Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War

David Cole
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu

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David Cole
Professor of Law
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cole@law.georgetown.edu

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Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War

By David Cole†

The United States does not have a statute authorizing preventive detention of suspected terrorists without charge.¹ Some consider that irresponsible, as it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which the government might want to detain a suspected al Qaeda operative, but not be prepared to file charges in open court as required for a criminal prosecution. The government may have learned of the individual from a confidential or foreign-government source that it cannot publicly disclose, or from an ongoing investigation. It may lack sufficient evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, but have substantial grounds to believe that the individual was actively engaged in armed conflict for al Qaeda. The disclosures necessary for a public trial might seriously compromise the military struggle against the Taliban and al Qaeda. U.S. law has no formal statutory mechanism by which the government could detain such a person. Some have suggested that this is a potentially profound defect in our national security armature.²

¹. For reviews of other nations’ preventive-detention regimes, see, for example, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, LL FILE NO. 2005-01606, PREVENTIVE DETENTION: AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (2005); PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW (Andrew Harding & John Hatcher ed., 1993); John Ip, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DETENTION OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 773 (2007) (comparing the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand).

². See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, THE TERRORISTS’ COURT, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Stephanie Cooper Blum, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A COMPARISON OF HOW THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND ISRAEL DETAIN AND INCAPACITATE TERRORIST SUSPECTS, 4
Others hail the absence of such a preventive-detention law as a testament to the United States’ commitment to individual liberty. The fact that the United States has survived for more than two centuries without employing a freestanding preventive-detention law for dangerous persons counsels strongly against adopting one now. Preventive-detention laws in other countries have often been abused to round up persons who pose little or no real danger. The United States itself has conducted three significant preventive roundups on domestic soil: the Palmer Raids of 1919-20, the internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese nationals during World War II, and the detention of several thousand Arab and Muslim foreign nationals within the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In each period, not one person detained was identified as posing the threat that was said to justify the sweeps in the first place. These experiences provide strong support for those who oppose calls for preventive detention today.

Yet the debate about whether the United States should enact a preventive-detention statute is, in an important sense, misleading. Those who warn that we are dangerously unprepared to protect ourselves because of the absence of a preventive-detention statute overstate the case; many existing laws and authorities can be and have been invoked in an emergency to effectuate preventive detention. At the same time, those who object to any preventive-detention statute as a matter of principle often fail to confront the same fact—that even in the absence of a freestanding statute for preventive detention of suspected terrorists, there are numerous laws on the books that can be and have been employed for those purposes. After 9/11, for example, without ever

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3. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo, HUFFINGTON POST, May 5, 2008 (arguing that preventive detention would be a “massive loophole to our basic due process rights . . . worse than the Guantánamo problem”), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/05/usint18752_txt.htm.


5. For an account of these detentions, see David Cole, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22-46, 88-128 (2005).

invoking a USA PATRIOT Act provision authorizing preventive detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorist ties, the executive branch implemented far-reaching preventive detention by employing preexisting immigration law, the material witness statute, pretextual prosecution, and an asserted power to detain “enemy combatants.” When human-rights advocates focus exclusively on the “Guantánamo question,” they risk ignoring the problems posed by existing preventive-detention laws.

Preventive detention is in fact an established part of U.S. law. Federal and state statutes authorize preventive detention of those facing trial on criminal or immigration charges, and of those whose mental disabilities warrant civil commitment. All juvenile detention is, at least in theory, preventive rather than punitive. As Paul Robinson has shown, criminal sentencing often includes substantial preventive considerations, such as when a court gives different sentences to two persons convicted of the same offense because it predicts one will be more dangerous in the future. In reality, then, preventive detention is already an integral feature of the American legal landscape.

The proper question, therefore, is not whether the United States should authorize preventive detention—it is already authorized—but how and under what circumstances it should be authorized. In particular, is there a case for preventive detention of persons suspected of terrorism beyond the preventive-detention authorities that already exist? Are existing preventive-detention authorities appropriately calibrated to distinguish between those who truly need to be detained preventively, and those who do not? Should different rules apply in light of the potentially catastrophic harms posed by twenty-first century terrorists? Should special rules apply to al Qaeda, a terrorist organization that has declared war on the United States and attacked us here and abroad, against whom Congress has authorized a military response, and with whom the United States is in an ongoing military conflict in Afghanistan? If preventive detention is permissible under some circumstances, what are the appropriate substantive and procedural safeguards that should accompany it? These are some of the most difficult and controversial legal questions of the day.

“Just say no” is not a realistic response. Unlike torture, which is universally condemned without exceptions as a matter of international law, the question of preventive detention is not susceptible to absolute answers. The prevalence of preventive-detention authorities in other countries, as well as in the United States, demonstrates this fact. Moreover, if those concerned about human rights and the rule of law insist that there is no place for detention of

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8. See Cole, supra note 5.
combatants in an armed conflict with foes such as al Qaeda or the Taliban, their arguments may have the perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal force, or to seek to act outside the law without even the safeguards that accompany wartime detention.

At the same time, there are three important reasons to be deeply skeptical of preventive-detention regimes. First, preventive detention rests on a prediction about future behavior, and no one can predict the future. Decision makers all too often fall back on stereotypes and prejudices as proxies for dangerousness. Humility about our predictive abilities should counsel against preventive detention. Preventing terrorist attacks is a legitimate social goal, of course, but there are many ways to do so short of detention, such as securing borders, enhancing intelligence gathering, safeguarding nuclear stockpiles, and developing smarter foreign policy. Locking up human beings is one of the most extreme preventive measures a state can undertake; it should be reserved for situations where it is truly necessary.

Second, the risk of unnecessarily detaining innocent people is high, because decision makers are likely to err on the side of detention. When a judge releases an individual who in fact poses a real danger of future harm, and the individual goes on to inflict that harm, the error will be emblazoned across the front pages. When, by contrast, a judge detains an individual who would not have committed any wrong had he been released, that error is invisible—and, indeed, unknowable. How can one prove what someone would or would not have done had he been free? Thus, the visibility of release errors and the invisibility of erroneous detentions will lead judges to err on the side of custody over liberty.

Third, preventive detention is inconsistent with basic notions of human autonomy and free will. We generally presume that individuals have a choice to conform their conduct to the law. Thus, we do not criminalize thought or intentions, but only actions. Respect for autonomy requires us to presume, absent a very strong showing, that individuals will conform their behavior to the law. To lock up a human being on the prediction that he will undertake dangerous and illegal action if left free is, in an important sense, to deny his autonomy.¹⁰

Thus, any consideration of preventive detention should begin with a strong presumption that society should deal with dangerous people through criminal prosecution and punishment, not preventive detention. We prohibit harmful conduct (including conspiracy to engage in such conduct), give notice that those who violate the prohibitions will be punished, and then hold responsible those who can be shown, in a fair trial, to have engaged in such

¹⁰ I am indebted to Alec Walen for this insight. See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15 (2008).
activity. Given the dangers of preventive detention, we should depart from this model only where the criminal process cannot adequately address a particularly serious threat.

While it is not always explicitly rationalized in such terms, constitutional doctrine governing preventive detention is best understood as reflecting a strong presumption that the criminal process is the preferred means for addressing socially dangerous behavior. As the Supreme Court has said, “‘in our society, liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’”11 The exceptions largely arise where criminal prosecution is not a viable option for addressing a serious threat to public safety. For example, civil commitment of mentally disabled persons who pose a danger to the community but lack the requisite intent to conform their conduct to the law is justified, in part, because these individuals cannot be held culpable in a criminal prosecution. Similarly, because the adjudication of criminal liability and immigration status cannot be performed instantaneously, federal law authorizes detention without bail of persons facing criminal trial or deportation where they pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Quarantines of persons with infectious disease similarly fit this model; we cannot make it a crime to have a disease, and therefore quarantines protect the community from a danger that the criminal justice system cannot adequately address.

Preventive detention of prisoners of war in an international armed conflict can be understood in much the same way. The criminal justice system cannot address the problem of enemy soldiers for at least three reasons. First, under the laws of war, the enemy’s soldiers are “privileged” to fight, which means that nations may not criminalize fighting for the other side absent the commission of specified “war crimes.”12 Second, enemy soldiers cannot be expected to conform their actions to the capturing nation’s laws by avoiding combat if they are released; they have no obligation to obey a hostile nation’s laws, and are generally compelled to fight by their own country’s laws. Finally, problems of proof regarding battlefield captures and the need to incapacitate the enemy while preserving military secrets mean that the criminal justice system may prove inadequate even where criminal prosecution is a legal possibility. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that persons captured on the battlefield fighting for the Taliban could be preventively detained as “enemy combatants” because that authority is a fundamental incident of warfare.13 Controversy has raged ever since regarding the appropriate scope of that

authority.14

In short, preventive detention should be limited to situations that cannot be adequately addressed through the criminal justice system. The post-9/11 roundups of thousands of persons with no proven ties to terrorism15 reveal the need for reform aimed at restricting the use of sub rosa or de facto preventive-detention powers. At the same time, the longstanding and still unresolved dispute over the scope of “enemy combatant” detention—in addition to fundamental separation-of-powers concerns—suggests that a statute expressly addressing that issue is necessary. This Article argues that comprehensive reform is necessary and should be guided by the constitutionally founded principle that any preventive-detention regime must be predicated on a showing that criminal prosecution cannot adequately address a serious problem of dangerousness. Part I will briefly describe the existing statutory authorities that the government used—and in many instances misused—to effectuate preventive detention after 9/11. The laws in question include immigration law, the material witness statute, broad criminal statutes penalizing material support of terrorist groups, and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al Qaeda, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to authorize detention of at least some “enemy combatants.”16 The government used each of these measures to achieve preventive detention in the absence of a law expressly authorizing detention of suspected terrorists or al Qaeda fighters. In many instances, the government has exploited these laws for purposes they were not designed to serve.

Part II will address the constitutional principles that should govern preventive detention. Preventive detention implicates fundamental rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Suspension Clause. I will argue that together, these provisions reflect a presumptive constitutional obligation to address dangerous conduct through criminal prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has struck down preventive-detention laws that are triggered by proof of dangerousness alone.17 In most settings where the Court has upheld preventive detention, criminal prosecution and incarceration cannot adequately address a particular danger to the community. As a constitutional matter, then, preventive detention should be tolerated only in those rare circumstances where dangerous behavior cannot be addressed through the criminal justice system.

Part III applies the above principle by proposing a set of specific reforms

designed to forestall the kinds of preventive-detention abuses that followed 9/11. If preventive detention is to be reserved for situations where it is truly needed, existing laws must be tightened. As it currently stands, federal law permits preventive detention of persons who have not been shown to pose a serious future danger. The reforms would include: conforming standards for detention under immigration law to detention standards under criminal law; restricting the time that individuals may be detained as material witnesses to ensure that this authority is used solely to obtain testimony; narrowing the sweeping criminal laws that penalize material support to terrorist groups and that have become proxies for preventive detention; and reshaping the largely ad hoc and poorly defined authority to detain “enemy combatants.” With respect to the latter category of “enemy combatants,” I contend that to be constitutional, any preventive-detention regime must closely conform to the traditional model of military detention of prisoners of war—and not be predicated on the much broader and more malleable concept of “suspected terrorists.” Terrorism should remain a matter of criminal prosecution, and preventive detention should be authorized only where we are engaged in an ongoing armed conflict. But when we are so engaged, there is no reason why we should not have recourse to the preventive military detention that has historically been recognized as appropriate during wartime.

I also explore whether the U.S. Constitution affords a legitimate basis for short-term preventive detention of suspected terrorists wholly apart from the authority to detain “enemy combatants.” In my view, there has been no showing that such a law is needed, as the criminal process already authorizes short-term preventive detention of those as to whom the government has shown probable cause of terrorist activity. If authorities cannot show probable cause that a person is engaging or has engaged in a crime, they should not be using preventive detention outside the circumscribed military setting. If authorities can show probable cause, the tools are already available to hold an individual pending the outcome of the criminal or immigration case against him.

I conclude with some questions about whether a de facto or de jure preventive detention regime is ultimately preferable. This is, in fact, the real choice we must make when it comes to preventive detention. Advocates on both sides of the issue too often fail to acknowledge that the government already has substantial preventive-detention authority, and has shown its ability and willingness to use it. The question is whether the United States should maintain a system that pretends to bar preventive detention, but in reality allows it as an implicit and de facto matter, or whether it should acknowledge candidly that preventive detention has a limited but appropriate place in liberal democracies, and then carefully circumscribe the authority to ensure that it is no broader than necessary. In my view, the latter approach is more likely both to provide society with the protection it needs and to reduce the number of people unnecessarily detained.
I

EXISTING STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION

A. Types of De Facto Preventive Detention

The debate over whether the United States should adopt a preventive-detention law often proceeds as if preventive detention is not already a part of the fabric of American law. In fact, existing federal and state laws already authorize preventive detention of persons accused of criminal or immigration violations and awaiting trial or removal; persons with information relevant to a grand jury investigation or criminal trial who are unlikely to appear to testify if served with a subpoena; convicted sex offenders who have completed their criminal sentences but pose a continuing risk of recidivism; persons with a mental abnormality who pose a risk to themselves or others; nationals of a country with which we are in a declared war; and “enemy combatants” fighting for the enemy in a military conflict.

