The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century

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The New Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century
Andrew I. Schoenholtz*

Abstract

When the fledgling U.N. negotiated a treaty to protect refugees after the Second World War, member states focused on Europe as well as on events causing forced migration that occurred prior to 1951. No one imagined that cross-border escape from persecution would become a global phenomenon and remain one more than sixty years later, or that this human rights treaty would be needed in the twenty-first century. In fact, as increased numbers of asylum seekers from developing countries reached the most developed regions of the world during the last thirty years, critics have questioned the merits of this treaty and argued that the Refugee Convention has become outmoded and obsolete.

This Article considers how well suited this treaty is for the protection of refugees fleeing persecution in today's world. The author first looks at how the nature of the state itself has evolved and finds that too many governments today fail at providing significant portions of their citizenry with the most basic level of human security. A new cast of persecutors apart from the state now exerts authority and power in such societies, targeting particular societal groups using new forms of persecution. Examining how states have adapted this multilateral agreement to these changing circumstances, the author finds that this treaty continues to be vital in protecting the human rights of refugees thanks to two important treaty elements: a clear and fundamental purpose to protect individuals whose governments have been unwilling or unable to do so, and flexible terms that have enabled jurists and government officials to adapt the refugee definition to the changing nature of forced migration. Accordingly, the author's analysis confirms the conclusion of the International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on Treaties over Time that "subsequent practice by the parties may guide an evolutive interpretation of a treaty."

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"The sine qua non of the political commonwealth is to defend the citizen from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another."

I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES

When governments established the U.N. in 1945, war and persecution had displaced over forty million people in Europe alone. Today's state system continues to produce large numbers of forced migrants in connection with such causes. At the same time, new forms of displacement related to natural disasters and climate change challenge governments and civil society to respond in humane and effective ways to ensure that the crisis needs of all people are met in a non-discriminatory fashion. Experts agree that new norms beyond those established for persecution and war refugees need to be developed. As the international community carefully considers how to deal with the latest forms of forced migration, officials, advocates, and scholars of human rights might learn from the evolution and implementation of the core human rights treaty on forced migration created in 1951—the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”). For that reason alone, why and how this treaty matters today merits reflection.

An even more compelling reason to investigate this human rights treaty is that State Parties have tried for some time to minimize its relevance to today's forced migrants. In a 2000–2001 report for the Australian Parliament, one researcher called the treaty "outdated" and "obsolete." In contrast, I argue that

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3. See, for example, id. at 362 (addressing the protection needs of survival migrants who face "an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution" and who fall outside the scope of the international refugee regime) (internal quotation marks omitted); Etienne Piguet, *Climate Change and Forced Migration* (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 153 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/47a316182.pdf (discussing the protection needs of environmental refugees).
the treaty created in 1951 to address then-contemporary international displacement is reasonably alive and well with respect to today’s persecuted refugees and has enabled states to protect many of these particular forced migrants.

This study, then, will closely examine the Refugee Convention’s application to the changing nature of forced migration. As such, it aims to contribute to the recent and ongoing examinations being conducted by the International Law Commission regarding “Treaties over time/Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to interpretation of treaties.”6

My focus will be on the evolution of the substantive law in terms of whom this treaty protects as refugees pursuant to the international definition, which has remained unchanged since its creation. States negotiated this definition in a particular Western historical context: the aftermath of the Second World War and the very early days of the Cold War. How viable is this definition in today’s world?

I will argue that this definition possesses core characteristics that have enabled adjudicators, advocates, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and scholars to apply it to the protection needs of persecuted refugees in today’s world. While this has not occurred without struggle and challenges, my claim is that the “refugee” definition, now in its seventh decade of life, has proven adaptable to the changing nature of persecution.

