of the tax code to favor the wealthiest. Even more common are examples resulting from government

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186. Id. at 584–85.
187. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 173, at 52–54; Gilens, supra note 174, at 79–81 (showing asymmetry of government responsiveness to policy preferences of rich and poor); E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America 32 (1960) (“[T]he [political] pressure system has an upper-class bias.”).
188. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (rev. ed. 1971) (theorizing a political economy of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, where small groups can successfully lobby for special benefits in the face of majority opposition when the individualized costs of opposition are too high and the individualized benefits of opposition are too low).
189. See Hacker, supra note 180, at 252 (discussing “incremental” and “subterranean” policy drift in favor of the wealthy).
190. The 2017 tax overhaul is a notable example of this. See Kamin et al., supra note 44, at 1443. Consider also the expansions of Section 179 and Subsection 168(k), as discussed in Michael A. Livingston & David Gamage, Taxation: Law, Planning, and Policy 342–43 (3d ed. 2019). Or, for a more technical set of examples that opened the door to substantial tax gaming, consider the legislative changes since 1996 that have facilitated the rise of tax gaming through “Mega-IRAs” as discussed in Letter from Daniel Hemel, Professor of L., Univ. of Chicago L. Sch., and Steve Rosenthal, Senior Fellow, Urb.-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., to Senate Comm. on Fin. 5–8 (Aug. 11, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3903624 [https://perma.cc/8AH2-ELCW].
191. See Livingston & Gamage, supra note 190, at 340–41 (explaining how the so-called “repair regulations” revised tax law to the substantial benefit of well-off taxpayers); Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 Tax Notes 1381, 1382–87 (2003) (explaining how the Treasury Department revised the rules governing capitalization of intangibles to favor wealthy taxpayers); Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-6-97, Review of Selected Entity Classification and Partnership Issues 13–17 (1997) (discussing the check-
inaction—the failure to block new forms of sophisticated tax gaming that undermine the effectiveness of the rules to the benefit of the wealthiest.192

Because the costs of tax policies aimed at the wealthiest are concentrated and the benefits diffused, there is a heightened hurdle to achieving any reforms that would meaningfully tax the wealthiest. But this hurdle can be overcome to the extent that the reforms in question are sufficiently popular with the overall voting public. Yet for this popularity to matter, the voting public must understand the policies in question at least well enough to reward politicians and other political actors supporting such policies and to penalize politicians and other political actors opposing them. Consequently, the more complicated and difficult to understand the policies are, the less likely it is that public opinion can effectively counteract the concentrated political power wielded by the wealthiest who would suffer the costs of distributional tax policies.193

The dynamics of tax deferral are inherently complicated and difficult to convey to the voting public, as are the mechanics and effects of provisions like § 1014’s step-up in basis that can serve to negate tax following deferral. By contrast, the voting public typically finds it much easier to understand tax

the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3, which opened the door to large-scale tax-gaming by sophisticated taxpayers); Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. Polsky, The Employment Tax Challenge to the Check-the-Box Regulation, 111 TAX NOTES 1039, 1039 n.1 (2006) (same); see also Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding the check-the-box regulations); Jesse Drucker & Danny Hakim, How Accounting Giants Craft Favorable Tax Rules from Inside Government, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2021). https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/business/accounting-firms-tax-loopholes-government.html [https://perma.cc/6VR2-3EYD (dark archive)] (discussing the regular “revolving door” practice of lawyers from top accounting firms and major law firms taking positions at the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy, working on regulatory projects on issues related to the interest of their former and future clients, and then returning to accounting firms or law firms at senior levels to advise on the regulations they worked on, and providing numerous examples of how this resulted in regulations favorable to the wealthy interests that can afford to hire these elite tax lawyers once they return to private practice); Daniel Shaviro, The Revolving Door at Treasury, START MAKING SENSE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2021), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2021/09/the-revolving-door-at-treasury.html [https://perma.cc/TQ64-N99M (staff-uploaded archive)] (commenting on this revolving-door practice and saying that the elite tax lawyers involved are “creating at least the appearance of impropriety, and embracing systemic, even if one chooses not to say personal, corruption”).

192. See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 633 (2017) (explaining that, and why, the Treasury Department only minimally uses its powers to support revenue raising and instead generally acts in a revenue-losing manner) [hereinafter Hemel, The President’s Power]; Brian Galle & Stephen Shay, Admin Law and the Crisis of Tax Administration (July 3, 2020) (incomplete draft) (on file with authors) (explaining why tax agencies are biased “against revenue and against the poor”); Speck, supra note 185, at 584–85 (explaining how “[t]ax planning drift” disproportionately benefits the wealthiest).

193. It is worth noting here that wealth tax reforms are especially easier to explain to voters—at least as compared to reforms to the timing rules of the income tax—and we view this as a major advantage of wealth tax reforms.
policies that raise revenue currently, and tax cuts offered with respect to such policies are typically more salient.194

Overall, this picture of U.S. tax policymaking suggests that major reform is difficult and rare, and that when it happens, it will be at least partially undermined over time by policy drift, unless the original political coalition remains at its full strength and retains its full initial commitment to the reform—which almost never happens. In the more likely scenario, party and ideological control will shift over time, opening the door to a gradual erosion of the original policy. And this is especially likely the more complicated and difficult it is to convey the essence of the reform to the general voting public.

Consequently, for a major tax reform targeted at the ultra-wealthy to remain effective over time, it is crucial to implement as many key mechanics of the reform as possible at the time of enactment, or soon thereafter, while the original reform coalition still retains its strength and commitment. Yet future-assessment tax reforms do the opposite. This is because putting off the actual assessment and collection of tax means also putting off the review of the tax-gaming techniques that taxpayers will devise in their attempts to escape the tax, putting off the technical revisions and other administrative responses that will need to be made to correct the unanticipated difficulties that will inevitably arise as part of assessing and collecting tax, and, more generally, putting off the many administrative agency decisions required to effectuate tax assessment and collection.

Effectuating a major tax reform requires more than just passing the initial legislation. Many crucial administrative decisions and technical corrections must be made at the time that taxes are actually assessed and collected. For current-assessment tax reforms, this typically happens during or immediately following the reform being enacted, while the initial reform coalition typically maintains its full strength and commitment and while key administrative officials and staff are thus typically oriented toward bolstering the reform.

For example, a wealth tax or accrual-income tax reform could begin collecting revenues immediately. Indeed, such reform proposals are often

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194. This is partially an artifact of budget rules, as explained further in Section III.A.3. But this is also an artifact of the fact that definitions of income and of other tax-base measurements are inherently murky with respect to time, which makes it impossible to convey unambiguous and uncontroversial revenue or distributional information with respect to unrealized gains and other future-assessment components of tax systems. See Sullivan, supra note 113, at 401–02; Brooks, Definitions of Income, supra note 30, at 268. By contrast, it is relatively easy to measure the tax revenues actually paid (or expected to be paid) in any given year, which makes it relatively easy to communicate related information about these measurements to the voting public. For more extended discussions of factors affecting tax salience, see, for example, David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mechanisms and Limiting Factors, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 173, 176–202 (2013); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 20–22 (2011).
designed so as to apply retroactively, with the first year of tax assessment scheduled to start with the tax year prior to the passage of the reform legislation.\textsuperscript{195} By contrast, for future-assessment tax reforms that would continue to rely on realization, taxes on current gains or wealth accumulations would typically only be assessed much later (following realization), potentially many years or even many decades later. By then, the initial reform coalition would likely have lost at least some of its strength and commitment to the reform. Additionally, key administrative officials and staff would likely have moved on from their initial focus on bolstering the reform to instead being motivated more by the asymmetric pressures that generally tend to undermine distributive policies over time.

