1973

The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence

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62 Geo. L.J. 125-173 (1973)

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THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN*

The Supreme Court has approved a uniform code of evidence for all federal courts. Amendments to the Supreme Court's rules are now pending in the House of Representatives. From the point of view of a specialist in the law of evidence, Professor Rothstein analyzes the differences between the Supreme Court's proposals and the House amendments and suggests solutions to these conflicts.

On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States approved for use in virtually all federal court proceedings a uniform set of evidence rules¹ to take effect July 1, 1973, unless vetoed within 90 days of transmittal to Congress.² The rules were the product of seven years of drafting by a distinguished, Supreme Court-appointed Advisory Committee,³ which in the course of its work produced two well-circulated drafts⁴ and received and considered numerous comments from persons involved in nearly every area of court-related law.

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¹ Order, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972); see RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Fed. R. Evid. (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972)].

² The rules were transmitted to Congress on February 5, 1973, and some authorities believed that, pursuant to the 90-day provisions of the enabling statutes, congressional power to veto the rules would expire on May 6, 1973, although the rules would be implemented only as of July 1, 1973. H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973); see 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (rules governing district court criminal proceedings); 28 id. § 2072 (rules governing civil actions); id. § 2075 (rules governing bankruptcy proceedings); cf. 18 id. § 3402 (rules governing criminal proceedings before magistrates and appeals therefrom; no provision for congressional consideration).

³ The panel was the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence appointed by the Chief Justice in March 1965 at the direction of the Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. §§31 (1970). The committee chairman was the well-known Illinois trial attorney and Warren Commission counsel Albert Jenner, who had participated in drafting the Uniform Rules of Evidence as a longtime Commissioner on Uniform State Laws. The panel also included Judges Simon Sobeloff, Joe Estes, and Robert Van Pelt; Professors (now federal judges) Jack Weinstein and Charles Joiner; Professor Thomas Green; Herman Selvin, father of the pioneering California Evidence Code; former chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Appeals Division, Robert Erdahl; and famed litigators David Berger, Egbert Haywood, Frank Raichle, Craig Spangenberg, Edward Bennett Williams, and the late Hicks Epton. The reporter was Professor Edward Cleary.

Believing 90 days was too short a period in which to consider this complex and far-reaching body of evidence rules, Congress passed legislation in March 1973 requiring express congressional approval before the Rules could have any force or effect. Congress believed that an evidence code would affect fundamental matters of civil and criminal justice that reach beyond technical courtroom conduct and into the lives of citizens. In addition, many lawyers, preferring case-by-case development of the law, questioned the desirability of any evidence code.

On June 28, 1973, after conducting hearings, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice proposed amendments to the Supreme Court Draft. While leaving most provisions of the Rules

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9 See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 144 (testimony of Justice Arthur Goldberg); id. at 200-02, 208-10 (testimony of Robert Clare, Jr.); id. at 214-16 (statement of a committee of New York trial lawyers); id. at 246-65 (testimony and statement of former Chief Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); id. at 219-20 (letter from former Chief Judge Henry Friendly to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Judicial Conference, Mar. 31, 1970). Prior to appointment of the Advisory Committee, the desirability of a unified body of evidence rules for federal courts was indicated by a study performed for the Judicial Conference. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79 (1961).
9 See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7.
10 SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (Comm. Print June 28, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Changes]. The committee amendments, without the notes, have been published in the Congressional Record. 119 Cong. Rec. H5452 (daily ed. June 26, 1973). The Subcommittee formerly was known as the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. Despite its name, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction comprises both civil and criminal aspects of the rules.
intact, the amendments contemplate a major change respecting privileges and less extensive revisions in several other areas. The amendments also propose a few minor language changes, primarily intended to produce greater clarity or consistency. In many instances the Subcommittee substantially reverted to positions which had been adopted by the Advisory Committee in earlier drafts but dropped under pressure from influential "law and order" proponents. Although the Subcommittee should have made several additional changes and clarifications not requiring major policy reconsideration, this article discusses only those rules substantially affected by the proposed amendments.

11 See, e.g., Proposed Changes rule 104, supra note 10, at 6 (absolute right of accused to have preliminary matters heard out of hearing of jury; not merely "where justice demands"); id. rule 902(8), at 35 (acknowledgment by a notary, making a document self-authenticating, must be in "manner provided by law" rather than "under hand and seal"); id. rule 1001, at 36 ("photographs" broadened expressly to include videotapes).

In addition, several comments of the Subcommittee are significant although no textual changes would be made. See, e.g., Proposed Changes rule 405 (b), Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 10 (cases will be rare when character truly in issue so as to make evidence of specific conduct admissible); id. rule 902 (9), Subcomm. Note, at 35 (specifies what is meant by "the general commercial law" making commercial paper self-authenticating); id. rule 1003, Subcomm. Note, at 36 (courts should be persuaded easily that a "genuine issue" concerning authenticity exists so that duplicates may not come in easily); id. rule 1004, Subcomm. Note, at 37 (for purposes of best evidence rule, documents lost or destroyed by proponent include those lost or destroyed at his direction).


13 For example, rule 103 (d) defines plain error using the same term, "substantial rights," as is used in the definition of harmless error in the federal procedural rules. This invites the confusion that error is both prejudicial and plain if it affects substantial rights, and harmless if it does not, and thus that there is no prejudicial error that is not also plain error. Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 103 (d) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (a)-(b).

Rule 613, prescribing the foundation for former statements of witnesses, is ambiguous as to whether the opportunity to explain, deny, or challenge the statement must be accorded prior to the introduction of the statement. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 613 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Furthermore, clarification is needed in the related area of the foundation required for bias impeachment. Schmerz & Czapasik, Bias Impeachment and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 Geo. L.J. 257, 265-70 (1972).

An additional change in the Rules is needed in Article VII which relates to expert testimony. Article VII dispenses with the requirement of showing the basis of an expert's testimony in direct examination and dispenses with the necessity for the hypothetical question. The cross-examiner may bring out the basis on cross-examination but rarely will attempt to do so without the advance preparation which formerly was afforded, in part, by the direct examination. Because the onus of investigation is thus on the opponent of the expert and because in criminal procedure discovery is minimal, provision should be made for discovery and notice respecting the expert. Civil discovery also may be inadequate to prepare a challenge. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 701-06 (Supreme
Privilege

The Rules as approved by the Supreme Court prescribe an exclusive list of carefully defined privileges for all federal court proceedings, civil and criminal, diversity and federal question. The Subcommittee's proposed amendments, however, would eliminate this list of privileges and, depending on the claim or defense involved, instead would apply either state law or a federal law of privileges to be developed on a case-by-case basis. Because the Supreme Court Draft provides more affirmative guidance on difficult policy questions and unifies federal evidence law, its approach is more useful than that of the proposed amendments.

Several ambiguities exist in the Rules at present. See, e.g., Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 407, 408, 411 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (varying terms for similar thoughts); id. 801(d)(2) (applicability of predecessor-in-interest rule); id. 801(d), 803, 804 (applicability of opinion rule to out-of-court statements); id. 802, 801(d), 803, 804 (relation of personal knowledge rule to out-of-court declarants); id. 801(d), 803, 804, 901-03, 1001-08 (applicability to out-of-court statements of authentication and best evidence requirements); id. 803(6)-(7), 901-03, 1001-08 (relation among authentication and best evidence rules, the business records exception to hearsay rule, and the Federal Business Records Acts); id. 403, 801(d), 803, 804 (relation of probative-prejudice balancing rule to out-of-court statements). See Understanding the Rules, supra at 28-29, 77, 108, 114-16, 121-22.

Because as complete a definition as practicable of the scope of federal privileges ought to be provided, the general provision in the Supreme Court Draft defining the word “privilege” in the evidentiary context should be retained. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The provisions dealing with disclosures under compulsion and with jury instructions and comments upon invocation also should remain. See id. 512, 513.

Further, rule 511 concerning waiver of privileges also should be retained, but one flaw must be corrected. See id. 511. The rule presently provides that a privilege is waived if a voluntary non-privileged disclosure of otherwise privileged information is made. Thus, if the privilege holder tells the secret not only to his psychotherapist or clergyman, but also to his mother, father, or spouse, the privilege can be waived. Communications to the mother, father, or spouse ought to be regarded as facilitative of the communication to the psychotherapist or clergyman and should not constitute waiver. Either rule 511 or the privilege rules themselves should be altered to protect such facilitative communications. See generally Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 70-71.

Another criticism of rule 511 is unfounded. A state secret leaked to the press would not still remain privileged. Although voluntary disclosure is provided as one kind of waiver, the converse, that the privilege remains if disclosure is involuntary, does not follow. Further, rule 509, the state secrets privilege, states that only a "secret" is privileged.
Consequently, although certain changes should be made in the Supreme Court Draft before final adoption, its general format should be retained.

Evidentiary privileges clearly affect conduct outside the courtroom and touch matters of state policy. Nonetheless, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in *Hanna v. Plumer,* the Advisory Committee did not feel compelled to provide for deference to state law, even in diversity cases. The Advisory Committee, while recognizing that some forum shopping and infringement of state policies might result from a divergence between federal and state privilege law, concluded that adverse effects in these areas would be minimal and more than compensated by the value of having uniform rules in federal courts.

The Supreme Court Draft recognizes only nine specifically defined privileges. Conspicuous by their absence are several well-known privileges. The Supreme Court Draft does not contain a general physician-patient privilege, but only a psychotherapist-patient privilege. There is no spousal communications privilege in any kind of case, and the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is confined to criminal cases. In addition, the Supreme Court Draft lacks any provision for a journalist's privilege. Some critics contend that these privileges are desirable or at least ought to be recognized in federal courts where recognized by state law. Others, raising a broader question, urge that greater deference be accorded state privilege law across-the-board.

The Subcommittee's proposed amendments, which were intended to eliminate the problems detected in the Supreme Court Draft, actually sidestep many of them. Rather than a list of specific privileges prescribed for all federal court proceedings, the amendments would provide that

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19 Id. But see *Krattenmaker,* supra note 14, at 101-17.
20 Article V consists of a privilege for those reports required under state or federal statute, when that statute grants a privilege (rule 502); a lawyer-client communications privilege (rule 503); a psychotherapist-patient communications privilege (rule 504); a privilege of an accused to prevent his spouse from testifying against him in a criminal proceeding (rule 505); a privilege covering communications to clergymen (rule 506); a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of one's lawful vote (rule 507); a trade secrets privilege (rule 508); a privilege covering secrets of state and other official information (rule 509); and a privilege covering the identity of an informer (rule 510). *Proposed Fed. R. Evid.* art. V (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Article V also provides for additional privileges if required by the Constitution, an act of Congress, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Id. 501.
21 See *Krattenmaker,* supra note 14, at 101-17.
state privilege law govern in civil cases "with respect to a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision" and that common law principles "interpreted in the light of reason and experience" govern privileges in all other federal actions.