One clarification before I present this analysis: I am on record elsewhere critiquing a significant limitation of the international refugee regime as well as ways that states have implemented the treaty.7 While the 1951 Convention addresses the protection of persecuted refugees, it does not deal with the protection of refugees fleeing conflict that does not involve targeted, individual persecution. States have had many opportunities since establishing the Refugee Convention to develop a global treaty for conflict refugees, but one does not yet exist. That subject continues to deserve the attention of states, advocates, and scholars. But it does not take away from the considerable accomplishments of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As to the shortcomings in implementation, an important role of researchers is to document such problems as they occur. But

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7 See, for example, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Improving Legal Frameworks, in THE UPROOTED: IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO FORCED MIGRATION 30–72 (Susan F. Martin et al. eds., 2005); Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 323 (2005).
such shortcomings should not prevent us from recognizing implementation successes.

II. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW REGIME

Born in 1951 in the aftermath of the failure to save the persecuted who perished at the hands of the Nazis, the Refugee Convention set out both to protect refugees from persecution and to ensure their widest possible exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, as affirmed by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through this treaty substituting a willing sovereign for an irresponsible or incapable one, State Parties created an international legal regime that respected the stabilizing and humanitarian value of the state-citizen relationship. Via the non-refoulement obligation set out in Article 33, states committed themselves not to return an individual who reasonably feared serious harm in her state of nationality or residence. The treaty strongly encourages governments to naturalize refugees, and most of the Refugee Convention provisions speak to a set of political, social, and economic rights as well as State Party obligations that enable refugees to rebuild their lives through a relationship with a new sovereign.

Of course, this international agreement started out principally as a European treaty limited in time to events occurring before 1951 that had caused cross-border displacement. In fact, Contracting States could limit their obligations to the territory of Europe. During the Convention's adolescence, these temporal and geographical limitations became outmoded when the General Assembly called on UNHCR primarily to protect and assist large numbers of refugees in the developing world. Accordingly, in 1967, the General Assembly adopted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, removing these limitations and essentially universalizing the international refugee definition and the rights set forth in the Convention.

In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the Convention refugees in the West fled the Communist states controlled by the Soviet Union and migrated as individuals. The exception was the mass exodus of 200,000 Hungarians fleeing the Soviet repression of the 1956 uprising. The treaty faced a special challenge, because the agreement only applied to "events occurring" before 1951. Dr. Paul

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8 **See** Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(B)(1).
Weis, the Legal Advisor to the High Commissioner, did what jurists, legal experts, and advocates have done ever since when presented with this problem of interpretation: he analyzed how the treaty applied to a contemporary situation. In this case, he articulated the connections between the causes of the 1956 refugee flight and events that occurred before 1951.11

III. CHALLENGES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION

The Refugee Convention has spent much of its adult life under attack in both developed and developing countries. Starting especially in the 1980s, European states began to interpret the refugee definition more strictly in response to larger flows of individuals from the developing world applying for refugee status through formal screening procedures.12 The rate of recognition in Western Europe fell from forty-two percent in 1983 to sixteen percent in 1996.13 Western states acted to some degree as if the political purposes of the treaty, less important as the Cold War waned, mattered more than the humanitarian ones.14

States began restricting territorial access to refugees in significant ways. The Reagan Administration established an agreement with Baby Doc Duvalier to return Haitians interdicted on the high seas unless U.S. officials determined on the spot that they needed Refugee Convention protection.15 In reality, this meant that the U.S. returned over 22,000 Haitians who tried to reach the U.S. on boats and admitted around one hundred who could then apply for asylum.16