These dynamics make it dramatically more likely that a future-assessment reform will be eroded or undermined prior to the assessment of tax, especially as compared to the likelihood of a current-assessment reform being fully repealed along with taxpayers then being given refunds for tax previously paid through a current-assessment reform. Completely overturning a current-assessment reform and then refunding taxes previously paid typically requires explicit legislative action that must overcome all relevant veto points. And legislating refunds of taxes previously paid by ultra-wealthy taxpayers is likely to be very politically salient. By contrast, as we have explained, future-assessment reforms can be undermined through inaction or through relatively minor and much less salient forms of action. For all of these reasons, taxing now is relatively certain, whereas taxing later is quite tentative.

2. The Time Value of Options

Taking the political-optionality metaphor literally, the longer the time to maturity of an option, the greater its value.\textsuperscript{196} For a financial option,\textsuperscript{197} the logic is that the longer the time until the option expires, the greater the likelihood that the option will end up “in the money,” or with a strike price greater than the current market “spot price” for a put option (and vice versa for a call option).\textsuperscript{198}

Political optionality has the character of a put option. The taxpayer has an asset with built-in gain, and she could realize that gain today or tomorrow. If, because of a change in the tax regime, tomorrow’s after-tax price could be higher


\textsuperscript{197}. A financial option is a financial instrument that gives the holder the right to buy (call) or sell (put) some underlying asset at a set “strike price” at some point in the future.

\textsuperscript{198}. KIDWELL ET AL., supra note 196, at 323.
than today's (all else equal), then a rational taxpayer could wait to see—and might even pay for the option of waiting.

In the context of tax reform, a future-assessment tax, assessed at the present-value equivalent of a currently assessed tax, carries with it an option to wait for a more favorable regime. Furthermore, as with financial options, the longer the time until that future assessment, the greater the likelihood of a taxpayer-favorable change—for example, by waiting for a congressional or presidential election that shifts power in a taxpayer-favorable direction. If that new Congress or new presidential appointees to key administrative agencies act to minimize or repeal the future-assessed tax, the taxpayer can then “exercise” the option to realize the gain under that new law.

To be clear, the path of legal change does not need to be monotonically in favor of the taxpayer for this to work. It could be that one Congress passes a future-assessment reform, and the next Congress makes it even stronger. But if the Congress after that could weaken or repeal the reform, the option is still valuable. Just as an asset price might be volatile, so might tax policy. Indeed, the value of a financial option tends to increase with volatility in the price of the underlying asset. All the taxpayer needs to do is wait for a favorable moment to realize a gain—and, as we discuss, history shows that taxpayers tend to do exactly that.

Indeed, the option value that results from future-assessment tax reforms is even easier to exercise than are financial options because taxpayers are often given advance notice of upcoming political and legal changes as such changes work their way through the legislative or administrative process. Whereas the prices in financial markets are typically forward looking, taxpayers can often act to recognize their deferred tax liabilities in advance of upcoming tax hikes or strengthening of tax-base rules that rely on future assessment.

Then, by contrast to current-assessment reforms, later changes to a future-assessment regime are inherently retroactive with respect to deferred tax liabilities. This is because, under a future-assessment regime, any economic income or accruals to wealth will be “inchoate” until the time of realization.

199. See Kamin & Oh, supra note 39, at 15; Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation in the United States: Realizations, Revenue, and Rhetoric, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 595, 605 [hereinafter Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation].


201. To extend the metaphor, political optionality is like an “American” option, i.e., one that can be exercised at any time, rather than a “European” option, i.e., one that can be exercised only on its expiration date. See Black & Scholes, supra note 200, at 637.

202. The concept of “inchoate income” is generally considered incoherent from the perspective of “economic income.” That is, all gains are income regardless of realization. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 68, at 87. Nonetheless, the realization doctrine still means that economic income does not become “real” for tax purposes until the tax law says so.
Thus, even if the tax when realized carries with it an interest charge to cover the time-value benefits of deferral, any gain will, for purposes of tax law doctrine, still only be income in the year of realization. Consequently, if a future Congress lowers the tax rate or the interest rate that applies to that gain, this would implicitly have retroactive effects even though it would doctrinally only apply to that year’s and future years’ realized income. Arguably more importantly, the same is true if a future administrative agency creates or fails to prevent a new tax-gaming opportunity for reducing or escaping the tax.

Therefore, if Congress is limited to enacting only future-assessment tax reforms, the result would effectively be a partial one-way ratchet toward weakening effective taxes on the ultra-wealthy. Any attempt to hike taxes on the ultra-wealthy through future-assessment can be expected to result in greater deferral of tax liabilities as taxpayers wait for future regimes more favorable to them. And once such future changes happen, including changes in the form of newly invented forms of tax gaming that are not effectively prevented by a future Congress or by future administrative agencies, these changes will have the effect of retroactively allowing income earned during earlier time periods to escape tax.

Exacerbating all of these dynamics, ultra-wealthy taxpayers can and do lobby and exert other political pressures to increase the likelihood that future legal or political changes will be favorable to them, so as to increase the option value they derive from the realization doctrine and from future-assessment reforms. In this manner, the time value of options interacts with and magnifies the other ways in which future-assessment reforms foster dynamics that tend to result in these reforms eroding over time.

However, all of these changes in important ways if a Congress desiring to hike taxes on the ultra-wealthy instead opts to do so through current-assessment reforms. For instance, consider that a full deemed-realization mark-to-market


204. This is even more true—obviously so—for some reforms of loophole benefits, like the step-up in basis. If the step-up in basis is repealed one year and reinstated the next, the repeal would have had no effect on anyone who had not died in the interim period.

reform could include within its base all of the unrealized gains that were deferred during the prior years in which the previous realization-based future-assessment regime governed. In this way, such a reform could be designed to implicitly have retroactive effects even though it might doctrinally only apply starting in the year of enactment (or perhaps starting in the tax year preceding enactment). This is essentially the same way that future changes reducing the effective taxation of the ultra-wealthy’s investment income currently have implicit retroactive effects to prior year’s investment gains, as we explained above. Thus, current-assessment reforms can transform what is currently a partial one-way ratchet toward weakening effective taxes on the ultra-wealthy into a full two-way ratchet capable of also strengthening effective taxes on the ultra-wealthy.

Future legal and political changes will inevitably happen—no tax reform will remain permanently stable. Yet reliance on future-assessment reforms creates powerful biases against effective taxation of the ultra-wealthy because of the time value of options. Ultra-wealthy taxpayers can respond to future-assessment reforms they dislike by deferring their tax liabilities. Current-assessment reforms can counteract these biases by preventing or at least

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206. For example, the proposed NY Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act would do just that, although only for billionaire taxpayers. See S. 8277, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); David Gamage, Emmanuel Saez & Darien Shanske, The NY Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act: Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis 1 (Sept. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3766547 [https://perma.cc/D4P3-WE5L]; Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 195, at 541. A prepayment mechanism built into a progressive consumption tax reform would also in essence rely on deemed realization and so would similarly have implicit retroactive effects. Likewise, an annual wealth tax reform would also have implicit retroactive effects, as the wealth accrued through gains in prior years would be included in the tax base, although these retroactive effects would occur somewhat more gradually over time as compared to a full deemed-realization reform.

207. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.