The most common form of preventive detention is of persons formally accused of violating criminal or immigration law. Under the Bail Reform Act, a judge may deny bail and keep a criminal defendant detained pending trial if he poses either a risk of flight or a danger to others.\(^\text{18}\) The detention is preventive because it is imposed not to punish the individual, who remains innocent until proven guilty, but to ensure his presence at trial or to protect the community from danger in the meantime. Similarly, when an individual has been charged with an immigration violation, she may be preventively detained pending resolution of the proceedings if there is a risk that she will flee or pose a danger to others in the interim.\(^\text{19}\)

There are three important constraints on these forms of preventive detention. First, they apply only to persons charged with violation of criminal or immigration law. Second, the detention is temporally limited—it ends once the criminal trial concludes, or once a foreign national is either removed or determined to be not subject to removal.\(^\text{20}\) Third, these forms of preventive detention generally require an individualized hearing in which the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the individual poses a danger that warrants his detention.\(^\text{21}\)

The material witness statute authorizes another form of preventive detention.\(^\text{22}\) If the government establishes reason to believe that an individual

\(^{19}\) See 8 C.F.R. § 236 (2008).
\(^{20}\) See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that foreign nationals ordered deported who cannot in fact be removed must be released from custody).
\(^{21}\) See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding preventive detention pending criminal trial where government shows by “clear and convincing evidence” that defendant poses a danger to the community if released).
has testimony relevant to a grand jury proceeding or a criminal trial, but would likely flee if served with a subpoena, a federal court may authorize detention of the individual as a “material witness” in order to ensure his presence at the grand jury or criminal trial. The detention is imposed not on the basis of any past or ongoing violation of law, but to prevent the individual from a future evasion of his societal obligation to testify. Detention under this statute is limited in time to that necessary to obtain the individual’s testimony, and requires individualized proof that the individual is indeed likely to flee if served with a subpoena.

Some states also authorize preventive detention of individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and have fully served their sentences but have a mental disability and pose a risk of repeat offending. This is a form of civil commitment, which the Supreme Court has upheld for persons who have a mental disability that renders them unable to conform their conduct to the law and dangerous to themselves or others. Individualized showings of disability and danger are required, as are fair and regular procedures for judicial review.

Two forms of preventive detention are authorized only during wartime. The laws of war have long authorized detention of those fighting for the enemy in a military conflict. Pointing to this authority, the Supreme Court in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* held that a Congressional authorization to use military force authorized, as an incident to military force, detention of even U.S. citizens captured on the battlefield fighting for the enemy. Under the laws of war, this authority extends only to persons actually fighting for the enemy, and therefore also requires an individualized determination that the individual in question falls into that category. The tribunals that make those determinations are generally comprised of military officials.

In addition, the Enemy Alien Act, enacted in 1798 as part of the Alien and Sedition Acts and still part of the U.S. Code today, authorizes the detention of anyone who is a national of a country with which we are engaged in a declared war. Under this statute, there need be no determination that an individual is fighting for the enemy, is likely to engage in sabotage or espionage, or is

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23. *Id.*
24. *Id.*
27. *Id.* at 357.
hostile to the United States. The law presumes that any national of a country with which we are at war poses a potential danger and does not require any individualized determination beyond ensuring that the individual in question is in fact a national of the enemy country.

Since shortly after 9/11, federal law has also contained a preventive-detention statute that has never been employed, and therefore never judicially tested. Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the Attorney General to detain foreign nationals he certifies as terrorist suspects without a hearing and without a showing that they pose a danger or a flight risk. They can be held for seven days without any charges, and after being charged, can apparently be held indefinitely in some circumstances, even if they prevail in their removal proceedings by obtaining “relief from removal.” The Attorney General need only certify that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the individual is “described in” various antiterrorism provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which are in turn extremely expansive. The statute does provide for immediate habeas corpus review of the detention, and perhaps for that reason, the government has yet to invoke this authority.

As a practical matter, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause also implies a de facto preventive-detention authority in very limited circumstances. It guarantees the right of detained persons to seek judicial review of the legality of their detention, but also provides that in “times of Rebellion or Invasion,” where public safety requires it, Congress may suspend the writ of habeas corpus. While this provision does not authorize preventive detention as such, it acknowledges Congress’s power to suspend habeas corpus, which would as a practical matter remove the recourse that a detainee would otherwise have to the courts to challenge his detention. Because suspension has so rarely been invoked, this Article will not address the powers of Congress or the executive under the Suspension Clause, but will instead consider what sorts of preventive-detention regimes might be permissible or advisable in the absence of the extraordinary act of suspending the writ.

Still, the Suspension Clause is significant for this discussion in at least two ways. On the one hand, it underscores that preventive detention is not necessarily anathema to our constitutional democracy, at least where limited to extraordinary emergencies. On the other hand, the presence of suspension as a

32. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The INA’s antiterrorism provisions include persons who are mere members of designated “terrorist organizations,” persons who have supported only the lawful activities of such organizations, and persons who have used, or threatened to use, any weapon with intent to endanger person or property, regardless of whether the activity has any connection to terrorism as it is generally understood. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), (iii)(V)(b) (2006).
kind of safety valve undermines arguments in favor of a freestanding preventive-detention statute for ordinary times because the Constitution already acknowledges the possibility of preventive detention in true emergency situations.

Finally, while it does not formally fit within the technical definition of preventive detention, the expansion of criminal laws is another way in which governments may implement a kind of de facto preventive detention. Preventive detention is ordinarily defined as distinct from punitive criminal incarceration, but if the criminal law is written broadly enough, it may become a tool for de facto preventive detention. For example, the federal government after 9/11 aggressively prosecuted individuals under material-support statutes that, at least as the Bush administration interpreted them, permit the prosecution of persons who have never engaged in terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, conspired to engage in terrorism, or provided any support to terrorism. Under this interpretation, the prosecution need only prove that an individual provided something of value to a group that the government has designated as terrorist, even if there is no connection shown between the support provided and terrorism, and no intent to further terrorist activity. These laws amount to little more than guilt by association, as they effectively punish the individual not for his own terrorist acts, nor for any terrorist acts that he has supported, but for his support of a group that has been labeled “terrorist.” Here, the state punishes and incarcerates the defendant not so much because he did anything harmful in the past, but because it fears that he, or the group he supports, may do harm in the future.

B. Abuses of Preventive-Detention Authorities

The Bush administration used many of the above authorities to effectuate widespread preventive detention, at home and abroad, after 9/11. But it also abused these authorities by detaining persons as to whom it appears to have had little or no basis for concern. For example, it has admitted to using immigration laws to preventively detain more than 5,000 foreign nationals, nearly all of


39. See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the "Soft-Sentence" and "Data-Reliability" Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 855 (2007) (observing that "the statute does not require any showing of personal dangerousness on the part of the defendant; in the paradigmatic case, the defendant provides money, equipment, or services to other individuals"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339a(b)(1) (2006) (broadly defining material support to mean "any property, tangible or intangible, or service").
whom were Arab or Muslim, in the first two years after 9/11. Especially in the first several months, the government often detained individuals without evidence that they posed any danger and without charging them with any immigration violations. Where it lacked evidence to justify detention, it sought to delay bond hearings that might have led to release orders. It kept foreign nationals in detention even after immigration judges ordered them released. And it kept foreign nationals in custody on immigration pretexts even after their immigration cases were fully resolved and there was no longer any need to detain them to ensure their removal. Not one of the more than 5,000 detained foreign nationals was convicted of a terrorist offense.

In addition, the Bush administration employed the material witness law to detain suspects for investigation on less than probable cause. In many instances, it never called its material-witness detainees to testify—the only legitimate reason for a material-witness detention in the first place. The government presumably found the material-witness law attractive because it permits detention on a showing that an individual merely may have information relevant to a criminal investigation, a much lower threshold than probable cause that the individual has engaged in wrongdoing.

The Bush administration also aggressively prosecuted individuals under material-support laws. In one case, it argued that running a website that featured links to other websites that in turn contained jihadist rhetoric constituted material support for terrorism. In another, it argued that members of a Muslim charity had violated the material support statute not by providing aid to a designated terrorist group, but by providing humanitarian assistance to local “zakat committees” in the West Bank and Gaza that the members of the charity should have known were connected to a designated terrorist group, even though the United States itself had never designated any of the “zakat committees” as terrorist organizations.

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42. See id. at 78-80.
44. See OIG Report, supra note 41, at 78-80.
47. Id. at 2.
committees” as terrorist. In still another case, the Bush administration argued that providing humanitarian aid to Hamas, before there was any law on the books designating Hamas as terrorist or criminalizing support to it, was a crime under RICO. In none of these cases did prosecutors offer any evidence that the defendants had in fact provided aid to terrorist or violent acts. Most of the convictions on “terrorism” charges since 9/11 have been under the material-support statute, which requires no proof that support was intended to further terrorist activity. In some cases, there may have been reason to suspect that the defendants intended to support terrorist activity, but the statute itself has been interpreted to require no such proof, and therefore juries need find no such evidence to convict.

Finally, the Bush administration cited the AUMF and its own executive power as authority to detain anyone it declared an “enemy combatant”—whether captured at home or abroad. It initially held them incommunicado and denied them any hearings whatsoever, and it subjected them to cruel and inhuman coercive interrogation, and in some instances, torture. While the Bush administration initially described all those it held at Guantánamo as the “worst of the worst,” it subsequently released more than 500 of them,

53. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that material-support statute violates due process because it fails to require proof of specific intent to further a group’s illegal activities).
54. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing the government’s argument that either the AUMF or the President’s inherent constitutional powers permit detention), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009).
suggesting that they might not have been so dangerous after all. Of the more than 500 released, the Pentagon claimed in January 2009 that 61 had returned to terrorism, a figure disputed by others as unfounded.

As this overview demonstrates, existing law gives the government substantial options for detaining those whom it suspects of terrorist activity. At the same time, it also shows that existing authorities are susceptible to abuse and already afford the government too much unchecked power to detain. Within the United States alone, thousands of people were detained who posed no demonstrable threat. Accordingly, if reform is necessary, it should start by seeking to correct for the abuses evident in the wake of 9/11. While concerns about the need for preventive detention often rest on hypothetical scenarios, the case for reform of existing laws is supported by actual experience.

II

PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution itself neither expressly forbids nor expressly authorizes preventive detention. The Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence reflects a healthy skepticism on the subject, tempered by the pragmatic acknowledgment that the criminal justice system cannot adequately address all of the dangers that individuals may pose to society, and that therefore preventive detention, narrowly confined, is sometimes appropriate.

The constitutionality of preventive detention is a critically important subject, as the power to detain human beings is one of the most awesome authorities exercised by a sovereign. If that power is unchecked, it matters little what other rights are guaranteed on paper. If people have the right to speak freely, for example, but the government has the power to lock them up without legal justification, fair procedure, or access to court, then the right to speak freely is essentially eviscerated.


59. See Mark Denbeaux et al., Released Guantánamo Detainees and the Department Of Defense: Propaganda by the Numbers? 2, 9-15 (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/propaganda_numbers_11509.pdf (showing vast inconsistencies in numbers Pentagon has reported as having returned to battle upon release from custody); David Morgan, Pentagon: 61 Ex-Guantánamo Inmates Return to Terrorism, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2009; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2009, at A1 (reporting on an undisclosed Pentagon report indicating that 74 released Guantánamo detainees had engaged in terrorist or militant activities, but noting that the report declines to identify most of the detainees, alleges only associations with respect to others, and that most of its allegations could not be independently verified); cf. Shayana Kadidal, The Myth of Return to the Battlefield from Guantánamo, HUFFINGTON POST, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/the-mth-of-return-to-the_b_206603.html (critiquing Bumiller’s report).
freely cannot for all practical purposes be guaranteed. In this sense, due process
and habeas corpus are the *sina qua non* not only of all other rights, but of the
very idea of limited government. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, “If
I had to choose between living in a country with habeas corpus but without free
elections, or a country with free elections but without habeas corpus, I would
choose habeas corpus every time.”

In recognition of the importance of checking the government’s detention
power, the Constitution restricts that power through the Due Process Clause,
the Suspension Clause, and the Fourth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has
noted, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention,
or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” The writ of habeas corpus, a preexisting common
law right to challenge the legality of detention in court, was given
constitutional status by the Suspension Clause, which guarantees recourse to
the writ except in the most extreme circumstances—when Congress determines
in the face of a rebellion or invasion that the public safety necessitates
suspension. The Fourth Amendment also restricts official detention, for it
requires that all seizures (including arrests) be reasonable, and generally
provides that an arrest is not reasonable unless based on probable cause.

### A. Due Process

Most of the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning preventive detention
have addressed the issue through the lens of due process. In a 2001 decision
surveying the landscape and articulating the constitutional preference for
criminal prosecution of socially dangerous behavior, the Supreme Court stated
that “government detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause” unless it is
imposed as punishment in a criminal proceeding conforming to the rigorous
procedures constitutionally required for such proceedings, or “in certain special
and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances’.” Nonpunitive, or preventive,
detention has been upheld only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or

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corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that
context that its protections have been strongest.” (footnote omitted)); see also *Brown v. Allen*, 344
U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The historic purpose of the writ [of habeas
corpus] has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.” (footnote
omitted)). The roots of the right not to be detained unlawfully extend back beyond the
Constitution. William Blackstone characterized as an absolute right “the personal liberty of
individuals . . . without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (footnote omitted). He also stated that “to refuse or to delay
to bail any person bailable is an offence against the liberty of the subject . . . by the common law,
as well as by the statute and the *habeas corpus* act.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*297 (citations and footnote omitted).
63. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 690.
immigration proceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the community or flight risk; 64 (2) is dangerous because of a “harm-threatening mental illness” that impairs his ability to control his dangerousness; 65 or (3) is an “enemy alien” or “enemy combatant” in wartime. 66

Three general principles are common to all of the preventive-detention regimes that the Court has upheld. First, the purpose and character of the detention must not be punitive; punishment requires a criminal trial. This principle of “nonpunitiveness” assumes that where the government seeks to address dangerous conduct by depriving individuals of their liberty, criminal punishment is the first and presumptive line of defense. Only where punishment through the criminal justice system cannot address the problem is preventive detention warranted.

