2022

The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(n)ons, and the Waters Wars

William W. Buzbee
Georgetown University Law Center, wwb11@georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2479
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4307276

Case Western Reserve Law Review (forthcoming)

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub

Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Construction Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Legislation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Rule of Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the Water Law Commons
The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(n)ons, and the Waters Wars

William W. Buzbee†

Abstract

The Clean Water Act has become a centerpiece in an enduring multiform battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array of antiregulatory skews and frames can be decisive, especially when wielded before sympathetic judges skeptical about the administrative state or environmental protection. The Article questions the legitimacy of this antiregulatory arsenal, highlights how these antiregulatory moves in the Waters setting often dodge actual statutory choices, and identifies countervailing strategies that are more respectful of democratic choices. The new antiregulatory canons are akin to weaponized cannons empowering judges. The Article calls for judges to

† William W. Buzbee is the Edward and Carol Walter Professor and a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. He also directs Georgetown Law’s Environmental Law and Policy Program. He thanks Case Western Reserve University School of Law for the opportunity to participate in a 2022 symposium on The Clean Water Act at 50, at which a preliminary version of this Article was presented. Thanh Nguyen and his Georgetown Law Library colleagues provided invaluable research assistance. He also thanks Sara Colangelo, director of Georgetown’s Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, and Jack Whiteley, a fellow-attorney with the Clinic (and new law professor at University of Minnesota Law School), for their work together on an amicus curiae brief in Sackett v. United States, a pending case discussed below. He also thanks Jon Devine, an attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, for periodic discussions regarding the Clean Water Act and fights over its protections. The author dedicates this Article to the late Joan Mulhern, a superb lawyer at Earthjustice and a Clean Water Act expert. She for years worked to preserve the Clean Water Act’s protections and educated everyone around her, including the author, about the history, logic, and importance of the statute.
apply more legislatively respectful frames in exploring questions of regulatory power, with greater attention to statutes’ policy priorities and obligations assigned by Congress and wielded by agencies based on scientific or factual criteria prioritized in governing statutes.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 2

I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE WATERS QUESTION’S STATUTORY ROOTS AND EARLY INTERPRETIVE STABILITY............................................................ 3

II. FRAMING AND NAMING THE PROREGULATORY CONSENSUS AND EMERGENT ANTIREGULATORY ARSENAL IN WATERS JURISDICTION DISPUTES .................................................................................................................. 6

A. The Pre-SWANCC Proregulatory Frames.................................................................. 7

B. The Antiregulatory Arsenal Begins to Emerge ......................................................... 11

1. The Federalism Revival and Clear Statement Skews .................................................. 12

2. SWANCC’s Destabilizing Ruling .................................................................................. 12

3. Rapanos and Its Many Questions ................................................................................. 17

4. Post-Rapanos Regulatory Vacillation to Sackett ...................................................... 20

III. THE ANTIREGULATORY ARSENAL, DISTILLED ...................................................... 24

A. Anti-Federal Skewing and Deference Lost ................................................................. 24

B. Anecdotal Tales of Overreach ..................................................................................... 26

C. Microtextualist Moves and Erratic Attention to Context .......................................... 27

IV. POLITICAL BRANCH PRIMACY AND RESPONSES TO THE ANTIREGULATORY ARSENAL ........................................................................................................... 29

A. Statutory Interpretation and Drafting Counters ......................................................... 30

1. Statutory Language Clarity .......................................................................................... 31

2. “Waters of the United States” as a Statutory Methodology Puzzle ......................... 33

B. Regulatory Effects’ Complexity Counters .................................................................. 47

C. Methodological Critique of Unfounded, Skewed, or Illogical Claims ....................... 52

D. Check Unfounded Empirical Claims ......................................................................... 53

E. Major Questions Counters ........................................................................................ 54

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 56

INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act)\(^1\) has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. Looking at this law’s track record, or particular regulations and related battles, could lead a reader to misunderstand key drivers of waters-linked legal choice and contestation. Such contestation over waters protection turns on far more than just what Congress wrote, or changing science, or interest

---

\(^1\) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.
group realignments. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States” (WOTUS or “Waters”)\(^2\). This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation.

This Article traces key moves and developments in this multi-decade battle over Waters protections. As with much law, developments concerning the CWA and WOTUS draw on familiar regulatory moves and counter-moves but also have themselves generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and often powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array of antiregulatory skews and frames can be decisive, at least when wielded before sympathetic judges skeptical about the legitimacy or benefits of the administrative state or environmental protection. The Article closes by identifying countervailing strategies and arguing for a more democracy-respecting and science-focused approach when addressing the issue of Waters protection and in other environmental regulation battles. The new antiregulatory canons are now akin to weaponized cannons empowering judges. They are often far from neutral interpretive canons or frames applied to questions of legal meaning, policy priorities, or regulatory power as allocated by Congress and wielded by an agency based on scientific or factual criteria set forth in statutes.

I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE WATERS QUESTION’S STATUTORY ROOTS AND EARLY INTERPRETIVE STABILITY

This Part provides a brief review of the CWA provisions at issue in Waters battles and early approaches to that question. The CWA extends federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution to “navigable waters,” which in turn are defined as “the waters of the United States.”\(^3\) The “navigable waters” language was drawn from the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA).\(^4\) The RHA mainly regulated waterway obstructions but also regulated water pollution.\(^5\) In early enforcement

2. Id. § 1362(7).

3. Id. (defining “navigable waters”); id. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985[,]”); id. § 1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” as meaning “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters”).


5. 33 U.S.C. § 403, 407. For tracing of this history, see Andreen, supra note 4, at 220–22, 258–60, 293–94 (tracing “navigable waters” pollution law
actions and regulatory interpretations, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") interpreted the RHA’s section 13 “navigable waters” language to limit its regulatory power to materials specifically impeding navigation. By around 1970, as pollution concerns intensified, more expansive views of the RHA’s protections were asserted by antipollution enforcers and, eventually, the Army Corps itself.

The statutory definition of “navigable waters” included in the CWA—“waters of the United States”—built on RHA law, but went even further. Congressional discussions about this 1972 amendment state a desire to provide broader regulatory power than in the RHA. An early narrow Army Corps interpretation of this CWA Waters language was judicially rejected for unduly constraining the Agency’s own power.

For roughly the next forty-five years, all government actors, including those in both Democratic and Republican administrations, embraced or at least concurred in the view that this language extended federal jurisdiction to protect Waters as far as the Commerce Clause would allow. The Supreme Court had decades earlier, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., strongly affirmed that federal authority over the nation’s Waters extended beyond a mere focus on


6. Andreen, supra note 4, at 221.
7. Id. at 258–59.
8. Id. at 280–81.
11. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
shipping-linked “navigable-in-fact” Waters. The Court stated that “navigability… is but a part of this whole” of federal Commerce Clause authority.¹² Similarly, the Court had upheld jurisdiction over Waters due to flood control rationales.¹³

And in the more broadly significant Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.¹⁴ case, the Supreme Court held that pollution-focused regulation aimed at preventing environmental harms from commercial activity easily surmounted challenges to federal constitutional power due to the numerous facets of commerce implicated.¹⁵ Nothing in that case focused on interstate water flows and linked commerce as a necessary foundation for federal environmental laws. Promulgated CWA regulations issued during the 1970s, which were only modestly adjusted thereafter, fleshed out particular types of Waters subject to federal protection, including a sweep-up provision protecting Waters used for, subject to use for, or affecting interstate commerce.¹⁶

As a result, both industrial dischargers and those seeking to dispose dredge or fill materials encountered a strong CWA that disfavored the filling of any Waters, plus a requirement of permits for any industrial discharges, with ever-tightening reductions in permitted discharged pollution. But because water-edge land is of immense value for development and industrial polluters and the agricultural sector claimed concerns with regulatory uncertainties and possible liability, success in weakening the CWA’s Waters reach offered a huge economic opportunity.¹⁷

¹² Id. at 387, 426. For a similar conclusion regarding federal constitutional authority over a dam on a non-navigable stream with a goal of the “control of destructive floodwaters,” see United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960) (also deferring to legislative judgments about “[beneficial effect[s] on the arteries of interstate commerce”).


¹⁵ Id. at 275–83.

¹⁶ Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,250 (Nov. 13, 1986) (finalizing rule regulating wetlands, those adjacent to other Waters, all interstate Waters, and all intrastate Waters, the “use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”). The Waters-linked promulgated regulations were largely stable from 1977 to 2015, and are found at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 (2014) (regulations providing “Definition of Waters of the United States”); 33 C.F.R. pt. 320 (2014) (regulations setting forth guidelines for assessing dredge or fill disposal).

¹⁷ See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining “point source” to include “concentrated animal feeding operation” but excluding “agricultural stormwater
A 1980s effort to weaken the power of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps to protect Waters “adjacent” to larger “navigable in fact” Waters suitable for ships, shipping, and commerce, or perhaps adjacent to a clear wetland, came up short. The Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, in 1985, unanimously agreed that delegated, expert, science-intensive regulatory judgments about where to draw the appropriate line between land and water were worthy of deference. The 1977 amendments, in a provision directed at state delegated programs, had added explicit language about federal regulation of “adjacent wetlands,” making the outcome affirming federal regulatory power easier as a statutory interpretation matter.

This ruling reflected and was consistent with the period’s low-conflict consensus about the reach of federal power under the Constitution, the need for judicial deference to expert regulatory judgments, and the CWA’s reach. Land and water exist on a continuum, and the CWA made protecting the country’s Waters from pollution a national priority. Expert regulatory judgments about where to draw the protective line were not suitable for judicial second-guessing.

II. Framing and Naming the Proregulatory Consensus and Emergent Antiregulatory Arsenal in Waters Jurisdiction Disputes

Since Riverside Bayview, little has been settled. Waters jurisdiction has been under perpetual attack, with the decisive antiregulatory

discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture”). Due to agricultural exclusions and the rarity of agricultural activities triggering all of the elements required for being a regulated point source discharge, it remains unclear if the agricultural sector’s frequent opposition to Waters jurisdiction is personal to that sector or part of an overall industry- or Chamber of Commerce–unified weakening strategy. Concentrated feeding operations, commonly referred to as CAFOs, are expressly subject to jurisdiction under the CWA if polluting a jurisdictional water. See id.

19. Id. at 134 (emphasizing the science and pragmatic expert judgment involved in drawing the line on the continuum between land and water).
20. Id. at 135–39 (discussing the new language, legislative discussions, and defeated amendments and the common assumptions they revealed about the Act’s reach).
Waters shift occurring in the *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County*, or SWANCC, case. This Part first examines the preceding period of stability about regulatory power from a broader legal perspective, then turns to the emergence of the antiregulatory arsenal, analyzing how this arsenal has both shaped and been shaped by Waters battles, ultimately emerging stronger from these disputes.

A. The Pre-SWANCC Proregulatory Frames

The regulatory—or perhaps proregulatory—building blocks or frames that led to three decades of Waters stability had several key elements. First, by the early 1940s, the Supreme Court had affirmed several elements of substantial federal regulatory power. Most importantly, Commerce Clause authority was viewed as expansive, including authority over waters extending beyond mere protection of interstate shipping. For decades, congressional judgments that there were constitutionally sufficient commerce links were close to unreviewable. This was partly due to a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, but also linked to the United States’ growth as an integrated, vibrant center of commerce with people, goods, and production’s benefits and harms all pervasively crossing state borders.

As confirmed in foundational cases like *Wickard v. Filburn* and *Hodel*, even seemingly small and localized activities and resulting effects linked to statutory protections provided commerce linkages justifying federal jurisdiction. *Gonzalez v. Raich* confirmed, or at least clarified, that adequate commerce links were assessed at the programmatic, aggregate level; seemingly small-scale regulatory interventions or fights were not lost from federal jurisdiction just because they, on their own, were small.

---

23. See *supra* notes 9–15 and accompanying text (introducing *Appalachian Power* and other early major cases about Waters and federal power).
27. *Id.* at 127–29 (upholding federal power to regulate homegrown wheat due to commercial ripple effects of such conduct); *Hodel*, *supra* note 14, at 275–93.
29. *Id.* at 23; see *id.* at 37 (Scalia, J. concurring).
Second, and similarly, statutory savings clauses, floor preemption provisions, and cooperative delegated program federalism designs were used in most environmental and other risk regulation laws.  

Hence, Congress politically sorted out the federalism-linked choices, not only setting foundational minimum federal requirements but also welcoming state cooperative efforts and state choices to do more. Such designs did not trigger any major backlash in politics or the courts. The Supreme Court, in several major environmental law decisions, carefully traced what was federal and what was left to state judgment, declining to redraw those lines. As a result, expansive federal power tended to overlap and intertwine with state and local regulation. Earlier constitutional “dual federalism” views that federal and state power were mutually exclusive were jettisoned. Concurrence, not mutual exclusion, became the federal norm.

Third, the seriousness of environmental degradation and ripple effects of pollution for years triggered in Congress a strong majority legislative consensus and bipartisan commitment. For example, although President Nixon vetoed the modern 1972 CWA, Congress resoundingly overrode that veto. That legislative consensus was, with only occasional judicial road bumps, met with a sympathetic judicial reception. If laws were expansive and protective, they would be enforced


31. See Esty, supra note 30, at 600–03. For explorations of rationales for, and benefits of, federal and retained state power in the climate regulation setting, see generally William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1037 (2017) [hereinafter Buzbee, Hedging]. For a citation to literature discussing climate federalism rationales, see id. at 1040–42 nn.4–5.

32. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 262–63 (1976) (tracing Clean Air Act’s divisions and declining to find federal power to second-guess state planning choices complying with federal requirements); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497–500 (1987) (centering analysis on which state’s law governed claims regarding common law–pollution harms and carefully reviewing savings clauses to preserve pollution-source state’s common law and more stringent regulation alongside federal water pollution regulation).

33. Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 24, at 1215–19 (reviewing multiple and often overlapping ways federal regulation was found constitutional after 1937).