208. It may be worth noting that our analysis here is based on some implicit assumptions about what sorts of retroactive reforms are plausible (we thank Daniel Shaviro for helpful discussions with us on this point). Absent any constraints on retroactive reforms, there might not be as much difference between current-assessment reforms and future-assessment reforms—because, for instance, a future Congress enacting a future-assessment reform to hike taxes on the ultra-wealthy might in theory include in the base of that reform gains that were realized in prior years and thereby already subject to the lower rates governing in those prior years. However, current constitutional doctrines, federal budget rules, and politics all make retroactive reforms of this sort impossible or at least implausible. For instance, current constitutional doctrines generally permit retroactive reforms that go back to the prior tax year or that only implicitly affect tax years before that, but current doctrine does not generally allow revising tax rates or rules in a manner that would require taxpayers to recalculate taxes paid through prior years’ returns (such as subjecting previously realized gains to new rates). See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 195, at 546–47. Thus, although our analysis depends on some implicit assumptions about what sorts of retroactive reforms are plausible, these assumptions are grounded in current constitutional law precedents, federal budget rules, and politics. Fully explaining how our analysis and conclusions might change under different constitutional rules, budget rules, and political limitations would be an interesting project but is well beyond the scope of this Article.
deterring such deferral, thereby creating a more level playing field for future changes affecting taxation of the ultra-wealthy.

3. Federal Budget Rules and Related Political Incentives

Fiscal institutions and budget accounting rules, though somewhat technical and arcane, have very real effects on the politics of tax law and tax reform. In particular, they can weaken future-assessment reforms in some surprising ways. To see this requires first explaining a few basics of budget policy and revenue scoring.

First, the CBO is required to “score”—provide a cost estimate of—bills and resolutions approved by congressional committees. This is done using a combination of the CBO’s own methodology and the revenue estimates of tax bills produced by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. That “score” is useful to legislators thinking about the overall budget, but it also affects the application of various budget rules and targets.

Second, one aspect of those budget rules is that revenue and cost estimates generally only cover the “budget window” of, typically, the next ten years. Revenue and cost effects beyond those years do not appear in budget estimates and are only relevant in a few circumstances.

Third, an important case when budget estimates outside the budget window are relevant is in the context of “budget reconciliation.” This is a process that allows budget-related bills to pass through expedited congressional procedures (and no Senate filibuster), provided that they do not raise the budget deficit in any of the “out years” beyond the budget window. This is one reason why recent tax cuts have been written to only stay in effect for the ten years after passage—to avoid increasing the deficit in years eleven and beyond.

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211. Id. at 2.

212. Under law, a congressional budget resolution must cover a window of the next five years, 2 U.S.C. § 632, but typical practice has been to estimate revenue and outlays over a ten-year period. See, e.g., Budget and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data [https://perma.cc/3WGN-RZYS].


What does this mean for future-assessment reform? Suppose Congress passes a law that includes retrospective capital gains taxation for at least some assets, like shares in closely held corporations or interests in partnerships. Because that revenue would appear only in some future years, it would have a muted revenue estimate for budget scoring purposes—some of the revenue would likely show up only in the “out” years, and thus would not be part of the official revenue estimate.

Suppose, for example, that in year one after the reform there is appreciation in share values that, if taxed immediately, would raise $100 billion. The future-assessment reform by assumption will raise $100 billion in present value someday. But because of the timing of actual realizations, suppose that only $60 billion will actually be collected in the next ten years. In that case, it would be “scored” for budget purposes as only raising $60 billion. Recall that we are still talking about current economic income—the actual taxation of gain that occurs in year one might not happen until year eleven or beyond, and therefore it would essentially have no budget effect, even though it will raise $40 billion in present value. And given budget rules, like various caps and pay-as-you-go rules, it would be institutionally difficult to spend that $40 billion before it is actually collected.215

If government accounting were more like business accounting, that future tax revenue—the $40 billion of revenue outside the budget window—might at least show up as a deferred tax asset on the government’s balance sheet—as value that it would monetize in the future.216 If that were the case, then a future legislative change destroying that value would impair that asset and show up as a cost. Alas, that is not the case.217 Instead, and perversely, Congress could pass a law that would lower the value of the tax asset—that is, would collect less than the $40 billion that would have been expected—but would be scored as raising revenue (or at least lowering revenue less than it really does).218

For example, suppose Congress repealed a future-assessment tax that would have taxed gain at the present-value equivalent of a current-assessment

215. The federal government could of course borrow against that future revenue—the government has essentially unlimited borrowing capacity. But the associated spending would still show up as outlay without any offsetting revenue within the budget window.
218. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-69-04, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 4520, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004,” at 5 (2004) (showing that a one-time 85% deduction for dividends received by a U.S. parent from a controlled foreign corporation would raise $2.8 billion for the year it was in effect, partially offsetting the projected revenue loss of $6 billion over the next nine years).
tax and replaced it with a current-assessment tax, but at a far lower tax rate. Let’s say the $40 billion that was expected to be raised (but which did not appear in the original budget score) is reduced thereby to $10 billion, but that $10 billion is collected immediately and therefore within the budget window. For budget purposes, Congress has now lost a lot of revenue in the out years—the years beyond the ten-year budget window—but added a little revenue within the budget window. The bill would be a net loser in present value by $30 billion but could increase revenue estimates by $10 billion for budget scoring purposes. This is a dynamic we saw play out, for example, in the taxation of the foreign income of U.S. multinational corporations, discussed below.\(^\text{219}\)

The reform need not be this dramatic for the same effect to exist. For example, Congress could keep the future-assessment tax in place but simply lower the tax rate or narrow the base that would apply upon realization. In a static setting, that would seem to lower revenue uniformly. But in a dynamic setting, the lower rate might induce some taxpayers to accelerate realization of their previously deferred tax liabilities inside the budget window so as to take advantage of those reduced rates or narrowed base, again making it appear as if an overall revenue loser actually increases revenue.\(^\text{220}\)

The effect of these deferred tax assets (to the government) or liabilities (to taxpayers) goes beyond formal budget rules. The politics should be obvious—a tax cut that does not impact the budget for favored priorities is a win-win for most politicians.\(^\text{221}\) Moreover, as taxpayer deferred tax liabilities accumulate, enforcement incentives change. In particular, taxpayers would inevitably come up with new tax-gaming ideas for making use of their deferred tax liabilities, and the larger the amount of accumulated deferred tax liabilities, the more pressure there would likely be on the Treasury and IRS to be lax in policing these new forms of tax gaming.\(^\text{222}\)

By contrast, a current-assessment reform would immediately begin generating tax revenue. Then, subsequently reducing the tax rates or narrowing

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\(^{219}\) See infra Section III.C.2.

\(^{220}\) This is the opposite of the problem with raising current capital gains tax rates (absent a current-assessment reform). See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

\(^{221}\) See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 370 (2017) (explaining how when a proposed tax reform is estimated to raise little revenue for the policymakers considering proposing the reform that this tends to make those policymakers lose interest in the reform); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Trouble with Tax Increase Limitations, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 50, 79 (2013) (“There is ample evidence that voters desire both lower taxes and increased spending on all of the major programs on which governments spend significant resources.”).