In addition to requiring, unwisely, that both state and federal evidence law be applied in a single case, the amendments could introduce an unfortunate distinction between ultimate and mediate facts.

The Supreme Court Draft's list of carefully defined privileges clearly is the better approach. Whatever its flaws, the Supreme Court Draft at least attempts to grapple with the issues and provide clear-cut answers regarding difficult policy questions. Sufficient experience has been accumulated concerning evidence questions to permit definite choices in most areas, including privilege. Having a clear and easily located body of law for uniform use in all federal courts is necessary if evidentiary questions in the hurly-burly of daily litigation are to be handled soundly, expeditiously, and without protracted appeals. Infringement of state policies, difficulties encountered by lawyers practicing in both state and federal courts, and forum shopping, can be minimized if the federal privilege rules are drawn in general accord with the policies behind pre-

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This practice often seems at variance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide that state law should be rejected on evidence questions if it is more restrictive respecting admissibility than federal statute or former federal equity practice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (a).

24 Proposed Changes rule 501, supra note 10, at 12. The "common law . . . reason . . . experience" standard is, under present rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, applicable to all evidentiary questions in federal criminal cases. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26. The proposed amendments would limit this standard to questions of privilege but extend it beyond criminal cases to federal claims or defenses in civil cases.

25 Similar difficulties are presented by identical language in the proposed amendment to rule 601 regarding incompetencies. See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text.

26 See note 72 infra. Ambiguity inherent in the language "supplies the rule of decision" also may create difficulties. See note 73 infra.

27 The present sources of evidence law are cumbersome, unlikely to produce uniformity, often fail to provide an answer, and place a premium on a lawyer's experience in practice in the particular locale of the trial. Moreover, federal appeals judges should not be required to achieve expertise in the law of each state comprising their circuit. Disuniformity among federal courts also hinders the practice of assigning federal judges to sit away from their home jurisdiction. See generally Degnan, *The Law of Federal Evidence Reform*, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 275 (1962); Green, *Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence*, 52 Cornell L.Q. 177 (1967); Orfield, *Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence*, 67 Dick. L. Rev. 381 (1963); Weinstein, supra note 22.
vailing state privileges where such policies seem at all justifiable. Moreover, divergence between state and federal law will diminish as states imitate the federal rules.28

The Supreme Court Draft should be revised in several respects to conform more closely to privilege policies prevailing in the states. The spousal communications privilege,29 found in nearly every state, should be reinstated. While this privilege actually may not encourage communication between husband and wife, it probably is reflective of another justifiable policy concern—popular revulsion at the disclosure of such confidences.30 The adverse spousal testimony privilege,31 which does appear in the Supreme Court Draft,32 should be retained in modified form.

28 It is reasonable to expect that federal evidence rules will be widely copied by the states, as were the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 1B J. Moore & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.504, at 5041 & n.10 (2d ed. 1965); cf. Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 64-65 (Supreme Court Draft privilege rules so inconsistent and without underlying rationale that they will not provide model that states will copy). Three states already have adopted evidence rules patterned after drafts of the proposed federal rules. See Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 4, ch. 47-52 (1971); New Mexico Rules of Evidence, 84 N.M. xi, xi-cxxi (1973); Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, West 1973 Wis. Legislative Serv. 131.

29 This privilege covers communications of a confidential nature between husband and wife. It covers communications whether introduced for or against a spouse and can be applied to any form of evidence of the spousal communication, whether or not either spouse is a party to the litigation or is asked to testify. The privilege, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, usually is limited to communications made during the marriage but continues even after the marriage has ended. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (dictum). See generally Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 143-45 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849 (1945); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1943); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 227 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, in Symposium—Evidentiary Privileges, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208 (1961).

30 This privilege covers testimony given by one spouse against the other, regardless of whether the subject matter of the testimony is a communication. This privilege generally is applied only in criminal cases and only when the spouse is a party in the litigation and the testimony is adverse to the spouse. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 252, 526-31 (1960); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75-79 (1958); United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ch. 79 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, supra note 29.


If properly drawn, it will serve a valid function in preserving marital harmony and in according respect to the popular aversion to testimony by one spouse against the other. The Supreme Court Draft, however, in assigning the privilege to the defendant spouse rather than the testifying spouse, permits a defendant to prevent his spouse, who may wish to testify, from so doing. Normally a spouse's willingness to testify bespeaks an absence of the marital harmony the privilege seeks to protect. Moreover, the community's sense of justice is unlikely to be offended if such testimony is admitted, provided the testimony does not concern a marital confidence protected by the marital communications privilege. Consequently, there is little reason to suppress this testimony and deprive the court of relevant evidence.8

The Supreme Court Draft also should be amended to include a general physician-patient privilege.34 This privilege, some form of which exists in 43 states and the District of Columbia,85 probably does aid the flow of complete and accurate information from patient to doctor. Although the Advisory Committee was un receptive to a privilege so extensively riddled with exceptions,86 protection of the physician-patient relationship is sufficiently widespread to warrant inclusion in the Rules.8

33 Rule 505 provides several exceptions to the adverse spousal testimony privilege. Id. 505(c). These exceptions are not drawn in accord with any rational policy objective of the privilege. See generally Rothstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony in the Light of its Purpose, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189 (1963).

34 Rule 504 of the Supreme Court Draft provides only a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but defines psychotherapist broadly so as to include not only psychiatrists and psychologists, but also ordinary physicians while treating mental or emotional conditions. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504(a) (2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The drafters do not consider the possibility that there is a mental or emotional aspect or sequela to all illnesses.35


36 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). An additional reason advanced for retention of only a psychotherapist-patient privilege was the greater need for protection of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. A man would be foolish not to communicate freely with the person who is going to prescribe medication or operate, but a privilege may be necessary to encourage the free communication required for successful psychiatric treatment. Id. A privilege also may be required to get a person to seek psychiatric treatment in the first place. See also Louisell & Sinclair, Reflection on the Law of Privileged Communications—The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Perspective, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 51-53 (1971).
Forum shopping, conflict with state policy, and other difficulties engendered by divergence between state and federal law, can be minimized if an effort is made to identify and codify the most frequent exceptions to the privilege.

Although not related to conformity with state policy, several changes should be made in the attorney-client privilege of the Supreme Court Draft. First, rule 503(b) should be revised to provide clearly that in situations involving more than one attorney and client, a client may prevent disclosure of responses made by an attorney representing another interested party that inferentially reveal the client's communication. Second, uncommunicated opinions in a lawyer's file also should be protected. Third, rule 503(c) should be amended to make clear that an attorney may claim the privilege on behalf of his client, even if the communication was made to a different attorney previously representing the client. Fourth, the exception for consultations in furtherance of crime or fraud should be expanded to include clear torts. Fifth, rule 503 should provide guidance regarding stockholder access to communications between the corporation and its lawyers. Finally, the definition of lawyer in

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37 The rule presently provides that in such situations, only communications "by" the client are privileged, instead of communications "between" the lawyer and the client, as is stated for the single attorney situation. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Through use of the word "by," the rule apparently seeks to avoid the situation in which, after a joint conference, a client is prevented by the privilege claims of the other clients from disclosing his own statements or those of his attorney. See id. Advisory Comm. Note. As the rule stands, a client's only hope, respecting the problem in text, is to argue that a response by another attorney is "evidence" of a communication "by" the client, much as testimony about it or a document containing it would be, and that the response therefore should be suppressed under the privilege.

38 Such documents might be protected independently of the evidence rules by the work product privilege. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). However, the attorney-client privilege often will be the only recourse. To apply the rule as presently drafted to this situation requires the sometimes difficult argument that the uncommunicated material contains or evidences a prior communication of the client. Unless explicit coverage is enacted, the attorney-client privilege may not fully encourage disclosure to an attorney, and on occasion the quality of legal services could be affected.

39 The rule presently provides that the "person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim the privilege." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The inference thus arises that the attorney at trial cannot claim the privilege for his client if he was not the attorney when the communication was made.

40 See id. 503(d)(1). Whether or not this exception is expanded, a procedure should be enacted for determining whether a consultation was unlawful.

41 An express exception to the privilege might be provided when a stockholder is involved in litigation on behalf of the corporation or represents a class owning a majority of the shares of the corporation. See 45 Tul. L. Rev. 1063 (1971). Contra, Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 316-19 (1969).
rule 503(a)(2) should be expanded to include the new professional corporation law firm. Drafting problems similar to the preceding ones in the attorney-client rule, are present in some of the other privilege provisions.42

A journalists' privilege should not appear in the federal evidence rules even though some form of this privilege is desirable.48 Instead, separate federal legislation should be enacted, mandating the privilege for both

Specific guidance also could be provided on the difficult issue of distinguishing legal communications from business communications when the corporation's attorney is also on the board of directors or otherwise involved in management or ownership.

Further, the Supreme Court Draft permits an extremely liberal test as to what are lawyer-client communications in the corporate context; by one interpretation communications of a legal nature by any employee to the corporation's lawyer would be privileged. Because the work-product principle provides sufficient protection for such employee communications, a more restrictive lawyer-client privilege is preferable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See also Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424 (1970).

42 The problem of uncommunicated opinions also arises in rule 504, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, with respect to notations made and filed by a psychiatrist, not communicated to the patient, and not directly regarding a communication from the patient. Such opinions would not be privileged unless they embody or evidence a patient communication. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); cf. note 38 supra and accompanying text. A general physician-patient privilege, if adopted, would have to be broad enough to cover the various kinds of hospital records that are, arguably at least, neither communications nor uncommunicated opinions. In some cases these extensions of the privilege would foster the seeking of professional help, full disclosure, and more informed medical services.

The trade secrets privilege, rule 508, also reflects poor drafting. By one interpretation that privilege is not available to corporations, who most need the protection. Corporations are not included explicitly among those who may hold the privilege, as they are in rule 502, defining the holder of the required reports privilege, and in rule 503(a)(1), defining the holder of the attorney-client privilege. Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 508 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) with id. 502 and id. 503(a)(1). The trade secrets privilege also should specify that licensees of a trade secret can invoke the privilege.

The communications to clergymen privilege, rule 506, presently covers only communications by the penitent, not communications between clergyman and penitent. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Thus, the drafting raises the problem of revealing inferentially the penitent's communication through compelled disclosure of the clergyman's response. Cf. note 37 supra and accompanying text.

43 This judgment involves consideration of the extent to which (1) the media are necessary to watchdog other institutions, (2) the media have been effectively performing without privilege, (3) privilege encourages sources to give information or misinformation, and (4) government informants and media informants are comparable. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, Uniform Reporters' Privilege Act (First Tentative Draft, 1973). The Supreme Court has held that a general journalists' privilege is not required constitutionally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Nevertheless, as of 1970, 19 jurisdictions had some form of journalists' privilege. See Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 368 (testimony of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317, 321 n.15 (1970).
If a journalists' privilege is to encourage prospective informants in this day of multi-jurisdictional events and media, it must assure confidentiality in all jurisdictions.