34. Sapp et al., A Historical Review, supra note 5 at 10204.
and interpreted fairly, with courts expressly deferring to the political branches’ policymaking primacy.\textsuperscript{35}

Not only were environmental laws read sympathetically, but agencies’ implementation and enforcement actions, if undertaken in good faith, tended to receive deferential judicial review. Judicial interpretations were met with deference, especially after \textit{Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.}\textsuperscript{36} announced the “\textit{Chevron Two-Step}.”\textsuperscript{37} That case actually involved a policy shift to embrace market-mimicking forms of environmental regulation to reduce costs, but its usually deferential framework had broader implications. It provided latitude for agencies to adjust their policies to address new risks or embrace better means to address risks.

Likewise, key Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedents framed most environmental cases as implicating congressional judgments about allocations of work to expert agencies that were not up for judicial second-guessing.\textsuperscript{38} Congress, agencies, and reviewing courts generally agreed—as reflected in the \textit{Riverside Bayview Waters} case reviewed above—that agencies in the risk regulation and environmental realms were working in areas of specialized expertise involving scientific, ecological, public health, and technological assessments; agency expertise far surpassed that of generalist courts.\textsuperscript{39} This was a key underpinning of \textit{Chevron}, but also a major rationale for deference in many cases from before and after \textit{Chevron}.\textsuperscript{40} Major precedents discuss

\begin{itemize}
  
  \item \textsuperscript{36} 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Id. at 842–43.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{38} For a classic statement of such attitudes, see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (declining calls to narrowly read the Endangered Species Act because “it is . . . emphatically . . . the exclusive province of Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation”).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{39} For discussion of the role of expertise in judicial review of agency actions, see Sidney A. Shapiro, \textit{The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences}, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1097–98, 1105–07 (2015) (analyzing facets of agency regulatory expertise and their link to judicial deference rationales).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Prior to \textit{Chevron}, the two most significant opinions about the nature of and rationales for judicial deference to agencies were Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) (explaining that agency views about law and facts deserve “respect,” deference, and “in some cases decisive weight” since agency will have “more specialized experience”) and NLRB v. Hearst
\end{itemize}
the laws’ goal and what Congress or agencies found about the environmental concerns, underlying science, and effectiveness of responsive measures, but with little stingy reading or skeptical judicial parsing of statutory language.\textsuperscript{41}

During this period, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, courts actually often skewed in favor of regulatory protections and power, sometimes even chastising agencies that failed to do the protective work mandated by statutes.\textsuperscript{42} This was especially evident in early appellate cases under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),\textsuperscript{43} where the D.C. Circuit rejected mere grudging formalistic agency compliance with NEPA’s requirements that agencies assess the environmental effects of their actions.\textsuperscript{44}

Lastly, statutory interpretation norms applied to the wave of post-1960s environmental laws were pluralistic, with courts tending to look at laws, underlying legislative history, and the judicial role through a sympathetic, and sometimes purposive, lens.\textsuperscript{45} Courts often adopted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 268–72 (1981) (identifying congressional goals and rationales for mining regulation and finding them both constitutional and worthy of judicial deference).
\item \textsuperscript{42} For an influential, early such opinion, see Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) (rejecting FPC failure to assess natural resource implications of a project and stating the Agency could not “act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it . . . [but] has an affirmative duty to inquire into and consider all relevant facts”).
\item \textsuperscript{43} National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4337.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112–14, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that with NEPA’s enactment, the AEC “is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into account” and that its “procedural duties . . . must be fulfilled to the ‘fullest extent possible’”). The Supreme Court has, when reviewing actions under NEPA, repeatedly in recent years moved to narrow the power of the law, and Congress has added NEPA carveouts in numerous statutes. See Glicksman et al., supra note 35, at 251–59, 279 (discussing exemptions and exclusions). For analysis of NEPA’s track record in the courts, see generally David Adelman & Robert Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in Environmental Litigation, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 3 (2018).
\item \textsuperscript{45} This was true across regulatory fields. With the rise of textualism, especially in the forms championed by Justice Antonin Scalia, many judges and courts shifted to a more parsimonious or stingy approach that looked at words in isolation, often with little attention to their goals and purposes. For a general discussion from the perspective of a supporter of
a partner role, seeking to work with agencies and Congress to ensure laws were not derailed or rendered ineffective. Especially in the environmental law realm, judicial “resistance norms” or skews against congressional or agency power were virtually nonexistent.46

B. The Antiregulatory Arsenal Begins to Emerge

All of that started to change, however, with the strategic, sequential development of the increasingly prevalent, mutually reinforcing set of frames or moves that this Article focuses on and refers to as the “antiregulatory arsenal.” The Article now turns to that emergence by tracing those shifts as both influencing and emergent in Waters jurisprudence, with the occasional integration of linked supportive developments and other major cases.47

The antiregulatory arsenal is, basically, a near-complete reversal of the sympathetic valence of the proregulatory consensus period sketched above. It has several elements that are explored below: Constitutional frames have shifted, with federalism a prevalent scale-tipper or barrier to federal environmental power, often acting through avoidance canons. Deferential judicial review to delegated, expert agency judgments has given way to judicial embrace of claims of federal overreach and even growing presumptions against federal power. Judicial reluctance to second-guess agencies’ scientific and other data-driven judgments has given way to minimal concern over actual science or data points. Selective or exaggerated claims of hardship, or a sole focus on concerns of those regulated, often become the heart of challengers’ claims and Supreme Court responses. This has been true even in reviewing regulatory actions with millions of lives at risk.48 And, lastly, the rise of textualism, especially in its more microtextual forms, has become a

textualism, see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). For criticism of textualism and discussion of statutory interpretation methodology shaping or contesting the antiregulatory arsenal, see infra Part III.C.

46. See infra notes 235, 237 for discussion of antiregulatory shifts, especially with the major questions doctrine.

47. For a larger historical legal review of the decades-long push to weaken the administrative state through an array of concerted strategies, some of which are analyzed in this Article, see Thomas O. McGarity, Freedom to Harm: The Lasting Legacy of the Laissez Faire Revival 67–83 (2013).

48. For a recent example, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21A244, slip op. at 5–6, 8–9 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam) (striking down Occupational Safety and Health Administration COVID-19 regulation of larger employers requiring worker vaccination or testing as beyond the Agency’s power, with focus on concerns and burdens on those opposed to vaccination but no discussion of effects on workers left at greater risk).
major facet of moves to judicially trim statutory reach and agency powers.

1. The Federalism Revival and Clear Statement Skews

The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival became central to arguments and actions unsettling this bipartisan political consensus over Waters protection. After decades of deferential judicial review upholding federal laws under the Commerce Clause, a decisive shift occurred in the 1990s. After the Court rejected the claim that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate guns near schools in United States v. Lopez,49 attacks on expansive federal environmental laws suddenly had new legal material to leverage and provided a double opportunity. Given the commercial nature of most polluting activities, commercial uses of Waters, and massive costs linked to harms to Waters, a direct challenge to Commerce Clause–based authority for environmental laws would be a long shot.

However, constitutionally weighted “clear statement” arguments could perhaps weaken or shrink environmental laws by trimming their scope under the guise of constitutional avoidance efforts, especially focused on impingements on state turf. In addition, efforts to challenge the reach of environmental laws, rather than complete attacks on their validity, might further shift and expand upon these new limitations on federal Commerce power.50 Basically, the constitutional shifts made in Lopez and later United States v. Morrison,51 which struck down portions of the Violence Against Women Act, created opportunities for shrinking federal statutory and constitutional power.52 This opportunity was seized and the law transformed in 2001.

2. SWANCC’s Destabilizing Ruling

The recasting of Waters law took its most significant shift when the Army Corps asserted jurisdiction over abandoned Midwestern water-filled gravel pits slated for municipal landfilling. The site fell into a category called “isolated waters.”53 The Army Corps’ rationale for protecting that particular site included reference to migratory bird use of the pits.54 An earlier Federal Register discussion—which was not a promulgated regulation, but is nonetheless referred to as the “Migratory

52. Id. at 601–02.
54. Id. at 162; Brief for Federal Respondents at 8, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
Bird Rule”—identified migratory bird use of putative Waters as a potential grounds for federal Waters jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{55} Although the statutory term “navigable” is defined with the broader “waters of the United States” phrase, challengers to federal power nonetheless sought to revive the defined term “navigable” as a rationale to deny or limit federal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{56} Challengers also were pushing against regulatory, Supreme Court, and lower court rulings that said the definition of “navigable waters” provided jurisdiction broader than a navigability focus on use by large scale ships, barges, and the like.\textsuperscript{57}

In \emph{SWANCC}, the Supreme Court embraced these new power-shrinking arguments and, partly due to its sketchy and mostly unexplained conclusions, launched the revamping of Waters law.\textsuperscript{58} The Court revived “navigable” as power-limiting language.\textsuperscript{59} Drawing on the Court’s own federalism revival, the Court stated the Army Corps was acting at the outer bounds of federal authority, but without a clear congressional statement authorizing the particular power assertion at issue.\textsuperscript{60} The word “navigable” still mattered despite its definition; the Court stated the statute did not provide a clear enough statement to authorize jurisdiction over the isolated Waters at issue. The Court also saw the jurisdictional assertion as a problematic incursion on states’ usual land use regulation primacy, and drew on a statutory savings clause’s references to states’ “primary” roles and “land use” authority but otherwise left its constitutional concern unexplained.\textsuperscript{61}

This claim that the action was at the boundaries of federal power was crucial to \emph{SWANCC}, but upon examination remains hard to fathom. The regulatory action at issue seemingly passed muster in numerous ways. It was consistent with long-standing views of the CWA and other environmental laws’ reach and abundant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The ostensible constitutional concern seemed addressed by numerous types of commerce links. After all, the water-filled pits were created by past commercial use, migratory birds’ cross-state

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (containing agency discussion of migratory birds’ protection and Waters jurisdiction in preamble to regulation to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts 320–330).
\item \textsuperscript{56} Brief for Petitioner at 16–19, \emph{SWANCC}, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
\item \textsuperscript{58} \emph{SWANCC}, 531 U.S. at 171–72.
\item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 172–73.
\item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.} at 172–74.
\item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.} at 174.
\end{itemize}
movements and linked commerce had long been a basis for federal jurisdiction, and the site’s proposed new municipal landfilling was rife with direct commerce links and commerce effects. And the size of the particular disputed Water was not grounds for a constitutionally driven loss of jurisdiction. As mentioned above, and as subsequently reaffirmed in Gonzales v. Raich, Commerce Clause analysis does not excise from federal jurisdiction individual seemingly small-scale applications within overall regulatory schemes that satisfy commerce linkages. Furthermore, all antipollution laws overlap with state and local land use, pollution regulation, and states’ broad police powers, but preceding Supreme Court precedents did not see this as a problem.

And while savings clauses, like those in the CWA, preserve room for complementary state roles or greater stringency, as do cooperative federalism provisions, here the actions in dispute implicated a strongly federalizing law, with numerous federalism-linked provisions. The CWA clearly went well beyond state laws’ protections and created a new federal antipollution norm, unless the polluting activity was federally permitted. The CWA was not a crude law that swamped state authority or was of uncertain preemptive effect. The CWA made very particular choices about federal requirements and left abundant room for additional state action. Its preservation of state power did not actually anywhere state limitations on federal power. Instead, the law’s provisions reflected an embrace of mutual, overlapping, substantial protective powers of the federal government and the states.


63. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.


65. Savings clauses are several, each with a different focus. The CWA “purpose” provision embraces states’ ongoing “primary” pollution control roles and land use primacy and preserves their authority to “prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). States’ common law regimes and right to enact more stringent laws are expressly preserved. Id. §§ 1365(e), 1370. Likewise, state primacy over water allocations is preserved. Id. § 1251(g). Several provisions also allow states to constrain federal actions or federally permitted actions. See, e.g., id. § 1341 (providing state certification process linked to water quality obligations for federally licensed or permitted actions). Section 404 similarly contains its own dredge or fill–specific savings clause that can constrain federal activities. Id. § 1344(t). Section 313 requires federal land and facilities managers to comply with state water quality protections. Id. § 1323.
statute’s language had (and still today has) a strongly protective valence, allowing states to do more, but never do less.  

The clear statement move, linked here to the constitutional avoidance canon, was not a new move, but as applied in SWANCC was odd.  

At its most basic, the constitutional avoidance canon arises when a constitutional question could be part of a controversy, but that controversy could be resolved without a new binding or partial declaration of constitutional law.  

Under the logic of this avoidance canon, courts should not dive in and create new constitutional lines; rather, they should avoid new constitutional declarations. On the other hand, in most settings where it had been applied prior to SWANCC, the constitutional concern was clear, even if the Supreme Court or lower courts avoided an authoritative resolution. In SWANCC, however, it was hard to see how there was any constitutional concern at all. The preemptive provisions and savings clauses created no constitutional issue, and commerce linkages of several kinds clearly existed. Regulatory overlap of federal and state law was by then commonplace, and had not presented constitutional issues for decades. Nonetheless, consistent with criticisms that “clear statement” moves create a judge-empowering means to rewrite laws, the SWANCC Court cited the constitutional avoidance canon, then alluded to unspecified federalism concerns, and then used that rationale to narrow the statute’s regulatory reach.  

The SWANCC Court’s use of a “clear statement” and anti-federal federalism move did not just tip the scale for the case. SWANCC created a powerful new precedent for challengers, in large part due to its odd and also unspecified application. If these vague, mostly illogical concerns were enough, then SWANCC could be artillery to challenge federal power without actually explaining the constitutional problem;
turf overlap might suffice, and turf overlap pervades environmental laws.\textsuperscript{72} Or, as in \textit{SWANCC}, even a strongly federalizing law could, if accompanied by common savings clause language, become suitable for judicial trimming. In addition, all antipollution and natural resource–protecting laws overlap with state and local land use roles, yet that overlap here, combined with the savings clause, was claimed to further justify the \textit{SWANCC} Court’s unsettling of Waters law.\textsuperscript{73} These challenger and antiregulatory court moves could be cloaked in language of jurisprudential modesty, yet rewrite a law’s reach and jettison precedents: Congress simply had not conferred authority with adequate clarity.\textsuperscript{74} These interwoven strategies seized in \textit{SWANCC} both reflected changing trends in the law and created powerful legal shifts due to their combination of breadth and indeterminacy.