\(^{222}\) As Daniel Hemel has explained, political pressures tend to bias the Treasury Department and IRS toward using their regulatory authority mostly in taxpayer-favorable, revenue-losing directions, because doing so “will be quite attractive to the President: if his administration acts on its own to reduce taxes, the President will reap all the political benefits, while he and Congress will share the political costs of spending cuts.” Hemel, The President’s Power, supra note 192, at 643.
the base would be expensive because instead of reducing the value of the government’s deferred tax assets (a nonbudgetary cost), there would be a reduction in current tax revenue that would directly affect budget scoring. Moreover, if that change were to also reduce tax revenue in the out years, it could not be passed through the expedited budget reconciliation process.

All of this adds up to asymmetric institutional pressures. A current-assessment reform, once passed, becomes sticky—repealing it would cost real money, in budget terms, and face a more difficult legislative process with more stringent budget rules. By contrast, a future-assessment reform carries the seeds of its own diminution, since scaling it back or repealing it would appear to cost less in budget terms than it really does and could even score as increasing revenue. These asymmetric pressures magnify the political-optionality benefits to taxpayers from future-assessment reforms by making it substantially more likely that law or policy will move in the direction of reducing the future taxation of deferred tax liabilities.

The indirect effects related to the political incentives of building coalitions around the spending of tax revenues further exacerbate these asymmetric institutional pressures. This is because tax revenue generated today—such as through a current-assessment reform—can be used to fund public spending or other policy goals, which would likely then generate a political constituency with the motivation to defend this new revenue source.

We discussed above the typical dynamic of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits that characterizes repealing tax benefits for the ultra-wealthy. One way to counteract that, at least partially, is to use the new revenue stream to create a constituency that would lose something if the new revenue source were lost. Yet a future-assessment reform, by contrast, would in most circumstances not be able to appropriate the tax revenues it might eventually raise until some theoretical future date. One can see this dynamic by comparing the opposition to the ACA in 2010—before any benefits had been delivered—with the unsuccessful attempts to repeal the law in 2017. Before benefit delivery began, public opposition was fairly strong, but by the time Congress tried to repeal in 2017, there were enough people benefiting from the law to make repeal too politically costly.

Of course, Congress could choose to borrow in advance of receiving that revenue to start distributing the benefits sooner. Indeed, that might be the financially rational thing to do, if the future revenue were assured. But, as noted

223. See supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
above, budget accounting and budget politics do not generally provide for a clean way to do that because the spending would not be funded by offsetting revenues that count for budget scoring purposes. Thus, without a constituency directly benefiting from the future-assessment revenue stream, repeal would have diminished political cost—just as it would also have diminished budget cost.

B. Prior Future-Assessment Proposals

We believe there is a strong theoretical case for current-assessment reforms, compared to future-assessment reforms, as discussed in the prior subsection. However, the prior literature has generally concluded that more conventional (realization-based) future-assessment reforms should suffice for fixing the personal tax system, so that current-assessment reforms have typically been viewed as unnecessary and thus not worth pursuing. To flesh out our theoretical argument, we now examine two prominent categories of future-assessment reforms in more detail: (1) retrospective capital gains tax reforms (including hybrids of partial mark-to-market and retrospective capital gains tax reforms), and (2) progressive consumption tax reforms.

We focus here in particular on reforms that address the time-value benefits of deferral, since these are the trickiest problems to solve. By contrast, there are numerous proposals for ending at least some of the major loophole benefits of deferral (the other category of existing-law benefits of deferral). For example, repeal of the § 1014 step-up in basis would be relatively straightforward—at least in terms of legislative drafting. The primary obstacles instead are the political difficulty of accomplishing it and then sustaining it. As we will explain below, the history of prior attempts to repeal the basis step-up illustrate the dangers of political optionality. And we believe those same dangers also arise with these more comprehensive future-assessment reform proposals that we will discuss below.

The reform proposals below would—if they remained politically stable—end (or at least make irrelevant) the time-value benefits of deferral. However, as we will elaborate, these proposals would retain the political-optionality benefit of deferral. That is, because these proposals would continue to use realization as the time of tax assessment, the actual collection of tax would often occur in later time periods than when income is earned (or when wealth or spending power is accumulated). As a result, these proposals would be vulnerable to later political or legal changes undermining the actual collection of tax.

226. See supra note 23.
227. See supra note 23.
1. Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation

A realization-based tax system can, at least in theory, counteract the time-value benefits of deferral by instituting an additional charge at the time of realization that reflects the time value of money during the deferral period—essentially an interest charge that covers the time from when the income was earned to when it is taxed. The seminal modern proposal of this type came from Alan Auerbach.\(^{228}\) Auerbach’s proposal has since been praised and elaborated on by many other academics and analysts.\(^{229}\)

Auerbach’s proposal is actually more nuanced than simply an interest charge. Prior retrospective proposals, especially that of William Vickrey in 1939, imagined knowing how much unrealized gain was earned in a given year, and thus how much tax would have been owed on realization.\(^{230}\) The government could then just treat that unpaid tax as a loan and charge interest accordingly, repeating each year. The catch, as Auerbach points out, is that this would require knowing the value of the asset at each point in time, which we often do not.\(^{231}\)

Auerbach suggested a different approach. He was primarily concerned with the lock-in effect—the incentive that taxpayers have, at any given moment in time, to hold an asset and thus defer tax, rather than sell it and be taxed.\(^{232}\) The goal of Auerbach’s proposal was “holding-period neutrality,” a world where, at any given point in time, taxpayers would be indifferent between holding or selling assets.\(^{233}\) If the lock-in effect could be removed, that would eliminate some of the welfare costs of the realization doctrine. Auerbach demonstrated how to achieve holding-period neutrality with a formula that uses only the asset value at realization, the tax rate, the holding period, and the risk-free interest rate, and without needing to know asset values during the holding period. This formula computes a tax upon realization that increases the longer the holding period.\(^{234}\)


\(^{231}\) Indeed, in the current era, retrospective proposals are almost uniformly directed at illiquid assets, where annual accrual taxation would be too inaccurate. If the value is known, as with publicly traded assets, we can instead use mark-to-market schemes.

\(^{232}\) Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains, supra note 228, at 167.

\(^{233}\) Id. at 169.

\(^{234}\) Id. at 170. In the simple case where there are no cash flows from the asset, just an increase in value, Auerbach’s formula for a tax liability at time \(s\) is \(T_s = (1 - e^{-is})A_s\), where \(t\) is the tax rate, \(i\) is the
Auerbach’s proposal was designed to avoid the liquidity and valuation problems that the prior literature has generally viewed as being the primary disadvantages of current-assessment reforms.235 As Auerbach has noted, however, retrospective capital gains taxation alone is not sufficient to end the existing-law benefits of deferral without other reforms, most importantly repealing the step-up in basis at death.236 This is because retrospective capital gains taxation cannot solve the problem of a legal rule that simply erases a large portion of the tax base.

But that limitation points to the larger problems caused by the political-optionality benefits of deferral. By leaving intact the taxpayer’s choice as to when the tax will apply (even if the amount of the tax is calculated so as to theoretically be timing neutral), retrospective capital gains tax reforms would allow taxpayers the option to wait for future legal changes beneficial to them.237

The problems that the political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for full retrospective capital gains tax proposals also apply to hybrids of partial mark-to-market and retrospective capital gains tax proposals, although potentially to a somewhat lesser degree. Most of the proposals in the prior literature for mark-to-market style reforms would actually only enact a partial mark-to-market system that would apply mostly just to publicly traded securities.238 With respect to other, harder-to-value assets, most of these proposals would then apply a retrospective capital gains tax reform.