The privileges accorded the Government and corporations in the Supreme Court Draft are significantly broader than the narrowly defined personal privileges. The overly sweeping protection granted the Government in the Supreme Court Draft for "secrets of state" and "official information" resulted from late changes by the Advisory Committee. If the rule granting this protection is retained, the category of official information should be removed since the secrets of state privilege sufficiently protects the Government. The Supreme Court Draft also should be altered to require the Government, in asserting the state secrets privilege, to show more than a reasonable likelihood that evidence would reveal "a governmental secret relating to . . . national defense or
international relations.” A better standard would require a showing of reasonable likelihood that disclosure would be detrimental or injurious to national defense or international relations. Procedurally, the Government should not be able to require that its arguments and showings on the issue of privilege be made in camera; rather, a judge should order in camera proceedings only if justice so requires.

The identity-of-informer privilege should be amended to exclude informers to legislative committees and their staffs. Moreover, the identity of informers to law enforcement agencies should be protected only if the informer furnishes information purporting to reveal a violation of law, not just, as under the Supreme Court Draft, “information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of law.” Additionally, the circumstances should be expanded in which a judge is required to enter an order favorable to a private party who is foreclosed from obtaining information by the government’s privilege.

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61 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Moreover, “due regard” apparently is to be accorded the executive’s classification of the information. See id. 509, Advisory Comm. Note.
62 See id. 509(a) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971).
63 As used in the Rules, an in-camera proceeding is an ex parte proceeding held in secret. See id. 509(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
64 This limitation should apply as well to rule 510, the identity-of-informers privilege. Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(c), 510(c)(2) & (3) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) with id. 509(b), 510(c)(3) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). Because government officials may exaggerate the need for secrecy and be more solicitous of their own immediate concerns than of the broad spectrum of societal concerns, it is difficult to see how a court, without some form of party confrontation, can determine fairly whether the privilege should be applied. The Supreme Court Draft should be altered to provide explicitly that an in-camera proceeding shall be held only when the judge determines that such a procedure is necessary to protect the state secret or the informant’s identity and that unfairness will not result to the private party. Moreover, the judge should have the power, if warranted by the circumstances, to reveal to a private party matters disclosed in camera, regardless of the contrary wishes of the Government. But see id. 509(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (such power explicitly denied).

Whereas earlier drafts were silent, the Supreme Court Draft rule respecting state secrets provides that the judge may not penetrate the secret to resolve the privilege issue. Id. 509(c). In United States v. Reynolds the Court held out the possibility that such penetration might be permissible under appropriate circumstances. 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953).
65 Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 510(a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) with id. (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). This additional guarantee of confidentiality to potential committee informants probably will not result in significantly more information reaching legislative bodies. Grants of immunity probably are the significant tool in this area.
66 Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 510(a) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) with id. (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). The expanded provision of the Supreme Court Draft is unlikely to pay dividends sufficient to justify such a broad bar to ascertainment of truth.
67 See id. 510(c)(2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). This rule provides that an order in favor of a private party (for example, establishing a litigated fact or dismissing
The Supreme Court Draft eliminates all witness incompetencies other than those of judges, jurors, and persons lacking personal knowledge. Gone are the incompetencies of children, dead men, mental defectives, drug- and alcohol-impaired persons, spouses, and atheists, which join other incompetencies rejected at an earlier stage of our legal history. Moreover, as in the case of privileges, the competency a case may be entered on a showing of reasonable probability that the informer can give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence in a criminal case, or of a material issue in a civil case. Id. The material issue test should be applied in both civil and criminal cases, since it is a fairer standard and comes closer to the one provided in the leading case on the subject. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (disclosure of informer's identity permitted where "relevant and helpful to defense . . . or essential to fair determination"). An earlier draft applied the material issue test to both civil and criminal cases. See Proposed Fed. R. Evd. 510(c) (2) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971). In addition, it should be sufficient that "circumstances indicate" the reasonable probability, without an affirmative showing.

See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 505-09 (3d ed. 1940).


While the total incompetency of a witness to testify in any case involving his spouse no longer exists, lesser spousal incompetencies have persisted in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948); Zakrzewski v. Zakrzewski, 237 Mich. 459, 212 N.W. 80 (1927); In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); Espana v. Espana, 382 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 600-20 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1952).


For example, incompetencies based on conviction of crime and on an interest in the outcome have been abrogated widely. See McCormick, supra note 30, §§ 61-65;
rules of the Supreme Court Draft make no provision for deference to state law, even in diversity cases.\(^6\)

As one of two important changes, the Subcommittee's proposed amendments would provide that state competency law govern in civil cases "with respect to a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision . . . ." \(^7\) This language unwisely requires application of a dual body of evidence law in cases involving both state and federal claims or defenses.\(^7\) The application of a dual body of evidence law would have its worst effects in, for example, a case involving joined federal antitrust and state unfair competition claims, where a witness might be competent to testify concerning only the antitrust claim even though the same testimony bears on both claims. These problems are compounded by ambiguities inherent in the words "with respect to" \(^7\) and

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Rowley, *The Competency of Witnesses*, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 482, 496 (1939). Of course these considerations of capacity may play a role in the jury's assessment of credibility. But see Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 610 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (evidence of religious beliefs or opinions not admissible to impugn or enhance credibility). In an extreme case, these considerations also might prompt a court to exercise its general authority to exclude substantially worthless, misleading, or prejudicial evidence. See id. 401.


The language of the witness competency amendment risks introducing difficulties posed by similar language in rule 302 of the Supreme Court Draft, which provides that state law is to determine the effect of a presumption "respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision . . . ." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 302 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Lesser, or "tactical," presumptions are always governed by federal law. Id. 302, Advisory Comm. Note. Thus, the rule quite unwisely necessitates an inquiry into whether the presumption relates to an element (ultimate fact) or to a lesser (mediate) fact. This unfortunate distinction which frequently is difficult to draw, can be illustrated by a plaintiff's attempt to apply a presumption under state law concerning regular business procedures. Specifically, he may wish to prove that his letter accepting the defendant's offer was mailed by showing that he placed it in his office out-basket for mailing. The act of mailing the letter would be an ultimate fact only if it establishes acceptance, an element of the plaintiff's claim. If his acceptance is not complete on mailing, but rather on receipt by the offeror, the act
in the words "supplies the rule of decision." 73

Although the best solution would be to apply federal evidence law in all federal cases, an intermediate yet satisfactory solution exists. State evidence law might be applied across-the-board in cases wherein the only ground for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, while federal evidence law might be applied in pure federal question cases. 74 In those instances where both diversity and federal question jurisdiction exists, the evidence law applicable to the entire case might be determined on the basis of whether state or federal issues predominate.

In another important change, the Subcommittee's proposed amendments would broaden significantly the competency of a juror in an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment in which he participated. Returning to the language of earlier drafts, 75 the Subcommittee would permit a juror to testify or give affidavit with regard to all matters except his or another juror's mental or emotional processes. 76 Under the Supreme Court Draft, which itself may be too broad, a juror can testify or give an affidavit concerning extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the attention of the jury or an outside influence of mailing the letter probably is only a mediate fact. Even in cases involving only state claims and defenses, a dual body of evidence law would be applicable, for presumptions of mediate facts always are controlled by federal law under the Supreme Court Draft. Id.

The proposed amendments to the privilege and competency rules do not incorporate expressly the ultimate-mediate distinction. The language refers only to a "claim or defense" and not to an element thereof. Proposed Changes rules 501, 601, supra note 10, at 12, 19. Nonetheless, there is danger that the courts might borrow the distinction from the presumption rule in determining whether a privilege or competency is "with respect to" a state claim or defense. The mere elimination of the reference to elements is insufficient to preclude the application of the ultimate-mediate distinction to such questions.


74 The approach advocated here should be applied to presumptions, as well as to privileges and competency. The Advisory Committee concludes that under the Erie doctrine, state law must govern certain presumptions. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In disputably, a presumption has a greater effect on the complexion of a right or obligation than does a privilege or competency. Thus, there is more justification, and perhaps more need, for some deference to state presumption law. That need, when balanced with the federal interest in a single body of evidence law for each case, is met sufficiently if the application of state law is limited to diversity cases. See Hanna v. Plumer, supra.

75 See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971); id. 6-06(b) (Prelim. Draft Mar. 1969).

76 Proposed Changes rule 606(b), supra note 10, at 20.
improperly brought to bear on a juror. The Subcommittee’s approach is antithetical to the smooth functioning of the jury system and conflicts with the traditional policy justifications for juror incompetency—the encouragement of full and frank jury deliberations and the avoidance of juror harassment, annoyance, and reprisals. Furthermore, although a number of jurisdictions do apply a more liberal standard than that of the Supreme Court Draft, only California’s standard seems so expansive as to permit testimony on all matters other than mental and emotional processes.

Presumptions Against the Accused in Criminal Cases

The Supreme Court Draft, in prescribing the effect of statutory and common law presumptions in civil and criminal proceedings, distinguishes between one general and two special classes of presumptions. The general class, which consists of presumptions affecting federal claims and defenses in civil cases, presumptions affecting mediate factual propositions involved in state claims and defenses, and presumptions favoring the accused in criminal cases, places the burden of persuasion on the party against whom the presumption operates. Presumptions directly affecting elements of state claims and defenses in civil cases fall within one special class and are governed by state law. The other special class consists of presumptions against the accused in federal criminal cases. These are circumscribed by a prohibition against directing a finding of fact against the accused, and, in addition, their submission to the jury is not mandatory. Further, the Supreme Court Draft accords little effect to these presumptions, and no effect when the court con-

77 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 606 (b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). It may be unwise to render jurors competent to testify concerning extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jury’s attention. Such a rule might render verdicts subject to challenge on grounds that a news report came to the jury’s attention. This may permit juror harassment or threats by dissatisfied litigants seeking to obtain statements impeaching the verdict. In contrast, juror competency concerning threats and similar outside influences under the Supreme Court Draft does serve the important function of discouraging such threats or harassments.

78 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).


80 See generally Understanding the Rules, supra note 13, at 13-18.

81 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 301 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).

82 Id. 302.

83 See id. 303.

84 See id. 303 (b).

85 The only effect of a presumption under the Supreme Court Draft is to invoke the
cludes that, on the evidence presented, the trier of fact reasonably cannot perceive a rational connection between the fact or facts giving rise to the presumption and the presumed fact. This test exceeds the restrictions heretofore endorsed by the Supreme Court. Although Congress may be displeased by the limited effect given to statutory presumptions, the restrictions prescribed by the Supreme Court Draft are in harmony with Anglo-American notions of fairness in criminal cases.

The Subcommittee's proposed amendments would remove from the Rules all criminal presumptions and leave that subject to separate legislation now pending before the Senate. Even if this separate legislation were not deficient in certain respects, codifying the entire law of presumptions in the federal evidence rules would be preferable. Certain changes proposed by this legislation might be incorporated in the proposed amendments if necessary to gain congressional adoption of the Rules.

rather mild instruction required by rule 303(c), which in most instances would be given anyway. Rule 303(c) provides that when the existence of a presumed fact is to be decided by the jury, the judge must instruct them that the presumed fact may, but need not, be found. If the presumed fact is an ultimate one, the judge also must instruct that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 303(c).