Second, the detention must be temporally limited. Indefinite detention is an especially drastic measure, and accordingly most preventive-detention regimes that have been upheld have an articulable endpoint— for example, a trial, deportation, treatment of a mental disability, or termination of a military conflict. The endpoint need not be a specific date, but there must be a conceptual terminating point to the detention. When individuals are detained pending criminal trial or deportation proceedings, the conclusion of the legal process marks a clear end to their preventive detention. In a criminal trial, the defendant will either be acquitted and set free, or convicted and then imprisoned for punitive rather than preventive ends. Similarly, a deportation proceeding will result either in a determination that the individual is not deportable, in which case she will be freed, or in an order of removal, which must be executed in a reasonable period of time or the individual must be released. In civil commitment settings, if the mental illness that is a predicate for the commitment is successfully treated, or if the individual no longer poses a danger, he must be released. Finally, prisoners of war must be released when the necessity created by the military conflict comes to a close, either because the war ends or because as individuals they no longer pose a threat to return to battle.

Third, with narrow and questionable exceptions, the justification for detention must be particularized to the individual, and generally requires probable cause of some past wrongdoing as well as proof of some future danger or risk warranting prevention. Just as the state cannot impose criminal sanctions

64. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (finding the Bail Reform Act constitutional because it authorizes pretrial detention based on danger to the community and acknowledging bail’s traditional use against flight); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541 (1952) (holding executive could detain violent immigrants pending the outcome of deportation proceedings).


on individuals absent a determination of individual culpability, it cannot lock up a person absent a demonstrated need to lock up that specific person.

The Bail Reform Act illustrates these principles. In *United States v. Salerno*, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s authorization of preventive pretrial detention for dangerous criminal defendants against a due process challenge. The Court emphasized that the statute authorized detention only for preventive purposes, only for a limited period of (pretrial) time, and only upon a showing both of individualized probable cause for arrest, and of clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions “will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.” Denial of bail to dangerous arrestees pending trial did not constitute punishment, the Court reasoned, because it served a legitimate nonpunitive interest in protecting the community and was not excessive in light of that interest. If the government’s interests could be addressed through criminal prosecution, then detention without trial would be excessive, and therefore would violate substantive due process. Because it necessarily takes time to bring a case to trial, criminal conviction and punishment cannot address the danger that a defendant will flee or commit further harm pending trial.

The Court also held that the Bail Reform Act’s “extensive safeguards” satisfied procedural due process. The safeguards included the rights to counsel, to testify, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. In addition, the government was obliged to prove the need for detention by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the statute required that an independent judge, guided by “statutorily enumerated factors,” issue a written decision subject to “immediate appellate review.”

If detention were imposed without an individualized showing of necessity, it would be excessive in light of its legitimate purposes, and would violate substantive due process. And without safeguards affording the individual a meaningful opportunity to defend himself, civil detention would violate procedural due process. Thus, *Salerno’s* reasoning implies that preventive

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69. Id. at 741.
70. Id.; see also id. at 750-52.
71. Id. at 747. A detention may be deemed impermissibly punitive not only if it has a punitive motive, but also if, even if properly motivated, it is excessive in character. Id.
72. Id. at 752.
74. Id. at 752.
75. Id. at 751-52.
detention in the pretrial-detention context may be imposed only if the criminal-prosecution model cannot adequately address the state’s compelling interests in protecting the community or precluding flight of a criminal defendant, it lasts only for a limited period of time, and it includes a fair, individualized determination that detention is necessary.76

Civil commitment, like detention pending trial, also addresses a scenario in which criminal prosecution cannot adequately address danger to the community. Persons who lack the requisite mental capability to distinguish right from wrong or to control their own actions generally cannot be held criminally liable. Yet they may pose a serious danger to the community. The Court has accordingly upheld civil commitment where an individual is found, after a fair adversarial proceeding, to be a danger to himself or others and to have a mental illness or abnormality that makes it “‘difficult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’”77 The latter showing is particularly essential “lest ‘civil commitment’ become a ‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment.”78

Commitment for dangerousness alone is not constitutionally permitted. In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that authorized civil commitment on a finding of dangerousness without any finding of mental illness, stressing that our present system, “with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.”79 The civil commitment cases thus underscore that criminal prosecution is, as a constitutional matter, the presumptive route for addressing socially dangerous behavior, and that preventive detention is permissible only where for some reason the criminal process cannot adequately address dangerousness.

The maxim that civil commitment may not be imposed for purposes of retribution or general deterrence also supports the requirement that detention be predicated on an individualized showing of need. One might otherwise contend

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76. Analogous reasoning supports preventive detention of foreign nationals charged with deportation pending the outcome of their proceedings, provided they pose a risk of flight or a danger to the community. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1029 (2002); see, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001).


78. Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). To the same effect, the Crane Court stated that this requirement was designed “to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” Id. at 413. Similarly, in Hendricks, the Court explained that the requirement of a harm-threatening mental illness “serve[s] to limit involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.

that detention of a whole category of persons will have a general deterrent
effect, eliminating the need to show that each individual’s detention is in fact
necessary for reasons specific to that individual. With those purposes off
limits, the only legitimate purposes for detention are by definition subject to
individualized proof, such as protection of the community from dangerous
persons and avoiding flight from pending criminal or immigration proceedings.

Civil commitment, unlike pretrial preventive detention, does not formally
require probable cause that an individual has engaged in criminal conduct. But
as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that the government could establish
that someone posed a sufficient danger to warrant civil commitment without
proving some past harmful conduct that, but for the individual’s mental illness,
would amount to probable cause of criminal behavior. Accordingly, the
prediction about future harm that underlies civil commitment will often require
proof of past harmful conduct.

Preventive detention is also permitted in wartime. Here, too, the criminal
model does not adequately address the state’s legitimate concerns. In a
traditional armed conflict, the laws of war forbid the state from prosecuting
enemy soldiers for fighting—conduct that, outside a war setting, would violate
laws against murder, assault, and the like. In addition, a nation cannot
presume, consistent with respect for individual autonomy, that an enemy
soldier will desist from fighting against it, because the soldier is under no
obligation to do so, and on the contrary, is generally required by his own
country’s laws to fight. Finally, problems of proof are significant, both because
military forces cannot be expected to gather evidence carefully on the field of
battle and because the military will frequently have legitimate needs to
maintain secrecy about what it knows about the opposing forces. Accordingly,
preventive detention during wartime without criminal charges or a criminal trial
has long been recognized as legitimate.

Most recently, in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, the Supreme Court upheld the
detention of a U.S. citizen allegedly captured on the battlefield carrying arms
and fighting for the Taliban during the military conflict in Afghanistan. The
administration argued that it could hold Hamdi indefinitely as an “enemy
combatant” without affording him any hearing, on the basis of a hearsay

80. The Bush administration made just that argument to justify detention of asylum seekers
arriving from Haiti, contending not that any particular individual had to be detained to guard
against the risk of flight or danger to the community, but that the detention of all Haitian asylum
seekers would deter Haitians from coming to the United States to seek asylum. D-J-, Resp’t, 23 I.

States in the Field* (Lieber Code), U.S. War Dep’t General Orders No. 100, § 3, art. 57
(1863) (“So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath of
fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or

affidavit from a midlevel military official. At most, it maintained, habeas corpus review should ask only whether the government’s affidavit constituted “some evidence” to support the detention, an extremely deferential standard that precluded any inquiry into whether the affidavit’s assertions were in fact true, and that would not involve any evidentiary hearing.

The Supreme Court recognized that detention under the narrow circumstances presented was statutorily authorized and constitutionally permissible, but insisted on much more robust procedural guarantees than the Bush administration provided. It ruled that detention for the purpose of preventing a fighter from returning to battle during a military conflict was supported by a long tradition under the laws of war, and was therefore authorized as a “fundamental incident” to Congress’s AUMF. But it held that the government had failed to afford Hamdi adequate procedural protections. Due process required the government to provide Hamdi notice of the factual basis for his detention and a meaningful opportunity to contest the government’s allegations before an independent adjudicator. Thus, even in wartime, an individualized showing of need, established in a fundamentally fair proceeding, is required if preventive detention is to satisfy due process.

B. Fourth Amendment

While preventive detention has most often been analyzed through the lens of due process, the Fourth Amendment also imposes limits on the practice. Its requirement that all seizures be “reasonable” has long been interpreted to mean that arrests (seizures of the person) generally require a showing of probable cause that the arrestee committed a criminal offense. Since preventive detention requires an initial arrest, probable cause of some past or ongoing illegal activity under criminal or immigration law is generally required for preventive detention.

Exceptions to this requirement in the detention setting would generally require a finding that a given seizure served special needs, above and beyond ordinary law enforcement, and was reasonable. The material-witness law

83. Id.
84. Id. at 527-28.
85. See id. at 519.
86. Id. at 529-37.
87. Id. at 533.
88. See id. at 523.
89. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
90. The Court has upheld searches and seizures without probable cause or a warrant where the search or seizure scheme serves special needs above and beyond ordinary law enforcement, and the scheme is otherwise reasonable. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint on highway where it served special need of highway safety, was applied across the board, and involved only a minimally intrusive, brief stop). In assessing reasonableness, the Court balances a number of factors, including the intrusiveness of the search, the extent to which it is standardized or discretionary, and its effectiveness. Id.
authorizes preventive detention without any showing of probable cause of past or current criminal activity, and instead requires proof that an individual has testimony material to a criminal proceeding and “that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” Civil commitment does not formally require probable cause of a past crime, although as a practical matter it may require something very close. And military detention of combatants does not require proof of criminal activity, but does require that the individual be a combatant for enemy forces. The Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of these measures under the Fourth Amendment, but presumably they would be deemed “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment for reasons similar to those outlined under the Due Process Clause analysis above. Where the government cannot invoke a special need distinct from law enforcement, but is merely engaged in counterterrorism, the criminal standard would apply, requiring probable cause for any arrest.

As a procedural matter, the Fourth Amendment requires either a judicially approved warrant in advance of arrest, or, where warrantless arrests are permissible, that the arrestee be brought before a judge promptly, presumptively within forty-eight hours, for a probable cause hearing. The government may be able to show that a delay of more than forty-eight hours is necessary, but the burden rests with the government.

There is no reason why these Fourth Amendment protections against “unreasonable seizures” ought not to apply to all arrests in the United States, including arrests of foreign nationals, and including arrests for preventive purposes. An arrest for immigration or preventive purposes is just as much a “seizure” as an arrest for criminal law enforcement purposes. Thus, any preventive detention regime would presumably require some showing of individualized suspicion, and prompt access to a court for a determination as to whether the government can justify the preventive detention.

92. The Court permits warrantless arrests where there is probable cause and an arrest takes place in public, or where there are exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
94. Id. at 57.
95. Any substantial restriction on an individual’s freedom of movement is a seizure, and requires reasonable suspicion, if it amounts to only a brief investigative stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), or probable cause if it amounts to a custodial arrest. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) (seizure of luggage for ninety minutes was not a brief stop, and required probable cause); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (stop of airline passenger rose to level of custodial arrest, and therefore required probable cause).
C. Suspension Clause

The Suspension Clause guarantees the availability of the most important practical safeguard against arbitrary detention: judicial review.96 The Suspension Clause strictly limits the situations in which habeas corpus may be suspended, and guarantees that absent suspension, a detained individual should have prompt and effective recourse to a court to challenge the legality of his detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that this constitutional guarantee applied even to foreign nationals held as “enemy combatants” at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, outside the United States’ borders.97 Boumediene holds that the Suspension Clause establishes a constitutionally based source of jurisdiction, subject to restriction only through a formal suspension of the writ. Thus, where the Suspension Clause applies (a question governed in the extraterritorial setting by a practical consideration of multiple factors), any preventive detention regime must include prompt and effective access to a court to test the legality of the detention, absent a formal suspension of the writ.

In sum, the Constitution does not forbid preventive detention, but does require that any preventive-detention scheme meet four basic requirements: (1) it must have a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose that cannot be served through the presumptive approach of criminal prosecution; (2) it must be accompanied by fair procedures to establish that the individual in fact poses a threat sufficient to warrant preventive detention; (3) it must provide for prompt and meaningful judicial review, absent suspension of the writ; and (4) it must be subject to a definable (if not necessarily definite) endpoint.

D. Exceptions to the Rule

Constitutional jurisprudence on preventive detention includes some exceptions to the rules set forth above, but these exceptions are of questionable validity, and in any event are confined to very particular circumstances.

In Korematsu v. United States, for example, the Court infamously upheld President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s World War II “Japanese exclusion order,” requiring the displacement and ultimate internment of all Japanese Americans and Japanese nationals residing on the West Coast.98 The Court’s

96. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, observed that: “Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than . . . after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this context the need for habeas corpus is more urgent.” Id. at 2269.

97. Id.

decision focused on equal protection rather than due process, and concluded that the need to forestall espionage and sabotage, coupled with the asserted inability to identify specific threats on an individualized basis, gave rise to a compelling state interest that justified excluding all persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast. The majority did not expressly address a due process challenge, but its reasoning would presumably also support the constitutionality, as a matter of due process, of detentions without individualized showings of dangerousness.

Korematsu, however, has been thoroughly discredited. The Court has never cited it with approval, much less followed it, and every sitting Justice who has mentioned it has condemned it. Congress ultimately issued a formal apology and paid reparations to the Japanese internees, and the federal courts invalidated the convictions of Korematsu and others for defying the exclusion orders. Korematsu has little if any precedential value. To the contrary, its widespread rejection over time reinforces the principle that individuals should be treated as individuals, on their own facts and circumstances, even when national security is at stake.

In World War II, the Court also reviewed a challenge to the detention and removal of a German national under the Alien Enemy Act, which authorizes the President to detain, deport, or otherwise restrict the liberty of any person over fourteen years of age who is a citizen of the country with which the United States is at war and has not naturalized as a United States citizen. In Ludecke v. Watkins, a bare majority upheld the President’s action, but offered little reasoning to support its conclusion. Instead, it rested almost entirely on custom, asserting simply that the Alien Enemy Act was “almost as old as the Constitution, and it would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the statute offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights.” This is hardly persuasive.