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\text{risk-free interest rate, and } A_t \text{ is the value of the asset at time } t. \text{ Conceptually, the tax system taxes the investor as if the asset had grown at the risk-free rate to reach the value of } A_t. \text{ The idea is that at any given point in time, a rational investor should be indifferent at the margin before taxes between investing in a risky and a risk-free asset, which implies a risk-adjusted expected rate of return for the risky asset equal to the risk-free rate. If that is so, then telling the investor that they will pay tax in the future on that risk-free return regardless of whether they sell or hold should make them indifferent after taxes too.}
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235. Id. at 168.


237. Auerbach’s version of retrospective capital gains taxation has other problems as well. A large one is that it taxes from an ex-ante perspective rather than an ex-post perspective, meaning that those who ended up with especially large extranormal returns would end up being taxed relatively lightly as a percentage of their actual gains. See Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains, supra note 228, at 176–77. This is especially concerning if our motivation is to more effectively tax the ultra-wealthy—by definition, the big ex-post winners.

238. See Kleinbard, The Right Tax, supra note 33, at 354 (“Nearly every such proposal limits its reach to publicly traded instruments . . . .”); WYDEN, supra note 169 (discussing the 2019 version of Senator Wyden’s hybrid of a mark-to-market and a retrospective capital gains tax reform proposal). Note that, after this Article was accepted for publication, the authors worked with Senator Wyden’s staff on developing a revised version of his prior reform proposal that then became the “Billionaires Income Tax Reform,” publicly released in October 2021. See Wyden Unveils Billionaires Income Tax, U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wyden-unveils-billionaires-income-tax [https://perma.cc/UF3Y-R3SS]. Had it been enacted, the proposed Billionaires Income Tax Reform of 2021 (“BIT”) would have only applied to billionaire taxpayers and would have combined a mark-to-market regime for tradable assets with a retrospective regime for nontradable assets, along with rules designed to shut down all of the major current-law loopholes as
However, taking account of the political-optionality benefits of deferral, sophisticated taxpayers would likely expect that future legal or political changes would eventually undermine the retrospective capital gains tax component of such a reform, so that sophisticated taxpayers would potentially still face incentives to shift their investments away from assets subject to the mark-to-market component of the reform toward those subject to the retrospective capital gains component. For this reason, although a hybrid of a partial mark-to-market and a retrospective capital gains tax reform might well be a substantial improvement over the current income tax system, we doubt that such a reform (on its own) could succeed at sustainably fixing how the income tax is currently broken.

2. Progressive Consumption Taxation

An alternative realization-based approach for eliminating the time-value benefits of deferral involves abandoning the attempt to tax time-value returns altogether. Various approaches for progressive consumption tax reform proposals have been designed to accomplish this, with specific versions of these proposals often labeled as personal expenditure tax reforms, progressive spending tax reforms, and cash-flow consumption tax reforms, among other labels.239

Although specific design elements vary, these different consumption tax proposals generally share two key features: first, including in the tax base only funds used for consumption, at the time that these funds are used for consumption; and second, eliminating the tax on the risk-free time-value returns to holding wealth, specifically, the return that is due only to the value that comes from having the wealth today rather than tomorrow.240 By taxing funds only once when withdrawn to fund consumption, the ultimate tax is the

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240. Under most versions of these sorts of reform proposals, supernormal returns (or “economic rents”) would still be included in the tax base. Many commentators also argue that “risky returns” do not face an effective tax burden under an income tax and therefore can be ignored, though this is not a universal view. See John R. Brooks, Taxation, Risk, and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 255, 256 (2013).
same in present-value terms no matter when the funds are withdrawn, thereby eliminating any financial time-value benefits to deferral.

Furthermore, well-designed consumption tax reform proposals would generally also change the tax rules governing borrowing, so that borrowing money to fund consumption would generate the same tax as would selling assets to fund consumption.241 Thus, taxpayers like Larry Ellison (who, as we previously explained,242 has funded around $10 billion of untaxed consumption through borrowing) should face much higher effective tax rates under a well-designed progressive consumption tax than under the existing income tax.

However, as with retrospective capital gains taxation, progressive consumption tax reforms would retain the realization-based nature of the personal tax system by allowing for separation in time between the point at which the power to spend is accumulated and when it is taxed.243 This thus retains the political-optionality benefits of deferral.

It may perhaps seem odd to describe a tax on current consumption as being a future-assessment reform. But because consumption generally occurs at a point after income has been earned, and thus also after the power to spend has been accumulated, a consumption tax is assessed in the future with respect to both income and the accumulation of spending power. We can thus analytically distinguish the base that is to be taxed over a taxpayer’s lifetime (here, total lifetime consumption) from the points in time at which that tax is to be assessed and collected.

The typical consumption tax proposal uses the times when actual consumption occurs to impose tax, but we could imagine a current-assessment version of a progressive consumption tax that would instead impose tax at the times in which spending power accumulates. Thus, to transform any of the major progressive consumption tax reform proposals into a current-assessment reform, all that is needed is to add a prepayment or withholding mechanism that would assess and collect tax as the power to spend accumulates. These prepaid or withheld (currently-assessed) tax payments could then be reconciled

241. This is often held out as a major advantage of progressive consumption taxation over income taxation—one could not pursue the usual "buy, borrow, die" strategy. See, e.g., McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, supra note 1, at 878–80.

242. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.

243. By delaying when money received is used to fund consumption, a taxpayer can create a separation in time between when money is received by the taxpayer and when that money is realized and reported as taxable under a consumption tax. This is still deferral and allows the taxpayer to defer tax while waiting for favorable (to the taxpayer) future legal changes. Whether we call this receipt of money “income” or “wealth accumulation” or something else, the key is that taxpayers can receive money along with control of that money, and then defer any tax on those receipts by delaying consumption.
with the final assessment of tax that could be calculated when funds are withdrawn to pay for actual consumption.²⁴⁴

Because the progressive consumption tax proposals in the prior literature lack such mechanisms, we label them future-assessment reforms. Under any of these proposals, a taxpayer could just wait for a tax rate reduction or a narrowing of the tax base before withdrawing funds for consumption and thereby subjecting those funds to tax. Because taxpayers could opt to postpone withdrawing funds for consumption until a later period, they could simply wait for a more favorable Congress or IRS. To be sure, many taxpayers have much less ability to defer actual consumption than they do to just defer realization under the rules of the existing income tax. Thus, strategic deferral might be somewhat less available as a tax planning strategy under a well-designed progressive consumption tax than under either the existing income tax or a retrospective capital gains tax. Indeed, this is part of the normative arguments typically made in favor of using consumption as a tax base.²⁴⁵

However, the ultra-wealthy differ from more ordinary taxpayers and—almost by definition—have more wealth than they are likely to ever consume. Many of the ultra-wealthy would thus be able to strategically time at least large portions of their withdrawals following any of these progressive consumption tax reforms. In particular, future heirs would have a strong incentive to lobby hard for future rate changes or exemptions, knowing that most of their consumption would come in later time periods.

Thus, the likelihood that future consumption would eventually come to be taxed at lower effective rates due to political or legal changes would almost certainly lead many ultra-wealthy taxpayers to defer substantial portions of their tax liabilities. This would then result in essentially the same dynamics as

²⁴⁴. We plan to elaborate on how proposals of this sort could work in future scholarship. Daniel Hemel (among others) has previously explained how a prepayment or withholding mechanism of this sort could work in the context of a retrospective capital gains tax reform. Hemel, Taxing Wealth, supra note 39, at 768–69.

with retrospective capital gains tax reforms, although perhaps to a comparatively lesser degree.