The Supreme Court has held that a statutory presumption is acceptable if a reasonable factual basis for the presumption existed before the legislature, not necessarily in the evidence before the jury. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); cf. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). See generally CLARK BOARDMAN FEDERAL PRACTICE SERIES, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (P. Rothstein ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Rothstein on Rules].

S. 1 fails to insure that findings of fact will not be directed against the accused since it contains no specific prohibition and since it applies only to statutory presumptions (and probably only those pertaining to ultimate facts), thus leaving common law and mediate fact presumptions unregulated. S. 1 also is defective because it applies a reasonable doubt standard to all presumptions, not just to presumptions of ultimate facts and presumptions against the accused. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201(h) (1973); see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 87, at 3-4.

An acceptable alternative would be to place the provisions dealing with civil and criminal presumptions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure respectively. However, this would entail unnecessary duplication since criminal presumptions in favor of the accused and civil presumptions presumably should be treated alike.

For instance, submission to the jury, when a reasonable juror could find the presumed fact, might be made mandatory, if the rather slim effect given statutory presump-
The Supreme Court Draft provision respecting presumptions against the criminal accused should be amended to delete the distinction between questions of presumed ultimate fact and questions of presumed mediate fact. Under the rule, the standards for submission of a presumed fact to the jury and for instructing the jury depend upon this distinction. Difficulties in administering this distinction are inevitable, as most judges, lawyers, and juries will find it difficult to comprehend. Moreover, the confusing distinction is unnecessary, since the same result as under the rule would ensue if the ordinary rules governing sufficiency of evidence and burden of proof were applied to presumptions. The presumption rule merely should provide for submission to the jury whenever such would be warranted in the absence of a presumption, and provide for

A distinction between statutory standards purporting to define prima facie cases and those purporting to create presumptions also might be inserted in the Supreme Court Draft. The Supreme Court Draft treats both as presumptions. In contrast, both S. 1 and the Brown Commission Report contain specific provisions prescribing the effect of prima facie standards: submission to the jury is not mandatory but only warranted and there is to be no instruction attributing any special weight to the facts constituting the prima facie case. An instruction somewhat stronger than that authorized by rule 303(c) of the Supreme Court Draft would be required in the case of presumptions. See S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201(h) (1973); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 87, at 4. While introducing unnecessary complexity into the trial and appeal of criminal cases, a distinction may accurately reflect congressional intent behind the legislative prescription of prima facie cases.


Id. 303(b). Ultimate facts are submitted only when a reasonable juror could find the fact beyond a reasonable doubt; mediate facts are submitted where there is substantial evidence. Id. The Advisory Committee may have included the provision to create a uniform standard regarding motions for judgment of acquittal. At the time the Supreme Court Draft was written, three distinct views concerning when it is appropriate to direct an acquittal were extant in the federal courts. This now may have been reduced to two, for the Second Circuit recently has joined the majority position. Compare United States v. Brown, 436 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970) (directed acquittal when reasonable juror could not find prosecution's case proved beyond a reasonable doubt; majority view) with United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944) (directed acquittal when reasonable juror could not find prosecution's case proved by a preponderance of the evidence); overruled, United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972) and with Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788 (8th Cir. 1915) (directed acquittal when there is no substantial evidence of facts excluding every hypothesis but that of guilt). However, an evidentiary provision should not be used as a backdoor vehicle of such reform. A more appropriate and effective mandate could be inserted in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 201(h) (1973).

Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 303(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The jury is instructed that presumed ultimate facts cannot be found unless the jury is convinced of them beyond a reasonable doubt, but presumed mediate facts simply may or may not be found, with no specification of the degree of persuasion required. Id.
a mandatory instruction that the jury "may but need not find the presumed fact from the evidence which gives rise to the presumption," without any indication of the degree to which the jurors must feel convinced—for example, beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.

IMPEACHMENT

convictions

Rule 609 of the Supreme Court Draft provides that, unless stale, prior convictions of crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment or involving false statements or dishonesty may be used to impeach a witness, including a criminal defendant. The Subcommittee's proposed amendments would add to the rule a provision empowering the judge, in his discretion, to bar ordinarily admissible prior convictions if they are unduly prejudicial when compared to their impeaching value. This veto power should be adopted. It is required to safeguard the rights of witnesses, particularly if they also are the criminal accused, and to avoid discouraging witnesses unnecessarily.

Allowing the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness is in accord with prevailing law, although the type and age of convictions that may be used varies greatly. The power to exclude such evidence if unduly prejudicial also has met with acceptance in a significant number of decisions. An earlier draft of rule 609 included this judicial veto power, but the Advisory Committee finally yielded to the entreaties of "law and order" advocates and deleted it. In light of this deletion, it would

95 See Proposed Changes rule 609, supra note 10, at 21-22.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Greely, 471 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1972) (12-year-old robbery conviction admitted to impeach defendant charged with robbery); United States v. Tubbs, 461 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1972) (two-year-old and seven-year-old robbery convictions admitted to impeach defendant charged with robbery); United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1971) (convictions for manslaughter and assault with intent to kill admitted to impeach defendant charged with stealing a television).
seem difficult to contend that the judicial veto power still exists in the Supreme Court Draft by virtue of rule 403, which grants the general power to bar evidence that is unduly prejudicial in relation to its probative value.

The absence of a judicial veto power in the Supreme Court Draft will foster undesirable results. For example, in a case where a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter takes the stand, a prior conviction of the same offense may be admitted ostensibly for impeachment purposes, despite its low probative value on the question of witness credibility and its high potential for prejudicing consideration of the merits.\(^\text{100}\)

The Subcommittee's proposed amendment, while wisely including the veto power, suffers from ambiguity. The amendment is not clear whether prior convictions both for crimes punishable by more than one year and for crimes of false statement and dishonesty are subject to the veto power.\(^\text{101}\) Although the Subcommittee Note, in an apparent attempt at compromise, indicates that only crimes punishable by more than one year are subject to judicial veto,\(^\text{102}\) this power should apply to both categories of prior convictions. In the same manner as prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year, convictions of minor offenses involving false statement or dishonesty can prejudice the merits of a case while adding little to the question of witness credibility.

Rule 609(b) of the Supreme Court Draft provides that a prior conviction is barred as stale only if the witness has not been convicted of any crime within the 10 years preceding trial.\(^\text{103}\) Apparently a conviction occurring in that 10-year period can render earlier convictions usable,

\(^{100}\) See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 403 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Yet a court would not countenance direct use of a prior conviction to establish the propensity of a defendant to commit a certain crime. See People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930).

\(^{101}\) The amendment provides:

[Evidence of a prior conviction] is admissible if, but only if, (1) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement or (2) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, unless the judge determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value or the evidence of the conviction.

Proposed Changes rule 609, supra note 10, at 21. The problem, of course, is whether the last clause modifies both the first and the second categories.

\(^{102}\) Id., Subcomm. Note, at 22.

\(^{103}\) Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). These sweeping provisions, allowing revival of an otherwise stale conviction by more current convictions, apparently were forced upon the Advisory Committee by "law and order" proponents. See Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 7, at 317 (letter from Senator John McClellan to William Hungate, Feb. 16, 1973).
even though the recent crime involves a punishment of less than a year and does not involve a false statement or dishonesty. Such a rule might achieve the highly undesirable result of allowing a 40-year-old conviction into evidence merely because the witness was convicted of a minor offense within the last 10 years. This result is especially troublesome when the witness is the criminal defendant since the admission of a stale conviction unjustifiably may prejudice not merely the issue of credibility, but the merits as well.\textsuperscript{104} The proposed amendments laudably would prohibit the use, for impeachment, of any conviction more than 10-years-old.\textsuperscript{105}

\section*{Juvenile Adjudications and Other Types of Wrongdoing}

The Supreme Court Draft, while generally barring use of prior juvenile adjudications, allows their use for impeachment of a witness other than a criminal defendant if the judge concludes that exceptional circumstances justify it.\textsuperscript{106} The Subcommittee's proposed amendments would limit the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment to criminal proceedings where the accused is not the witness to be impeached.\textsuperscript{107} The Subcommittee apparently made this change under the mistaken assumption that this is the real intent behind the Supreme Court Draft.\textsuperscript{108} However, the Supreme Court Draft clearly intends its rule to apply to both civil and criminal proceedings, except for the special case of the criminal-accused witness.\textsuperscript{109} Nevertheless, the amendment is a good one, bringing the rule more into accord with prevailing goals of the juvenile

\textsuperscript{104} See \textit{Understanding the Rules, supra note 13, at 55-63. When coupled with the manslaughter example above, the result seems totally unconscionable. See also note 105 infra.}

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Proposed Changes rule 609(b), supra note 10, at 21. The Supreme Court Draft regards a conviction as having occurred within the 10-year period in any of the following occurred in the 10-year period: final judgment of conviction, release from actual confinement, or expiration of parole, probation, or the official sentence. \textit{Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The amendments wisely would calculate the 10-year period from the date of conviction or the date of release from confinement, whichever is later. \textit{Proposed Changes rule 609(b), supra note 10, at 21.}}

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(d) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).}

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Proposed Changes rule 609, supra note 10, at 22.}

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Id., Subcomm. Note.}

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The Supreme Court Draft provides in part: "The judge may, however, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if . . . ." Id. 609. Use of the word "accused" does not mean the Advisory Committee intended to authorize the judge's power to permit use only in criminal cases. Rather, that term is meant to preclude the power in one criminal situation and to affirm it in all other criminal and civil situations.}
system and with the general policy of avoiding undue embarrassment or discouragement of witnesses. In criminal cases, where the necessity for and probative value of a juvenile record are likely to be greater, these policies are overridden.

The new amendments would provide needed clarification on the matter of when wrongdoing, not the subject of a conviction or a juvenile adjudication, may be used for impeachment. The amendments state expressly, rather than impliedly as under the Supreme Court Draft, that inquiry into such wrongdoing (limited in both drafts to cross-examination) is permissible only in the discretion of the judge. Unfortunately, remoteness in time is dropped from specific mention as a factor for the judge to consider, although it may still be implied.

HEARSAY

PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES

Under prevailing American law, prior statements of witnesses, if offered as substantive evidence and not coming within some exception to the hearsay rule, are hearsay and inadmissible. As substantive evidence, the truthfulness of such prior statements would be relied upon, but the statements would not have been subject to certain courtroom safeguards when made, such as cross-examination in the light of current issues, and hence must be excluded. The present availability of the witness for cross-examination is not considered an adequate safeguard; to be effective, cross-examination must occur when the statement is first made.

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110 The preservation of confidentiality and the minimization of adverse consequences from an adjudication are goals of the juvenile system fostered by the limited use of juvenile records for impeachment purposes. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16, 22-25 (1967); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 286-89 (1967).