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11 See id. at 30-31.
13 Id. at 71. In 1996, another ten percent were allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds. Id. at 71–72.
16 U.N. High Comm'rr for Refugees, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES—2012: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY 176 (2012) [hereinafter STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2012]. The U.S. continues to interdict asylum seekers on the high seas and, at times, return them without determining whether they are refugees. Other countries have followed suit. Australia started doing so in 2001; in contrast with the U.S. direct returns, Australia made some determination (though not necessarily with a fair process) as to an individual's need for protection. See Jessica Howard, To Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers, 21 REFUGEE 35, 36 (2003). Most recently, Italy and Spain, with the assistance of the European Union through FRONTEX, have taken this to the next legal level and teamed up with Libya, Senegal, and Mauritania, respectively, to interdict asylum seekers and other migrants in the territorial waters of these states before they can reach the high seas. See FRONTEX Risk Analysis Unit, Report for the Second Quarter of 2010
The number of asylum seekers that reached the West increased significantly over time, and the origins of those claiming protection shifted from Eastern Europe to the developing world. Between 1985 and 1995, the industrialized world received about five million asylum applications. Western nations responded to these increases and demographic shifts by more aggressively controlling their borders, changing their procedures, and revising their laws and policies in a variety of ways. To limit access to their territories, some states established pre-clearance and pre-inspection programs abroad. Some imposed new visa requirements on nationals from countries that produce refugees. Several began to detain arriving asylum seekers. Many Western States created fast-track asylum procedures aimed at "manifestly unfounded" claims. Some established filing deadlines. Aimed in part to control abuse, many European governments imposed new policies regarding claimants who came from what were called "safe countries of origin" as well as those who had passed through "safe third countries." Western governments started to deny asylum claims where persecution was not countrywide (invoking so-called "internal flight alternatives"), and a few European states denied protection involving certain non-state agents of persecution.

According to Professor Aleinikoff, the exilic bias of post-World War II refugee law lost its appeal in the developed West in the 1980s, such that "states,
as matters of domestic law, have adopted narrow readings of the [C]onvention’s definition of refugee.” States replaced the original exilic bias with what Aleinikoff calls “source control bias” and “policies of containment.” The laws, policies, and practices described above support this thesis.

Some governments, analysts, and journalists directly attacked the Refugee Convention. Some states reportedly threatened to opt out of the treaty. For example, the British head of the Conservative Party and Opposition to Prime Minister Blair pledged to pull out of the 1951 Convention. In a 2000 paper prepared for the Australian Parliament, commentator Adrienne Millbank asserted that “the problem with the Convention is that it was developed in and for a different era,” and “the Convention definition of refugee is outdated, as is its notion of exile as a solution to refugee problems.” Millbank echoes this criticism repeatedly, and she notes that some Austrian and British leaders have espoused similar views.

Concerned about large numbers of refugees requesting asylum in the U.K. under the Refugee Convention, Prime Minister Blair’s government considered removing asylum seekers who reached the U.K. to protection areas near their countries of origin in 2003. The deported asylum seekers would have had to stay in these UN zones for six months before processing of their claims. The opposition party leadership pushed the concept further to include a strict quota

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23 Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 262.
24 Id. at 263, 265 (emphasis omitted).
27 Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 2, 4.
28 Id. at 3.
29 For example, she states: “The crux of criticism is that the Convention is obsolete and inappropriate to deal with contemporary challenges.” Id. at 5. “The essence of criticism of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention is that it is anachronistic.” Id. at 6 (internal citation omitted). She provides examples of Western leaders who espouse this view: “In 1998 the Austrian Presidency of the EU suggested replacing the Convention with an EU asylum law ‘which meets today’s requirements rather than those of a geopolitically outdated situation.’” In April 2000, “the UK Home Secretary, Jack Straw, criticized the Convention as ‘too broad for conditions in the 21st Century.’” Id. at 8.
from among those found to be Convention refugees. Noting that these problems have not gone away in 2011, journalist Ed West declared the 1951 Refugee Convention "unfit for purpose": "the very concept of asylum," he asserted, is "an outdated and unworkable relic from the mid-20th century."

Why do Millbank, these Western leaders, and journalists such as Ed West view the Refugee Convention in this way? One reason concerns how refugees flee their homes outside of the controlled channels of immigration: "The use by the boat people of people smugglers to circumvent visa and border controls has prompted Australia to join other countries in openly questioning the operation and continuing viability of the Convention itself." Millbank goes on to point out that "asylum systems in Western countries have come under increasing strain through their use as a migration channel," though this is particularly true for European countries without traditional avenues of legal immigration.