C. Historical Examples of Political Optionality in Action

To further explain why we are skeptical of future-assessment reforms that would leave intact the political-optionality benefits of deferral, we next discuss lessons that can be drawn from tax history. Specifically, we consider three sets of historical examples where political optionality undermined important aspects of the tax system: (1) capital gains tax rate fluctuations, (2) tax holidays related to the repatriation of foreign-source income, and (3) stepped-up basis reform efforts.

Each of these historical examples illustrates a slightly different aspect of the problems posed by the political-optionality benefits of deferral, and together they tell a strong cautionary tale against any reform that would act to limit only the existing-law benefits of deferral without also limiting the political-optionality benefits of deferral. Specifically, the history of taxpayer responses to capital gains tax rate fluctuations reveals the extent to which taxpayers can be expected to change their behavior in response to future legal changes and even just the possibility of such changes. The history of the repatriation of the foreign-source income of controlled foreign corporations then clarifies how the political-optionality benefits of deferral on their own (even in the absence of any existing-law benefits of deferral) can create powerful incentives for taxpayers to defer realizing income. And, finally, the history of attempts at reforming the provision for stepped-up basis shows the

246. Edward Kleinbard has made a limited version of this argument in a few paragraphs of his prior work. Kleinbard, The Right Tax, supra note 33, at 232–33. In particular, Kleinbard focuses on the concern that, following the enactment of a progressive consumption tax reform, Congress would see large amounts of invested wealth build up and not spent or realized, and so would then be unable to resist the temptation to create tax holidays, especially during economic downturns. See id. We agree with Kleinbard on this point, but we view this as only a portion of the broader problems that the political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for progressive consumption tax reforms. As we explained in Section III.A.1, inertia and drift are the dominant feature of tax politics, and it is thus much easier for a coalition to defeat attempts to modify previously enacted tax reforms than to create new modifications. Consequently, what is likely to be the most important dimension of the problems that the political-optionality benefits of deferral pose for progressive consumption tax reforms arises from the near inevitability of taxpayers eventually devising tax-gaming stratagems capable of granting them access to their deferred tax liabilities without triggering tax, followed by a failure to adequately police these stratagems. For some examples of how this could happen, see Gamage, The Case for Taxing, supra note 86, at 428–29.

247. Whether a progressive consumption tax reform would result in these sorts of dynamics to a comparatively lesser, or a comparatively greater, degree is hard to say, and would depend on the design of the progressive consumption tax reform, among other factors. Notably, many of the most prominent proposals for progressive consumption tax reforms would involve full expensing of asset purchases to replace depreciation, which could result in much greater deferral of tax liabilities as compared to either the existing income tax or a retrospective capital gains tax.
unsustainability of attempting to end the major loophole benefits of deferral absent current-assessment reforms and, more generally, how reform attempts that would rely on future assessment can be highly vulnerable to political attack.

1. Capital Gains Tax Rate Fluctuations

Legislators regularly tinker with tax rates, whether to achieve revenue targets, distributional goals, constituent demands, economic incentives, or other goals. This includes not just tax rates on capital gains, but also ordinary income, corporate income, and more. Indeed, rates on ordinary and corporate income have varied over a wider range than capital gains. Since 1982, the top statutory marginal rate on ordinary income has varied between 28% and 50%, and the top corporate rate has varied between 21% and 46%. In that same period, the top capital gains rate has fluctuated between 15% and 29%.

Nevertheless, due to the realization doctrine, we should expect capital gains rate changes to influence behavior far more than changes to ordinary income or corporate income. This is because it is relatively easy to shift the timing of capital gains realization forward or backward to maximize tax benefits, but harder to do so for most business and salary income. And, indeed, past experience with rate changes has shown that there is a relatively high elasticity (that is, taxpayer responsiveness) of capital gains realizations to the tax rate, particularly from transitory rate changes.

For example, in 1987 the capital gains rate went up from 20% to 28%, and as a result, capital gains realizations spiked in 1986, the year before the increase, and then dropped to an even lower level during the 1987–1997 period. We


250. See Historical Capital Gains and Taxes: 1954 to 2014, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 4, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-capital-gains-and-taxes [https://perma.cc/4VQZ-3QCN]. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was even a 33% “bubble rate” that applied to taxpayers just below the highest income group, intended to offset the advantages of the lower marginal rates on smaller income amounts. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(g)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2097 (repealed). This was intended to achieve the effect of a flat 28% for the higher income groups, and so we treat 28% as the top rate for that period.

251. See Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation, supra note 199, at 595.


saw similar behavior in 2012, the year before the 15% capital gains rate increased to 20%, and also in 2017, when taxpayers assumed that rate cuts or other tax breaks would be coming in that year’s tax reform bill. Sophisticated taxpayers—who hold most of the capital gain-producing assets—have repeatedly shown that they will time realizations based on anticipated tax changes.

The regular fluctuation of capital gains tax rates also reveals a different—but related—type of behavior. David Kamin and Jason Oh apply an analysis similar to our own to argue that capital gains rate uncertainty itself generates a return to deferral because of the option value of a potential future lower rate. They argue, for example, that if the current capital gains rate is relatively high, then a taxpayer might reasonably guess that in a future year, the rate could revert toward the historical mean, thus creating an incentive to defer realization until that future year. When the taxpayer has a long time horizon, the likelihood of some future year having a lower rate increases, thus also increasing the incentive to wait. How much this behavior occurs in practice is an empirical question that requires further study, but the logic is compelling and dovetails with other common tax planning strategies, such as deferring compensation until future, lower tax-bracket years.

2. Repatriation Holidays

A similar option value to waiting is at play in the choices of multinational corporations for when to “repatriate” the income earned by their foreign subsidiaries back to the U.S. parent corporation. Because even related corporations are treated as separate legal entities, the income earned by a

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254. Id.
256. See supra Section I.A.
257. Kamin & Oh, supra note 39, at 15.
258. Id. at 12–14.
259. Kamin and Oh also introduce the step-up in basis into their model. If a person is close to death, there is much less uncertainty about the future capital gains rate, since it will be 0% shortly. That decreases the uncertainty, but increases even more the incentive to wait, as we discuss below. If anticipated death is farther away, a taxpayer might decide to take advantage of a low-rate year in the interim. Id. at 19–20.
260. This is the primary reason a person would choose a traditional 401(k) or IRA plan over a “Roth”-style 401(k) or IRA plan, for example. See, e.g., Kristin Mckenna, Roth 401(k) vs Traditional 401(k): Investing Pre-Tax or After-Tax, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristinmckenna/2020/10/19/roth-401k-vs-traditional-401k-investing-pre-tax-or-after-tax/?sh=4499b3d334a3 [https://perma.cc/7U8H-62RG].
controlled foreign corporation ("CFC") does not become U.S. source income of the parent corporation until the subsidiary actually pays a dividend to the parent.\footnote{261} Prior to 2018,\footnote{262} that decision carried heavy tax consequences, analogous to the realization doctrine for capital gains—by simply not having the CFC distribute a dividend to the U.S. parent, the U.S. parent could avoid paying current U.S. tax.

As with the capital gain income of U.S. individuals, the timing of a repatriation dividend was almost entirely voluntary. There is little nontax cost from failing to repatriate—if the parent corporation needs capital, for example, it does not matter that some cash is trapped offshore in a CFC because the fact that it had offshore cash holdings makes it easier to raise money in the capital markets. And in the case of public companies, shareholders need not wait for a dividend to get access to the profits, since they could just sell shares on the market instead (or borrow against the shares, as described above).