The law invalidated in Marbury v. Madison was also enacted contemporaneously with the Constitution, and that did not protect it from invalidation. Similarly, laws criminalizing homosexual sex have a long

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99. See id. at 223-24.
100. See id. at 218-19.
103. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
107. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). When the Court decided Ludecke, the Enemy Aliens Act had been on the books for a much longer time than the statute invalidated in Marbury had
legacy, yet the Court has held that they violate due process today.\(^{108}\)

In *Ludecke*, moreover, the President had asserted only the power to deport those alien enemies who he specifically determined to pose a danger, and had afforded Ludecke a hearing on his specific circumstances.\(^{109}\) The Supreme Court has more recently characterized *Ludecke* as holding that “in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous,” a description that is consistent with a requirement of individualized findings. The Alien Enemy Act itself does not require the President to make an individualized finding of danger or suspicion,\(^{110}\) but as the law had been implemented in Ludecke’s situation such a finding was indeed required.\(^{111}\) Moreover, the continuing validity of the Alien Enemy Act has not been tested since *Ludecke*, because the Act applies only in declared wars,\(^{112}\) and the United States has not declared war since World War II.

As with *Korematsu*, there is reason to doubt that *Ludecke* remains good law. The *Ludecke* Court employed highly deferential reasoning strikingly similar to that used in *Korematsu*, and strikingly different from that employed in *Boumediene*. *Ludecke* precedes the development of the Court’s modern due process jurisprudence regarding preventive detention, which requires an individualized showing of need for detention, even in wartime.\(^{114}\) And the Court has warned that the power over the particular category of “enemy aliens” should not be extended beyond its unique setting.\(^{115}\)

The only non-wartime Supreme Court decision to uphold preventive detention without the procedural safeguards set forth above concerned a statute subjecting certain “criminal aliens” to mandatory immigration detention pending removal.\(^{116}\) As in *Ludecke*, the Court in *Demore v. Kim* split five to four. The majority relied on statistical evidence that “criminal aliens”—those who had been convicted of crimes that rendered them presumptively deportable—were more likely than other foreign nationals to commit additional crimes or flee if released on bond.\(^{117}\) And the Court stressed that rules that


\(^{109}\) *Ludecke*, 335 U.S. at 163-64.


\(^{111}\) See *Ludecke*, 335 U.S. at 163.


\(^{114}\) See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring that American citizen detained as “enemy combatant” be afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before a neutral decision maker).


\(^{117}\) Id. at 521.
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens may be permissible in the immigration setting.\textsuperscript{118}

Justice Kennedy, who cast the necessary fifth vote, emphasized in a separate concurrence that under the immigration statute, foreign nationals were entitled to an individualized hearing if they claimed not to fall within the category subject to mandatory detention.\textsuperscript{119} He further noted that if deportation were unreasonably delayed, an individualized showing of dangerousness or flight risk would be constitutionally required.\textsuperscript{120}

The Court’s reasoning in \textit{Kim} is flawed, as it proffers no good reason for discarding the requirement of individualized need before subjecting a human being to preventive detention. Its explicit invocation of a double standard, allowing the deprivation of liberty of foreign nationals without the due process to which citizens would be entitled is especially troubling, as it posited no legitimate rationale for differential treatment in this context.\textsuperscript{121}

At most, then, the Court has upheld preventive detention only three times without requiring the usual showing necessary for preventive detention: a fair, individualized determination that the detainee poses a threat that cannot be addressed through the criminal process. Two of those decisions arose in World War II, and may not withstand the test of history. The third is limited to temporary preventive detention of a class of foreign nationals who are almost certainly removable and have been shown as a class to pose a greater than average risk of flight—and even there the crucial fifth vote stressed the importance of at least some kind of individualized determination. With the exception of these three decisions, the Court has upheld preventive detention only where criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a serious danger to the community, the need for preventive detention in an individual case has been established in a fair, adversarial hearing subject to judicial review, and the detention has a definable endpoint.

Still, the precedents described above leave many unanswered questions. Is it ever permissible to detain an individual on grounds of future danger without any charge or adjudication of past dangerous conduct or wrongdoing? What

\textsuperscript{118} Id.
\textsuperscript{119} Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{120} Id. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
burden of proof is required for preventive detention, and does the burden vary depending on the length of the detention? When does the Constitution mandate that a detainee be afforded access to a lawyer? How should the individual’s right to a fair hearing be reconciled with the government’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information relevant to detention?

In short, the Court’s precedent provides important, albeit limited guidance on the constitutionality of a terrorist preventive-detention law. On the one hand, the Court has not ruled out preventive detention altogether. On the other, it has viewed the practice skeptically, and upheld it only in limited settings, principally where the criminal justice system is incapable of addressing the government’s legitimate concerns about an individual’s danger or flight risk, and where fair procedures are in place to minimize the risk of error. The Court has made clear that preventive detention is not permissible for punitive purposes or for general deterrence. And it has recognized the legitimacy of preventive detention only where an individual is awaiting resolution of formal charges that he has violated criminal or immigration law, where an individual suffers from a mental disability that renders him dangerous to himself or others, or where the laws and customs of war have long recognized the power to detain as an incident of engagement in an ongoing military conflict.

III
REFORM OF EXISTING LAW

The history of preventive detention, both before and after 9/11, suggests that there is more need for restricting than for expanding its existing scope. The United States has survived for more than two hundred years without a preventive-detention law directed at terrorists or other serious criminals. Proponents of expanded preventive-detention powers have not pointed to a single al Qaeda member or other terrorist who had to be released because of the lack of adequate existing detention authority. At the same time, thousands of persons having nothing to do with terrorism were subject to preventive detention in the wake of 9/11. Accordingly, reform of the preventive-detention laws must be designed to curtail the abuses. This would require, at a minimum, reforms of immigration law, the material witness law, the material support statutes, and the enemy-combatant-detention authority. In each instance, the proper reform is not elimination of preventive-detention authority, but a narrowing of the law to ensure that it is employed only where truly necessary. Finally, I will address whether there is a need for a new short-term preventive-detention statute directed at persons suspected of involvement in imminent terrorist attacks.
A. Immigration Law

The vast majority of persons detained in antiterrorism measures in the wake of 9/11 were foreign nationals detained pursuant to immigration law. Under that law, if a foreign national is placed into immigration proceedings for having allegedly violated the terms of her visa, she may be denied bond and held pending resolution of the removal proceeding if she poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. This form of preventive detention is analogous to that imposed on persons awaiting a criminal trial, and is not objectionable in itself. However, this authority was widely abused after 9/11, resulting in the detention of many persons without any objective justification for their detention.

Immigration law should be amended to ensure that preventive detention is available on the same terms—and with the same safeguards—as in the criminal bail context. The immigrant facing a deportation hearing and the criminal defendant awaiting trial have identical interests in not being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. Similarly, the government has identical interests in detaining the immigrant and the criminal defendant if they pose a risk of flight or a danger to the community. We treat foreign nationals and citizens awaiting criminal trial identically; why should it matter that a foreign national is being detained pending an immigration proceeding rather than a criminal trial? There is no justification for a double standard here. Accordingly, a statute modeled on the Bail Reform Act should be enacted to govern preventive-immigration detention.

In addition to adopting Bail Reform Act procedures and standards, several other reforms would be necessary to achieve parity between the treatment of foreign nationals in immigration proceedings and defendants in criminal proceedings. First, foreign nationals arrested for alleged immigration violations should be charged and brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of their arrest. Under current immigration rules and regulations, foreign nationals can be arrested without charges, and the regulations merely require that they be charged within a “reasonable period of time” in emergencies. That language, introduced by Attorney General John Ashcroft in the first weeks after 9/11, ultimately led to hundreds of foreign nationals being held for days, weeks, and sometimes even months without being charged with any immigration violation. A criminal arrest is
“unreasonable” absent probable cause, found by a judge either before or within forty-eight hours after arrest. 127 An immigration arrest ought to require the same showing and procedure.

Second, if the government is unable to meet its burden of demonstrating that an individual poses a danger to the community or risk of flight, release on bond or the individual’s own recognizance should be ordered. The Justice Department’s Inspector General found that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, immigration authorities frequently delayed bond hearings solely because they had no objective evidence that would justify denying bond, and they did not want to risk a hearing that would expose that fact and lead to the individual’s release. 128 The Bush administration’s official policy was to hold individuals in detention until they were “cleared” of any connection to terrorism, and government officials exploited immigration law to obtain that result. 129

Third, indigent foreign nationals detained during removal proceedings should be entitled to government-provided counsel at least with respect to the issue of their detention. Existing immigration law does not entitle indigent foreign nationals to receive legal representation at the government’s expense in immigration hearings, despite the gravity of such hearings for individuals’ lives, and the difficulty of navigating the complex immigration system. The kind of justice foreign nationals receive often depends on whether they have legal assistance, and on the quality of that assistance. 130 Irrespective of whether the United States should provide indigent foreign nationals legal assistance for removal hearings in general, the government should certainly provide legal assistance when it seeks to detain them. Foreign nationals often languish in detention for long periods while their cases are pending. 131 While detention may be necessary for some, appointment of counsel would help to ensure that we detain only those who truly need to be detained. Over time, such a reform might even save the government money, by saving on the cost of unnecessary detentions.

Fourth, the government should rescind its regulation providing an automatic stay of release orders where immigration authorities appeal a grant of

127. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring prompt judicial hearing of probable cause, presumptively within forty-eight hours, where individuals are arrested without warrant).

128. See OIG REPORT, supra note 41, at 76-80.

129. See id. at 77; COLE, supra note 5, at 26-35; CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE USE AND ABUSE OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL 6 (2008), available at www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Immigration_Authority_As_A_Counterterrorism_Tool.pdf.

130. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 349 (2007) (finding, in 247 immigration asylum hearings from 2000 until 2004, asylum seekers who received legal assistance were more likely to be granted asylum than those who lacked assistance).

release on bond. 132 Under this regulation, which Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated in the wake of 9/11, the government need not show that it has any chance of success on appeal in order to keep a foreign national detained, even after an immigration judge has found no basis for detention. 133 The mere filing of the appeal automatically stays the foreign national’s release for the duration of the appeal. Appeals can easily take several months to resolve. Where an immigration judge has found no basis for detention, there is no legitimate rationale for giving the government a stay without requiring it to show that it is likely to succeed on appeal, the showing traditionally required for stays and injunctions pending appeal. 134 For these reasons, many courts have declared the automatic-stay provision unconstitutional. 135

Finally, immigration law should be clarified to make explicit that immigration detention must end once removal can be effectuated. After 9/11, the government often kept foreign nationals in detention long after they could have been released. 136 In some instances, individuals admitted that they had overstayed their visas and agreed to leave, and immigration judges granted “voluntary departure” orders, which provide that the alien is free to leave. 137 At that point, the only action remaining was for the foreign national to leave the country. Yet under the Bush administration’s “hold until cleared” policy, the government would not allow the detainee to leave the country until it was satisfied that he was not connected to terrorism even where there were no other obstacles to his immediate departure. 138 Such detention should be unlawful, for the only legitimate purpose of an immigration detention is to aid removal. Once a person has agreed to leave and can leave, there is no legitimate immigration reason to keep him detained any further. 139

133. Id.
136. OIG REPORT, supra note 41, at 37-38.
137. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5, at 33-34 (discussing Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006)).
138. Id.
139. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), held that once removal was no longer reasonably foreseeable, immigration detention could not be maintained, for the only legitimate purpose of immigration detention is to aid removal. In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, a district court interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas as having established a presumptively reasonable six-month detention period for foreign nationals under final deportation orders. Turkmen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *118. That decision gets Zadvydas backwards. The Court in Zadvydas considered whether there were limits on the government’s ability to detain a demonstrably dangerous individual where it faced obstacles to his removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. It read the statute to give federal authorities six months to attempt to resolve any such obstacles, and then required release thereafter if removal was not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 701. Thus, in Zadvydas, the six-month statutory period was treated as a constraint on the detention
These reforms would place preventive detention in the context of pending immigration proceedings on the same footing as preventive detention pending a criminal trial. By ensuring that the government must promptly demonstrate that detention without bond is actually necessary, such reforms would reduce the likelihood that immigration detention is employed unnecessarily to detain persons who pose no threat. Preventive detention unquestionably has a place in immigration enforcement, but under current law it can too easily be imposed without an objective basis—as the aftermath of 9/11 illustrated.

B. Material Witness Law

The material witness law is designed for a legitimate purpose: to ensure that individuals do not evade their civic obligation to provide testimony in a criminal investigation or trial by fleeing the jurisdiction. However, because it permits detention without probable cause of criminal activity, it is a tempting tool for law enforcement authorities who suspect a given individual but lack sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The law was not designed, however, as a catch-all provision to allow detention of suspicious individuals. If it were, it would likely be unconstitutional because it would provide an end-run around the probable cause requirement.

To forestall abusive invocation of the material-witness law, it should be amended to impose a presumptive time limit on detention. It might provide, for example, that a material witness must be brought to testify before a grand jury within forty-eight hours of his arrest unless the government can show good cause for delaying the testimony. In no event should the government be permitted to hold an individual for more than a week to procure grand jury testimony. There is no reason not to have the detained individual testify promptly, especially given the constitutional interest in minimizing nonpunitive restrictions on individual liberty.

When witnesses are held to testify at trial, delay issues are more difficult. Fitting an individual’s testimony into a criminal trial will often require more flexibility as trials can be lengthy and are frequently delayed or deferred by forces beyond the prosecution’s control. But the material-witness law permits a judge to order that a material witness’s testimony be taken by videotape deposition. When delays of more than two weeks are likely, courts should require that the witness’s testimony be taken by videotape deposition. Without

141. See id. ("No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.").
such time limits, the material witness statute poses too great a temptation to the prosecutor who seeks to detain suspicious persons for investigation without probable cause of wrongdoing.