111 See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 42, at 83.

112 Compare Proposed Changes rule 608(b), supra note 10, at 21 with Proposed Fed. R. Evrd. 608(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).


The Supreme Court Draft, following in some measure the lead of the new California Evidence Code, makes an exception to this rule for certain prior statements, including prior inconsistent statements, and declares that such statements are not hearsay. The Subcommittee's proposed amendments wisely would restrict the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements to those made under oath and subject to penalty for perjury at a trial, hearing, deposition, or grand jury proceeding. The proposed amendment represents a compromise between the relatively unlimited use of prior inconsistent statements permitted under the Supreme Court Draft and the prevailing law which totally forbids substantive use unless the statement qualifies for some regular exception to the hearsay rule.

In criminal trials, the Supreme Court Draft's liberal standard respecting prior inconsistent statements will favor the prosecution, which is better able to procure such statements and which often must rely on witnesses who grow increasingly hostile as trial nears. Such a rule may encourage widespread gathering of prior statements by the Government and may lead toward trial by affidavit and away from full and effective confrontation. A witness' obdurate disclaimer of all knowledge concerning

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117 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The Supreme Court Draft, in addition to prior inconsistent statements, admits into evidence prior statements of identification and prior consistent statements offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Id.
118 Proposed Changes rule 801(d)(1), supra note 10, at 11. Statements before a grand jury, while not subject to cross-examination, at least are surrounded by some judicial safeguards. In addition to the oath, these safeguards include the penalty for perjury, reliable transcription of and observers to the making of the statement, and the witness' realization of the importance of the matter and occasion. These safeguards, when combined with present opportunity for cross-examination, arguably compensate for lack of actual cross-examination at the making of the statement.

The proposed amendment does not require, however, that the prior hearing or grand jury proceeding have been in the same case as that in which the evidence is now sought. Thus, the witness' motivations, contemplation of stakes, and realization of the issues may be quite different and present a threat to reliability or accuracy. See United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).

This change probably reflects the influence of then Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit, who voiced his opposition to the permissiveness of the Supreme Court Draft respecting prior statements and who formulated the Second Circuit's De Sisto rule. Hearings on Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 219-20 (letter from Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Mar. 31, 1970); id. at 246-65 (testimony and statement of Chief Judge Friendly); see United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (admission of prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence permitted because made under oath). See also United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 910 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972).
ing his prior statement can make effective cross-examination especially difficult. The decisions of the Supreme Court have shown that the confrontation clause furnishes little protection against substantive use of prior statements.\(^{110}\) Since analogous dangers are present to a sufficient degree in civil cases, the amendment should be adopted for civil as well as criminal cases.

**STATEMENT OF RECENT PERCEPTION**

Rule 804(b)(2) of the Supreme Court Draft provides an innovative exception to the hearsay rule. Good faith statements of recent perception made by a presently unavailable declarant while his memory was clear are admissible if not made in response to a person interested in a claim arising out of the event or condition perceived nor made in contemplation of litigation.\(^{120}\) The proposed amendments wisely delete this exception.\(^{121}\)

This new exception makes enormous inroads into the ban on hearsay. In an auto collision case, for example, it allows into evidence a disinterested and unsolicited letter written by an uninvolved bystander to her mother shortly after the occurrence if the bystander is unavailable at trial. Moreover, the exception would admit the testimony of the mother's neighbor as to what the mother told the neighbor about the contents of the letter if the mother also is unavailable and made her statement to the neighbor without litigation motive shortly after perceiving the letter.\(^{122}\) While the neighbor's testimony would be double hearsay—there are two out-of-court declarants whose credibility is at issue—rule 805, in accord with accepted law,\(^{123}\) provides that "hearsay within hearsay" is acceptable if each of the two branches of the hearsay is covered by an exception to the hearsay rule.\(^{124}\) Here each branch would be covered


Under the Supreme Court Draft, a conviction might be obtained in a case where the sole "live" evidence consists of witnesses' testimony favorable to the accused, if one or more of these witnesses made a prior written inconsistent statement embracing the facts necessary to convict. Hopefully, a court would direct an acquittal on grounds that on this evidence, a reasonable man must entertain a reasonable doubt concerning guilt.

\(^{120}\) PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).

\(^{121}\) PROPOSED CHANGES rule 804(b)(2), supra note 10, at 31.

\(^{122}\) One member of the Advisory Committee has indicated that the use of the words "event or condition" in the rule, rather than the word "fact," to describe what it is that must be recently perceived, precludes admissibility in this hypothetical case because the letter, while a fact, is not an event or condition. Interview with Craig Spangenberg, Member of Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence, in Asheville, N.C., Aug. 25, 1973.

\(^{123}\) See generally McCormick, supra note 30, §§ 310, 313.

\(^{124}\) PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 805 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); accord, PROPOSED CHANGES rule 805, supra note 10, at 32.
by the new exception for statements of recent perception provided by rule 804(b)(2).

The proposed deletion of the recent perception exception would not affect the continued vitality of two other similar hearsay exceptions which are better supported by precedent. Rule 803(2), pertaining to excited utterances, allows admission of statements made about a startling event or condition while under the stress of excitement caused thereby. This exception differs from the recent perception exception in that the statement must concern a startling occurrence; the time in which the statement must be made is not measured in terms of “recent” but rather in duration of excitement; the declarant need not be unavailable; and the requirements concerning litigation motive are not express. Rule 803(1), the other similar hearsay exception not affected by the proposed amendment, deals with present sense impressions. This rule is accepted in fewer jurisdictions and comes very close to the controversial recent perception exception. The present sense impressions exception embraces statements recounting an event or condition perceived contemporaneously with the statement or immediately previously. Contemporaneity supposedly guarantees trustworthiness as excitement allegedly does under rule 803(2). The controversial recent perception exception differs from the present sense impression exception in that the requisite time period is “recently perceived” rather than perceived contemporaneously or immediately previously. Further, the recent perception exception requires a presently unavailable declarant and an absence of litigation motive. Thus, deletion of the recent perception exception will not leave without recourse the litigant who offers a deserving hearsay statement along these lines.

BUSINESS RECORDS

The hearsay provisions of the Supreme Court Draft would be modified further by proposed Subcommittee amendments restricting the business records exception to “business and professional records”


See, e.g., Kelly v. Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269 (1934); McCaskill v. State, 227 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1969); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942). See generally McCORMICK, supra note 30, § 298.

rather than the records of any "regularly conducted activity." Although the Subcommittee rightly may fear that overly broad language will bring the records of social clubs or small community organizations within the scope of the exception, their proposed solution would raise inevitable questions about the inclusion of police, charity, and low-level government records. Clearly these latter records should qualify if they possess the same guarantees of trustworthiness that are assumed to inhere in regular business records. The language of the Supreme Court Draft, "regularly conducted activity," when read in conjunction with the Advisory Committee commentary and general case law, will eliminate many unnecessary questions posed by the Subcommittee's proposed limitations while guaranteeing that records excepted from the hearsay rule do meet high standards of reliability.

The Federal Business Records Act should be repealed with the adoption of the federal evidence rules, to the extent they conflict. At present, there is no clarification of the relationship between the Rules and the Act.

STATEMENTS AT EARLIER PROCEEDINGS

The common law excepts from the hearsay rule testimony given at former judicial or quasi-judicial hearings in the same or a different case if the witness is presently unavailable, the earlier proceeding provided an opportunity for cross-examination, and if the issues, stakes, and parties were the same in the earlier proceeding as in the later proceeding. Strict adherence to these requirements seems to be eroding as courts begin to realize their purpose: to insure that someone, with at least as great an interest or motive as the present opponent of the evidence, confronted the evidence in the earlier proceeding. The Supreme Court

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130 The reliability of such records derives from systematic checking of the records, regularity and continuity in keeping the records, actual reliance on the records, and a continuing occupational duty to maintain accurate records. Id. 803 (6), Advisory Comm. Note.
131 See id. An additional difficulty with the proposed amendment is its failure to make clear that the "regular course" requirement applies to each element of the exception.
133 Understanding the Rules, supra note 13, at 121-22; see 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970); note 128 supra.
135 See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, §§ 256-58.
Draft expands this former testimony exception by dispensing with any express requirement that the issues, stakes, or parties at the two proceedings be comparable.\textsuperscript{10} The Supreme Court Draft instead substitutes a requirement that someone with a motive and interest similar to that of the present opponent of the evidence have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the earlier proceeding.\textsuperscript{107} No distinction is made between civil and criminal cases.

The proposed amendments require instead that “the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, [have] had an opportunity to develop the testimony by . . . examination.”\textsuperscript{108} However, the proposed amendment would not require that the prior opportunity for cross-examination have been adequate, nor that the issues, stakes, or the examiner’s motive or interest in the earlier proceeding have been comparable to those in the present proceeding. Thus, a party might be bound by his own or his predecessor in interest’s less-than-vigorous examination, or by an examination which, although possibly adequate in the light of the earlier stakes and issues, is inadequate in the light of the later ones.

This is an area in which a distinction should be made between civil and criminal cases. The Supreme Court Draft is an excellent formulation for civil cases, and one which some courts may be approaching anyway. In civil matters a person frequently is bound by the efforts of another or of himself in a previous, though somewhat different, case in the interests of limiting litigation, easing the burden on public coffers, and freeing judicial resources for dispensing justice to more people.\textsuperscript{109} But these interests should not be given priority in criminal cases where they might result in undeserved criminal stigma and deprivation of personal liberty. Therefore, the proposed amendment, with an additional requirement that the prior opportunity to examine must have been adequate, comparable, or in excess of the present needs and with the deletion of the “predecessor in interest” language, should be adopted for criminal cases where the evidence is to be used against the accused. For civil cases and

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{10} Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Gone also is the requirement that the party against whom the evidence was offered must be the same. \textit{Id.} 804(b)(1), Advisory Comm. Note.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} 804(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{108} Proposed Changes rule 804(b)(1), \textit{supra} note 10, at 31.

\end{footnotesize}
for criminal cases where the evidence is to be used against the Government, the rule of the Supreme Court Draft is appropriate.\textsuperscript{140}

**STATEMENTS AGAINST INTERESTS**

The traditional declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule embraces a declarant’s out-of-court statements that, in the mind of the declarant when made, were so far against his pecuniary or proprietary interest that he probably would not have made the statements had he believed them untrue.\textsuperscript{141} The major issue under the traditional exception has been the interpretation of “pecuniary or proprietary interest.” Statements which expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or may subject him to hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, or have an adverse effect on a legal claim or defense, generally have fallen outside the definition of pecuniary or proprietary interest.\textsuperscript{142} Nonetheless, some decisions have recognized these risks as within the exception by liberal construction of the words “pecuniary or proprietary.”\textsuperscript{143} The common law has been uniform, however, in excluding out-of-court statements which expose the declarant to criminal liability and are offered to exculpate or inculpate an accused other than the declarant.\textsuperscript{144}

Both the Supreme Court Draft and the proposed amendments have expanded significantly the reception of statements exposing the declarant to a risk of criminal liability. The Supreme Court Draft permits admission of statements jointly incriminating both the declarant and the accused if far enough against the declarant’s self-interest that trustworthi-

\textsuperscript{140} The Supreme Court Draft may accomplish the result recommended here if the constitutional right of confrontation is held to limit the rule as applied against a criminal defendant. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1), Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Nevertheless, the law should not be located in two places but rather should be codified clearly in the Rules.