Also notable in \textit{SWANCC} was judicial inattention to underlying science and economic effects of regulation or failures to protect the disputed Waters. Instead, the Court focused on the word “navigable” as its linchpin. It did not limit protection only to Waters plied by shipping; previously established law extended jurisdiction beyond large Waters usable or used by ships.\textsuperscript{75} Nonetheless, “navigable” was given a meaning that, in the Court’s ruling, precluded federal protection for isolated Waters. Despite the CWA’s provisions focused on “chemical, physical, and biological integrity” and provisions expressly focused on aquatic ecosystem protection against pollution and filling, the Court put those express goals to the side in favor of a shipping focus rooted in this one defined word, “navigable.”\textsuperscript{76} This case did not otherwise rely heavily on the textualist tool chest. Nonetheless, as explored further below, this sort of focus on a single word—with neglect of consequences of that read, failures to consider statutory criteria for Waters protection decisions set forth in the statute, and undercutting of statutory protections—was consistent with an emerging strain of textualist methodology.\textsuperscript{77}


\textsuperscript{73}. \textit{SWANCC}, 531 U.S. at 174.

\textsuperscript{74}. See \textit{infra} Part III.A (discussing deference regimes and major questions doctrine’s link to clear statement moves).

\textsuperscript{75}. \textit{SWANCC}, 531 U.S. at 167–72 (stating that conclusion but declining “next step”).

\textsuperscript{76}. See \textit{id.} at 166–72. These many other provisions and textual indicators that suggest that the CWA was focused not on navigability but protecting the functions and integrity of Waters are addressed \textit{infra} at notes 159–164 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{77}. See \textit{infra} Part IV.A.2 (analyzing counterarguments based on provisions the Court neglected).
Likewise, the case lacked language of deference to expert regulatory judgments, despite the *Riverside Bayview* Court’s unanimous view that the Waters-land jurisdictional line was one for expert agency application and deserved deference.\(^{78}\) Instead, the *SWANCC* Court said it “would not extend *Chevron* deference” due to the unspecified federalism and Commerce Clause concerns.\(^{79}\)

*Chevron* deference, however, centers mainly on statutory language and agencies’ interpretative latitude, not on issues of deference to science, technical, or other empirical judgments. *SWANCC* nevertheless did not mention or engage with the question of deference to the Agencies’ expert scientific judgments about why such Waters, under the Act, were worthy of deference. For the *SWANCC* Supreme Court majority, analysis of power, stated constitutional concerns, and analysis of statutory language and inferences from regulatory history seemed to crowd out respect for expert agency scientific judgments delegated to agencies under the Act. The scientific judgments delegated by Congress to agencies and required by the Act were supplanted by the *SWANCC* majority Justice’s focus on a few words, with no analysis of the effects of their own redrawing of the statute’s protective lines. The same language and somewhat similar Waters questions were at issue in both *Riverside Bayview* and then *SWANCC*, but the Supreme Court majority’s attitudes had dramatically changed.

3. *Rapanos* and Its Many Questions

In the *Rapanos v. United States*\(^ {80}\) litigation—another case about the reach of the CWA—new opportunities presented by *SWANCC*, the federalism revival, and the growing use of antiregulatory skewing were further exploited and fiercely contested.\(^ {81}\) *Rapanos*, as well as its included companion case, *Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*,\(^ {82}\) again involved disputes over how to deal with Waters that in some respect were “adjacent” or linked to larger Waters that no one disputed were federally jurisdictional. The challengers saw *Rapanos* as a vehicle to extend *Lopez*, *Morrison*, *SWANCC*, and “clear statement” claims as

---

82. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), *vacated and remanded sub nom.* *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. 715.
well, possibly weakening the CWA and federal power more broadly.\textsuperscript{83} If victorious, more waterside land could be developed and pollution discharged with impunity.\textsuperscript{84} Opponents also sought to build on yet another new regulatory crosscurrent, namely the weakening of decades of deference to agency law interpretations under the \textit{Chevron} case—an emergent anti-deference trend that \textit{SWANCC} had helped get rolling.\textsuperscript{85}

Supporters of Waters protection raised counterarguments and wielded different frames and methodologies. Pro-environmental interests and dozens of states emphasized the stable, bipartisan nature of CWA Waters protections.\textsuperscript{86} They argued that \textit{Riverside Bayview} largely ruled as a precedent due to substantial overlap in the particular Waters-land borders at issue.\textsuperscript{87} Defenders highlighted strong commerce linkages in the actual facts of the case before the Court.\textsuperscript{88} Even the Bush administration—a generally antiregulatory administration—called for retention of long-standing views of federal CWA power.\textsuperscript{89} The resulting 4–1–4 \textit{Rapanos} Court split left confusion in its wake, but then resulted in a period of consensus about how the Act should be read in its applied precedential impacts. No single majority opinion spoke for the Court, although numerical majorities joining certain elements was apparent (and expressly stated). Different opinions addressed the array of statutory, constitutional, and precedent-based claims.\textsuperscript{90}

Justice Scalia, speaking only for a plurality in his opinion’s limiting language, drew on his “new textualism” tool chest. He mostly ignored legislative history, then dismissed decades of administration and court views about Waters authority, viewing them as reflecting “entrenched executive error” and overreach.\textsuperscript{91} Science and systematic assessment of

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{83} Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 12–15, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034).
  \item\textsuperscript{84} \textit{See} Brief for National Association of Home Builders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–7, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034) (arguing ditches are not navigable waters but “point sources”).
  \item\textsuperscript{85} Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 4–6, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034); Brief for The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17–19, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034).
  \item\textsuperscript{86} Brief of Former EPA Administrators Carol M. Browner et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–7, 21–23, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034) (Disclosure—the author of this Article was a co-author of this brief).
  \item\textsuperscript{87} Brief for the United States at 26–30, \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715 (No. 04-1034).
  \item\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Id}. at 38–49.
  \item\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Id}. at 49.
  \item\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Rapanos}, 547 U.S. 715.
  \item\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Id}. at 722–29 (Scalia, J., plurality op.) (asserting “immense expansion of federal regulation of land use”); \textit{id}. at 752 (making “error” point).
\end{itemize}
effects were not addressed. For him, it was a question of clear language, with a heavy weighting (it appeared) of concern with regulatory excess. He sought to establish such claimed excess through citations to and sketches of past litigated cases resulting in court decisions. He did not consider broader regulatory costs and benefits, nor did he address agency experience and experience overall (whether litigated or not). Likewise, he did not look at a broader body of adjudicatory records or rulemaking materials about Waters protected, relevant science, and effects of various uses and Waters harms. The selection bias risks of looking only at challenges to regulatory power as proving systemic regulatory overreach were obvious and basic, but that risk was ignored in favor of the rhetorical punch such examples provided. But the logic weakness of relying on cases alleging regulatory overreach as establishing a pervasive problem of overreach should have been apparent, acknowledged, and perhaps explained away (if possible).

Instead, after his anecdotal documentation of claimed overreach, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion focused on dictionary definitions of “water” or “waters,” the use of “the” before “waters,” and the “waters’” relationship to permits required for “point sources,” then made a brief foray into federalism to reject agency deference and the claim of agency jurisdiction. Calling his view the “natural,” “commonsense” and even “only plausible” reading, he advocated for a brand new, unprecedented, limiting read. His plurality opinion asserted that the CWA only protected permanently flowing, continuously connected Waters.

This novel limiting read of the statute was utterly without precedent in any phase of the CWA’s history. Its effects—were it a majority opinion—would have radically curtailed the Act’s reach. It would have newly removed from federal protection most of the arid West and Southwest, where hot and dry conditions often leave riverbeds and other water-linked features dry. That the Scalia plurality’s conclusions would provide a federal green light for pollution of Waters where they are an essential and particularly rare and precious resource was given no attention. In such settings, they would be least


93. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732, 735–38.

94. Id. at 731–34, 739.

95. Id. at 739.
protected. In fact, Scalia’s plurality opinion said nothing about the consequences of his interpretation, apart from criticizing the dissenters as offering a “policy-laden” conclusion that would (in his view) let the Army Corps “regulate the entire country as waters.”\footnote{Id. at 746, 749.} This claim of pervasive federal overreach was again unsupported by any record basis in his opinion, citations, or underlying materials.

Justice Kennedy’s swing vote opinion—the 1 in the 4–1–4 split—focused on what he called “significant nexus” Waters that were assessed for their connections and functions. His opinion was mostly embraced by the four dissenters.\footnote{Id. at 759–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 787–812 (dissenting opinions).} His test largely tracked factors and criteria in the statute, as long utilized in promulgated Waters regulations and also applied in adjudicatory judgments about Waters. He still called for judicial affirmation that an adequate “significant nexus” existed.\footnote{Id. at 760–61, 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).} The dissenters agreed with protecting both Kennedy’s Waters and the small but sometimes different Waters protected by the Scalia plurality. As the dissenters stated, this meant a five-Justice majority agreed with protecting Kennedy’s “significant nexus” Waters, and eight Justices agreed with also protecting the more limited but different sorts of Waters protected under Scalia’s opinion.\footnote{Id. at 808–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by J.J. Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (explaining how Court majorities voted to protect both “significant nexus” Waters and the less protective but differently framed plurality Waters).} A clear majority rejected the Scalia plurality’s jurisdiction-limiting language. The dissenters would have deferred to the underlying regulatory judgments, but expressed agreement with Kennedy about the sorts of variables and protective goals that should inform questions about Waters jurisdiction.

4. Post-\textit{Rapanos} Regulatory Vacillation to \textit{Sackett}

Between 2015 and 2021, the Waters battles shifted to agencies and the courts. The Obama administration by rule in 2015 sought to restore Waters protections based substantially on a “connectivity” study of all peer-reviewed science regarding Waters’ functions.\footnote{Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110–401).} That was met with a cascade of challenges, echoing the claims and artillery wielded in \textit{SWANCC} and \textit{Rapanos}.\footnote{See infra notes 104–112 and accompanying text (tracing judicial and regulatory contestation that followed the Obama rule).} The Obama Clean Waters Rule also sought both to offer some simplified distance-based lines about what was
protected and make clearer several express carveouts from jurisdiction. Those regulatory judgments were also challenged, with a challenger’s public relations campaign claiming the regulation would reach puddles and tiny ditches and calling for regulators, courts, and legislators to “ditch the rule.”102 The Obama regulation was stayed by the Sixth Circuit, although the Supreme Court subsequently held that the rule was not subject to that court’s direct review.103

The Trump administration, in a series of reversal actions, built heavily on Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos to argue that it legally had to shelve the Obama Clean Waters Rule.104 In an unusual regulatory twist, but one used in several other major Trump administration actions, the Agencies claimed that they were compelled to adopt this deregulatory view that, in this instance, ran contrary to over forty years of executive branch views of the CWA.105 They basically ignored the plurality nature of the Scalia opinion, majority rejection of its limitations, and contrary majority support for the Waters protected under the Kennedy opinion.106 That Trump agency action, in turn, led to its own judicial challenges and several rejections.107 After President Joseph Biden assumed control of the White House in 2021, his EPA and Army Corps started the process to issue a new Waters regulation that differed from both preceding


105. For analysis of this unusual “statutory abnegation” strategy of the Trump administration, where agencies newly claimed to completely lack power previously asserted, see William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L. J. 1509, 1509 (2019).

106. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text (reviewing the Rapanos case opinion alignments).


Litigation and regulatory actions continued throughout this period prior to the new finalized 2023 regulation, with EPA and the Army Corps approaching Waters jurisdiction issues through adjudicatory judgments and under long-standing regulations, as they had after *Rapanos* but before either the Obama or Trump regulations. One of those adjudicatory actions led to an early 2022 Supreme Court challenge from a Ninth Circuit ruling. In *Sackett v. EPA*, in response to pleas from antiregulatory interests about regulatory confusion, overreach, and need for clarity, the Supreme Court voted to wade yet again into the Waters question. The challengers’ arguments were basically the entire antiregulatory arsenal rolled into one set of largely echo-chamber briefs.

The *Sackett* certiorari grant was unusual: a strong lower court consensus existed on the Waters protected; the regulatory approach by EPA, the Army Corps, and DOJ in adjudicatory judgments had long been held legal; and with a regulatory proposal midstream, there was a transitional moment in agency interpretations. The particular enforcement setting underlying the challenge appeared to be resolved. The challenges raised in *Sackett*, however, again built on the same mutually reinforcing set of antiregulatory frames.

The Court’s framed petition grant question was itself puzzling, skewed to a judge-empowering answer. It may have reflected a legal error and also failure to understand the science-intensive nature of jurisdictional determinations. The Court’s question stated: “Whether


110. 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).

111. Excerpts of those briefs are cited below as examples of the antiregulatory arsenal’s elements.

the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).”113 The puzzler is that the lower court had no choice but to study Supreme Court opinions and obey what it perceived as binding precedent. The Supreme Court, however, undoubtedly has power to revisit and clarify, so a more logical question would focus on the question itself, under the Act’s language. Second, the Court framed the question as though only wetlands are at issue, yet the question of what are jurisdictional Waters is the linchpin of the whole statute.114 Petitioners, and those seeking to shrink the Act’s protection and perhaps federal Commerce Clause power, have long tried to shine their attacking lights on wetlands, given their (by definition) less river-like nature. No one could know if the Court took the bait or really planned to confine its ruling just to wetlands protections and federal power.115

Lastly, the question as framed in Sackett seemed to be calling for a single test, yet the United States is vast and contains innumerable types of Waters, with varied geographic attributes and functions, thereby implicating different underlying science. No single brief “test” can be created, unless the Court plans to disregard the Act’s own quite specific express goals and criteria for protection, as long applied in decades of rulemakings and other regulatory actions and materials. In addition, Congress chose particular procedures and express criteria for determining what is a protected water. Regulatory requirements mandate that regulators apply those factors to determine what pollutant dischargers can do. As this Article goes to print, the Sackett outcome is not yet known.