At times, public reaction in certain Western nations to increasing numbers of refugees and other migrants entering from developing countries has been particularly negative:

Asylum seekers, along with those who enter via family reunion, have comprised the bulk of the sizeable immigrant intakes into Western European countries in recent years. Asylum-driven immigration ranks high among voter concerns, anti-foreigner sentiment is widespread, and right-wing anti-immigration parties are getting up to 30 per cent of voter support.

Political elites in numerous European nations, including France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., Sweden, and Finland, have taken hard lines on immigration to address public concerns. In this context, states have actively tried to restrict access to asylum in myriad ways, including by externalizing border controls.

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33 Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 3.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 5.


UNHCR's own magazine featured a cover story on the fiftieth anniversary of the Refugee Convention entitled "A 'Timeless' Treaty Under Attack."38 The article stated that in 2001 "the Convention is coming apart at the seams, according to some of the same capitals which had breathed life into the protection regime a half century ago."39 States reported that their asylum systems are being overwhelmed and are "urging a legal retrenchment," concluding that the Convention is "outdated, unworkable and irrelevant."40

Given the shift in developed-state attitudes towards the Refugee Convention, UNHCR, the international organization responsible for working with states as they implement this agreement, felt compelled at the end of the twentieth century to redress the deteriorating quality of asylum and to "revitalise a too often criticised, disregarded or abused protection framework."41 The agency understood that "states face considerable challenges as they try and reconcile their obligations under the Convention with problems raised by the mixed nature of migratory movements, misuse of the asylum system, increasing costs, [and] the growth in smuggling and trafficking of people."42 UNHCR proposed Global Consultations to clarify the scope and content of protection with the goal of strengthening the implementation of the 1951 Convention "as the foundation and central refugee protection instrument."43 The agency heard the complaint that the refugee treaty regime was outmoded: "We hear with increasing regularity that the protection regime of which we have been made the guardian no longer exactly fits the problem."44 UNHCR's leadership disagreed with that state perspective and asserted that "refugee protection is not a static but a dynamic and action-oriented function. It has and must retain an inherent capacity for adjustment and development in the face of a changed international environment."45 Accordingly, one of the goals of the Global Consultations was to "promote the progressive development of international law for the protection of refugees."46

39 Id. at 6.
40 Id. at 6–7.
43 U.N. High Comm't for Refugees, supra note 41.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 U.N. High Comm't for Refugees, supra note 42.
These UNHCR campaigns for the protection of refugee rights appropriately aimed to motivate states to behave as they committed themselves to do when they became signatories to or ratified this treaty and/or its Protocol, or to comply with international customary law (for those states not yet signatories). But more than a decade following UNHCR’s Global Consultations, these issues remain.47

IV. WHY AND HOW THE REFUGEE CONVENTION MATTERS TODAY: AN EXAMINATION OF NEW AGENTS AND TARGETS OF PERSECUTION

Despite these direct challenges to their effectiveness and the fact that there is no international enforcement mechanism, the Refugee Convention and Protocol are implemented on a daily basis in ways that protect persecuted refugees, even in states that have tried to limit their treaty obligations. While implementation is imperfect, many refugees are protected.48 UNHCR reported that states recognized more than 210,000 asylum-seekers as Convention refugees in 2012.49

How are states applying the terms of the Refugee Convention to protect today’s refugees who show up on their shores? Focusing on two significant legal concepts, I will show that the refugee definition has enabled states to protect refugees from new kinds of persecution and from both non-state and state agents of persecution.

47 In 2013, Millbank opined that the Refugee Convention legitimizes unregulated entry, a growing number of voters think the treaty is past its “use-by date,” and Australians should “rethink dubious international obligations” and require asylum-seekers to apply for a refugee or humanitarian visa overseas. Millbank, Ditch the Refugee Convention, supra note 5.