C. Material Support Laws

We generally conceive of preventive detention as incarceration imposed without a criminal conviction. But that conception may be overly formalistic. Another way to effectuate preventive detention as a de facto matter is to expand criminal liability. In Philip K. Dick’s short story, “Minority Report,” psychics predict who will commit crime in the future, and the legislature enacts a “pre-crime” law that allows the government to arrest and prosecute people before they commit their crimes. The United States has not gone quite so far, but its laws prohibiting “material support” to proscribed “terrorist organizations” allow for the prosecution and conviction of individuals based more on what the government fears might happen in the future than on the wrongfulness of their past conduct.

The most important of these statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Although rarely enforced before 9/11, it has since become a principal tool in the Justice Department’s “terrorism” prosecutions. The reason is simple: it allows the government to obtain a “terrorist” conviction without establishing that an individual engaged in any terrorism, conspired to engage in terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, or even intended to further terrorism. The government need only show that an individual provided “material support,” which includes virtually any service or thing of value, to a group that has been labeled a “foreign terrorist organization.” Under this law, humanitarian donations of blankets to a hospital or of coloring books to a daycare center are crimes if the recipient has been designated a terrorist. The Justice Department has taken the position that the law criminalizes training or assistance in human rights advocacy, even if it is established that the intent and effect of the assistance is

144. Cole & Lobel, supra note 52, at 49; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Counterterrorism White Paper 10-14 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (listing the Justice Department’s major terrorism prosecutions, most of which are under the “material support” statute).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
to reduce violence by encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes.  

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has struck down as unconstitutionally vague the law’s prohibitions on the provision of “training,” “services,” and some forms of “expert advice and assistance,” but has otherwise upheld the law against constitutional challenge.

The material support law is for all practical purposes indistinguishable from a law imposing guilt for mere membership in a proscribed group. The courts have, however, generally rejected claims that the law imposes guilt by association, maintaining that the law permits individuals to join proscribed groups but forbids them from providing the groups with “material support.”

But this distinction reduces the right of association to a mere formality, because virtually any associational penalty can be recast as a prohibition on material support. The right to join an organization is meaningless if the state can bar any payments of dues or donations, and even the volunteering of one’s time.

The material support laws serve much the same function as the McCarthy-era “guilt by association” laws and the World War I laws criminalizing speech critical of the war. In each instance, it is not the defendant’s proscribed conduct—whether material support, membership, or speech—that poses a threat to the state. The concern is rather that if people are allowed to speak, associate, and support organizations freely, those organizations might be strengthened, and might take dangerous action in the future. In this sense, the statutes are preventive in purpose. And because they are drafted so broadly, they can be employed to incarcerate individuals preventively, without proving that they have undertaken any actual harmful conduct. The problem, however, is that while some people tried and convicted for “material support” may pose a real threat to the nation’s security, the laws’ overbreadth means that many who do not pose such a threat may nonetheless fall within their proscriptions. In this sense, they are inaccurate proxies for actual dangerousness, and, as preventive measures, are vastly overinclusive.

In order to limit the extent to which the material support laws serve a de facto preventive-detention function, they should be amended to incorporate an express requirement of intent to further a proscribed group’s illegal ends. That

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146. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, (9th Cir. 2000).

147. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (holding these provisions unconstitutional but rejecting arguments that the statute as a whole violates the Fifth Amendment by failing to honor the principle of individual culpability); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (holding prohibitions on “personnel” and “training” were unconstitutionally vague, but rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the statute for imposing guilt by association).

148. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 204 F.3d at 1133 (finding that “[t]he statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group”); United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (D. Minn. 2008).

149. See Cole, supra note 38, at 234.
is the line the Supreme Court eventually drew, as a constitutional matter, with respect to laws penalizing association with the Communist Party. The intent requirement ensured that if one associated with the Party only to advance its legitimate ends (such as civil-rights advocacy and union organizing), one could not be prosecuted. If, by contrast, one joined the Party with intent to further its illegal ends of violent overthrow of the state, one could be convicted. That line, the Court insisted, was necessary to distinguish those morally culpable from those exercising their rights to associate with a group having both legal and illegal ends. The same principle ought to apply to the material-support statute.

This does not mean that those supporting terrorists will be able to avoid prosecution by writing “bake sale” in the subject lines of their checks to a terrorist entity. Proof of intent to further illegal ends is required under conspiracy laws, and prosecutors obtain convictions under such laws on a regular basis. The requisite intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including what was said about the donation, the donees’ track record, the donor’s due diligence, the character of the group, and the nature of the aid.

Such an intent requirement would focus the “material support” laws on their legitimate purpose of proscribing support to terrorist activity, conform the statutes to First and Fifth Amendment principles, and reduce the likelihood that this otherwise overbroad law will be abused for sub rosa preventive-detention purposes. The broader the criminal statute, the more tempting it will be as a tool to target individuals for de facto preventive detention.

D. Military Detention of Enemy Combatants

Since Congress authorized the use of military force against the perpetrators of 9/11 and those who harbor them, and President Bush launched an attack on Afghanistan in 2001, the United States military has detained well over a thousand “enemy combatants” allegedly connected to these conflicts.
Some were captured on the battlefield; others were found as far from Afghanistan as Bosnia, Africa, and Chicago’s O’Hare Airport. Many are being held in Afghanistan at Bagram Air Force Base, approximately 775 have been held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where many remain. An undisclosed number have been detained in secret CIA prisons (which were closed by President Obama in one of his first actions as President). Some of the detainees are said to have been members of the Taliban or al Qaeda military forces carrying weapons on the battlefield, but others are accused merely of being “associated” in an unspecified way with one of those groups. Many have been detained for more than seven years.

The Bush administration initially took the extreme position that it could hold anyone it labeled an “enemy combatant” indefinitely, without charges or a hearing, and without the protections of the Geneva Conventions. The administration argued, in effect, that no law limited its authority to hold anyone it so labeled, and that no court had the power to question that extraordinary assertion of power. That position led, not surprisingly, to charges that Guantánamo was a “legal black hole.” Soon, accounts of abusive interrogation tactics began to leak out—meticulously recorded by the Army itself in interrogation logbooks, and by the FBI in emails and memos objecting to the abuses its agents observed there. Guantánamo became a focal point of international condemnation of the United States’ approach to the “war on terror.” One of President Obama’s first actions as President was to order that Guantánamo be closed within a year.

155. Id.
161. Sands, supra note 56 (discussing development and implementation of order authorizing coercive interrogation tactics at Guantánamo); Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Details Dissent on Guantánamo Tactics, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2008, at A21.
162. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 152.
Closing Guantánamo, however, will not resolve the difficult question of what to do with the men still detained there, or with the hundreds more held at Bagram Air Force Base. President Bush’s ad hoc approach to the problem, assertedly predicated on Congress’s AUMF and his powers as commander in chief, was a legal and political disaster. The Bush administration took a maximalist position from the start. It insisted that it need not provide any hearings to ensure that detainees were in fact enemy combatants; that the detainees were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, and therefore could be subjected to harsh coercive interrogations; and that the detainees had no recourse to judicial protection. The Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments, as did most of world opinion.163

Closing Guantánamo will restore legitimacy only if the Obama administration adopts a policy that clearly rejects the illegitimate aspects of the Bush administration approach.

Human rights groups have responded to the abuses at Guantánamo by arguing that the government must either “try or release” the detainees.164 It should try those who are charged with crimes in fair trials, preferably in civilian criminal courts, and release the rest. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the human rights groups, Professors Neal Katyal and Jack Goldsmith have proposed that Congress enact a statute creating a national security court empowered to detain “suspected terrorists” indefinitely.165 Such a scheme, applicable to foreign nationals and citizens alike, and without any link to a military conflict, would create a permanent authority to bypass criminal prosecution for anyone deemed to be a “suspected terrorist.”

In my view, both proposals are misguided. The “try or release” position disregards the legitimate, if limited, role of preventive detention in an ongoing military conflict, and would inappropriately tie the United States’ hands. Detaining enemy soldiers has long been a recognized incident of war.166 It was not the concept of detaining the enemy that made Guantánamo an international embarrassment, but the way the Bush administration asserted that power—defining the category of “enemy combatants” far too expansively, refusing to

163. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court held that detainees at Guantánamo were entitled to habeas corpus review of the legality of their detentions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, and in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court held that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant was constitutionally entitled to a fair hearing on whether he was an enemy combatant.


165. Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 2.

166. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
provide hearings to determine whether the detainees were actually combatants, subjecting them to inhumane interrogation tactics, asserting the right to detain them as long as the “war on terror” continued, and claiming that no law restricted its actions there. As long as the United States is engaged in an active military conflict in Afghanistan, detention, narrowly defined and properly implemented according to the laws of war, should be an option for those fighting against us. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to release persons we had strong reason to believe were fighters for al Qaeda or the Taliban and would resume fighting upon release. Closing Guantánamo and restoring the rule of law therefore need not mean the release of all those detained there, or even the release of all those who cannot be tried criminally. However, if the United States seeks to continue to hold some Guantánamo detainees in preventive detention without criminal trial, it must do so in a way that is legitimate, carefully constrained by law, and meticulously fair.

The Katyal-Goldsmith proposal to authorize detention of “suspected terrorists” is even more problematic. Such a statute, not tied to the traditions and limitations of military detention during armed conflict, would be unprecedented and unconstitutional. It fails the threshold test of establishing the inadequacy of criminal prosecution. Terrorism, after all, is a crime. It has historically been addressed through criminal prosecution, and there is no reason to believe that terrorist crimes cannot continue to be so addressed. Two former federal prosecutors recently reviewed over one hundred criminal prosecutions of terrorist crimes, and concluded that the criminal justice system is fully capable of handling such cases. Absent a showing that terrorism cannot be prosecuted criminally, there is no constitutional justification for bypassing the criminal process anytime a crime can be labeled “terrorist.”

Moreover, once we start carving out categories of criminal offenders who can be detained indefinitely without being charged with or convicted of any criminal conduct, it may be difficult to resist extension of such measures to other crimes. There is no categorical difference between terrorism and any number of other serious crimes. If “suspected terrorists” warrant preventive detention, why not suspected murderers, rapists, gang leaders, or drug kingpins?

Even if the preventive detention category were restricted to “terrorists,” that term has often been very expansively defined. Federal law treats as “terrorist” even nonviolent conduct, such as the provision of humanitarian support to a designated group, and also treats as terrorist virtually any use or threat to use a weapon against person or property, regardless of whether it


targets civilians or is intended to terrorize a population. The breadth of the
definition of “terrorism” will in turn contribute to the slippery slope problem. If
preventive detention were authorized for persons suspected of making
humanitarian donations to the “wrong” groups, shouldn’t it be authorized for
persons suspected of violent crimes? Even without such extensions, the sweep
of the federal definition of “terrorism” would permit the imposition of
preventive detention on persons who could certainly be addressed through the
criminal justice system.

Terrorism should have nothing to do with the justification for preventive
detention. Instead, detention should be predicated on, and restricted by, the
customs and laws of war. Where terrorists are engaged in armed conflict, they
may be detained on the same terms as others so engaged—but they should be
detained because they are engaged in armed conflict, not because they are
terrorists. Where terrorists are not engaged in an ongoing armed conflict, the
threats they pose can and should be addressed through the criminal justice
system, and there is no precedent for subjecting them to preventive detention.

A statute authorizing preventive detention only of combatants in an
ongoing armed conflict would create an authority definitionally restricted to
wartime, and therefore would be less likely to invite a slippery slope. Military
detention of persons engaged in an ongoing armed conflict—regardless of
whether the conflict or the individuals have anything to do with “terrorism”—
has long been a “fundamental incident” of warfare.170 Thus, if long-term
detention of some of the individuals held at Guantánamo and Bagram Air Force
Base is authorized, it is because at the time of detention they were engaged in
armed conflict against the United States, and continue to pose an ongoing threat
that they will return to hostilities—not because they are “suspected terrorists.”

Looking to the laws of war, the Supreme Court has ruled that as long as
fair procedures are provided, the Constitution does not prohibit the United
States from holding even U.S. citizens as “combatants” if they are captured on
the battlefield fighting for the enemy.171 Because of the unusual nature of the
conflict against al Qaeda, however, neither the laws of war nor the Constitution
provide precise guidance on who may be detained, for how long, and pursuant
to what procedures.

No one disputes that a nation fighting a traditional international armed
conflict with another nation may capture and detain enemy soldiers for as long
as the conflict lasts. The conflict with al Qaeda, however, is not traditional. Al
Qaeda is not a state and has not signed the Geneva Conventions. Yet we
continue to be engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and the

170. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; see generally Geremy C. Kamens, International Legal
Limits on the Government’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”, in ENEMY COMBATANTS,
171. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
Taliban, centered in Afghanistan. Unlike the ill-conceived “war on terror,” the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban is not a metaphor or a slogan. Al Qaeda declared war on the United States,\textsuperscript{172} and has attacked it both at home and abroad. The Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden, and permitted al Qaeda to operate within its borders. The attacks of 9/11 were recognized by both NATO and the United Nations Security Council as warranting a military response in self-defense,\textsuperscript{173} and approximately 120 nations signed on to the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{174} As of March 2009, the fighting continued, with no immediate end in sight.\textsuperscript{175}

If the United States could hold Italians fighting against it during World War II in military detention, should different rules apply to Taliban and al Qaeda members fighting against it in Afghanistan? One argument for differential treatment would draw a distinction based on the relative availability of criminal sanctions in a traditional international armed conflict and the conflict with al Qaeda, a nonstate actor. As argued above, preventive detention is generally permissible only where criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a particular danger. In a traditional war between states, military detention is often the only option available for incapacitating the enemy short of killing them. Under the laws of war, soldiers are entitled or privileged to fight, meaning that they may not be tried criminally for doing so.\textsuperscript{176} The criminal law literally cannot address the very substantial danger posed by armed soldiers under orders to kill in an international armed conflict, and preventive detention is accordingly permissible.