The resulting mix of Rapanos, SWANCC, and the earlier Brown & Williamson116 decision has, as a line of precedent, subsequently been harnessed in frequent calls for “clear statement” presumptions against federal power and against deference to agency power claims in other major regulatory battles.117 Along with the earlier Commerce Clause

113. Sackett, 142 S. Ct. at 896.
114. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, in 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 200–01 (1996) (calling Waters jurisdiction the “linchpin” of the statute that should be applied through a “single judgment” regardless of the type of polluting activity at issue).
115. In merits briefing, petitioners in Sackett sought to expand the question framed by the Court. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 1, Sackett, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022) (No. 21-454).
revival precedents, these cases together create linkable antiregulatory gambits.

The Article now breaks out these key antiregulatory moves in very brief form, first showing how they have been used in Waters battles and with brief reference to other battles, such as those over climate regulation and COVID-linked requirements, and the full emergence of a court empowering “major questions doctrine.” It then in the closing Part critiques them for their lack of democratic legitimacy and their disrespect for the empirical expert tasks and linked judgments allocated to agencies. It then explores countervailing strategies.

III. THE ANTIREGULATORY ARSENAL, DISTILLED

The Waters battles are hence not an isolated body of legal tumult, but reflect and contribute to a growing antiregulatory jurisprudence. This brief Part breaks out the shifts identified above and identifies other settings where they will likely be used, but also reflects on their ubiquitous, powerful, and largely legally unmoored nature. Examples from recent briefs, mostly from the Sackett case, are provided to illuminate uses of the antiregulatory arsenal.

A. Anti-Federal Skewing and Deference Lost

These antiregulatory moves, in their collective impact, end up strongly working against any federal regulation with national reach. Indeed, that may be their very reason for existence. Federalism under our nation’s Constitution is a two-edged sword, with congressional choices about federalism allocations often wielded with nuance and reflecting varied choices about federal and state roles. That federal law is supreme and potentially preemptive is part of the Constitution’s federalism design. Agencies have long been the vehicle for carrying out federal law, with deference regimes central to their regulatory implementation adjustments and judgments.

In the antiregulatory arsenal, however, states are viewed as needing protection; assertions of federal regulatory power are met with pushback. That laws tend to embrace quite particular mixes of express preemptive regulatory floors, some carveouts from federal power, savings clauses that range from the general to quite specific, and then cooperative delegated program federalism options, does not seem to matter. Likewise, the legislative norm of federal and state overlap.

---

118. See Brief for West Virginia and 25 Other States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners *passim*, *Sackett*, 142 S. Ct. 896 (No. 21-454) (emphasizing alleged federal overreach and impingement on state turf).
and intertwined authority is viewed by antiregulatory advocates and judges not as a welcome attribute, but a problematic bug.

Likewise, claims that the breadth of federal power is suspect is itself problematic since, by its very nature, federal regulation is meant to have a national reach. States are often given latitude to devise compliant plans, usually under cooperative delegated program federalism structures, but nationally uniform requirements are the norm and often a key rationale for federal environmental and other risk-reducing laws.\textsuperscript{119}

A shift is underway from routine application of \textit{Chevron} deference. Although that case involved a major policy change in regulation affecting almost every factory in the country, it is now often ignored or declared inapplicable due to the breadth of the action’s claimed effects.\textsuperscript{120} Advocates and courts sometimes leave it unmentioned.

On the Roberts Court as of 2023, the antiregulatory majority now often adopts anti-deference or even “clear statement” demands and “major questions” presumptions against federal power. The 2022 climate regulation case \textit{West Virginia v. EPA},\textsuperscript{121} which rejected EPA’s power despite a strong textual and factual justification for the Clean Power Plan’s (CPP’s) “generation shifting” strategy, will likely now be the quintessential antiregulatory arsenal citation and example.\textsuperscript{122}

A key starting move by the \textit{West Virginia} Court was the claim that the regulatory approach of the CPP was “extraordinary” and had huge political and economic effects.\textsuperscript{123} This was questionable, if not clearly controverted by regulatory materials. Actual regulatory materials published by the Trump administration compared its own deregulatory policy weakening to the effects of the CPP’s “generation shifting”-based pollution reduction goals. The CPP had been stayed by the Supreme Court and never came into effect. Nonetheless, as the Trump administration’s analysis found, emissions reduction targets of the CPP had been exceeded by business shifts even though the regulation never came into effect.\textsuperscript{124} The Trump administration’s rollback action would

\textsuperscript{119} See Esty, supra note 30, at 603 (reviewing rationales for federal environmental regulation).

\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–5, \textit{Sackett}, 142 S. Ct. 896 (Apr. 18, 2022) (No. 21-454) (arguing against deference to agencies and for judicial resolution but without mention of \textit{Chevron}).

\textsuperscript{121} 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).

\textsuperscript{122} Id. at 2627 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{123} Id. at 2604, 2612 (arguing that CPP would have had massive consequences).

\textsuperscript{124} Id. at 2638–39, (Kagan, J., dissenting) (challenging the claim of massive consequences with recounting of this history and findings).
have made no climate difference.\textsuperscript{125} Basically, the CPP was actually neither ambitious nor disruptive. Inaction exceeded its mandated reductions. The CPP was politically controversial, but if mere controversy becomes a trigger for tougher judicial demands, then the question of regulatory power will hinge largely on the nation’s state of partisan division, post-statutory enactment regulatory opposition, and even public relations campaigns. Nonetheless, the majority opinion rested almost entirely on the Court’s choice to subject the challenged agency action to the major questions doctrine’s skeptical, usually fatal, scrutiny and demand for clear statutory authorization due to such claimed major effects.\textsuperscript{126}

These are all major shifts in presumptions. Breadth of language and power are now rationales for limiting federal agencies’ power, rather than grounds for supporting and deferring to their actions.\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{B. Anecdotal Tales of Overreach}

In cases cutting back on federal regulatory power or seeking such outcomes, both antiregulatory advocates and aligned judges and Justices often go well beyond the actions presented to claim much broader overreach or abuses of regulatory power.\textsuperscript{128} In each new case, earlier case language about overreach is then quoted as establishing the fact of broader problems or abuses.\textsuperscript{129} Other reported cases are cited as establishing much broader and contestable claims about inappropriate action. Rarely in these cases do advocates or judges painstakingly establish from actual regulatory materials that these claims are accurate. Regulatory cases get to the courts after rulemakings or

\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 2638 (quoting Trump administration rulemaking preamble that “there [was] likely to be no difference between a world where the [CPP was] implemented and one where it [was] not”); see id. at 2638 n.6 (discussing the CPP’s modest projected impacts).

\textsuperscript{126} See id. at 2607–17 (majority opinion) (labeling the “major questions doctrine” for the first time and applying it to conclude no clear enough statement authorized the EPA action challenged).

\textsuperscript{127} See id. at 2628–33 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s “major questions doctrine” articulation and application by analyzing how interconnected logic and coverage of the Clean Air Act, along with broad language and terms, show Congress’s intent to confer discretionary authority on EPA).

\textsuperscript{128} See, \textit{e.g.}, Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2–3, 6–11, Sackett v. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 21–454 (Apr. 18, 2022) (Sup. Ct. argued Oct. 3, 2022), 2022 WL 1214887 at *2–3, 6–11 (extensively recounting tales of regulatory overreach and burdens attributable to Waters disputes in Alaska, mostly with no citation to any regulatory materials supporting the claims).

\textsuperscript{129} See generally Brief for State of W. Va. and 25 Other States Supporting Petitioners, \textit{supra} note 118 (weaving anecdotes, case quotes, and only rarely referencing supportive regulatory materials).
adjudicatory actions, so there is usually a substantial regulatory record about regulatory programs’ effects or factors, often applied in more context-specific adjudicatory settings (whether enforcement actions or permit evaluations). Finding such record documentation, if it exists, is possible. Relatedly, regulatory impact analyses assessing the costs and benefits of regulatory actions often themselves contain support or refutation of claims of illogical or egregious regulatory overreach later asserted.\textsuperscript{130} They too nonetheless are rarely cited.

Also notable is that tales of agency overreach or abuse are rarely leavened with analysis of the extent to which underlying statutes, in their protective policies, explain or even require the actions under attack. Nor is analysis of benefits of a regulatory action provided in any thorough manner; the focus is on burdens.\textsuperscript{131}

C. Microtextualist Moves and Erratic Attention to Context

The last, but perhaps most important, common element in the antiregulatory arsenal is changing statutory interpretation methodology. Methodology that consistently and with thoroughness involves parsing of the major environmental laws’ texts and their operative logic would probably tilt in a protective direction. After all, environmental laws tend to be quite express about their antipollution, environmental, and health-focused protective goals and decisional criteria and choices about who is to play what roles and through what procedures. The antiregulatory arsenal, however, tends to rely on decontextualized, microtextual analysis. Advocates and sympathetic judges look at a few words in isolation, often with inattention to the larger context or surrounding illuminating provisions or how a statute works or even its express statements of goals, purpose, decisional criteria, or findings.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} See Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKL.J. 1593, 1618–27 (2019) (analyzing how cost-benefit analyses accompanying major rulemakings can elicit and include information that constrains later agency policy vacillations possible under governing policy change law).

\textsuperscript{131} See, e.g., Brief of W. Va. at 21–28, Sackett, No. 21-454 (Apr. 18, 2022) 2022 WL 1190195 at *21–28 (providing a litany of alleged burdens on states and businesses from the “significant nexus” test and arguing for its judicial rejection).

\textsuperscript{132} For example, as analyzed in Part IV.A.2, the CWA includes dozens of provisions that declare its antipollution goals and provide environmentally focused criteria to guide regulators, especially regarding wetlands. Notably, the Sackett petitioners’ initial brief fails to cite most of these key provisions. See Brief of Amici Curiae 167 Members of Congress in Support of Respondents, Sackett, No. 21-454 (June 17, 2022), 2022 WL 2288142, for a criticism of this omission and a review of the missing language. (Disclosure–this author was the lead author of this brief.)
Sometimes, advocates or antiregulatory judges seem to engage in “textual gerrymandering,” where the texts they choose and others they ignore or downplay appear strategically chosen to favor their desired outcome.133 Findings and purpose provisions are derided as not reflecting operative terms’ more particular bargains. Digging further into legislative history or other historical context and legislative evidence is largely condemned; those sources of illumination, with their usual explanation of why and how a statutory provision works, tend to be written to make clear what a statute or provision is meant to do. When excluded from analysis, they are not there to check contrary conclusions drawn from isolated statutory words or cherry-picked dictionary provisions.

But other cases will at times rely heavily on larger structural inferences, or even claims about problematic consequences of particular statutory reads.134 To the extent textualism’s main claim is that it is neutral and constrains judges from pursuing their preferred policy ends, erratic levels of focus and methodological heterogeneity actually empower judges with many ways to reach their preferred ends. As Professor Gluck has argued, this methodological heterogeneity and erratic applications of the textualist tool chest undercut claims it is a formalist, predictable, and constraining school of interpretation.135

Similarly, and related to the shift away from the deference regimes mentioned above, advocates or judges focusing on a few words to reach agency-disempowering conclusions tend to avert their gaze from larger complexities in how laws and regulations actually work.136 Agencies do


134. For a notable Supreme Court environmental law example drawing on claimed large effects to justify a trimming of statutory power, see Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 316–17, 319–20 (2014) (rejecting EPA’s rigid interpretation and calling for a “reasonable, context-appropriate meaning” that allows regulations that “may sensibly be encompassed within the particular regulatory program” with focus on reading statutory provisions “in their context” and in light of “design and structure of the statute as a whole”) (citations and quotations omitted).


136. For example, the Sackett petitioners do not discuss the environmental effects of the shrunken federal Waters jurisdiction that they advocate. Despite the CWA’s express protective focus, their brief is all about burdens and allegations of regulatory overreach and jurisdictional confusion, and claims the CWA only protects Waters that are “channels” of commerce. See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 5, 7, 29–32, 36–42, Sackett, No. 21–454 (Apr. 11, 2022) 2022 WL 1096470 at *5, 7, 29–32, 36–
heavily weigh such real-world complexities; they live with their regulatory programs and statutes every day, hearing from those regulated and protected about how agency actions and regulatory regimes work or fall short. Agencies also are often major players in drafting statutes and, of course, develop understanding over the years regarding how statutes and their many linked provisions and programs interact.

Were courts to put those different levels of agency versus court expertise onto the scale, it would tip power back to agencies. Instead, words are decontextualized from surrounding words, from analysis of regulatory interactions, and with little or no analysis of documented effects of outcome choices. The result is a weakening or even elimination of deference to agency judgments and insensitivity to how a regulatory program actually works.

IV. POLITICAL BRANCH PRIMACY AND RESPONSES TO THE ANTIREGULATORY ARSENAL

The antiregulatory arsenal is powerful. With a six-Justice antiregulatory majority now ensconced in 2023 on the Supreme Court, it is also unlikely to fade in the near future. This closing Part analyzes doctrinal counters and strategies that might nonetheless check aggressive reliance on this arsenal. Some success with these strategies might, over time, shift doctrine or at least case outcomes in ways more respectful of political branch choices and statutory primacy.

Notably, new legislative or regulatory actions are no guarantee of success. After all, the antiregulatory arsenal moves are judicially created scale-tippers that at times give little attention to the actual statutory choices, skeptically assess regulation, and embrace anecdotes and assertions over attention to actual data, science or regulatory materials.