49 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, STATISTICAL Y’BOOK 2012 6 (2013). This number included an estimated 20,500 individuals whose negative decisions were overturned at the appeal or review stage, although UNHCR reports the figure is likely to be substantially higher, as a significant number of decisions rendered by states at the appeal or review stage of the asylum procedure have not been released. In 2012, the U.S. recognized the largest number of Convention status refugees (25,300 during the U.S. fiscal year), followed by Germany (17,100), Rwanda (15,100), Sudan (14,000), Sweden (13,700), Malaysia (13,100), and Turkey (10,900). Id. at 46. In 2013, states granted 44 percent of asylum seekers Convention refugee status or a complementary form of protection, a significantly higher value than the 37 percent granted in 2012. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, GLOBAL TRENDS 2013 30 (2014).
A. The Changing Nature of the State and Agents of Persecution

As Andrew Shacknove observed almost three decades ago, the absence of state protection is the basis of refugeehood:

In exchange for their allegiance, citizens can minimally expect that their government will guarantee physical security, vital subsistence, and liberty of political participation and physical movement. No reasonable person would be satisfied with less. Beneath this threshold the social compact has no meaning. 50

There is a long history of states not living up to this understanding of the social compact, and in that regard, many states today do not protect all their citizens well. In some instances, they are simply not willing to do so—the state itself may persecute individuals or condone persecution carried out by non-state actors. In other situations, states are willing but unable to protect all citizens.

The nature of the state has changed since 1951, resulting in governments with varying degrees of authority and territorial control. The UN consisted of fifty-one countries at its founding in 1945. Thirteen of these states participated in the Ad Hoc Committee on Stateless and Related Problems, as formed in 1949 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare and revise draft agreements on the legal status of stateless persons. 51 Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 429(V) of December 14, 1950, UNHCR convened the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, comprised of twenty-six State participants and two State observers, to prepare what became the 1951 Refugee Convention. 52 Political scientists and international relations experts report that most governments in 1951 asserted authority throughout their territory, whether they were by nature authoritarian or democratic. 53 In contrast, these experts observe a

50 Shacknove, supra note 1, at 281.
51 These states were Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Israel, Poland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela. See Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Préparatoires Analyzed, with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis 2 (1994).
52 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland (also representing Lichtenstein), Turkey, the U.K./Northern Ireland, the U.S., Venezuela and Yugoslavia were the participating states, with Cuba and Iran as observers. See U.N. High Comm’n for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees with Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 6 (Jan. 31, 1967), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66e2aan10.pdf.
range of capabilities among today's 193 members of the U.N. with respect to how well states protect their populations.54

While the model of state sovereigns effectively controlling their territories originated in seventeenth-century Western Europe, that model reached its “apex” by the middle of the twentieth century when “effective sovereignty” meant that governments not only effectively policed their own societies, but also provided public goods and services.55 “Ungoverned spaces” where state control is absent, weak, or contested emerged particularly after the end of the Cold War.56 Non-state actors, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, FARC in Colombia, and Mara Salvatrucha in El Salvador, have “provided state-like functions for extended periods of time” in recent years.57

The very concepts of “failing,” “weak,” or “fragile” states are relatively new.58 The United States National Security Strategy of 2002 as well as the European Union 2003 Security Strategy named failing or fragile states as major threats to security.59 The Fund For Peace and Foreign Policy started publishing the Fragile States Index (formerly the Failed States Index) in 2005.60 Based on twelve key political, social, and economic indicators, the Index classifies states into categories that evidence degrees of fragility and concern.61 The 2014 Index classifies thirty-four states as either Very High Alert, High Alert, or Alert; thirty-two states as Very High Warning; forty-three states as High Warning; seventeen


55 Anne L. Clunan & Harold A. Trinkunas, Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority, and Softened Sovereignty, in UNGOVERNED SPACES: ALTERNATIVES TO STATE AUTHORITY IN AN ERA OF SOFTENED SOVEREIGNTY 17, 18, 20 (Anne L. Clunan & Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., 2010).