But the repatriation case also departs from the individual capital gains case in an important way. In the case of individual capital gains, deferral also generates a time-value financial benefit. As we have discussed, that existing-law benefit is on top of the political-optionality benefits of also waiting for a favorable legal change. With repatriation, however, the time-value benefits of deferral were often not present—all that was available to multinational corporations in many circumstances were the political-optionality benefits. Yet, as discussed below, this was still more than enough to dramatically affect their behavior.

To elaborate, tax scholars have shown that, if a business enterprise faces a similar corporate tax rate and access to investment in the foreign jurisdiction as in the United States, then there really is \textit{not} a time-value financial benefit of deferring repatriation.\footnote{263} This is because the cash in question would be earning a similar return while being held by the CFC, and that return would be taxed at a similar rate in the interim. Moreover, when the dividend was finally paid, it would be larger (by the after-foreign tax rate of return), and thus the tax collected on that dividend would also be larger. It can be shown with simple math that this is equivalent to repatriating the dividend earlier and then investing that cash in the United States.\footnote{264} The only factors that matter are the rates of return and the tax rates in the two jurisdictions, not the timing of the dividend.

For sure, multinationals have been quite aggressive about lowering their effective foreign tax rates through international structuring or simply housing

\footnote{261}{See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31–32 (2014).}
\footnote{262}{See infra note 267 and accompanying text.}
\footnote{263}{See SHAVIRO, supra note 261, at 82–84.}
\footnote{264}{Id.}
the CFC in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction. But the evidence shows that multinationals were also keeping cash offshore even in high-tax jurisdictions. Why was that, if in fact there were no time-value financial benefits from doing so?

The answer, of course, comes from the political-optionality benefits of deferral. In 2004, when U.S. corporations had perhaps $500 billion of cash held in offshore subsidiaries, Congress enacted a repatriation “holiday,” a low 5.25% tax rate on dividends paid by CFCs during 2005 and 2006 (as opposed to the then-existing 35% tax rate on corporate income). Congress’s theory was presumably that a one-time holiday would allow the offshore cash to come home and be reinvested in the United States (notwithstanding the fact that much of that cash was already in dollar-denominated accounts at U.S. banks and often invested in U.S. Treasuries). And if corporations were told it was a one-time holiday, they would change their behavior going forward and not keep hoarding cash offshore.

The foreseeable result, however, was that U.S. corporations instead became even more emboldened to aggressively hoard cash offshore after 2006 and to then start lobbying for yet another repatriation holiday. In effect, Congress had signaled that a future lower rate was politically possible, meaning that the probability-weighted expected future tax rate immediately decreased. By thereby increasing the political-optionality benefit of deferral, Congress increased the likelihood that corporations would continue to delay repatriation.


266. See SHAVIRO, supra note 261, at 85–87.

267. Another possible explanation is that there was an accounting benefit to keeping money offshore if the corporation could claim that the money was “permanently reinvested earnings.” Id. at 86. In that case, there would not be current tax charged for the deferred income, thus giving a boost to reported earnings. Id.


269. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1514–19 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 965). The new § 965 provided for an 85% dividends-received deduction, meaning that only 15% of repatriated dividends were subject to the then-current corporate tax rate of 35%. Id. That is equivalent to a 5.25% tax rate on 100% of the dividend.


And indeed, even though around $360 billion was repatriated under this provision, offshore cash holdings quickly shot back up, exceeding $2 trillion by 2017.

The corporations’ bet on the political-optionality benefits of deferral ultimately paid off. Congress came close to passing another repatriation holiday in 2009, but then in 2017 enacted a holiday as a part of the general shift to a modified territorial regime. The huge influx of cash to U.S. parent corporations that followed was the likely cause of the burst of share repurchases during 2018.

Because of the shift to a modified territorial regime—that is, one in which foreign-source income, such as the profits of a CFC, are taxed only in the source jurisdiction—we may not see this pattern repeated in the future, at least to the same degree. But we nevertheless look to this example to highlight that the political-optionality benefits of deferral are real and can dramatically affect taxpayer behavior in predictable ways. If a person or corporation can easily choose when to realize income, and if there is even a chance that the effective tax rate on that income will be lower in the future than today, the strategic choice is obvious and easy to implement. Moreover, when the taxpayer’s own behavior can affect the likelihood of a future lower rate coming about—through lobbying or other political activity—it becomes even more clear what the taxpayer will likely do.

3. Stepped-Up Basis Reform Efforts

As we have noted repeatedly, § 1014’s provision for stepped-up basis upon death is perhaps the most important of the loophole benefits of deferral under existing law. Because of that provision, if an individual or family taxpayer can avoid realizing gains during their lifetimes, the gains will be wiped out at death when the asset is passed to the taxpayer’s heirs.

The problematic nature of § 1014 is well known, and few defend it on a normative basis. Stanley Surrey, for example, called it “the most serious defect


276. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-50-17, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 249 (2017) (describing the shift to a “participation exemption system” in which dividends from CFC’s would be exempt from U.S. tax in most cases).

in the federal tax structure” fifty years ago. And, in theory, the solution is simple: replace the basis step-up with a carryover basis regime—that is, where the basis of the asset remains the same as it passes from decedent to recipient—as already exists for gifts made during a donor’s life, or, alternatively, treat death as a realization event for the decedent. Such reforms have been proposed numerous times over the years, as discussed below, and have even been partially enacted—yet they never last.

As Larry Zelenak and others have noted, under the original income tax in 1918, all transfers by gift or bequest resulted in a step-up in basis, though this was because of Treasury guidance, not because of any statutory law. In the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress then codified the current split treatment, with a carryover basis for inter vivos gifts but with the step-up at death. At that time, the primary argument for the step-up at death was to avoid double taxation when most applicable taxpayers were also subject to the estate tax. Because there was no federal gift tax at the time, the issue cut the other way for inter vivos gifts—a carryover basis rule allowed for income taxation of gifts, since they were not included in the estate tax.

So the particular reform put in place in 1921 had a logic to it at the time. But—as an illustration of the sort of policy drift that we discussed above—that logic became obsolete by at least 1932, when the gift tax was added permanently, and certainly by 1944, when Congress made the wartime expansion of the income tax permanent. As a result, the income tax went from covering 5% of households to 56% of households by 1946 and continued to grow from there. Income taxpayers and estate taxpayers were no longer the same households, and gifts were no longer exempt from wealth-transfer taxes, and so the original logic for the step-up at death no longer applied.

279. I.R.C. § 1015.
282. See Zelenak, supra note 280, at 12–14.
In 1942, Treasury tried to get Congress to enact a carryover basis provision, and, in both 1963 and 1969, Treasury (with Surrey as Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy) pushed a detailed realization-at-death provision instead, but in the face of opposition, these proposals each went nowhere. In 1976, the first real change occurred, with a carryover basis provision, § 1023, replacing § 1014. The provision had a number of exceptions to carryover basis treatment, including for life insurance and annuity policies, and it also provided a minimum basis of $60,000 (so still a pretty large step-up in 1976, even if not to full fair market value). The provision also provided a full exemption for up to $10,000 of property transferred. Despite these carve-outs (or perhaps because of them), the provision was quickly deemed unworkable, and its effective date was postponed to 1980, because of them), the provision was quickly deemed unworkable, and its repeal during that period. Ultimately, the complaints about complexity and workability won the day and preserved this large benefit for owners of wealth.