Nonetheless, if legal doctrine as judicially established in court precedents, and not raw political power, remains relevant—and this is concededly a question—then regulatory actions are more likely to survive judicial review when Congress, agencies, or advocates do the following:

---

42; see also West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (failing to discuss the benefits lost by the majority and concurring opinions’ narrow reading of the Clean Air Act).

137. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015) (drawing on survey of agency officials to analyze how agencies interpret statutes and also their roles in the legislative enactment process).

138. Id. at 1011–12.
--rigorously provide or engage with statutory criteria, context, structure, and congressional choices about actors’ roles;

--carefully engage with science and other evidence made relevant under the statute;

--present and challenge evidence before agencies, forcing agencies (to the extent possible) to collect and assess those stakeholder contentions and materials and hence ensure that underlying record claims have been tested and the sound and unsound determined.

With stronger statutory, regulatory, and procedural analysis and factual vetting, advocate and judicial reliance on the antiregulatory arsenal will more likely be tempered with attention to legislative choices, science, and other effects analysis made relevant under statutory criteria.

A. Statutory Interpretation and Drafting Counters

The antiregulatory arsenal tends to be cloaked in claimed respect for statutory choices and, frequently, power-shrinking interpretive choices made in light of asserted inadequate statutory “clear statements” authorizing disputed regulatory powers.139 Language is often decontextualized and recharacterized, with champions of antiregulatory ends tending to shun much other than isolated snippets of language.140 Picking up on Justice Scalia’s multi-decade attack on uses and abuses of legislative history, antiregulatory judges and advocates also tend to shun interpretive cues that might be gleaned from legislative evidence generated during the legislative enactment process. Since legislators tend to talk about legislation to persuade other legislators, the President, and the public, such legislative evidence typically focuses on a law’s goals and public-regarding rationales.141 Later advocate or judicial refusal to consider such evidence predictably will reduce the body of material that might point in a protective direction.142 These methodological shifts, however, do not render wholly

139. See supra notes 58–74 and accompanying text (introducing clear statement move and literature).

140. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 133, at 1721–24, 1737 (highlighting the ways isolated “textual gerrymandering” leads to erroneous and illogical interpretive outcomes).


142. Professor Macey has called for enforcement of public-regarding, publicly stated statutory rationales despite less apparent bargains and rationales.
futile efforts to draft legislation with clarity or rigorously work with statutes’ actual words and choices.

1. Statutory Language Clarity

Statutory drafting clarity about regulatory goals, criteria, process, and actors is, of course, the most effective counter to power challenges. The clearer Congress is in making choices that are memorialized in the statute’s text, the more constrained will be all subsequent players working with that statute.143

However, broadly empowering statutes as enacted during the early to mid-twentieth century, with short but highly discretionary conferrals of authority, now create risks of judicial resistance. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act,144 NEPA, and perhaps some of the federal lands-regulating or resource-extracting statutes with broad language or difficult balancing exercises are unlikely to be given a liberal protective read. The Supreme Court’s COVID-19 decision rejecting the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) authority to enact a “vaccine or test” policy for workplaces provides a near template for checking any pathbreaking or unusual, or especially novel and onerous, regulatory actions under statutes empowering agencies with broad language.145 The Court’s per curiam opinion did not emphasize those imperiled by COVID in the workplace and their families and community. Instead, it called the vaccine policy “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number

that might also or even better explain statutory choices. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 226–27 (1986). Likewise, legislators and their staff consider, support, and craft statutes and often hold related hearings and craft linked reports to achieve a mix of accomplishing protective defined ends, persuading others and the President to support legislation, garnering support for electoral popularity, and often guiding agencies that will have to implement statutes. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 87–89, 91–92, 96–97 (2012) (arguing that interpreters of statutory language should consider the rules governing the legislative process and political reasons for creating such materials and drafting choices unrelated to judges’ later review).

143. For example, in American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896, 1899, 1903–06 (2022), a unanimous Supreme Court opinion by Justice Kavanaugh carefully traced a statute’s “meticulous[]” provisions setting forth healthcare compensation reimbursement rights along with the “text and structure” to refute an agency’s claimed authority to cut health reimbursements without a prerequisite survey process.


of employees.” It expected “Congress to speak clearly”—really more clearly—to find such power authorized. The power was not “plainly authorize[d].” The breadth of the risk, and that it was encountered both in and out of the workplace, was fatal: “That kind of universal risk” could not justify OSHA’s action because it would “permit[] OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life.” Only if “particular features” of a workplace made the “virus pose[] a special danger” might OSHA be able to act. Hence, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and in the antiregulatory arsenal, broad conferral of powers, or possibly even broad undefined language within otherwise detailed statutes, may be met with judicial resistance in the form of a “clarity tax,” in the words of Dean John Manning.

Environmental laws, in their key modern framework versions enacted since the late 1960s, tend to have far more clearly delineated goals, operational sections, federalism choices, and definitional clauses than such earlier, short, broadly worded statutes. Because most judges today give primacy to statutory texts, rigorously linking those actual textual choices remains an advocate’s most powerful tool. Environmental laws’ intertwined choices and textually evident logic, if highlighted, might ameliorate or check arguments rooted in narrowing reads.

But maybe not. In the 2022 West Virginia case, the Court conceded the statute’s key term—“system”—could provide a “plausible” basis for

146. Id. at 665.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See generally id.
152. See Manning, supra note 72, at 403, 414, 434, 449–50 (questioning use of substantive canons of interpretation to further claimed constitutional values as a “clarity tax” contrary to the tradeoffs and particular choices of the Constitution).
153. Textualist methodology involves many choices, but across the political and scholarly spectrum one finds broad consensus that enacted statutory texts are the most important illuminator of statutory policy. For discussion and critique, see Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 1409, 1410–14 (2017) (discussing prevalence of textualism while highlighting pervasive choice options of textualists about what textual materials to emphasize, disregard, and sometimes supply in determining meanings); Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 213 (2022) (discussing ascendance of textualism and questioning ordinary meaning focus).
the regulation’s “generation shifting” strategy embraced by the Obama administration, but in looking in that word in a decontextualized manner, found it too “oblique,” an “empty vessel,” and in too much of a “backwater” provision to justify EPA’s policy.\(^{154}\)

Given this symposium issue’s focus on the CWA at 50, this Article now turns primarily to examples drawn from the CWA and also Waters contestation, including questions and contentions in the major precedents and as framed in Sackett (which was pending when this Article was written).

2. “Waters of the United States” as a Statutory Methodology Puzzle

The ongoing battle over what is a federally protected jurisdictional “navigable water” has, at its roots, a statutory interpretation question. Contestation is traceable to that term’s seemingly circular definition of “the waters of the United States.”\(^{155}\) But this definition is clearly an expansion from a mere focus on navigability. The CWA is undoubtedly broader in its antipollution reach than the RHA, which did have a primary navigability focus and secondary, later-developed antipollution reach.\(^{156}\) Scholarship and legislative history of the CWA both confirm what the textual addition itself reveals; federal jurisdiction was made more expansive.\(^{157}\) Still, leaving unanswered in the statute’s text itself the question of which “waters” were reached with this expansion was unfortunate. Were the jurisdictional linchpin of the law made clearer, space for antiregulatory arsenal salvos would be substantially diminished. The statute, nonetheless, provides far more material that, in its actual text, structure, and operational mandates and logic, counters—and should have long ago countered—arguments and court opinions skewed against the heart and logic of the CWA.

A prime example of how textual analytical rigor can be powerful to counter the antiregulatory arsenal is provided by again parsing the Supreme Court’s choice of the question for Sackett: what should the “proper test” be for jurisdiction over “wetlands” under the CWA?\(^{158}\) Right off the bat, the Court’s question revealed statutory and programmatic ignorance, error, or statutory disregard at several levels. Effective responses are challenging due to a Catch-22 choice: CWA Waters are the jurisdictional hook for virtually all of the key operative antipollution provisions in the statute. This includes industrial

---


\(^{155}\) 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

\(^{156}\) See Sapp et al., A Historical Review, supra note 5, at 10195–96, 10200–03 (reviewing the history and expansions of protections under the CWA).

\(^{157}\) Id. at 10200–03.

\(^{158}\) Sackett v. EPA, 8 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
pollution discharges from pipes and other point sources, oil spills, and dredge or fill disposal permits that are often the main permitting affecting wetlands. (Wetlands can also be tainted with effluent discharges from industrial point source discharges regulated under section 402 or be dumping ground for oil; wetlands protections and rationales are not coextensive with section 404–reach questions.)

Those trying to protect the Act’s long-standing reach in *Sackett* were thus confronted with a strategically tough decision in responding to the Court’s framing of the question presented. They had to decide whether to emphasize the broader importance of the Waters jurisdiction question, and hence risk broadening the implications of a resulting decision, or take the Court’s word choice seriously and simply focus on wetlands and how and when they should be protected as CWA Waters. Such a narrow focus, however, could also lead to inattention to surrounding provisions that shed light on permissible or best statutory meanings. In addition, the Court’s framed question seemed to be implicitly assuming that it is for the Court to craft such a test. This too is wrong, for reasons now explained.

Most important to check antiregulatory derailments via judicial power grabs are four sorts of statutory text–based sources of meaning illumination, as illustrated by this CWA *Sackett* analysis. First, if Congress chose to include express findings and purpose provisions, that textual commitment should be emphasized. Similarly, when a law’s operative provisions through their operative logic, functions, and decisional criteria reveal their protective design, that should be central to later advocate, agency, and judicial choices about meaning. Express statements of purpose are far different from judges intuiting a purpose or goal and then expanding on it. So, for example, with Waters questions, the CWA’s opening provision emphasizes its integrity goals, namely that the statute is meant to protect the nation’s Waters’ “chemical, physical, and biological integrity.”

Similarly, and with greater detail, numerous provisions spell out various water quality goals with environmental, health, and recreation-

---


160. The Act contains pervasive antipollution mandates, all linked to three specified “integrity” goals: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
focused criteria guiding all regulatory actions. These provisions focus on water quality, preventing water pollution, and barring the filling of Waters (unless permitted in light of surmounting protective criteria discussed below). The jurisdictional language, in which “navigable waters” is given its broad definition of “the waters of the United States,” is just that—a statement of statutory jurisdictional breadth, not a statement of the statute’s goals or criteria for assessing a water’s status. Other provisions both confirm what the statute is aimed at doing and also refute claims it is focused on navigational commerce or only channels of commerce, as the petitioners in Sackett argued.

The relationship of “waters” protections’ criteria and navigation is actually made clear in two provisions that mention “navigation,” but within provisions with dozens of express environmental, health, and recreational criteria that must guide regulators in categorizing Waters and deciding whether to permit pollution. After specifying these environmental criteria, antipollution policies, and anti-fill presumptions, section 404 adds that regulators can “additionally” take into account “navigation and anchorage” concerns. The Act’s water quality provisions similarly state that navigation is a secondary “consideration.” This linguistic nuance reveals that navigation is a concern, but clearly secondary to the antipollution and environmental integrity goals and linked analysis of Waters’ functions and the protection of water quality.

Second, some textualists deride purpose or goals language even when it is expressly put into the enacted law, emphasizing that a statute’s operative provisions are what really matter and reflect actual choices and tradeoffs. Operative provisions that require particular actions, especially those that spell out criteria for regulatory action, are indeed central and must be engaged. There too, however, the CWA is even more clear about its focus as revealed by what it mandates and criteria it sets forth to guide agency actions. In numerous provisions, the CWA is express about constraining or stopping pollution, requiring permits for any polluting activity (except for some nonpoint and

161. See id. §§ 1313–17.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b).
164. See Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 789 (2015) (Justice Scalia arguing that the statute’s text applies, even if the actual case is not what Congress had most prominently in mind).
165. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added) (after listing environmental, health, and welfare factors for water quality–based regulation, adding “and also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation”).
agricultural carveouts), and in stating an express no-discharge aspiration.\textsuperscript{166} In its design, the CWA steadily tightens levels of pollution control over time and requires heightened pollution controls for new pollution sources, for toxics discharges, or if water quality remains impaired after technology-based effluent limitations are imposed.\textsuperscript{167}

In addition to its antipollution focus, the CWA repeatedly makes clear the “why” of such prohibitions and provides criteria for regulatory judgments. As shown in the next few paragraphs, the Act’s express criteria focus on protecting Waters’ ecosystem, recreation, health, and human functions. It is not a law about navigation, nor is it a law about land use regulation. The CWA is about protecting the environment from polluting activities that affect Waters resources for the services and functions they provide.

For example, and of especial importance to the Court’s Sackett-question framing, section 404 contains language about its environmental aims and its anti-fill tilt, and is laden with environmental criteria. This focus on Waters’ functions and water quality, as well as health, fisheries, and recreational goals, is expressly stated in part of section 404, but especially in section 404’s incorporation by reference, for all dredge or fill disposal permits, of the presumptions and criteria stated in section 403(c) for constraining ocean discharges. Apart from the “additionally” language referenced above, none of these provisions that are incorporated by reference in section 404 are about navigation. Section 404 regulatory choices must comply with mandated “guidelines” to be crafted by EPA, in “conjunction” with the Army Corps, that—as spelled out in section 403(c)—prioritize “effect[s] of disposal on human health or welfare, including...plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.”\textsuperscript{168} They must consider “effect[s] of disposal,” including effects on “ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability; and species and community population changes.”\textsuperscript{169} It further calls for consideration of “esthetic, recreation, and economic values,” thus expressly requiring attention to the commercial effects of Waters protection or failures of such protection.\textsuperscript{170} It also calls for choosing alternatives to such disposal, especially “land-based alternatives.”\textsuperscript{171} Note also that because the term “wildlife” is in addition to specified “fish” and “shellfish,” under anti-surplusage interpretive norms coupled with dictionary definitions,

\begin{enumerate}
\item[166.] Examples follow. See infra notes 167–193 and accompanying text.
\item[167.] GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 557–59 (reviewing key provisions and programs in overview of CWA’s design).
\item[168.] 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(b), 1343(c)(1)(A)–(G).
\item[169.] Id. § 1343(c)(1)(B).
\item[170.] Id. § 1343(c)(1)(C).
\item[171.] Id. § 1343(c)(1)(F).
\end{enumerate}
this language choice supports an argument that the statute’s protective reach focuses beyond species swimming in the water or in soils beneath or within the water.\textsuperscript{172}

These environmental, ecological, and biological goals are further reified in EPA’s veto provision in section 404(c). This provision empowers EPA to object to—to veto, in environmental practitioner parlance—a proposed or Army Corps–granted dredge or fill disposal permit if it “will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”\textsuperscript{173} Again, the law focuses on the environment and Waters’ functions.