56 Id. at 17.

57 Id. at 29.


59 Id. at 8–9; see also Liana Sun Wyler, Congressional Research Service, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy (2008).


61 See id.
states as Warning; and twelve states as Less Stable. Only forty states are classified as Stable, Very Stable, Sustainable, or Very Sustainable. This is a very different world than that of the West-dominated U.N. of the post-Second World War period when states created the Refugee Convention.

States that do not or cannot adequately protect their populations pose potential threats to their neighbors. In the extreme, a state may be violently challenged by an internal armed force, and such conflicts can spill over to other states, as occurred in West Africa in the 1990s and 2000s. Less traditional challenges to state authority over territory occur when gangs or organized crime groups control significant geographical areas. The majority of refugees in today's world have fled conflict and other serious violence.

To stabilize a region and protect their own interests, strong states today may attempt to address such problems. In 2012, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton created the newest bureau at the State Department, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), to advance "U.S. national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crises in priority countries." CSO engages in "conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization, aiming to address the underlying causes of destabilizing violence." Particularly telling is how the foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government explains why weak states are a "central security challenge." The State Department is concerned about the destabilizing effects of states unable to control their territories and protect their citizens with respect to increased risk of "weapons proliferation, organized crime, and activity by violent extremists." In the post-Cold War world, national security involves strengthening civilian security.

Even more revealing is the State Department's high prioritization of Honduras in its first year of operations. The U.S. government focuses principally on states experiencing traditional civil conflict or political violence—

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62 Id. at 4–5.
63 Id.
66 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
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Syria, Kenya, and Burma. Honduras, in contrast, matters to the State Department because its homicide levels are the highest in the world outside of war zones. CSO focuses on reforming the police and the prosecutor's office there, as well as "supporting a non-governmental coalition to enable citizens to help stem violence in their communities and advocate public security reform." Criminal violence is the issue—not political rebellion:

In recent years, Central America has become the most violent region in the world. Honduras leads this deadly trend with the world's highest murder rate of 86 per 100,000 in 2011. Increasing criminal violence and high levels of impunity have become so pervasive that citizens increasingly feel powerless to alter the grip of gangs, transnational criminal organizations, and corrupt officials. This corrosive combination of spreading violence and an increasingly resigned public threaten the security and prosperity of Honduras, potentially exacerbating trends of illegal immigration, trafficking in all forms of illicit contraband, and gang activities that reach into the U.S.

Then the real shocker comes. Belize has a serious gang problem:

Most Americans hear "Belize" and imagine sandy beaches and unspoiled rainforests. But Belize also has one of the world's highest homicide rates, due mostly to gang violence. A gang truce took effect in 2011, but it was fragile, and by January 2012 there was concern that the homicide rate would start to climb again.

The language of diplomats who work in conflict zones—a truce—is used to describe relations among gangs, thus implicitly recognizing the serious security threat posed by these non-traditional armed groups.

The U.S. government is appropriately concerned that nearby sovereigns are unable to protect their citizens from a variety of non-traditional, non-state actors. These powerful groups exercise authority through violence in many different parts of the world. Some groups control particular territories of the state. Corruption and violence enable organized criminal groups, such as drug cartels, to dominate over populations in certain areas.

To get a better picture of states that cannot protect their populations from these non-state actors, this Article closely examines certain Central American

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71 Id.
72 Id.
75 See id.
countries, along with Mexico, that have emerged as particularly dangerous.\(^76\) Different non-state actors operate in this region: street gangs, sophisticated criminal groups, and transnational criminal organizations rule particular territories. Demobilized military, paramilitary, and intelligence groups serve as the armed forces for the sophisticated cartels.\(^77\) While a significant portion of organized crime involves trafficking in people and arms, the movement of illegal drugs to the U.S. has led to violent struggles for the “strategic control of territories the length and breadth of the Central American land route between Colombia and Mexico.”\(^78\) This involves territorial control of certain urban and rural areas needed for the cross-border movement of drugs, arms, and trafficked persons.\(^79\)