By contrast, al Qaeda has no legally recognized right to wage war against the United States. It is a nonstate actor, and according to the Supreme Court, the United States’ conflict with al Qaeda is therefore a “non-international armed conflict.”\textsuperscript{177} Al Qaeda’s actions can be—and for the most part have been—criminalized by the United States, at least where they are directed at doing harm to U.S. persons or property. There is therefore no formal legal impediment to addressing through criminal law much of the threat that al Qaeda poses. And in its criminal justice system, the United States has


\textsuperscript{175.} See Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, supra note 152 (reporting that President Obama admitted that the United States was not winning the war in Afghanistan).

\textsuperscript{176.} See Geneva Convention, supra note 29; LIEBER, supra note 81; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 43.2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 23.

successfully prosecuted many persons associated with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{178} Thus, one might argue that because the criminal process is available to incapacitate al Qaeda fighters, the alternative of preventively detaining them should not be permitted.

But this may be too formalistic. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson has pointed out, there are many potentially legitimate reasons not to proceed against one’s enemy in an armed conflict exclusively through the criminal process, even where, as in a non-international armed conflict, there is no formal law-of-war impediment to doing so.\textsuperscript{179} These include the difficulty of collecting and preserving evidence in war settings, the increased need for secrecy in a military conflict, the diversion of scarce resources from the military struggle to the courtroom, the possibility that enemies might use the criminal process to pass information to their compatriots, and heightened security concerns presented by trying a military foe in a public courtroom.\textsuperscript{180}

Moreover, it is not clear why the fact that al Qaeda is engaged in warfare that is itself a crime should restrict the United States’ military options in defending itself, so long as a military response is legally justified in the first place. The United States has the right, under the laws of war, to try al Qaeda fighters for ordinary crimes or war crimes. But should it be required to try them while the conflict continues? War-crimes trials typically occur at the conclusion of a war, because a nation at war has a strong interest in devoting its resources to the conflict itself, and in not revealing what it knows about the enemy. The fact that some detainees in a traditional, international armed conflict may be triable for crimes (e.g., those who target civilians or fail to wear distinctive uniforms, and therefore surrender their prisoner of war status, or those who, as prisoners of war, commit crimes in detention) does not mean that these prisoners must either be tried or released. Rather, they may be held as combatants for the duration of the conflict, and tried (or not) at the state’s discretion. If the availability of a criminal prosecution does not eliminate the option of preventive detention while an international armed conflict is ongoing, why should the availability of such a prosecution in a non-international armed conflict bar military detention?

The state may also legitimately prefer preventive detention to prosecution during wartime because of differences in the burden of proof. In criminal cases, including for war crimes, the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{181} Suppose that the government has “clear and convincing evidence”
that an individual was captured while actively engaged in armed conflict for al Qaeda or the Taliban, and good reason to believe he would resume fighting if released. Now suppose that the government is nonetheless unable to convince a jury—civilian or military—that the individual is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime. Must he be released? An Italian soldier who prevailed in a war-crimes trial during World War II would not be entitled to release on acquittal, but only upon the cessation of hostilities. Why should an unprivileged belligerent fighting for an entity that has no right to fight receive more favorable treatment?

For these reasons, it seems likely that detaining al Qaeda or Taliban members actively engaged in armed conflict with the United States is at least consistent with, and not proscribed by, the laws and customs of war. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that detention of at least some “enemy combatants” during armed conflicts is consistent with the Constitution, provided that the procedures for determining a detainee’s status are sufficiently robust to satisfy due process.

The Court’s decision in *Hamdi*, however, hardly resolved the issue. Disputes continue to rage over both the proper substantive scope of “enemy combatant” detention, and over the procedures that alleged combatants are due. The disputes are exacerbated by the fact that the only congressional statement on the issue is the AUMF, which does not even mention detention, but simply authorizes the use of all “necessary and appropriate” military force. If preventive detention of “enemy combatants” is to continue, it should be defined—and carefully circumscribed—by legislation. The power to hold a human being indefinitely is too grave to delegate to executive experimentation. Such a statute would have to address both the proper substantive scope of the detention power, and the procedural guarantees available to those subjected to it.

1. Substantive Constraints: Who May Be Detained and for How Long?

Military detention should be used only against combatants in an armed conflict, and may last only as long as the particular armed conflict that justifies it. The first questions with respect to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, then, are who may be detained, and for how long?

As we have seen, the Supreme Court in *Hamdi* held that as an incident to war, the executive could detain persons captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan fighting on behalf of the Taliban against the United States.\(^\text{182}\) If one concedes that some individuals may be subject to detention in connection with the Afghanistan conflict, then *Hamdi* identified the core case for

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detention. But what about people captured far from the battlefield? What about members of al Qaeda or the Taliban who have never actually fought against the United States? What about those who sympathize with al Qaeda, and may even be inspired by the group to engage in terrorism, but have not themselves joined al Qaeda? What about someone who provides financial support to al Qaeda or the Taliban, but is not a member of either? What about someone who has provided medical attention to a Taliban fighter?

The Bush administration took an extraordinarily expansive view of who could be detained as an “enemy combatant.” It defined the category as containing not only members of al Qaeda or the Taliban, but also those who have merely “support[ed]” al Qaeda or Taliban forces, and those who are members or supporters of other groups “associated” with al Qaeda or the Taliban “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” This goes too far. If one analogizes to World War II, for example, such a standard would have allowed the United States to detain as “enemy combatants” not only those enlisted in the German armed forces, but anyone who paid taxes in Germany, worked in a German munitions factory, or treated a German soldier in a hospital.

The Obama administration has advanced a somewhat more limited definition of those it may hold in military detention. Where the Bush administration claimed it could detain anyone who provided any support whatsoever to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups, the Obama administration has asserted that it may detain those who provide “substantial support” to those groups. It failed to elaborate, however, on what law-of-war principles would dictate regarding military detention of “supporters” as opposed to members of an enemy armed force. At oral argument, the government’s lawyer asserted that the term would encompass those who provide financing to al Qaeda. Moreover, its proposed definition, like that of President Bush, is not predicated on a specific legislative directive, but is instead an act of executive interpretation based only the AUMF, which as noted above, does not even

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184. See Respondent’s Memo Regarding the Gov’t’s Det. Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay, *In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig.*, No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. The brief maintained that this definition was tentative because President Obama’s comprehensive review of detention policies had not yet been completed. See id. at 10-11.

185. Id. at 1 (stating that “[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict”).

mention the term “detention,” much less seek to define its proper confines.

Others have argued that only those captured on the battlefield or foreign soil should be subject to military detention, at least as long as the ordinary courts are open and available at home. For example, several members of an en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that only those captured on a foreign battlefield or as part of a foreign nation’s military could be detained as “enemy combatants.” The judges maintained that they were only interpreting the AUMF, but their reasoning suggested that it might be unconstitutional to extend military detention any further. As a constitutional principle, this seems too restrictive. If an enemy fighter is captured outside the field of battle, but the capturing nation has reason to believe that he is in fact an enemy fighter, and, if let free, would resume hostilities against it, why should it be compelled to release him? The Supreme Court’s decision in *Ex parte Quirin*, upholding a war-crimes trial against members of the German military who were arrested in the United States, far from any battlefield, suggests that military-detention authority need not be limited to battlefield captures. Moreover, where the enemy affirmatively seeks to attack soft targets and kill civilians, as al Qaeda does, restricting military detention to those found on traditional battlefields would significantly hamstring U.S. defenses.

Two courts—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Israeli Supreme Court—recently addressed the question of who may be detained as “enemy combatants” in armed conflicts with terrorist organizations. Both did so as a matter of domestic law, but with explicit reference to the international law of war (which informs statutory interpretation in both Israel and the United States). Both courts also took into account the need to adapt the law of war to the changed circumstances presented by military conflicts with nonstate terrorist organizations. Their decisions provide helpful guidance in determining the appropriate scope of “enemy combatant” detention in a military conflict with a terrorist organization.

The Fourth Circuit, in *Al-Marri*, considered whether a Qatari citizen lawfully residing in the United States could be detained as an enemy combatant. Al-Marri was arrested on criminal charges related to identity fraud and lying to FBI agents, but was transferred to military custody shortly before he was to go on trial. The United States alleged that al-Marri trained in an al Qaeda training camp, worked closely with and took orders from al Qaeda leaders, and came to the United States as an al Qaeda agent for the

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188. 317 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1942).
190. *Id.*
purpose of engaging in and facilitating terrorist activities. In a splintered opinion, a bare majority of the en banc court held that if the allegations were true, al-Marri could be detained as an “enemy combatant,” but that he had not been afforded due process in determining whether the allegations were true. The Supreme Court granted al-Marri’s petition for certiorari, but the Obama administration then indicted him in a civilian criminal court, thereby avoiding a Supreme Court adjudication of the scope of its detention power.

In the court of appeals, Judge Wilkinson’s concurring opinion provided perhaps the most illuminating discussion of who may be detained as an enemy combatant. Articulating a three-part test guided by the laws of war and the Constitution, Judge Wilkinson would require the government to establish that an individual is: (1) a member of (2) an organization against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force (3) who “knowingly plans or engages in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of furthering the military goals of the enemy nation or organization.” Congress did not authorize the use of military force against all terrorists, nor could it have. It authorized force only against those who perpetrated 9/11 and those who harbored them. Accordingly, a terrorist who does not belong to al Qaeda or the Taliban is not an enemy in this military conflict, and would not be subject to preventive detention under this scheme, no matter how dangerous he may be perceived to be.

Judge Wilkinson’s third criterion addresses whether the individual is a “combatant” and serves to distinguish “mere members” from those actually engaged in hostilities on behalf of the enemy. The laws of war distinguish between combatants and civilians. Judge Wilkinson’s third criterion does much the same thing. It distinguishes between those who merely associate with an enemy and those who are actually part of the enemy’s fighting forces. Only the latter may be preventively detained.

The Israeli Supreme Court has also addressed who may be detained in an armed conflict with a terrorist organization—in this case, Hezbollah. The Israeli legislature, unlike the U.S Congress, has addressed the question of

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191. Id. at 220.
192. Id. at 216.
194. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 323.
196. Id. at 324.
detention of “enemy combatants” through detailed legislation. The Israeli Supreme Court upheld Israel’s Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, which authorizes detention of individuals who “took part in hostilities against the State of Israel, whether directly or indirectly,” or who are “member[s] of a force carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel.”198 The court interpreted the law in light of both Israel’s Basic Law and the international laws of war to authorize detention where there has been an individualized determination that a person meets one of the above categories.

The court noted that in a traditional international armed conflict, “unlawful combatants” are not treated as “combatants,” a term limited to those privileged to fight and covered by the Third Geneva Convention, but are instead treated as a subset of “civilians,” protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention.199 However, it also noted that the Convention permits detention of civilians where detention is “absolutely necessary” to the security of the state, and is subject to judicial or administrative review.200 The court stressed that to meet the requisite showing of necessity, an individualized determination must be made, and construed the Israeli law to require a showing by “clear and convincing evidence” that the individual either (1) took a non-negligible part in hostilities against Israel, or (2) was a member of an organization engaged in such hostilities and “made a contribution to the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense.”201

Moreover, because the justification for detention is preventive, the court held that periodic review is required to ensure that detention lasts no longer than absolutely necessary.202 In addition, the court ruled that as the length of detention increases, the strength of the evidence that the individual poses a threat must also increase.203 Thus, a detention that is marginally justified at its outset may cease to be justified three months later if the government does not offer additional evidence that the individual poses a threat. This increasing evidentiary requirement is predicated on the notion that as detention is extended, the burden on individual liberty increases, and therefore a proportionally stronger showing is required to warrant further detention.204 Detention may last no longer than is necessary, and in no event longer than the hostilities that triggered it in the first place.

The Israeli Supreme Court’s approach to enemy-combatant detention is more expansive than Judge Wilkinson’s in two respects. First, it authorizes

198. Id. at 9 (quoting Section 2 of Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law).
199. Id. at 15.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id. at 44.
203. Id. at 43-44.
204. This is likely to affect only marginal cases, because where the evidence is very strong at the outset, it is unlikely to be weakened by the passage of time, and as long as the showing was strong to begin with, it will ordinarily suffice to justify an extended detention.
detention of individuals who engage in hostilities regardless of any evidence of membership, while Judge Wilkinson would require proof of membership as an absolute prerequisite for detention. Second, the Israeli Supreme Court authorizes detention based on membership without proof of actual involvement in terrorist activity, whereas Judge Wilkinson would require, in addition to membership, proof that an individual knowingly planned or engaged in harmful conduct “for the purpose of furthering the military goals of an enemy nation or organization.”

In my view, Judge Wilkinson’s narrower approach is more consistent with the principles of the laws of war. Absent a requirement of membership in (or at least active engagement in the conflict on behalf of) the enemy group, it will be difficult to distinguish “enemy combatants” from ordinary terrorists. And where terrorist organizations have multiple purposes, one cannot automatically assume that all members are in fact “combatants.”

Still, the two approaches share important core features. First, neither predicates detention on the basis of terrorism per se. Rather, both treat detention as necessarily tied to active involvement in a military conflict. Thus, Judge Wilkinson would require a showing that an individual is a member of an organization against which Congress has authorized the use of military force, and the Israeli Supreme Court requires proof of involvement in, or membership in an organization involved in, hostilities against Israel. As such, these detention regimes are substantially less expansive than a preventive-detention regime targeted at “suspected terrorists.”