\textsuperscript{141} See Jefferson, Declaration Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declaration Against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952); Comment, Declarations Against Interest—Rules of Admissibility, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 934 (1968).

\textsuperscript{142} See McCormick, supra note 30, §§ 178-79.

\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) (exposure to criminal liability); Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18, 91 N.W. 28 (1902) (exposure to tort liability for negligence); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (exposure to shame and possible criminal indictment).

ness is probable.\textsuperscript{145} Embodying a more restrictive rule, the proposed amendments would render jointly implicating statements inadmissible on constitutional grounds.\textsuperscript{146} Both the Supreme Court Draft and the proposed amendments admit singly incriminating statements—those inculpating the declarant and by implication exculpating the accused—but only if sufficiently against interest and corroborated.\textsuperscript{147} The corroboration requirement is defined more precisely in the proposed amendment.\textsuperscript{148}

The proposed amendment’s ban on jointly incriminating statements generally is sound. \textit{Bruton v. United States}\textsuperscript{149} does seem to compel exclusion of certain out-of-court statements which inculpate the accused as well as the declarant. The unreliability of such statements may not be appreciated fully by the jury without cross-examination of the declarant. However, the language of the amendment seems to exclude all jointly incriminating statements, made on or off the stand, and needs to be modi-

\textsuperscript{145} Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The decision as to whether it is so far against self-interest may be complex, because of the hope for leniency or to share, or relieve oneself partially of guilt. If a statement is both against interest and self-serving, the traditional rule permits admission of the evidence if the aspect that is against interest predominates over the self-serving aspect. \textit{See, e.g.,} Massie-Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 50 S.E. 92 (1905); Demassi v. Whitney Trust & Sav. Bank, 176 So. 703 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Small v. Rose, 97 Me. 286, 54 A. 126 (1903).

\textsuperscript{146} Proposed Changes rule 804(b) (4) & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 31-32. The Subcommitte felt this rule was compelled by \textit{Bruton v. United States} in which the Court held that the out-of-court statements of Bruton’s non-testifying, codefendant companion, jointly implicating both, could not be admitted in the trial even though the jury was instructed to use it only against the maker of the statement. \textit{Id.} at 32; \textit{see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).}

\textsuperscript{147} Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); Proposed Changes rule 804(b) (4), supra note 10, at 31.

\textsuperscript{148} Proposed Changes rule 804(b) (4), supra note 10, at 31. The Supreme Court Draft simply said “not admissible unless corroborated.” Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (4) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). The amendments state “not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” The comment attending the amendment states that this provision was meant to indicate that the accused’s own testimony shall not be corroboration. \textit{See Proposed Changes rule 804(b) (4), Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 32.}


Drafts prior to the Supreme Court Draft, like the common law, excluded jointly incriminating statements from evidence but, unlike the common law, allowed singly incriminating statements on a par with other statements against interest. No corroboration was required. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (4) (Rev. Draft Mar. 1971); \textit{id.} (Prelim. Draft Mar. 1969).

\textsuperscript{149} 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
fled in this regard. The amendment’s requirement that singly incriminating statements exculpating an accused be corroborated should be abandoned. Although third parties may be motivated to confess by forceful or fraudulent inducements of defense counsel, singly incriminating statements seem as reliable as any other evidence admitted on behalf of criminal defendants. The jury is as capable of assessing this evidence as other evidence admitted pursuant to exceptions to the hearsay rule where the declarant cannot be cross-examined.

The proposed amendments reject that part of the Supreme Court Draft which expressly broadens the common law exception to include statements exposing the declarant to civil liability, hatred, ridicule or disgrace, and statements having adverse effect on legal claims or defenses. The Subcommittee apparently believes that these consequences are insufficient to assure substantial trustworthiness or that a judge or jury will be unable to distinguish when they are and are not. However, these evaluations fall within lay experience. A jury is capable of evaluating, for example, the relative weight to be accorded statements merely embarrassing a declarant and those costing him a large sum of money. In addition, the rule allows a judge to keep the evidence from the jury if it is not sufficiently against interest to substantially guarantee trustworthiness. Thus the Supreme Court Draft should be adopted in this respect.

The amendment nevertheless would be acceptable if the Subcommittee Note made clear that a court may admit statements against these “new”

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150 The Subcommittee’s proposed amendment provides simply that a jointly incriminating statement “is not admissible.” Proposed Changes rule 804(b)(4), supra note 10, at 31. One solution would be to change this phrase to “is not included within this exception” to the hearsay rule. This substitute language embodies what actually was intended and eliminates the problem that, as worded, the amendment would exclude the statements even if they are within another exception to the hearsay rule or are not hearsay at all.

A similar problem is involved in the language of the Supreme Court Draft and the proposed amendment respecting singly incriminating statements offered to exculpate accused (“is not admissible unless corrobor[ed] . . .”).

151 A jury is more sophisticated about the possibilities of private coercion to obtain such exculpating statements than they are about the analogous governmental pressures to obtain inculpating statements. Exculpatory statements are no different in this respect from any other testimony. Even if they were, free reception of exculpating statements and not inculpating ones can be justified on the grounds that there is not and never has been parity between the rules or burdens applicable to the Government and those applicable to the defense.


153 See Proposed Changes rule 804(b)(4), Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 32.
interests if they have sufficient adverse effect derivatively on "pecuniary or proprietary interest." Had the broad exception of the Supreme Court Draft never been formulated, a court might have felt justified in admitting relatively reliable statements against the new interests because of their derivative effect on pecuniary or proprietary interests. However, a court probably would be reluctant to do so in light of the amendment's outright rejection of the Supreme Court Draft provision.

DYING DECLARATIONS

Rule 804(b)(3) of the Supreme Court Draft provides a hearsay exception permitting admission of "a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent" if the statement "concern[s] the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death." Had the broad exception of the Supreme Court Draft never been formulated, a court might have felt justified in admitting relatively reliable statements against the new interests because of their derivative effect on pecuniary or proprietary interests. However, a court probably would be reluctant to do so in light of the amendment's outright rejection of the Supreme Court Draft provision.

Rule 804(b)(3) of the Supreme Court Draft provides a hearsay exception permitting admission of "a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent" if the statement "concern[s] the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death." The rule, abandoning the common law restriction to criminal homicide prosecutions, applies in all kinds of cases. The proposed amendments, on the other hand, while permitting admission of dying declarations in all civil cases, limit the exception in criminal cases to homicide prosecutions. The assumptions behind admission of dying declarations are subject to serious question. When a declarant stands "before his Maker" and is knowingly on his deathbed, does he somehow become a more accurate perceiver, rememberer, and reporter, and abandon all motivation to lie? Should the rule be different if the declarant is an atheist? If such a guarantee of reliability actually exists, arguably it should extend to any statement made in that position, whether or not related to the cause or circumstances of what the declarant perceived as his approaching death.

Any limitation of the dying declaration rule in criminal cases is welcome. The amendment wisely would eliminate the rule in most criminal cases, retaining it only for homicide prosecutions. However, the proposed amendment unfortunately does not limit the exception to state.

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155 Id., Advisory Comm. Note.
156 Proposed Changes rule 803(b)(3), supra note 10, at 31.
157 The theory that dying declarations are especially reliable is at odds with the theory of the dead man rule, which considers testimony unreliable if it relates to a statement made by someone who has died. The dead man rule excludes such testimony because it cannot be tested. See McCormick, supra note 30, § 65.
158 Proposed Changes rule 803(b)(3), supra note 10, at 31. However, the Subcommittee's argument that a special need exists for dying declarations in homicide cases is specious. See id. rule 804(b)(2), Subcomm. Note, at 32. A dying declaration may be an essential piece of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case other than a homicide prosecution and may be superfluous or collateral in some homicide prosecutions.
ments about the very death at issue in the prosecution as did the common law. 160

THE "CATCH-ALL" EXCEPTION

The seemingly most revolutionary, yet in actuality most traditional, hearsay provisions of the Supreme Court Draft, are those that authorize the court to make new exceptions to the hearsay rule for evidence comparable in trustworthiness to evidence admitted under other exceptions specifically codified in the Rules. 160 The proposed amendments unwisely delete this authorization. 161 If the common law courts had been deprived of this power to create exceptions, none of the present exceptions to the hearsay rule would have evolved. 162 Inflexible codification of the hearsay exceptions in the Rules would freeze the contours of the hearsay rule and necessitate formal amendment for growth. 163 Yet new rules in the area can be evolved sensibly only through case-by-case judicial accretion and development. Compared with the inroads into the hearsay rule proposed or already made in England, 164 the Supreme Court Draft is quite moderate.

The Subcommittee's reasons for deleting the "catch-all" exceptions probably include fear of "adjudication without law," unpredictability, difficulty in preparing and evaluating a case, lack of uniformity, forum shopping, abandonment of the values inherent in the hearsay rule, and lack of congressional control. Admittedly, a power appearing in a codification is more likely to be liberally used than one implicit in antiquity, and thus is more open to these charges. An express exhoration that the

160 Contrary to the common law, which requires that a declarant have died as a result of the injury that was the subject of the declaration, the proposed amendments require only that the declarant be "unavailable." Compare id. rule 804(b)(2), at 31 with McCormick, supra note 30, § 283. Dying declarations about the very death at issue arguably constitute the most compelling case of need.


162 Proposed Changes rule 803, supra note 10, at 30; id. rule 804(b), at 31.


164 In England, fairly liberal rules of admissibility, including a notice requirement, have been adopted for civil cases and proposed for criminal cases. (ENGLISH) Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64, §§ 2-4, 8; (PROPOSED) Criminal Evidence Act 1972, §§ 31, 32.
power is to be used sparingly, or only in the most compelling of cases, might render the Supreme Court Draft more acceptable.

Although the confrontation clause surely overrides, or is implicit in the “catch-all” exception of the Supreme Court Draft, greater solicitude should be provided for the criminal accused’s right to confrontation than the Constitution demands. The rule expressly should alert judges and practitioners to the special considerations which demand extra caution in admitting hearsay evidence against criminal defendants.

Additionally, the “catch-all” exception of the Supreme Court Draft should require that evidence be comparably necessary to that admitted under the other exceptions as well as comparably trustworthy. As a safeguard against uncontrolled use of the exception, written findings by the judge on the need for and trustworthiness of the evidence should be required. Moreover, the rule should require pretrial notice of intent to invoke the exception, including particulars about the statement and the identity and residence of the declarant, to enable the other side to bring forward the declarant, or facts concerning the declarant, for purposes of examining the credibility of the declarant’s statement.

**DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY**

In general conformity with traditional law, five of the hearsay exceptions in the Supreme Court Draft require that the declarant be unavailable to testify. The Supreme Court Draft’s definition of unavailability includes the situation in which “the proponent of [a declarant’s] statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.” The Subcommittee, by inserting “or testimony” after the word “attendance,” purports to render a declarant “available” if he

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166 At any rate, all the law on the matter should be in one place to avoid misleading impressions and to avoid placing too much emphasis on assiduous research and on specialization, especially when many counsel are appointed from noncriminal practices.


168 An absent declarant may be impeached as though he testified in person. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 806 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). Although the civil discovery rules occasionally may be adequate to provide the information necessary for effective impeachment, the limited criminal discovery rules probably are not. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37 with Fed. R. Crim. P. 15-16.

169 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1)-(5) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (former testimony, statement of recent perception, statement under belief of impending death, statement against interest, statement of personal or family history); see McCormick, supra note 30, § 253.

has been deposed on the matter sought to be introduced or if a reasonable opportunity to depose him has been foregone. This insertion raises questions concerning what the new words embrace in addition to a deposition in the same case. For example, do they encompass testimony at other judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings; affidavits; unsworn statements; statements before grand juries; or depositions in other cases? If they apply to depositions in other cases, a logical conflict exists with rule 804(b)(1) which provides a hearsay exception for former testimony, including depositions in other cases, but requires unavailability. Moreover, why should the duty to depose apply only to situations where the declarant's unavailability is predicated upon "inability to procure his attendance by reasonable means" and not to situations falling within other definitions of unavailability? If applicable to the statements of all allegedly unavailable declarants, a rule of preference for depositions taken in the same case over other forms of hearsay, is probably salutary. However, such a rule should not apply in small cases where the expense of taking depositions is prohibitive.

SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

The Supreme Court Draft rejects the "restrictive" scope of cross-examination rule traditionally followed by the federal courts in favor of the "wide open" rule that now prevails in a number of states. Unavailability is interpreted to include, for example, death before trial and illness at the time of trial. Provision should be made for the exercise of judicial discretion on this matter, and upon proper application, the matter might be decided in advance of trial.

171 Proposed changes rule 804(a)(5) & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 30, 32. No other changes in the definition of unavailability are contemplated by the amendments.

172 See id. rule 804(b)(1), at 31.

173 Other definitions of unavailability include, for example, death before trial and illness at the time of trial. See id. rule 804(a)(4), at 30.

174 Provision should be made for the exercise of judicial discretion on this matter, and upon proper application, the matter might be decided in advance of trial.


176 See id. rule 804(b)(1), at 31.

177 Other definitions of unavailability include, for example, death before trial and illness at the time of trial. See id. rule 804(a)(4), at 30.

178 Provision should be made for the exercise of judicial discretion on this matter, and upon proper application, the matter might be decided in advance of trial.


However, the restrictive view is the majority rule among American jurisdictions, although there is considerable variation as to how the rule should be interpreted and applied. See, e.g., Carey v. Oakland, 44 Cal. App. 2d 503, 112 F.2d 714 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (witnesses who testified about incident, but not about conversations, could not be cross-examined as to such conversations); State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 A. 751 (1929) (doctor who gave general description of wound could not be asked his opinion of the gun's distance from victim on cross-examination); Nagel v. McDermott, 138 Wash. 536, 244 P. 977 (1926) (witness who testified only about collision could not be cross-examined as to speed before collision). See generally Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L.Q. 705 (1967).
der the wide open rule, any admissible evidence within the knowledge of a witness may be adduced upon cross-examination.\textsuperscript{177} The proposed amendments, however, would reinstate the restrictive rule.\textsuperscript{178}

Under this restrictive rule, cross-examination is limited to matters opened up on direct examination, except in the case of cross-examination directed at impeaching the witness. The cross-examining party who wishes to adduce evidence on a substantive subject not explored on direct examination, must do so when it is his turn to introduce evidence. The restrictive rule engenders disputes since it is without objective standards and is subject to varying interpretations. In addition, to administer the restrictive rule properly, a court must undertake the difficult task of ascertaining in advance where a line of cross-examination is heading, a determination that can neutralize some of the value of cross-examination which depends in considerable measure on surprise. On the other hand, the restrictive rule encourages orderly proof and allows a party to control his own case. On balance, the restrictive rule appears preferable and should be adopted.\textsuperscript{179}

Neither the Supreme Court Draft nor the traditional federal rule codified in the proposed amendment is inflexible. Rule 611(b) of the Supreme Court Draft allows the judge to deviate from the wide open view if, in his discretion, the "interests of justice" so require.\textsuperscript{180} Under the proposed amendment, the judge, in a similar exercise of discretion, may deviate from the restrictive rule and broaden the scope of cross-examination.\textsuperscript{181} Both proposals place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to invoke the judge's discretion to deviate from the norm. This burden is

\textsuperscript{177} See McCormick, supra note 30, § 21.

\textsuperscript{178} Proposed Changes rule 611, supra note 10, at 22.

\textsuperscript{179} The restrictive rule can make a considerable difference in several situations. (1) If the prosecution during cross-examination cannot adduce evidence known solely to the accused, such evidence may never be adduced since the privilege against self-incrimination may prevent the prosecution from calling the accused to the stand. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 104 (1900); United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally 8 J. Wimber, Evidence §§ 2250, 2252 (3d ed. 1940); Carlson supra note 176, at 710-17. (2) A party may avoid certain legal disadvantages by using cross-examination rather than direct examination to adduce a piece of evidence. See Vondrashek v. Dignan, 200 Minn. 530, 274 N.W. 609 (1937) (cannot impeach one's own witness); In re Estate of Rogan, 404 Pa. 205, 171 A.2d 177 (1961) (leading questions allowed on cross, not on direct) But cf. State v. Murphy, 216 S.C. 44, 56 S.E.2d 73 (1949) (when cross-examiner exceeds scope of cross-examination, witness is his and may not be impeached). (3) Psychologically a party is identified with a witness if he calls him.

\textsuperscript{180} Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).

\textsuperscript{181} Proposed Changes rule 611(b), supra note 10, at 23; see United States v. Taylor, 312 F.2d 159, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1963); Urring v. Fink, 141 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1944).
considerably more onerous under the Supreme Court Draft because the party seeking to limit the scope of cross-examination may not know in advance the direction the cross-examiner seeks to take, but nonetheless must argue that his objection to a line of questioning should be sustained. Under the proposed amendment, the party seeking an exercise of discretion asks that the scope of cross-examination be broadened to allow his own line of questioning, which is an easier argument to make.

The Supreme Court Draft does not state whether, when the scope of cross-examination exceeds that of direct, a witness should be treated as the cross-examiner's own witness or as the opponent's witness. This distinction, while no longer important for the purposes of the right to impeach the witness, still may have vitality for purposes of determining the right to ask leading questions. The scope of cross-examination rule of the Supreme Court Draft creates another difficulty for the prosecution in criminal cases and plaintiffs in civil cases, both of whom frequently must rely in their cases-in-chief on essentially unfriendly witnesses to establish some essential although limited points. Wide open cross-examination affords defense counsel a broad opportunity to introduce favorable affirmative evidence during the other party's case-in-chief, and probably to do so through leading questions. Because such evidence may appear more favorable to the defense than if presented later in the context of the defendant's own case, defendants may increase their chances of obtaining an undeserved directed verdict. The problem can be ameliorated somewhat, perhaps, by requiring a defendant who cross-examines beyond the scope of direct, to wait until the close of all the evidence before moving for a directed verdict.

182 Rule 607 removes restrictions on the right of a party to impeach his own witness. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 607 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); accord Proposed Changes rule 607, supra note 10, at 20.

183 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 611(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972) (leading questions ordinarily allowed on cross, not ordinarily on direct). In some jurisdictions, where a cross-examiner exceeds the scope of the direct examination in a substantive inquiry, the witness to that extent becomes the cross-examiner's own witness for purposes of the right to impeach or ask leading questions. See People ex rel. Phelps v. Court, 83 N.Y. 436, 459-60 (1881); State v. Hickman, 77 Ohio App. 479, 486-87, 67 N.E.2d 815, 818-19 (1945). Since rule 611(c) prescribes only what ordinarily is to be allowed or disallowed, the net result probably will be that the judge has discretion in allowing leading questions when the scope of direct is exceeded. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 611(c) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). See also id. 611(a).

184 Some federal courts have held the introduction of documents by defense counsel during the prosecution's case-in-chief to constitute waiver of the right to request a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court Draft is silent concerning whether cross-examination by defense counsel beyond the scope of direct is to be treated in the same fashion as defense counsel's introduction of documents. Another unanswered question is whether, assuming a motion at the close
The Supreme Court Draft does not eliminate disputes over whether a particular matter was opened up on direct, although theoretically this issue is irrelevant under a wide open cross-examination rule. The right to use leading questions on cross-examination and the right to move for a directed verdict after the initial case-in-chief may depend upon such a determination. Moreover, the judge must consider this question in exercising his discretion to confine the inquiry on cross-examination. Thus, far from eliminating disputes, the Supreme Court Draft engenders some for which existing federal law provides little guidance.

* **Judicial Notice**

The Supreme Court Draft’s rule respecting judicial notice of fact expressly applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative fact whereas the proposed amendments would permit judicial notice of both legislative and adjudicative fact. Although the distinction between these two types of fact often may be elusive, the basic difference is illustrated easily. In determining whether a particular criminal act alleged to have transpired at the Empire State Building is within the geographic jurisdiction covered by the New York courts, a court might take judicial notice of the adjudicative fact that the Empire State Building is in New York. On the other hand, in determining whether a husband-wife of the plaintiff's or prosecution's case is permitted, the evidence is to be assessed without reference to material brought out on cross by defendant that exceeded the scope of the direct.

In addition, the draft raises questions as to what factors the judge is to consider when asked to exercise his discretion under rule 611(b) to confine cross-examination, or under rule 611(c) to allow or disallow leading questions when cross-examination exceeds the scope of direct.

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188 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 201 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); Proposed Changes rule 201 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8. The Supreme Court Draft leaves to existing law judicial notice of law and of facts that are not “adjudicative.” Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 201 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).


188 [A]djudicative facts are those . . . that normally go to the jury . . . . They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses. Legislative facts . . . help the tribunal determine the content of law and . . . policy and help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take . . . . [F]indings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, frequently are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence.