In addition, the 1977 Act amendments expressly made clear for the first time that “wetlands” are protected, while subject to possible state programmatic assumption under a delegated or cooperative federalism program structure. Under this provision, the Army Corps and EPA would retain their powers over “wetlands adjacent” to transportation and foreign commerce–linked types of Waters.\textsuperscript{174} If this were all that the CWA reached, then the delegation option under section 404 would delegate nothing regarding wetlands. The language implies that state-delegated primacy under federal law reaches Waters that are not themselves directly used for commerce or navigation or adjacent to


\textsuperscript{173} 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).

\textsuperscript{174} Id. § 1344(g)(1).
wetlands. Again, close textual analysis reveals tenable or best meanings, but also can refute other advocated meanings.175

Third, also relevant to curtailing the antiregulatory arsenal is close attention to the “who” and “how” of each statute. Advocates, agencies, and judges must all respect the allocations of authority and what delegated actors must do with that authority. In the CWA, no major task is handed to federal judges. The CWA is not a law like early securities or antitrust laws that, by design, were drafted to allow agencies, government lawyers, and then courts to develop a body of statute-driven regulatory common law, crafting protective policies through the courts on a judicially written, case-by-case basis. Instead, the CWA makes express choices about the key federal agencies and also the roles of the states.176 Hence, section 404’s cross reference to 403(c) is express that EPA’s “Administrator” is to be the crafter of implementing guidelines, working with the Army Corps.177 EPA must make scientifically driven, environmentally protective judgments based on these lengthy, detailed criteria about when section 404 dredge or fill disposal permits may be granted.178 Other than later express references to other actors, EPA is expressly delegated overall primacy to “administer this chapter.”179 EPA also retains its section 404(c) veto power when environmental degradation concerns are serious.180 The Army Corps is given the key role in making initial section 404 permit choices based on site-specific, science-based judgments, subject to consultation rights of EPA, other agencies that might have concerns, and state and local preserved authority.181 Congress hence chose the key expert actors; courts are not among them, apart from subsequent judicial review roles.

Relatedly, antiregulatory moves often seek to put a heavy thumb (or foot) on the scale under the auspices of federalism concerns to protect state roles and, sometimes concomitantly, limit the federal domain. Statutes like the CWA, however, make very particular, and often subtle, choices about the mix of federal and state roles. Little is left to surmise if a statute is given a “fair” and careful reading, as the

175. See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 133, at 1783–84 (discussing how attention to larger language clusters will both illuminate tenable meanings and often preclude others).

176. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)–(h).

177. Id. § 1344(b).

178. See id.

179. Id. § 1251(d).

180. Id. § 1344(c) (setting forth criteria and process for EPA’s “veto” power).

181. See generally id. § 1344 (spelling out the Army Secretary’s permitting roles and others’ roles).
Roberts Supreme Court has now called for in several major cases.\textsuperscript{182} The overarching reality is that the CWA of 1972 was a massive new federal statute setting forth new goals, priorities, and limitations, with antipollution and integrity goals repeatedly stated and made express and paramount.\textsuperscript{183} The 1977 amendments strengthened its reach, especially regarding its ability to protect wetlands.\textsuperscript{184}

Furthermore, the Act’s section 404 policies and prohibitions were uniform national mandates. Similarly, the whole logic of section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits was to require nationally uniform levels of pollution control by industrial categories, linked to the pollutant at issue.\textsuperscript{185} Permits had to draw on EPA-created regulations that provided such information by category. As evident in the statute, in legislative history, in court decisions, and in scholarship, the logic behind the statute was to enact a uniform national policy that would prevent a destructive environmental “race to the bottom” among the states.\textsuperscript{186} Decades ago, the Supreme Court identified such categorical regulation as necessary to serve the CWA’s goal of “national uniformity.”\textsuperscript{187} But as with other federal laws, effective achievement of ambitious national environmental aims requires additional state and local efforts, if aligned or more

\textsuperscript{182} The “fair reading” phrase has now been embraced by most Justices on the Supreme Court. See, \textit{e.g.}, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1538–39 (2021) (citations omitted) (citing Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019)) (stating that courts cannot remake statutes with a judicial thumb on the scale, but must give statutes a “fair reading”); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 491, 498 (2015) (calling for a “fair construction,” “fair reading,” and “fair understanding” of a statute, which in that case involved close attention to how the statute functions, congressional express goals, and consideration of consequences of interpretive choices before the Court).

\textsuperscript{183} The Court has called the CWA “‘the most comprehensive and far reaching’ environmental law that “Congress ever had passed” and that established “an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation.”’ Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489, 492 (1987) (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981)).

\textsuperscript{184} United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135–39 (1985) (reviewing debate over wetlands protection, statutory battles, and amendments enacted to confirm that “wetlands are a concern of the [CWA]”).

\textsuperscript{185} See Esty, \textit{supra} note 30, at 600–03 (discussing rationales for CWA and other environmental laws, with uniformity across the nation a pervasive major goal).

\textsuperscript{186} See Buzbee, \textit{Asymmetrical Regulation}, \textit{supra} note 30, at 1564–76, 1610 (analyzing implications of federal regulatory floors and ceilings); Esty, \textit{supra} note 30, at 603–04 (reviewing rationales for strengthened federal regulation, among them concern with races to the bottom).

protective, and also benefits from site-proximate work by states offered
delegated program roles. Critically important are savings clauses that
allow states to do more and preserve certain state turf—namely,
riparian water governance and other forms of allocation of quantities of
Waters, nuisance liability, and possible more stringent state regulatory
requirements.¹⁸⁸

The CWA, like other federal environmental laws, thus sets federal
regulatory floors, allowing states to do more. Federal approvals do not
limit state and local governments’ authority to say “no” or further tailor
when, where, and how polluting conduct may occur. Federal law does
not supplant state and local land use planning.¹⁸⁹ Hence, and
importantly, federal permits do not guarantee or require a state or local
government to agree about a pollution source’s location, rights to
operate, or levels of pollution allowed, provided state regulation is no
“less stringent” than federal requirements.¹⁹⁰ States simply cannot try
to authorize something prohibited or embrace laxity if the conduct is
subject to particular forms of constraint under federal law, regulations,
or permits.¹⁹¹

Fourth, procedural choices further illuminate actors and criteria for
regulatory actions. Federal CWA permitting provisions—including
both industrial discharge permitting under section 402 and section 404
dredge or fill disposal permitting, as well as EPA’s veto provision—are
themselves subject to specified notice and comment procedures. These
procedures provide opportunities for input and objections by all players
concerned with water pollution permitting. Such disputes can range
from section 404 questions about the nature and function of categories
of water, a particular site’s Waters, the magnitude of risks and whether

¹⁸⁸. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (stating that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,” and “plan the
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources”); id. § 1251(g) (stating States
retain authority “to allocate quantities of water”); id. § 1370 (allowing
additional state regulation if no “less stringent” than federal
requirements).
¹⁸⁹. Id. § 1251(b) (preserving state right to “plan the development and
use . . . of land and water resources”).
¹⁹⁰. Id. § 1370.
¹⁹¹. The Act clearly authorizes states to be more stringent or act in additional
ways to protect their Waters. Section 505(e) preserves state common law
 protections alongside federal law. Additional protection through state
regulation is also authorized, as long as it is not “less stringent” than
federal requirements, see id. §§ 1365(e), 1370, as the Supreme Court
confirmed in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497–500
(1987) (recognizing the ability of states where pollution originates to
impose nuisance liability and regulate more stringently than federally
required).
they would justify an EPA section 404(c) veto. Or disputes can center on a polluter’s status, which can influence permitting stringency under section 402 NPDES permitting or possible eligibility for “nationwide” general permits that authorize types of actions by category. Both permit stakeholders and regulators must, in those settings, engage actual facts and science. This also includes section 401 state rights to shape federal activities that would cause pollution and possibly impair state water quality.\textsuperscript{192} The water quality and Total Maximum Daily Load backstop program further sets a national priority that, even beyond uniform federal permits, requires polluters and states to do more if water quality remains impaired.\textsuperscript{193}

No stakeholder can sit out these many delineated, congressionally devised procedures, fail to introduce arguments and evidence or disputed contentions, then later in the courts rely on conjecture. Courts, similarly, under long-established doctrine should, in all but limited irregular settings, respect these congressional choices of venues for evidentiary contestation, respect the regulatory modes specified, and only draw on materials contained in the “whole record” before the agency.\textsuperscript{194}

Such attention to express goals, statutory criteria, operational logic, assigned actors and process, as well as the record thereby created by agencies and stakeholders through specified procedures, is quite different from the atextual and cherry-picked nature of elements of the SWANCC and Rapanos decisions. In SWANCC, the somewhat abrupt key majority paragraph—penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist—gives substantial weight to navigability as a concern that required emphasis despite the far broader definition Congress provided. Attention to virtually all other statutory provisions discussed above reveals the law to be about limiting pollution and constraining and prohibiting discharges, with a focus on environmental and ecological functions of Waters and overlapping “integrity” goals. Only by weighting navigability and ignoring other express provisions and operational reach and logic could this SWANCC language seem at all tenable.


\textsuperscript{193} Seesawing views of state versus federal authority under section 401 were evident in battles over new constraints on state power under section 401 in a Trump administration regulation, subsequent litigation, and then a surprising Supreme Court stay of a trial court ruling that had found the Trump regulation to be illegal. Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142 S. Ct. 1347 (Mem.) (2022).

Likewise, the SWANCC majority cherry-picked one federalism provision—the savings provision preserving state “primary responsibility” over pollution—and then skewed its reading to preserve state land use regulatory authority not to fulfill federal CWA goals, but as a rationale to limit federal power.\(^\ast\) This was an atextual move that failed to look at the language in context of the many federalism choices. Complementary and overlapping federal and state roles, with the CWA overall creating a new protective superstructure of national requirements that neither states nor polluters could dodge, went unmentioned. The SWANCC majority replaced the actual statutory reticulated choices and decades of rulemakings and adjudicatory proceedings with the judicial view that federal regulation unduly impinged on state interests and had to be limited in the absence of a “clear statement.” No record was cited in support of this critically important empirical assertion. The Court basically rejected the federalism balance struck by Congress in the statute.

Similarly, both the Scalia plurality opinion and Kennedy concurring “significant nexus” opinion in Rapanos also can be criticized when measured against the CWA’s many intertwined and reinforcing provisions, although with the Scalia opinion clashing far more. Nothing in the CWA supports the heavy weight Scalia places on surface connection and permanent flow. It simply is not there, nor does it logically follow when assessed against the section 403(c) criteria incorporated by reference into section 404’s permitting process. These criteria focus on water quality, functions of Waters, fisheries protection, health, and recreation. The Scalia plurality’s microtextual, decontextualizing focus on “the” and “waters,” as well as dictionaries, is inattentive to the CWA’s actual larger statutory context, structure, express goals, or national uniformity goals.

Indeed, in its operational logic and inevitable consequences, the Scalia plurality—were it a majority view—would necessarily eliminate from national protection many, if not most, types of Waters features found in the U.S. West and Southwest and hotter, drier portions of California.\(^\ast\) It also might render unprotected flood-prone areas of the country that rely extensively on levees, or settings where wetlands that are sometimes blocked by natural berms that are episodically both built up and breached during major storm events. The federal respondents

---

\(^{195}\) SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 166–67 (2001) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).

\(^{196}\) S. Mažeika Patricio Sullivan, Mark C. Rains, Amanda D. Rodewald, William W. Buzbee & Amy D. Rosemond, Distorting Science, Putting Water at Risk, 369 Science 766, 767 (2020) (finding that the Scalia Rapanos plurality opinion, on which a Trump regulation to shrink federal Waters jurisdiction was substantially based, would newly eliminate the CWA’s protections in arid regions).
in *Sackett* highlighted this levee example as a reason to reject the Scalia plurality test or similar tests advocated in the case.¹⁹⁷

Paradoxically, in the states where water is most scarce and precious, the Scalia approach would have eliminated the CWA’s applicability to dredge or fill disposal activity, industrial pollution discharges, and oil and spill regulation and protections. Water features critical to recharging aquifers and carrying rare but heavy rains downstream in clearly evident riverbeds to larger rivers like the Colorado River would, it appears, be excluded. This sort of unequal and geographic exclusion embraced in the Scalia *Rapanos* plurality opinion is flatly contrary to the Act’s “national uniformity” and protective water quality goals expressly required throughout its hundreds of pages.¹⁹⁸ Nothing anywhere in the statute or its legislative history, science, or scholarly analysis supports a new judicial carveout of Waters in the arid West and Southwest or in the Southeast, where levees and berms sometimes block continuous water connections.

Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” concurrence in *Rapanos* was partly consistent with the CWA, when viewed through an integrated functional lens, but partly atextual in others. His explanations for when and why “significant nexus” Waters deserved protection largely tracked the section 404 and 403(c) criteria, the Act’s water quality–focused provisions, long-standing regulations, and decades of adjudicatory actions and the policies they reflected and further created. Kennedy looked at the functions of Waters and linked features and how their protections would further the statute’s expressly stated goals and criteria. He noted that sometimes Waters are of especial value precisely due to their being blocked from other Waters.¹⁹⁹ For this reason, the four dissenters agreed with protecting such “significant nexus” Waters.²⁰⁰

---


¹⁹⁹. The Kennedy concurrence focuses on the functions of wetlands Waters, especially the ways wetlands “filter and purify” water and reduce pollution flows, harms, and flooding, sometimes even due to “the absence of an interchange of waters.” Id. at 775 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

²⁰⁰. The *Rapanos* dissenters agreed with protecting “significant nexus” Waters, creating a numerical majority. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by JJ. Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (explaining how the Court majority voted to protect both “significant nexus” Waters and the less protective but differently framed plurality Waters).
On the other hand, the statute clearly assigns to EPA and the Army Corps primacy for making such judgments based on science and the protective goals stated in the law, both in regulations and then through specified procedures in programmatic delegations and in deciding on particular permits. By creating a new test putting generalist judges in the critical oversight role, Justice Kennedy was disregarding the contrary choices of Congress. The dissenters disagreed with this element of the Kennedy opinion.

The petitioners’ briefing in Sackett further made a stealthy but huge attack on the CWA’s reach that similarly, upon close examination, ran counter to the statute’s express reach and procedural choices. The petitioners and allies made central to their arguments that CWA jurisdiction—in their conclusory but unsupported view—is obviously severed if a human-constructed road or homes stand between an alleged Water and an indisputably jurisdictional Water. 201 It is true that Waters can lose their jurisdictional status if permitted activity changes them, if natural processes change their nature, or if the Army Corps confirms something is no longer a Water. 202 But that is it. Nothing in the statute or long-standing understandings confirms this much-repeated claim of petitioners and amici allies.

In fact, this stealth attack claiming that human barriers obviously sever federal jurisdiction lacked several normally required underpinnings. First, it was unsupported by evidence about the effects of such a policy and lacked any underlying regulatory record support or caselaw. It also ran counter to five decades of settled law embraced by all administrations and courts. In fact, this long-standing and statutorily grounded policy that Waters remain jurisdictional even if blocked or behind a barrier was never challenged in the ways required by the CWA and Administrative Procedure Act.

201. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 4, 8, 49–50, 52, Sackett v. EPA, 8 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022) (No. 21-454) (filed Apr. 11, 2022) (arguing that due to road and homes blocking the Sackett site from Priest Lake, the site lacks an allegedly required “surface-water connection” and therefore “EPA has no basis” to regulate the site).

202. Permits allowing fill can render them nonjurisdictional. Regulations state that “[c]hanges” in a water’s jurisdictional status can occur due to natural processes. 33 C.F.R. § 328.5 (2021). “Man-made” changes, however, can only alter jurisdictional lines after the Army Corps’ “examin[ation]” and “verif[ication].” Id. For further analysis contesting this claim (co-authored by this author who served as lead counsel on the brief), see Brief of Amici Curiae 167 U.S. Members of Congress in Support of Respondents, supra note 132, at 29–33.

203. For a frontal attack on this enduring view, challengers over the years could have petitioned the agencies to change their views or attacked past actions protecting such waters as either violative of statutory language or lacking a scientific or evidentiary basis and hence arbitrary and capricious.
The Sacketts basically needed to make this argument due to the physical setting of their disputed property and building plans. But for a road and some houses, their disputed property was much like the site found jurisdictional in Riverside Bayview, if not even more clearly jurisdictional given documented “shallow subsurface flow” connecting the site, a tributary, and a large jurisdictional lake.\textsuperscript{204} Justice Scalia’s plurality in \textit{Rapanos} similarly argued that breaks in surface connection would eliminate jurisdiction, but Scalia failed in securing majority support.\textsuperscript{205} He too did not grapple with contrary statutory language, contrary enduring regulatory policy, or the implications of such a view if it meant that, across the nation, human-constructed interruptions would eliminate federal protections. Much as the Supreme Court in \textit{County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund}\textsuperscript{206} understood and prohibited clever efforts to destroy protection through several strategic steps or manipulation of engineering design, close analysis provides strong arguments against the petitioners’ unbrieied but oft-mentioned astonishment that blocked Waters could ever be jurisdictional.\textsuperscript{207}

The flaws with this contention that human-constructed blockages destroy jurisdiction are highlighted by analysis of the statute’s choices and linked effects. Again, microtextual antiregulatory moves are subject to effective counters that engage more of the disputed statutory provision’s statutory context. First, the whole design of the CWA regulates human activity that, through pollution discharges or dredged or fill material disposal activities, impairs or destroys Waters. Allowing a tributary, a wetland, or the edge of a major river or coastline to lose protections due to linked or earlier human construction or pollution would, in effect, gut the Act.

Several provisions quite specifically address and preclude this move to sever CWA jurisdiction due to human-constructed barriers. Most important is section 404(f)(2), which creates a major exclusion to a long

\begin{verbatim}
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2021) (setting forth petition rights); id. §§ 701–706 (setting forth judicial review rights including authority, under section 706(2)(A), to reject actions found “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (2021) (setting forth judicial review rights tailored to various actions and provisions under the Act).
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{204} Brief of Amici Curiae 167 U.S. Members of Congress in Support of Respondents, supra note 132, at 28–32 (reviewing case facts and related law).


\textsuperscript{206} 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).

\textsuperscript{207} Id. at 1473 (quoting The Emily & The Caroline, Broadfoot, Claimant, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381, 390 (1824)) (rejecting test that would trigger “evas[ive]” manipulation of discharge pipes because the majority did “not see how Congress could have intended to create such a large and obvious loophole”).
list of exemptions from section 404 strictures. Even “incidental” discharges linked to efforts to “bring[] an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject,” and where “flow or circulation . . . may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced” remain subject to section 404’s permit criteria and requirements: they “shall be required to have a permit under this section.” Due to this provision and section 403(c)’s criteria, regulations have likewise long precluded construction methods, impoundments, berms, roads, and the like from destroying jurisdiction.209

Importantly, those long-standing regulations and the statutory provision on which they rest basically mean the following: apart from natural processes that destroy a Water, or regulatory actions approving a status shift (such as a permit), once something is a Water, it usually remains a Water even if humans somehow seek to change or destroy it. These longstanding regulations were not challenged in Sackett. Were they to be challenged, stakeholders and regulators would have had to apply the science and statutory criteria, then assess the effects of any such change on a national basis against the Act’s ubiquitous protective, environmentally focused goals. Any national policy shift from currently promulgated Code of Federal Regulations requirements and prohibitions would have to engage fully with the past record, the past rationales for protections, decades of experience and effects under the still-effective regulation, and empirical assessment of the effects of any redrawing of regulatory lines. It would also have to comport fully with the Court’s rigorous fact-intensive analysis required for agency


209. Implementing regulations dating back to the 1970s state that waters “used in the past” for interstate commerce or in tidal settings remain Waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2021). “Impoundments” of waters remain Waters. Id. § 328.3(a)(3). “Adjacent” waters are defined as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and they remain jurisdictional “adjacent wetlands” even if “separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like.” Id. § 323.2(d) (as codified in 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (July 19, 1977)) (the current definition of Waters was amended by 85 Fed. Reg. 22,338) (Apr. 21, 2020) and is at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2021). EPA and the Army Corps have long instructed field investigators to consider past wetland hydrology despite recent human construction alterations. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, U.S. EPA, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, & U.S.D.A. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS 13, 31, 50–55 (1989).

210. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2021) (protecting waters “used in the past” as Waters); id. § 328.3(a)(3) (protecting “impoundments of . . . waters” otherwise defined as Waters); 40 C.F.R. § 120.2(a)(2) (2023) (similarly protecting impounded waters).
policy changes. Decades of regulatory experience under this policy would need to be engaged, effects of both old policies and new policies assessed and compared, and a new flatly contrary policy justified as a matter of fact and law.

B. Regulatory Effects’ Complexity Counters

The second major counter to the antiregulatory arsenal’s elements still must draw heavily on rigorous, holistic statutory analysis, but turns in a different direction. Instead of focusing on enacted statutory texts to check cherry-picked textual claims and freewheeling sorts of policy revision, the focus is on the science, business, and fact side of regulatory choosing. All statutes, especially environmental laws, include goals and establish criteria that must be engaged in any regulatory action. Agencies, stakeholders, and later-reviewing courts must engage with “contingent facts” that statutory criteria and procedures choose. Especially prevalent in environmental laws are benchmarking forms of regulation that set limits or mandates based on what the “best” in some comparator category can achieve.

Courts asked to make major regulatory policy revisions should be overtly presented with the same avalanche of empirical complexities that make any agency regulation, especially agency policy change, a difficult climb.

Although antiregulatory advocates and judges often present the world through a simplistic lens focused on burdens on targets of regulation, or sometimes focused only on the business side of the regulatory ledger, such a one-sided focus can never be legally justified. All laws state protective goals, with their focus often on preserving or enhancing the value of the thing protected. Economic effects, costs, or other ripple effects must be analyzed as well. The Supreme Court’s *Michigan v. EPA* decision also creates a default requirement of


213. For example, section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to set limits based on what is achievable with the “best system of emission reduction” that is “adequately demonstrated.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). Likewise, the CWA requires regulation by categories of emitters and pollution types, with levels of stringency dependent on factors such as age, toxicity, cost, and facility size, but with further stringency required if receiving water quality is impaired. See Glicksman et al., supra note 35, at 79 (describing this form of regulation generally); id. at 558, 589–607 (introducing and then describing materials regarding key CWA provisions utilizing such regulatory forms).

consideration of both regulatory benefits and associated costs of any regulatory action, unless shaped or precluded by statutory language.\(^{215}\) No agency could legally ignore statutory criteria and evidence about regulatory choices’ effect in a thorough, balanced way; agencies must supply such balanced, statutorily respectful analysis. Courts tempted to engage in skewed, one-sided concerns about effects should similarly be challenged (or subject to polite entreaties) as well.

To reach the sympathies of antiregulatory courts and direct their attention to statutorily relevant criteria and effects, advocates may need to emphasize costs borne by other businesses and state and local governments, along with other tangible monetizable stakes and harms. What is a cost, benefit, or new burden depends on the valence of the action. Whether an action strengthens or weakens regulatory requirements, costs and benefits of the shift will be apparent and must be assessed, unless precluded by statute. Environmental laws may not, as written, be skewed to favor business concerns, but economic impacts and costs are usually part of the laws’ decisional criteria. If the effort is to awaken politically biased or partisan judges to congressional choices and all relevant effects, attention to such effects’ concerns may be essential.

For example, in the recent *West Virginia* case, power companies crafted just such arguments in support of EPA’s regulatory power.\(^{216}\) And although the Supreme Court trimmed EPA’s power and the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s)\(^{217}\) protections in its far-reaching opinion, the Court was responsive to the power companies’ argument. The companies sought to preserve long-standing industry practices and investments and, it appears, feared a Supreme Court opinion that would unsettle their regulatory and business arrangements. As alluded to above, the case focused on EPA’s power to set emissions caps for power plant greenhouse gas emissions by taking into account all of the ways—inside and outside the fence-line of power plants—such emitters actually reduce emissions while juggling business factors and environmental obligations under local, state, regional, and federal environmental and energy laws.\(^{218}\) This baseline analysis frame is crucial under the CAA’s relevant provision because pollution limits must be based on levels achievable by the “best system of emission reduction” that is

\(^{215}\) *Id.* at 2707–08.


\(^{218}\) The “inside or outside the fence-line” frame was widely used in the case and also in earlier battles over regulations. *West Virginia*, 142 S. Ct. at 2611–12.
“adequately demonstrated.” The power companies focused on such contingent facts in aligning themselves with EPA’s position, pleading with Justices evidently hostile to EPA’s power not to unsettle their business environment. The companies emphasized the challenge of crafting cost-effective compliance strategies while adjusting to their numerous constraining parameters while operating within complex, interconnected electricity grids. Power plants in all states operate within statewide, regional, or sometimes nationally interconnected grids, constantly needing to balance not only the engineering physics of the electricity sector’s energy generation and demand, but also the search for, and investments in, the most cost-effective and profitable ways to operate.

Generalist judges rarely have an inkling of how these sorts of industry-specific and context-specific factors play out in a dynamic, changing business sector and nation with states that favor different policies. For this reason, power company advocates emphasized this complex empirical matrix of regulations, day-to-day plant operations, fuel supply, investments, and current realities of balancing and pollution trading already in use.

The West Virginia Court’s opinion in several places was responsive. It carefully distinguished between the task of setting emissions limitations and the separate issue of how polluters and states could comply with federally set limits.

The power companies’ concerns in West Virginia are not unique. In any competitive business sector, one target of regulation may complain while others may take advantage of regulation or even be invested in anticipated future business and regulatory environments. A court decision protecting one polluter may fundamentally unsettle others’ investment choices and even basic business models. Or a decision might inadvertently reward business sector laggards, or even bad actors. Or, to reach federalism-focused courts, state and local governments—whether arguing for or against a federal regulatory action—will want to emphasize repercussions they may face and investments they may have made that could be unsettled by an uninformed antiregulatory court decision. Because the prevalent

219. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a), (d) (setting forth requirement for new sources and existing sources in the same category subject to new source regulation).
220. Brief for the Power Company Respondents, supra note 216, at 45–47.
221. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (“Generally speaking, a source may achieve that emissions cap in any way it chooses . . . .”).
222. Buzbee, Hedging, supra note 31, at 1088, 1090–92 (analyzing benefits of multiple levels of regulatory authority under federalism as akin to financial “hedging” and a prudent way to reduce environmental losses and business disruptions were federal climate legislation or regulation ineffective, changed, not enforced, or judicially rejected).
environmental law choice is to allow states to do more to protect the environment, this means states and often their businesses will have sunk costs into their different, additional choices that create distinctive regulatory environments.\textsuperscript{223} No court ruling or underlying regulatory action should, if true to congressional choices, contradict that statutory design.