Importantly for our theory and approach, the 1976 attempted reform reveals how the combination of incremental congressional action and nonaction often tilts in favor of nontaxation of deferred tax liabilities. As a part of the compromise to enact the carryover basis provision, Congress also increased the estate tax exemption, from $60,000 to $120,000, under the reasonable argument that much of that property would instead come under the income tax umbrella due to the carryover basis provision. But when the carryover basis provision was repealed, the higher estate tax exemption was kept in place—the whole effort thus ended up being a net benefit to wealthy taxpayers. By
immediately granting the estate tax break, but delaying the income tax increase, Congress had left open the door for the ultra-wealthy to undermine the latter while keeping the former. In contrast, a current-assessment reform that did not defer the tax increase could have been more stable and might have avoided that perverse result.

The next (and only other) major attempt to repeal the step-up in basis came under the Bush tax cuts in 2001, which also provided for a slow phaseout and then repeal of the estate tax.\(^\text{296}\) When the estate tax was fully repealed in 2010, a new partial carryover basis provision, § 1022, was to take effect—partial, because each decedent was entitled to $1,300,000 of aggregate basis increase, which could be spread among the various property in the estate.\(^\text{297}\) Recognizing the original connection between the estate tax and the step-up in basis provision, the general consensus at the time continued to be that the two should come and go together,\(^\text{298}\) and so the price of estate tax repeal was also repeal of the basis step-up and the institution of a carryover basis regime.

Because the Bush tax cuts were passed using budget reconciliation, and therefore under the “Byrd Rule” could not raise deficits in years outside the ten-year budget window,\(^\text{299}\) the estate tax was scheduled to come back in full force in 2011, along with § 1014. The hope of Congressional Republicans in 2001 was that a future Congress would make the estate tax repeal permanent,\(^\text{300}\) but that did not happen. As a result, § 1022 would have only been in force for one year, 2010. Even that was too much, though, and the provisions were instead repealed.\(^\text{301}\) However, estates of those who died during 2010 could still elect to forgo both the estate tax and the step-up in basis—again illustrating the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose nature of postenactment changes.\(^\text{302}\)

The broader lesson here is that the income tax almost certainly cannot be sustainably fixed just by calling for an end to stepped-up basis and the other major loopholes that allow taxpayers to wipe out their deferred tax liabilities. Even if these reform attempts were to be enacted, why should we expect them to be sustained? Both theory and history strongly suggest the opposite. Even if


\(^{297}\) Id. § 542(a), 115 Stat. at 76–77 (repealed) (proposing § 1022(b)).

\(^{298}\) See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing Inherited Wealth 23 (2005). Proponents of estate tax repeal today seem to have ridded themselves of the need to have a consistent approach to these policies. Major estate tax repeal proposals no longer included a repeal of § 1014 and institution of carryover basis. See, e.g., Death Tax Repeal Act of 2019, S. 215, 116th Cong. (2019).

\(^{299}\) See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 213, at 101.

\(^{300}\) See Graetz & Shapiro, supra note 298, at 158–59.


\(^{302}\) Id. § 301(c) (codified in 26 U.S.C. § 2001 note (Special Election with Respect to Estates of Decedents Dying in 2010)).
the major loophole benefits were to be ended, absent an accompanying current-assessment reform, ultra-wealthy taxpayers would just continue to defer their tax liabilities while lobbying for the loopholes to be restored (or perhaps for new loopholes to come into effect), and these efforts by the ultra-wealthy would ultimately win the day.

CONCLUSION

Parts I and II of this Article explained how the existing U.S. income tax is broken, especially with respect to the ultra-wealthy, and with many harmful consequences. Part III then argued that, because of the political-optionality benefit of deferral, only current-assessment reforms are likely to succeed at repairing the income tax or otherwise fixing the personal tax system. Together, these parts thus established the case for why a current-assessment reform is needed: the only way to effectively tax today's income (or, alternatively, today's accumulations of wealth or of spending power) is to tax it today.

This still leaves the question of how. How does one effectively impose a currently-assessed tax on investment income? We do not mean to minimize the challenges involved, although we will note again that there are already proposals in the literature that we think would do a reasonable job of addressing these challenges while enacting current-assessment reforms.303

Advocates for future-assessment reforms or for maintaining the current tax system typically object to these current-assessment reform proposals by citing some combination of: (a) the administrative difficulties of taxing the accrued income from hard-to-value assets, (b) concerns about taxpayers having sufficient liquidity to pay periodic taxes, and (c) worries about the constitutionality of some federal-level current-assessment approaches that might be at risk of being considered “direct taxes.”304 Most of all, the opponents of current-assessment reforms have argued that alternative future-assessment approaches to reform are good enough, so there is no need to deal with these challenges.

We hope we have dealt with this latter complaint by explaining why future-assessment taxes are emphatically not good enough. But the former complaints remain—how do we deal with the problems of valuation, of liquidity, and of constitutionality?

With respect to the ultra-wealthy, we view liquidity as mostly a nonissue. If current-assessment reforms are directed at the ultra-wealthy, then reformers

303. See supra notes 32–33.
need not be much concerned about whether there are sufficient liquid assets to pay an annual tax on unrealized income. Arguably, there may be limited exceptions, but in those very limited scenarios in which liquidity may still be a significant concern with respect to some ultra-wealthy taxpayers (such as perhaps the founders of start-up companies), it is not overly difficult to build mechanisms into current-assessment reforms for resolving liquidity concerns in those specific scenarios.305

The constitutionality and valuation challenges are potentially more vexing, but scholarship on both issues has advanced considerably in recent years306 such that, in our view, neither are insurmountable barriers. We will have more to say about both of these topics in subsequent work, but we hope that this Article also serves as a research agenda and a call-to-arms for tax scholars and reform advocates to continue to push forward to develop further innovative solutions.

Despite decades of endless discussions and tax reform efforts, the realization doctrine and the ability to defer income—the “Achilles’ heel” of our tax system—remain, eroding the fundamental fairness and effectiveness of our tax system and of our political economy more generally. We think that a major reason for this is that tax scholars and reform advocates have failed to appreciate the need for current-assessment reform. We have thus argued both that developing better current-assessment reform proposals should be at the top of the agenda for tax policy scholars and that pushing for the enactment of some approach for current-assessment reform should be at the top of the agenda for tax reform advocates.

Substantial tax reforms are hard to pass, so if the next major tax reform legislation fails to enact current assessment, we may not get another shot in our lifetimes. We thus urge any tax reform coalition desiring to increase taxes on the ultra-wealthy to prioritize current-assessment reforms. It might be worthwhile to simply hike income tax rates on the ultra-wealthy while retaining the realization doctrine or to enact future-assessment tax reforms, if that is the only politically feasible option. But we doubt that any such reform could succeed at sustainably fixing the ways in which the tax system is broken with respect to the ultra-wealthy. As we have argued, for a lasting solution, current-

305. For instance, many of the current-assessment reform proposals listed in notes 32–33 incorporate such mechanisms.

306. For drafts of our views as to how a federal wealth tax or other current-assessment reform could be designed to ensure its constitutionality, see generally Brooks & Gamage, supra note 304; John R. Brooks & David Gamage, Why a Wealth Tax Is Definitely Constitutional (Jan. 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489997 [https://perma.cc/7VPQ-C287]. For early drafts of some of our proposals for resolving valuation issues in designing a wealth tax or other current-assessment reform, see Gamage, Five Key Research Findings, supra note 28, at app. A; see also supra notes 32–33.
assessment reforms are needed. We should aim to tax now, or we may ultimately tax never.