Requiring involvement in armed conflict imposes a significant constraint on the use of preventive detention. It can only be employed in wartime, only for the duration of the conflict, and only against actual combatants. Over the course of its history, the United States has been subjected to many terrorist attacks, at home and abroad, but Congress has authorized the use of military force in response only once. As heinous as they may be, most acts of terrorism simply do not rise to the level of “war,” as that term is widely understood, or justify a military response.

In addition, armed conflicts eventually come to an end. The conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan has lasted eight years, but it is not likely to last forever. By contrast, the phenomenon of “terrorism” will always be with us. Thus, a detention authority linked to military conflict has a definable end point, even if one cannot predict precisely when the end will come. By contrast, a preventive-detention statute for “terrorists” would be a permanent feature of the law, applicable in ordinary as well as extraordinary times, and without any definable end point.

Second, both Judge Wilkinson’s and the Israeli Supreme Court’s approaches to preventive detention are substantially narrower than the Bush

administration’s and the Obama administration’s. Neither Wilkinson nor the Israeli Supreme Court would permit detention of mere supporters of an enemy organization, much less detention of members or supporters of associated groups. And neither Judge Wilkinson nor the Israeli Supreme Court would permit detention based on membership alone. They both require some evidence of involvement in hostilities. This may seem odd, because under traditional laws of war, any member of the opposition armed forces may be detained, without any need to show that he has planned or engaged in harmful conduct, or contributed to the cycle of hostilities. Why do both the Israeli Supreme Court and Judge Wilkinson require more than membership?

The answer, I believe, lies in the difference between membership in a terrorist organization and being enlisted in an army. A terrorist organization is a political organization, not a military force. It may well have a military wing, but many “terrorist organizations” are multipurpose groups, and include members who never engage in violence. Hezbollah, for example, is a political organization with representation in the Lebanese national legislature. Mere membership in such an organization should not be a ground for military detention, and under the Israeli law, it is not. Just as military detention would not be permissible simply because an individual was part of the German civil service, military detention should not be permitted simply because an individual is a member of a terrorist organization. A scheme of military detention predicated on the need to incapacitate the enemy’s combatants requires proof of more than mere membership in a “terrorist organization”; it requires proof of contribution to hostilities.

At the same time, membership in a terrorist organization will often be more difficult to prove than membership in a fighting army. Terrorist organizations tend to operate clandestinely and members often disguise themselves among the general population. Thus, proof of formal membership—a prerequisite for detention under Judge Wilkinson’s definition, although not under the Israeli law—may be too high an evidentiary burden in some instances. Where the state can demonstrate that an individual directly participated in hostilities against the state and on behalf of the enemy, military detention may be justified even if the state cannot prove actual membership in the organization with which it is at war. In a traditional conflict, mercenaries and irregular forces may be detained, even if they are not members of the armed forces of the enemy or nationals of the enemy state. So, too, an individual who is directly engaged in hostilities against the United States on

207. Civilians who actively participate in hostilities lose their status as protected civilians under the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention, supra note 29, at art. 3(1); Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 618 (1987).
behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban ought to be subject to military detention, even without proof that he is a formal member of either. As the Israeli Supreme Court emphasized, the focus of the inquiry, and the trigger for detention, should be the threat the individual poses to the state as part of an ongoing armed conflict.

As we have seen, the Obama administration has tentatively maintained that it may detain not only members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, but also those who provide “substantial support” to those entities. The administration was deliberately vague about what “substantial support” means, but indicated that it should be interpreted consistently with law-of-war principles. If “substantial support” were limited to those individuals who directly support an entity’s hostilities against the United States by fighting with it, this definition might be consistent with the laws of war. For example, the laws of war say that an individual who was not a member of the German army, but fought alongside it, would be subject to detention. However, a wealthy German capitalist who ran several businesses that supported the army and paid substantial taxes would presumably not be subject to military detention, even though he might be said to have provided “substantial support” to the war effort through his private businesses and tax payments. It remains to be seen how “substantial support” will be construed, but if the Obama administration means it to be construed consistently with the laws of war, general support to an organization should not be sufficient to warrant detention absent direct engagement alongside the organization in military hostilities against the United States.208

Finally, neither the Israeli Supreme Court nor Judge Wilkinson would restrict military detention to battlefield captures. This, too, seems appropriate. Detention should turn on whether an individual is a combatant and poses a risk of returning to battle, not on where he happened to be captured.209 Moreover, in an asymmetric conflict with a terrorist group, the enemy will virtually always prefer attacking far from any battlefield, for the same tactical reasons that it generally takes up terrorism in the first place—it cannot possibly prevail on a traditional battlefield.210 Therefore, limiting preventive detention to those

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208. One district court has rejected the Obama administration’s contention that its detention authority extends to those who are not members of al Qaeda or the Taliban but have merely provided “substantial support.” Hamilby v. Obama, No. 05-0763, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43249, *32-*36 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009). The court concluded that the laws of war permit detention of persons who are “part of” enemy forces, but not of persons who have financed or supported enemy forces. Id.; see also Gherebi v. Obama, No. 04-1164, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34649, *122 (D.D.C. April 22, 2009) (holding that detention authority based on “substantial support” was limited to persons “who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces”).

209. Establishing that an individual is actually a combatant will often be more difficult when he is not captured on the battlefield, but assuming he meets the appropriate definition, the location of capture should not preclude military detention.

210. To be clear, I do not mean this explanation of why terrorists choose terrorist tactics as a justification of those tactics in any way. In my view, terrorist tactics are unjustifiable, period.
captured on the battlefield fails to account for the nature of terrorist warfare, and would excessively limit the state’s ability to defend itself.

In short, military preventive detention should be permissible in the ongoing military conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, but only if authorized by a statute expressly addressing detention and respecting constitutional and law-of-war principles. To be consistent with constitutional and law-of-war principles, such a statute should limit detention to (1) persons involved in actual hostilities with the United States on the part of al Qaeda or the Taliban; or (2) members of al Qaeda or the Taliban who can be shown, by their activities or their position in the organization, to have played a direct role in furthering military ends, such as through providing training, planning, directing, or engaging in hostile military activities. Such persons may be detained only as long as the conflict continues and they still pose a threat of returning to hostilities. And as detention is extended, the burden on the government to prove that threat should be proportionately increased.


In addition to defining who may be detained and for how long, a constitutional preventive-detention statute must provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that the individuals detained in fact fit the category of enemy combatants. The Supreme Court in *Hamdi* held that at least with respect to a U.S. citizen, due process required notice of the factual basis for the detention, a meaningful opportunity to rebut that showing, and a neutral decision maker.\(^\text{211}\) This ruling provides an important starting point for analysis of what procedures should be applied generally, but it leaves many questions unanswered. Do the same due process rights apply to foreign nationals as U.S. citizens? What is the burden of proof? Are detainees entitled to lawyers? And how should confidential information be treated?

As a threshold matter, foreign nationals should be afforded no less protection than U.S. citizens.\(^\text{212}\) The process that is due is determined by balancing the individual’s interest in liberty against the government’s interest in security.\(^\text{213}\) A foreign national’s interest in being free of detention is the same as the U.S. citizen’s in *Hamdi*. The government’s interest in ensuring that

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\(^{212}\) The threshold constitutional question of the extent to which constitutional protections extend to foreign nationals beyond U.S. borders is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of that topic, see generally Gerald L. Neuman, *Strangers to the Constitution* (1996); David Cole, *Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantánamo Bay*, 2007-2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47. However, whether or not due process is deemed to apply abroad, the competing interests in liberty and security are simply not affected by citizenship status, so that Congress should as a matter of fairness require the same procedures for foreign nationals and U.S. citizens.

\(^{213}\) *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 529 (applying due process balancing test set forth in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
enemy combatants do not return to hostilities is also unaffected by the citizenship of the detainee. Thus, the basic analysis ought to be the same for citizens and foreign nationals. While the government is likely to have increased security concerns in some locales—such as when it detains an individual near a battlefield or other hostile territory—these considerations can be factored into the calculus, but should have identical implications for foreign nationals and citizens.  

The process in *Hamdi* should be sufficient as a matter of law in all cases. For example, Judge Traxler, who cast the decisive vote in the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in *Al-Marri*, suggested that more process should be required in some circumstances. The *Hamdi* Court ruled that the government may be able to establish its case through hearsay affidavits, and the government in *Al-Marri* did just that, relying exclusively on an affidavit written by a military officer with no firsthand knowledge of the facts he asserted. But Judge Traxler and four other members of the court noted that the Court in *Hamdi* actually said something more nuanced. The *Hamdi* Court acknowledged the government’s arguments about the difficulties of presenting firsthand witnesses in connection with battlefield captures, and stated that under those circumstances hearsay “may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence.”

Hearsay may not always be “the most reliable available evidence,” Traxler pointed out, and should not be accepted where more reliable evidence is available. Al-Marri himself was not captured on a battlefield; he was arrested in the United States through the ordinary criminal process. Given these circumstances, Judge Traxler concluded that the government had not shown that hearsay was the “most reliable available evidence.” If more reliable evidence was available and could be used without undermining legitimate security concerns, due process would require the government to produce it. In other words, Judge Traxler reasoned, the rule of *Hamdi* is not that hearsay is always sufficient, but only that it is sufficient where the government establishes that it is the “most reliable available evidence” in light of the government’s legitimate security needs. Where there is no need to rely on hearsay, it should not be permitted, as it directly undermines the individual’s opportunity

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216. *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 533-34.

217. *Al-Marri*, 534 F.3d at 256.

218. Id. at 265.


221. Id. at 268 (Traxler, J., concurring) (quoting *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 534).

222. Id. at 268-70.
to cross-examine his accusers.

Moreover, Judge Traxler may not have gone far enough. The due process balancing test considers not just the government’s security needs, but also the individual’s interest in liberty, and more broadly, the need for fair and accurate decision making. In addition to asking whether the government has established a need to rely on hearsay (or classified evidence, discussed below), the court should also ask whether reliance on hearsay negates the individual’s meaningful opportunity to respond. Since a meaningful opportunity to respond is a necessary component of due process, hearsay should not be permitted where it defeats that opportunity.

A related principle governs judicial review of combatant status determinations. In Parhat v. Gates, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the government had failed to justify a Guantánamo detention where it presented only allegations and accusations based on hearsay, and did not provide sufficient information for the court to assess the credibility of the government’s sources or their basis for knowing what they alleged. Absent that information, the court reasoned, it could not provide meaningful review.

Just as a failure to provide the court with sufficient evidence to assess the reliability of accusations negates the court’s ability to engage in meaningful independent review, so too may the failure to provide the detainee with sufficient information deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to respond. Thus, hearsay should be admitted only where it is “the most reliable available evidence” and its use does not defeat the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to defend himself.

What burden of proof should apply to determinations of combatant status? Israel requires “clear and convincing evidence” that an individual is an unlawful combatant, and as discussed above, the evidentiary threshold required increases as the length of detention increases. The same standard should apply in the context of the conflict with al Qaeda. The “clear and convincing evidence” standard, used in U.S. law for deportation proceedings and pretrial detention hearings under the Bail Reform Act, is less onerous than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal prosecutions. But it is substantially higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard that governs ordinary civil disputes. Surely the government should be required to meet as high a standard to detain an individual indefinitely as to deny bail pending trial or to deport a foreign national, actions that impinge less substantially on liberty interests.

225. Id.
Because of the high stakes of detention hearings and the complexity of the legal issues involved, detainees should be provided lawyers.\textsuperscript{227} From the perspective of the due process balancing test, there is every reason to require that detainees be permitted the assistance of counsel. In many instances, the detainees will speak little or no English, and will have had little or no experience with the American legal system. Most detainees at Guantánamo already have counsel representing them in habeas corpus proceedings, so allowing those lawyers to participate in combatant status hearings would come at little cost to the government. Security concerns can be addressed by imposing reasonable protective orders on the lawyers restricting their dissemination of confidential information. And given the enormous stakes for the individual—the possibility of indefinite detention—it is essential that the process be as fair as possible.

One of the most difficult issues is how to reconcile the individual’s right to notice and an opportunity to respond with the state’s interest in maintaining secrecy during an ongoing military conflict. While the military may often have a legitimate interest in preserving the confidentiality of information relevant to a detention proceeding, its ability to do so should be limited by the same principles that govern reliance on hearsay. When determining whether confidential information may be employed, two questions should be asked: (1) has the government exhausted all options that might protect both its interest and the interest of the detainee?; and (2) does the use of confidential information preserve the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to defend himself? Unless both questions can be answered in the affirmative, the government should not be permitted to use confidential information.

Detainees should be provided with sufficiently detailed information about the classified evidence to permit them to respond in a meaningful way to the factual allegations against them, much as is required under the Classified Information Procedures Act.\textsuperscript{228} In addition, the government should be required to appoint lawyers with security clearances who have full access to all of the evidence, and are assigned to challenge the classified evidence on the detainee’s behalf. In addition, when periodic detention reviews are conducted,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{227} Advocates dispute whether the Supreme Court decided this issue in \textit{Hamdi}, but it remains unsettled. \textit{See Al-Marri}, 534 F.3d at 272-73 (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing the \textit{Hamdi} and \textit{Boumediene} decisions as leaving evidentiary standards and right to counsel issues to the discretion of trial courts within the framework of “the general rule . . . that al-Marri would be entitled to the normal due process protections . . . ”).

\textsuperscript{228} 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006). The statute permits the use of unclassified summaries rather than classified information, but only if will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information. § 6(c)(1). The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled somewhat analogously that in order to provide a person subject to a “control order” with a fair hearing, he must be provided with sufficiently detailed allegations to allow him to instruct his attorney on how to make a meaningful response. \textit{A & Others v. United Kingdom}, App. No. 3455/05, (February 19 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4a1b2.html. A similar standard should govern here.
\end{footnotesize}
they should include reviews of whether previously confidential information can now be disclosed, as the need for confidentiality will often wane over time.