Such empirical reality-based complexities come in several forms that can be described in general terms. First, both regulations and more individualized regulatory actions such as permitting usually involve a \textit{first-level assessment of harms or risks of harms of the activity in its pre-regulatory action state}. This kind of baselines analysis, which is about the simplest level of empirical assessment in the environmental law setting, is nonetheless well beyond judicial competence. What kinds of effects are happening and can be anticipated in particularized receiving environments? If focused on the polluter, what is the range of capabilities of such polluters and control technology and practices one finds in the current operating environment?

A second level of empirical analysis both shapes and assesses the regulatory response. What level of control or risk-reducing measures can and should be required? Or to put it differently, \textit{where can protective regulations reasonably go in light of both statutory “best” benchmarking variants and new products and practices}? Here too, such analysis involves both environmental effects analysis but also knowledge about the targets of regulation and what they have done or can do. Even more challenging and beyond judicial ken are predictive expert regulatory judgments, often by engineers, field scientists, or economists with specialized expertise. They all must assess future trends, actions, and their effects. And often businesses invest in and develop business models and expertise in light of where they think the law is going or should go.

For example, in the CWA, such empirical effects analysis is ubiquitous. A common empirically focused attribute is found in section 404 guidelines for dredge or fill activity, categorical regulations about industries and polluters that in turn are drawn on in facility permitting, and also water quality-focused portions: all call for assessment of environmental effects, human and health repercussions, costs and benefits of all kinds, and business and polluter realities and potential at varied levels of general or individual analysis.\textsuperscript{224}

Moreover, a third type of empirical assessment of regulatory effects requires \textit{knowledge of the web of other statutes, regulations, and practices that shape a sector’s activities and would interact with any new regulatory choices}. Again, this tends to involve knowledge about

\textsuperscript{223} Id. at 1052–55.

\textsuperscript{224} See Glicksman et al., supra note 35, at 557–59 (describing and citing casebook materials presenting such strategies).
the intertwined workings of federal statutes, regulations, implementation and adjudicatory actions, and important court precedents. Yet another related body of expert knowledge is familiarity with similar webs or layers of laws and regulations at the regional, state, and local levels, plus contractual arrangements and informal practices built on these legal matrices. Again, no generalist court can have this knowledge. Even a judge with some working knowledge of a sector and its regulation will not be current about business and regulatory realities surrounding later actions.

Cost-benefit analysis also can be part of factually driven counters to antiregulatory proclivities. Cost-benefit analysis has now been part of the regulatory landscape going back to the 1970s, yet remains the subject of ongoing debate over its legality, accuracy, efficacy, and even its morality. Such analyses’ actual uses in regulatory actions change in varied settings, but such analyses provide another powerful empirical hook to check judicial overreach. Such analyses tend to both document baseline risks and then provide comparisons of costs and benefits of varied possible alternative regulatory responses, including the final regulatory choice. High-stakes permit proceedings rarely involve systematic preparation of cost-benefit reports like the regulatory impact analyses accompanying promulgation of most major federal regulation. They too, however, similarly generate or reflect empirical assessment of costs and benefits, and other empirical wrinkles raised by that permit.

Since Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, regulators and stakeholders know the importance of creating a supportive record, even in adjudicatory determinations. Advocates can and indeed must draw on such studies and findings, whether supporting or challenging a factual assertion before an agency or later-reviewing court. Since specious or shoddy agency analyses tend to be noticed and result in challenges, such analyses are less likely to contain cheap talk or be laden with speculation. And if an advocate can highlight consistent strains in such analyses over varied administrations, that creates an even more powerful fact-based check on judicial surmise.

225. For a skeptical, critical view, see generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002). For a recent defense of cost-benefit analysis and, especially, how it could serve to check regulatory vacillations, see Cecot, supra note 130.
227. Overton Park required agencies to justify their actions based on the “whole record” before them at the time of the disputed action, with more intrusive review if the agency did not in the action provide an explanation. Id. at 419–20.
Another strategy to check the antiregulatory arsenal is more awkward to assert but remains essential. Advocates and sympathetic regulators or judges will at times engage in speculation, anecdotes, or modes of reasoning that flunk any basic sound methodology or logic. In particular, advocates seem increasingly willing to present one-sided and lightly supported or unsupported claims about regulatory overreach or egregious regulatory burdens. Or advocates will draw on a mix of case language or perhaps reported cases to make broader claims about such alleged regulatory abuses. But conclusory surmise or rhetorical flourishes do not make something true.

Similarly, it is utterly illogical to cite a few reported cases involving regulatory disputes as establishing anything overall, as Justice Scalia does for the plurality in *Rapanos*.\(^{228}\) Cases are, by their nature, brought where issues are in dispute and the challenger, despite deference regimes, thinks it has a chance of winning a case alleging that a regulatory error or abuse has occurred. Litigated regulatory challenges hence will represent only a tiny percentage of overall regulatory actions or effects achieved under any statute or program. Unless and until one knows the denominator of all similar actions or overall costs and benefits associated with a program, one cannot draw any conclusion from a few contested actions resulting in judicial opinions. They might be outliers, or they might indeed be representative. But one reality is quite certain: the small number of litigated challenges are highly unlikely to reveal anything about the overall benefits or effects of a regulatory program. If judges do not understand the problem of selection bias, then advocates need to educate them.

Sometimes the error and counter are simple facts about the overall nature of a regulatory program, business, or engineering. For example, in *Rapanos*, during the oral argument, Justices’ questions sympathetic to the challenger were based on an assertion that federal Waters protections simply could not exist if a disputed Water was piped or involved water moving at times through ditches. Solicitor General Paul Clement, a noted politically conservative lawyer appointed by George W. Bush, responded simply and powerfully. Such a concept of jurisdictional severance due to any piping or human-constructed ditches or channels could not be right due to realities of Waters in their passage through urban areas. He recounted the Army Corps’ encountering many sorts of Waters modifications. He said it is now at “the point where the difference between that which is a man-made channel and that which is a natural channel is both difficult to discern and utterly besides the

\(^{228}\) See supra Part II.B.3 (presenting this analysis and selection bias problems with it).
point for this regulatory scheme.” 229 Relatedly, he said, “[S]ome things that are part of the storm water drainage system of a city are actually things that were previous navigable natural waters.” 229 This tested bright line to limit the CWA’s reach was revealed to be specious due to Clement’s greater knowledge of, first, how Waters have been pervasively modified and, second, why regulators as a result viewed such human modifications as irrelevant to Act jurisdiction.

D. Check Unfounded Empirical Claims

Agencies and stakeholders concerned with unleashed antiregulatory judges could modify how agencies work to establish a more robust record that would, or should, constrain later judging. Agencies could explicitly seek particular information from stakeholders, then memorialize what it reveals. Agencies similarly could target questions to particular claimants making apparently hyperbolic claims about regulatory excess or burdens, much as legislators after hearings will ask witnesses to support or amplify their assertions. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project 231 seems to give agencies broader latitude to seek stakeholder information but then act if not confronted by contrary responsive information. 232

Another move is evident within the Waters battles. After SWANCC and Rapanos began to weaken Waters protections, EPA issued public notice that it was gathering the best peer-reviewed science about categories of Waters and their functions. The resulting “Connectivity Report” was also shared when initially completed, with criticisms welcomed. 233 Later, the Obama administration drew on this compilation of the best peer-reviewed science to justify the regulatory lines it drew in the Clean Water Rule. Such a massive data- or science-collecting exercise serves to reduce administration-to-administration policy vacillation. After all, a later administration’s agency reassessing a policy would have to engage with the agency’s own earlier science or

230. Id. at 53.
232. Id. at 1159–60 (declining to judicially impose an agency obligation to conduct studies or generate supportive information when information was sought from stakeholders and they did not introduce controverting materials).
data, especially if relied on in an earlier regulatory action. Such science and data compilations would similarly constrain reviewing judges because they would be part of the agency’s record. Actual science and empirical information may differ from judicial conjecture or advocates’ contentions.

Another remedy would rely on a currently disfavored move. Agencies could do more of their work through formal, trial-like, on-the-record rulemakings or adjudications, at least on factually or scientifically crucial issues. In such settings, everyone—the government included—would need to introduce key science and data supporting regulatory contentions. Of particular value, cross examination of witnesses testifying under oath would provide a further crucible to test and perhaps reveal specious contentions.

A more oblique strategy is for regulatory disputants to push hard against standing to raise disputes in court unless claims of hardship are documented in sworn affidavits. Criminal perjury sanctions remain a deterrent to exaggeration and dissembling.

E. Major Questions Counters

The major questions move or canon—now called a doctrine—is an interpretive skew that, by its nature, cuts against any agency assertion of new power that is significant. In its recent strengthening and recasting, especially in the 2022 West Virginia case, it has gone from a rarely utilized lens rooted in careful documentation of legislative signals about regulatory power to general hostility to strong regulation. Early cases that began to craft this new doctrine or canon looked for major agency policy shifts, shifts that were hard to anticipate, and especially moves into areas where the underlying statute, or perhaps statutes, made the agency’s new power assertion suspect.

In its newest form—emergent since around 2020 in the Supreme Court and wielded by the current (2022–23) Roberts Court’s six Justices with antiregulatory proclivities—it is mostly about judicial suspicion of or hostility to agency powers. Even agencies working in the sweet spot of their turf, or with express past Supreme Court approval

234. Buzbee, Tethered President, supra note 102, at 1390, 1392–94 (discussing how agency data, studies, and other factual investigations will require attention and additional justification if the same agency later shifts policy with different factual conclusions).

235. West Virginia’s rejection of EPA regulation based on a “generation shifting” strategy was based mostly on the Court’s embrace and then broadening of the now officially named “major questions doctrine.” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607–16 (2022) (framing analysis with the major questions doctrine then applying it to reject EPA’s generation-shifting strategy).

236. Id. at 2607–09 (discussing previous precedents building the elements of the doctrine).
of their power, have been met with major questions attacks and power rejections. It may, concededly, now be operating as a cover for judicial rejection of policies Justices or other judges dislike. Nonetheless, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts are unfettered by countervailing statutory choices and evidence, regulatory track records, and judicial precedents; such long established forms of constraint may still serve to weaken reliance on this emergent “power canon.”

The major questions doctrine is problematic due to the discretionary judicial power it involves, but several countervailing moves might nonetheless possibly check major questions abuse. First, amassing statutory signals of all sorts that support the regulatory power asserted is critical. This means countering microtextual isolating interpretative and advocacy frames. Advocates supporting the regulatory power must provide text-based analysis that weaves support from all contextual, definitional, operational, and structural signals possible.

Second, a strain in Supreme Court precedents has historically recognized that broad power to address new circumstances can be conferred with broad language. As then Judge (now Justice) Brett Kavanaugh wrote in 2016, “[C]ourts should still defer to agencies in cases involving statutes using broad and open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’” The recent OSHA COVID-19 vaccine decision, however, concededly cuts against this scholarly view and past supportive cases, finding the breadth of the claimed power under broad language a reason to reject OSHA’s action.

Relatedly, major questions frames often rest, at their heart, on claims of massive regulatory effects. But if the statute, by its very nature, has broad national effects, that should counter or at least weaken such a move. So, in the WOTUS setting, the Court’s correct earlier characterizations of the CWA as a massive piece of antipollution legislation should serve to counteract the breadth of impacts as a rationale for judicial shrinking of a statute. And claims of overreach or massive effects should, in the regulatory setting, be somewhere


238. An example of such analysis is provided supra Part IV.A.2 regarding the Waters jurisdiction question.


241. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court opinions about the comprehensive nature of the CWA).
reflected in record proof. If such record support is absent, that absence should be the focus in arguments against applications of the major questions doctrine due to claimed major or disruptive effects.

Lastly, since the major questions move can turn on the novel use of a particular regulatory tool or reaching of new targets, those supporting regulation will need to frame ways the action is consistent with long-standing views of regulatory power or history. Not all new risks mean no power; agencies are often empowered to address new risks, but through the procedural vetting of rulemaking. If the agency has, over the years, identified new sources of risk and then acted, or developed different and more effective regulatory tools, yet another new regulatory assertion looks less like disruption and more like continuity. And, relatedly, pervasive statutory choices to set regulatory strictures based on the “best” of some comparator by their very nature are designed to move regulation into new and more stringent directions. Finding all novel and stringent regulatory actions suspect would often be illogical and counter to what Congress expressly chose in “best”-based benchmarking analysis.

CONCLUSION

The new antiregulatory arsenal is powerful, as evident in CWA Waters battles and also as a series of moves partly constructed from past Waters advocacy and decisions. This arsenal is now a pervasively important factor in devising, attacking, and defending regulatory policies. It is hard to avoid, especially due to ways the antiregulatory arsenal often is wielded with disregard of statutory choices, record evidence, and roles and procedures Congress devises within each statute. Nonetheless, close attention to the web- or lattice-like set of statutory text signals, regulatory records, and roles allocated and preserved by Congress might serve to check its aggressive use. But the Supreme Court is so powerful not because it is necessarily right, but because it is last. It can in effect rewrite statutes or weaken regulators’ powers and, in a time of political gridlock, thereby gut protective laws with enduring weakening effects. And the more it creates new antiregulatory moves and frames, the more advocates will build on that law and construct new regimes hostile to the administrative state.

242. This is a paraphrase of Justice Robert Jackson, who stated of the Supreme Court, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 542 (2014) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)).
The key facets of the antiregulatory arsenal are, in effect, a near opposite of the long-standing reliance on *Chevron* deference.243 Instead of agencies presumptively acting in realms of discretion where they will receive deference from courts, the reviewing climate and presumptions are becoming decidedly unsympathetic, undeferential, and often overtly hostile to agencies doing the work required of them by Congress. The antiregulatory arsenal may only be a judicial creation. Nonetheless, despite its lack of democratic provenance, the antiregulatory arsenal provides numerous powerful weapons empowering judges and those opposed to regulation to weaken the implemented reality of this nation’s environmental laws.