189 See Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.), reappealed, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962) (judicial notice of Mississippi’s school segregation policy); Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 P. 223 (1919) (judicial notice that a certain two-
Privilege should be extended to cover a situation where the communicating spouse has died by the time of trial, a court may base its decision on judicial notice of legislative fact.\footnote{190}

Judicial notice of legislative fact is inherent in the judgment which a judge is called upon to exercise daily.\footnote{191} Although it may make considerable sense to require some kind of indisputability before a court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, it would be antithetical to the process of exercising judgment to require indisputability respecting whether a particular privilege rule would promote or discourage or not affect communication.\footnote{192}

The Supreme Court Draft's rule on judicial notice requires that before a fact can be judicially noticed, it must be a fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" either because it is "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."\footnote{193} Applying these standards to judicial notice of adjudicative fact is a sound policy. However, the Subcommittee's proposed amendments would extend the Supreme Court Draft's rule to legislative facts as well\footnote{194} and would create a rule impossible of administration and, if literally applied, totally destructive of our judicial system. The amendments show a basic misconception of the judicial function and a simplistic belief that nothing even resembling a legislative function should be


\footnote{190} The court may decide (1) that the purpose of the spousal privilege is to encourage communications between husband and wife; (2) that such encouragement is normally marginal at best; (3) that parties, when communicating, usually are not thinking about possible disclosure should they die; and (4) even if they did think about this, they ordinarily would not be too concerned about after-death disclosure. The court, therefore, might deny the privilege.


\footnote{192} A decision either way on the privilege question presented the court in the above hypothetical case requires acceptance of one or another of the three fact propositions in the last text clause above, none of which is indisputable. If a judge were to decide the issue of privilege without regard to these propositions, he would be shirking his responsibility to exercise reasoned judgment. Either the judge must be allowed to take judicial notice of one or another of these disputable facts, or he must take evidence on them. Plainly the latter is not always an acceptable solution.

\footnote{193} \textit{Proposed Fed. R. Evid.} 201(b) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).

\footnote{194} \textit{Proposed Changes} rule 201, \textit{supra} note 10, at 7.
tolerated on the part of a court. Admittedly, as the Subcommittee points out, the decision as to whether a fact is adjudicative or non-adjudicative can be difficult and elusive.\textsuperscript{195} Nevertheless, some such distinction is necessary.\textsuperscript{196}

The proposed amendments additionally would permit evidence and argument, disputing a judicially noticed fact, to be considered by the trier of fact.\textsuperscript{197} In contrast, the Supreme Court Draft requires that the jury be instructed to accept a judicially noticed fact as established and does not permit evidence and argument disputing the fact to be introduced before the jury.\textsuperscript{198} The parties have an opportunity to dispute the matter before the judge prior to his taking final judicial notice,\textsuperscript{199} which the Subcommittee apparently overlooked in permitting dispute before the trier of fact.\textsuperscript{200} The likely consequence of the proposed amendment would be to render judicial notice a nullity, for it apparently would not foreclose evidence, would not result in an instruction to the jury, and would have no express effect on the question of the sufficiency of a case to get to the jury.

The Supreme Court Draft draws no distinction between civil and criminal cases and thus allows facts in criminal cases to be judicially noticed against the accused.\textsuperscript{201} The Advisory Committee seems to have forgotten here what they recognized in the presumption area—where a right to trial by jury exists, findings of fact should not be directed against a criminal accused.\textsuperscript{202} The judicial notice rule in the Supreme Court Draft allows a fact to be judicially noticed and conclusively established against the accused after a hearing before only the judge.\textsuperscript{203} With respect to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{195}] Id., Subcomm. Note, at 8.
\item[\textsuperscript{196}] For reasons similar to those advanced respecting legislative facts, the rule also must exclude from its coverage, as did the Supreme Court Draft, judicial notice of "non-evidence" facts used in the evaluation of evidence. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 201, Advisory Comm. Note (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972); notes 188-191 supra and accompanying text.
\item[\textsuperscript{197}] This would result from the deletion of rule 201(g). Proposed Changes rule 201 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8.
\item[\textsuperscript{198}] Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 201(g) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
\item[\textsuperscript{199}] Id. 201(e).
\item[\textsuperscript{200}] The proposed amendments would not change rule 201(e). Proposed Changes rule 201 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 7-8.
\item[\textsuperscript{201}] Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 201(g) (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).
\item[\textsuperscript{202}] See id. 303(b).
\item[\textsuperscript{203}] Id. 201(g). Whether allowing directed findings of fact against an accused, either by presumption or judicial notice, would violate constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury is an open question, except perhaps where the fact is an element of the crime. See Woolmington v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462; Model Penal Code § 1.12(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); id. § 1.13, Comment, at 108 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); 6 WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 288, at 882-886 (2d ed. 1961).
\end{footnotes}
criminal cases, the Supreme Court Draft should be amended to allow, as do the proposed amendments, dispute of a judicially noticed fact before the jury. Provisions also should be added governing the effect of judicial notice on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s case to go to the jury and prescribing jury instructions.204

JUDGE’S COMMENT ON WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

At common law and in federal courts, as in a number of state courts and in England, the judge may indicate to the jury his own views on the weight to be ascribed to the evidence, provided he stays within the limits of judicial propriety and impartiality, and provided he makes clear that his comments are advisory only.205 In federal courts there has been considerable judicial reluctance to use this power, while in England and in some of the states it has been exercised somewhat more liberally.206 The Supreme Court Draft simply states that the judge has this power207 while the Subcommittee, although apparently intending not to alter the power as it exists under present law, proposes to delete the express provision in the Rules, on the theory that the matter is procedural rather than evidentiary in nature.208

If the eventual result of the proposed amendment is that the deleted provision is placed in the rules of civil and criminal procedure, the Subcommittee will have accomplished little. If, on the other hand, the power is left in its present uncodified state, governed only by decisional or common law, a salutary result will have been achieved. The power of judicial comment on the weight of the evidence should be available; but, if it is expressly codified, the tendency may be to use it too liberally, unless the codification contains some exhortation that the power shall be used only where the evidence is complicated or difficult to assess.

DOCUMENTS USED TO REFRESH WITNESS’ RECOLLECTION

The Supreme Court Draft provides, subject to certain qualifications, that counsel has a right to see and use documents that opposing counsel

204 These provisions should be consistent with the provisions on these matters for presumptions against the accused. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.


has employed to refresh his witness' recollection, whether the documents are so employed before the witness takes the stand or during his testimony.\^200 Most authority has denied this right where the witness uses the document before testifying, although sometimes the matter is made discretionary with the trial judge.\^210 The Subcommittee, fearing "fishing expeditions," \^211 would amend the Supreme Court Draft to permit examination of documents used before testifying only where, in the judge's discretion, such examination is "necessary in the interests of justice." \^212 The amendment seems unwise, as the Supreme Court Draft provides adequate safeguards against abuses by requiring that the witness actually have used the document in preparing his testimony and by authorizing in camera inspection by the judge to excise nongermane matter.\^213

**SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS**

The Constitution vests the "judicial Power" of the United States over certain categories of cases, including diversity and federal question, in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts,\^214 and gives the Supreme Court "appellate Jurisdiction" over the lower federal courts.\^215 Arguably this includes the power to make rules of evidence,\^216 in which case Congress might have no authority to deprive the Supreme Court of the power to promulgate rules of evidence for itself and for the federal courts of appeals and district courts. Nor might Congress have the power to prevent the lower courts from making their own evidentiary rulings, though the lower courts would be subject to Supreme Court rules and appellate review. Under this theory the Supreme Court Draft could

\^200 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 612 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972).


\^212 Id. rule 612, at 23.

\^213 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 612 (Supreme Court Draft Nov. 1972). As an additional safeguard, the rule might provide that if a party fails to comply with an order of examination, the penalty is limited to striking the witness' testimony or, in an extreme case, declaring a mistrial. Thus, the party resisting examination could choose to suffer the penalty and avoid an ordered examination if it is extremely important to his case to avoid a fishing expedition. Rule 612 of the Supreme Court Draft provides such a rule where the fishing expedition fear is likely to have most merit—when the Government seeks to avoid examination in a criminal case. In other cases, the judge may enter such orders as justice may require, penalizing either the recalcitrant party, his case, or, presumably, his lawyer.

\^214 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; cf. id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.

\^215 Id. art. III, § 2.

\^216 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 327-29 (1816).
be made effective without congressional approval despite the enabling statutes and congressional attempts to amend the Rules. However, this theory of absolute Supreme Court power over rules of evidence is subject to serious dispute. Congress' ability to restrict the powers seemingly granted to courts by the Constitution has been upheld on a number of occasions. Specifically Congress' ability to deny federal district courts jurisdiction over certain cases, to restrict their power to grant certain remedies or consider certain issues in a case before them, and to curtail Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction has been upheld on the theory that Congress has express constitutional power to refrain from creating district courts and to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the congressional power to require legislative approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apparently was accepted when those rules were issued. To

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217 In this connection it is notable that the Supreme Court Draft makes exceptions from its provisions for other rules "adopted by the Supreme Court." Proposed Fed. R. Evm. 402, 802, 901(b) (10), 902(4), 1101(e) (Supreme Court DraftNov. 1972). The proposed amendments would make exceptions only for rules "prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority," purportedly barring unilateral judicial amendment of or deviation from the federal evidence rules. Proposed Changes rule 402 & Subcomm. Note, supra note 10, at 9; id. rule 802, at 37; id. rule 901(b) (10), at 34; id. rule 902(4), at 35; id. rule 1101(e), at 38. Of course, the courts still could act unilaterally in an area not covered by the Rules—for example, impeachment by bias. See generally Schmerz & Czapanskiy, supra note 14.


220 In Yaks v. United States an alternative procedure was provided by Congress for challenging the issue; otherwise, the Court might have found a violation of due process. See 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944).


222 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

223 Id. § 2.

distinguish the rules of evidence from this precedent, one would have to assume that evidentiary matters are more central to the judicial function.\(^2\)

Thus, as a general matter, the congressional suspension of, and proposed amendments to, the Supreme Court Draft probably are constitutionally permissible. Nevertheless, where Congress attempts to interfere with the essence of the judicial function, as under the proposed amendments concerning judicial notice, or to require adjudication according to evidentiary rules deemed by the courts to be unjust, as may occur under the proposal to freeze the hearsay exceptions, or if certain presumption proposals are made,\(^2\) Congress well may be infringing the

in the literature and the cases, both before and after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, have been whether any agency of the federal government has rule making power and whether Congress itself should prescribe rules or delegate the power to the judiciary. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941); Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329, 359 (1835); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 20-50 (1825); Clark & Moore, supra; Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 234 (1951); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1958); Sunderland, supra. Evidently only Professor Wigmore explicitly questioned whether congressional authority was needed for issuing the rules. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276 (1928). See generally Medalie, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 Law. Guid Rev. 1 (1944); Pound, The Rule Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).


Two cases ascribing to Congress authority to make evidentiary rules are more concerned with the propriety of rule making than with the proper locus for that authority. Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (dictum) (presumptions); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (witness competency); see note 224 supra.

\(^2\) This may also be the case if other branches of government have indeed "forced" the Advisory Committee (an arm of the judicial branch) to abandon the convictions veto power. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text. Some courts have indicated that there may be constitutional difficulty with such action. See Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
constitutional grant of judicial power and appellate jurisdiction. This could be true whether or not the particular adjudication is one which is so unreasonable vis-a-vis an individual as to violate his right to due process.

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227 Any sensible reading of the congressional constitutional power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must add the implied phrase "exceptions consistent with basic functions and purposes prescribed by the Constitution."
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