In the Mexican criminal world, controlling a *plaza* means collecting what is essentially a toll, or tax, on any activity undertaken by the multiple criminal groups operating in that territory. The so-called *piso* supplies a significant revenue stream, as the command group takes upwards of half of the value of the contraband moving through its corridor, whether weapons or humans or drugs.\(^80\) The cartels have created miniature armies in the battle for territorial control.\(^81\)

Gangs working with drug cartels facilitate these movements by exercising control over communities of interest. For example, the transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha extorts small business owners and kills or threatens with death those who don’t pay the “*renta*” or “war tax.” In this way, the gang obtains the resources to secure control over their territory.\(^82\) Organized crime groups such as gangs use extortion, “death threats, rapes, killings, torture, forced recruitment of youth, boys and girls, and kidnapping” to assert authority in their communities.\(^83\) They reign with impunity, whether due to ineffective law


\(^79\) See id.

\(^80\) Dudley, *supra* note 77, at 5.

\(^81\) See id.

\(^82\) See CIDEHUM/UNHCR, *supra* note 78, at 31.

\(^83\) Id. at 14.
enforcement or corrupt officials. At times, organized crime directly infiltrates the offices of the Public Prosecutors of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Those responsible for the rule of law, such as judges, prosecutors, and mayors, are at times threatened or killed to disable the enforcement of the criminal laws. Victim and witness protection programs are limited to a few people, and many do not denounce the perpetrators out of fear. Reportedly, contacting police is not only futile, but dangerous, as it risks further violence from the gangs in retaliation.

Some 70,000 to 300,000 belong to MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and affiliates (clicas) in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. One analyst identifies two major forms: youth and adult gangs. Youth gangs rob, extort, and deal drugs on the street, while more highly-organized adult gangs are also active in international trafficking of narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and persons. These adult gangs tend to be connected to drug cartels and corrupt public officials. For all practical purposes, there is no police presence in many gang-controlled areas.

Drug cartels and gangs in this region have adopted the same methods used during decades of civil conflict to terrorize politicians and the public so that they can operate as they see fit. "The strategic use of random violence, kidnapping, torture and murder are employed as part of a coordinated effort to terrorize and co-opt police, bureaucrats, prosecutors, judges and elected officials in order to shape a socio-political environment within which they are free to operate with impunity." U.S. military analysts characterize this as "asymmetrical warfare" or "insurgency" used to establish political control and domination. Motives differ from traditional insurgents, but objectives are the same: "to impose their power and undermine the operational capacity and authority of legitimate state
actors.”93 These gangs act as de facto authorities not to perform civic functions, as some guerrilla organizations did, but to undermine states’ “capacities to fulfill basic functions of governance to the point of making legitimate institutions largely irrelevant.”94

The gangs are not monolithic even in the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America. The Los Zetas cartel in Guatemala, for example, works through local criminal “franchises.”95 In El Salvador, the maras charge a levy from a large part of the population and enforce their rule through lynching and other types of killings. This violence is used also to intimidate those who denounce the gangs to the Public Prosecutor. Reportedly, these intimidation strategies have resulted in increased withdrawal of such denunciations. In addition, the maras rely heavily on forced recruitment of young people.96 In Honduras, the organized gangs control significant areas of the country. The gangs tend to operate in the cities, while the drug cartels reign in many rural areas.97

Gangs have been and continue to be a worldwide phenomenon. Jamaica, Brazil, the Russian Federation, Nigeria, Iraq, Kenya, many Eastern European countries, and, of course, the U.S. are among the nations that have significant gang activity today.98 In discussing the challenge posed by such groups to weak states, analysts talk about “criminal conflicts” and “criminal insurgency.”99 According to a Wilson Center expert, “[t]he spread of transnational organized crime—fed by drug-trafficking and by a growing number of other illegal economies—is the most significant security challenge for Latin American and Caribbean countries today.”100

These criminal organizations take on state functions and purposes. Drug cartel violence, for example, has a political goal: to accumulate capital and secure

93 Boerman, supra note 85.
94 Id.
95 CIDEHUM/UNHCR, supra note 78, at 18.
96 See id. at 21.
97 See id. at 25.
economic dominion. In essence, cartels have morphed into an alternative society and economy. They don’t just tax the population; they “steal from or control utilities such as gasoline, sell their own products and are the ultimate decision-makers in the territories they control.”