Limiting the use of hearsay and confidential evidence, requiring disclosure of sufficiently specific allegations to permit the detainee to respond meaningfully, applying the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, and allowing detainees access to counsel would mark a significant improvement to the process previously provided to detainees. Before *Hamdi*, the Bush administration afforded the Guantánamo detainees no hearings whatsoever. After *Hamdi*, it hastily created “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,” or CSRTs, to assess whether the detainee was properly detained as an enemy combatant.

The CSRT hearings have been widely criticized, including by the Supreme Court in *Boumediene*. Detainees were not allowed the assistance of a lawyer, even where lawyers already represented them in habeas corpus proceedings at no expense to the government. The tribunals heard no live testimony, but merely reviewed documents containing hearsay, and therefore the detainees had no ability to confront witnesses. Much of the evidence reviewed was treated as confidential and not shown to the detainee, making a meaningful rebuttal literally impossible. The hearing officers were military subordinates of commanders who had already determined—without a hearing—that the detainees were enemy combatants, thus calling into question the tribunals’ impartiality.

Some argue that the CSRT hearings were at least as fair as those generally provided pursuant to Article V of the Geneva Conventions, which requires that a hearing be provided where there is doubt about a detainee’s status. But Article V hearings generally take place at or near the field of battle, and as such, are necessarily informal. Moreover, Article V’s hearings requirement was written with a more formal war in mind, where doubt about the status of a detainee is likely to be the exception, not the rule. In traditional wars, the vast majority of soldiers wear uniforms and are not likely to contest that they are

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229. Cole, supra note 5, at 41-42.
236. Brief of United States at 10, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195).
237. Id.
members of the opposing armed forces, as their status as enemy soldiers gives them prisoner-of-war protections.

The Guantánamo hearings, in contrast, generally took place years after the detainees were captured and thousands of miles away from the battlefield. This fact made it more difficult for the detainees to muster evidence in their defense—how do you call a witness from a village in Afghanistan when you are being held in Guantánamo? At the same time, the distance from the battlefield should make it feasible to provide more attributes of a fair hearing with fewer security concerns. Most importantly, in the conflict with al Qaeda, where the enemy does not wear uniforms or otherwise identify itself, detentions shrouded in doubt are the rule rather than the exception, and therefore the possibility of erroneous detentions is much higher. These difficulties do not mean that military detention should be categorically rejected. But in these circumstances, with much greater doubt about who the detainees are, fewer impediments to conducting more formal and fair hearings, and lengthy detention at stake, greater procedural protections should be required.

Congress has thus far left the regulation of enemy-combatant detentions to executive innovation. The AUMF is silent on the subject. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 prescribes procedures for war-crimes trials, but says nothing with respect to the process for assessing the propriety of detention itself. Given what is at stake, both for the detainees, who may spend years in detention, and for the United States, whose reputation has been severely damaged worldwide by its failure to accord the detainees a fair process, a statute setting forth carefully crafted and fair substantive standards and procedures for enemy-combatant detentions should be required.

Some may object that establishing such a preventive-detention authority may open the door to future military responses to organized crime, drug gangs, and terrorists generally, accompanied by preventive-detention regimes. But while the “global war on terror” invoked by the Bush administration was a rhetorical slogan, not a legal state of affairs, there is little doubt that Afghanistan is the site of an armed conflict that continues to this day. The same has never been true with respect to drugs, organized crime, or any other act of terrorism. The situations in which war will be a legitimate response to action by a nonstate actor are likely to be exceptional. In addition, the narrow definition of “enemy combatant” advocated here, limited to persons engaged in armed conflict against the United States on behalf of a specified enemy in a specific armed conflict, avoids the problems that the Bush administration’s capacious definition created.

In sum, preventive detention should be predicated on the longstanding tradition of detaining enemy fighters during an armed conflict—an extraordinary power limited to the extraordinary setting of a specific, ongoing war. The nature of the conflict with al Qaeda makes the application of the military-detention model more complicated, to be sure, but does not render it
wholly inapplicable. The critical point is that the authority to detain should rest squarely on an individual’s participation in armed conflict, a fact that can be established objectively, and not on vague notions of future danger and “suspected terrorism.” Moreover, because the proposed preventive-detention authority would be tied to war, it would be triggered only when we are in fact at war, and will not be generally applicable to conduct that the community considers dangerous, whether it be organized crime, drugs, weapons sales, or terrorism.

E. Short-Term Preventive Detention

Would a much more limited short-term preventive-detention law for terror suspects be appropriate, such as the United Kingdom’s statute authorizing 28 days of pre-charge detention for terrorism suspects? Such a tool might be responsive to the hypothetical case in which government officials have credible and reliable evidence that an individual poses a serious and imminent danger to the community, but cannot immediately make that evidence public. Such cases are likely to be extremely rare, and there are sound reasons to question whether the United States needs to introduce a new preventive-detention regime for an eventuality that is likely to arise infrequently. The more important point, however, is that were such a situation to arise, it could be adequately addressed under existing legal authority for preventive detention pending a criminal trial.

As long as the government has probable cause that an individual has committed a crime, he can be arrested. The probable cause showing, whether made ex parte in advance to a magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant, or in the post-arrest probable cause hearing required where an arrest is made without a warrant, may be based on hearsay that preserves the confidentiality of the source of the incriminating information. The Bail Reform Act then authorizes preventive detention pending trial, and while the government must generally demonstrate that the defendant poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight, it is again permitted to oppose bail on the basis of hearsay that can protect the confidentiality of the source. Moreover, the Bail Reform Act creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of pretrial detention where a defendant faces terrorism charges, and thus effectively places the burden on the


239. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) held that where police make an arrest without a warrant, they must bring the arrestee before a court for a prompt probable cause hearing. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Supreme Court interpreted Gerstein’s “promptness” requirement to mandate a hearing within forty-eight hours of arrest unless the government can establish an emergency or extraordinary circumstance justifying a delay.

240. Gerstein, 430 U.S. at 124 n.25.

defendant to establish that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.\textsuperscript{242} The Speedy Trial Act requires a prompt criminal trial, but defendants routinely waive it to allow adequate time to prepare their defense.\textsuperscript{243}

Hence, existing law should be sufficient to address the situation in which the government has confidential information establishing probable cause that an individual is engaged in imminent terrorist conduct. Moreover, if the individual is a foreign national as to whom the government has evidence of terrorist activity, the government may also be able to effectuate short-term preventive detention pending immigration proceedings—even if all the immigration detention reforms suggested above were adopted. Of course, once the time comes for a criminal trial (or a removal hearing), the government may have to reveal its sources if it seeks to use confidential evidence affirmatively against the defendant. But if it has been able to develop other incriminating evidence that can be disclosed, it has the option of not using information whose source it would prefer not to reveal.

Accordingly, the only situations that cannot be addressed adequately by the criminal justice system are those where (1) the government lacks probable cause of any criminal or immigration violation; or (2) the government cannot develop sufficient nonconfidential evidence to hold the defendant criminally liable or to establish a deportable offense. In those cases, it is not clear that there is a justifiable case for preventive detention. Given conspiracy laws, it is difficult to imagine cases where the government has reliable evidence that an individual is going to commit an imminent terrorist act, but lacks probable cause of any criminal activity. If it lacks even probable cause, society should take the risk associated with continued surveillance, as we do with all other crimes, rather than permit preventive detention. Similarly, unless we are to authorize long-term preventive detention, if the government cannot ultimately come forward with admissible evidence that the individual has committed a crime, he should be freed. The government could, of course, continue to keep a close eye on the individual, and even if no criminal trial is held, its arrest and detention may well disrupt any ongoing terrorist plot.

Because we must start with a presumption that the criminal justice system is how we deal with dangerous persons—whether terrorists, murderers, rapists, spies, or traitors—we ought not authorize preventive detention absent a strong showing that criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a compelling need to protect the community from danger. Absent such a showing, there is no reason to expand the existing short-term preventive-detention authority, which is generally limited to individuals facing criminal or immigration proceedings and posing a demonstrable threat to the community or risk of flight.

\textsuperscript{242} 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006); see generally Zabel & Benjamin, \textit{supra} note 167, at 65-75 (arguing that existing federal law permits preventive detention of defendants pending criminal trial without disclosing confidential information).

CONCLUSION

The above reforms would have at least two significant benefits. First, they would bring preventive detention out of the shadows of existing law, and subject it to a more open and accountable process. Second, they would simultaneously empower the government to employ preventive detention where it is truly necessary while limiting its ability to sweep up large numbers of people on little or no evidence of dangerousness. If all of the above reforms had been in place on 9/11—so that the government had available to it a tightly regulated preventive-detention authority but was not able to exploit existing authorities for sub rosa preventive detention without sufficient safeguards—it seems likely that fewer people would have been unnecessarily detained. Detainees would have been limited to persons as to whom there was some legitimate basis for concern, and the length of detention would have been more strictly controlled. Those detained under immigration authorities, for example, would not have been subject to preventive detention unless the government had objective evidence that they posed a terrorist threat. And many of those unnecessarily and wrongly held at Guantánamo for years might not have been detained at all. The proposed reforms would reduce the number of unnecessary detentions while ensuring that detention remains available where truly necessary. And by bringing preventive detention above board and adopting rules that apply equally to citizens and foreign nationals, the reform effort would force us to confront when preventive detention is truly justified, rather than tolerating it as an informal practice as long as it does not apply to the majority.

There remain, however, good reasons to be skeptical about preventive detention. First, if a new preventive-detention law were enacted without reform of existing laws, it would not mitigate, and might well exacerbate, the abuses experienced after 9/11. The Bush administration did successfully obtain passage of one new preventive-detention law in the wake of 9/11: Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorized detention of foreign “terror suspects” without charges for up to seven days. But perhaps because the law included such safeguards as immediate access to federal court and a strict seven-day time limit on detention without charges (adopted over the administration’s objections), the government never used it. It found that it could lock up literally thousands of foreign nationals, often for longer than seven days, by abusing existing immigration laws, obstructing detainees’ access to court, and keeping them locked up even after judges had ordered their release. If the immigration, material-witness, and material-support laws remain unchanged, government officials may continue to exploit them in future crises, rather than invoke a new preventive-detention authority that might require a stronger showing of need for detention. Thus, under no circumstances should Congress enact a preventive-detention statute unless simultaneous reforms of existing laws are included as an integral part of the package.
Second, even a narrow preventive-detention law might be criticized for “normalizing” preventive detention. The number of instances that would truly necessitate a freestanding preventive-detention law seems small. During World War II, for example, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover argued that en masse preventive detention of Japanese Americans was unnecessary because the FBI had the capability to place suspected saboteurs under surveillance and charge them with a crime if it determined that they were truly dangerous. Creating a new legal regime for such exceptional circumstances may make the very idea of preventive detention more routine and acceptable. One of the checks on preventive detention in American legal culture today is that it is still viewed as exceptional. Congress should therefore narrowly tailor any reform to underscore the exceptional character of preventive detention. Even so, the creation of such an authority inherently carries the risk of subsequent “mission creep.” In my view, requiring a showing that the criminal justice system is inadequate, and tying freestanding preventive detention to an ongoing military conflict are critical to reducing that risk. But as with the risk of terrorism itself, the risk of “mission creep” cannot be entirely eliminated.

Third, as suggested in the introduction, any preventive-detention regime inevitably presents substantial risks: we cannot predict the future; skewed incentives systematically favor erroneous detentions over erroneous releases; and preventive detention contradicts a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy—that people should be judged by their actions, not their thoughts, desires, or associations. One might reasonably conclude that these risks are so great that one should not go down this path in the first place. But in that case, one would have to show why all the preventive-detention regimes that the United States already tolerates—and that most other liberal democracies have as well—are not equally illegitimate. I have sought to show that the unifying principle underlying legitimate preventive detention is that it is permissible only upon a strong showing that the criminal justice system cannot address a serious danger to the community.

Concerns about preventive detention are considerable, and I do not mean to minimize them. Reasonable people could conclude that we ought to oppose preventive detention wherever it appears. But my own sense is that the camel’s nose is already under the tent. Opportunities for de facto and sub rosa preventive detention already exist in current law, and the aftermath of 9/11 provides a blueprint for how the government can exploit them again if we do nothing.

If we are to learn lessons from our mistakes, then, we would do well to confront the issue of preventive detention directly. That would require amending existing laws to preclude their abuse for unjustified preventive-

detention purposes. But it might also include crafting a carefully circumscribed preventive-detention authority outside the criminal justice system for those engaged in an ongoing military conflict. Such a regime would be justified along roughly the same lines that preventive detention of prisoners of war in a traditional international armed conflict is justified. Because there are salient differences between traditional state-to-state conflicts and military conflicts with nonstate actors, however, the rules need to be more circumscribed in the latter context. In a conflict with a nonstate actor, there is no per se bar on criminalizing the enemy’s engagement in the conflict. At the same time, there is likely to be greater doubt about the identity of the enemy, a much longer and more nebulous conflict, and an ability on the part of detained individuals to choose to abandon the fight.

These differences require modification of existing rules, but do not, in my view, eliminate entirely an appropriate role for military preventive detention in ongoing conflicts. Moreover, if we insist that the rule of law knows no place for detention of those actively fighting against the state in a military conflict, we may unwittingly encourage the state to take matters into its own hands, outside any legal limits—much as the Bush administration did.

What is most critical is that any preventive-detention regime be justified as military detention, a concept with fairly well-established parameters, and not as detention of “suspected terrorists,” a new and potentially capacious category that poses substantial risks of unjustified expansion. These are difficult judgments. But in the end, if we were to succeed in bringing preventive detention out of the shadows in the ways I have suggested, subjecting it to careful controls, we might advance our liberty, our security, and our democracy.