Given how they assert territorial control, it is no surprise that drug cartel violence results in high rates of displacement. An Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre study examined displacement from states that accounted for 38 percent of Mexico’s population but 68 percent of its homicides. In over one hundred municipalities with the highest levels of violence, the rate of displacement was fifteen times higher than in municipalities without high levels of violence. Controlling for other drivers of migration, including economic, demographic and urbanization ones, the study found that 4.5 times as many people fled violent municipalities than non-violent ones. Drug-cartel related violence has displaced an estimated 220,000 Mexicans in Ciudad Juarez and its surroundings alone. More than one-quarter of the population of certain Mexican cities fled drug violence. One study found that fifty-five percent of Juarez would move out of the city for security reasons if possible.

When states cannot provide protection from groups such as drug cartels and gangs, some of the affected population cross borders to find safety. That is when the Refugee Convention comes into play for those targeted by non-state actors in connection with a protected characteristic.

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102 Id.


106 Id. at 21.
B. The New Agents of Persecution under the Refugee Convention

Given the nature of nation-states in 1951, human rights treaties focused particularly on a sovereign’s behavior towards all persons geographically within its authority. In the “European totalitarian experience, . . . refugees were primarily the persecuted victims of highly organized predatory states.”

Unfortunately, repressive governments continue to dominate their citizenry more than sixty years later. In 2012, Freedom House classified nine governments as the world’s worst human rights violators, very closely followed by seven others. The 2014 Maplecroft Human Rights Risk Index classified thirty-four countries as “extreme risk,” an increase of 70 percent since 2008. But today’s states include as well many that are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from non-state actors. How have states applied the Refugee Convention definition to these changing circumstances?

The definition itself declares that a refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” As to the identity of the persecutor, the definition is silent. Not surprisingly, this silence produced some debate among adjudicators regarding non-state actors as persecutors.

Most states interpreting the Refugee Convention readily protected those who fled persecution from both state and non-state actors. UNHCR’s

Shacknove, supra note 1, at 276.

Freedom House, Worst of the Worst 2012: The World’s Most Repressive Societies (2012), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-worst-2012-worlds-most-repressive-societies. Freedom House has identified Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as the world’s worst human rights abusers in the calendar year 2011. Two disputed territories, Tibet and Western Sahara, are also included in this category. These countries and territories received Freedom House’s lowest ratings for both political rights and civil liberties. Seven other countries (Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Cuba, Laos, and Libya) and one other territory (South Ossetia) fell just short of receiving these indicting ratings.


Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1A(2).

See Volker Turk, Non-State Agents of Persecution, in SWITZERLAND AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 95, §4.2 (V. Chetail & V. Gowlland-Debbas eds., 2002). See generally Walter Kalin, Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect, in THE CHANGING NATURE OF PERSECUTION 43–59 (2000); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Opinion of UNHCR Regarding the Question of Non-State Persecution, as Discussed with the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 1, at 276.
longstanding interpretive guidance on the Refugee Convention observes that persecution can emanate from state as well as non-state agents, including the local populace, when tolerated by the authorities or where the authorities refuse, or are unable, to provide protection. Only four European governments determined initially that under certain circumstances, the Refugee Convention did not protect individuals from persecution by non-state actors.

The jurisprudence in Germany, Switzerland, and, to some degree, that of France and Italy, differentiated among four different non-state actor situations. First, where the state instigated, condoned, or tolerated persecution, these four nations agreed with the prevailing interpretation “that persons fleeing such persecution are refugees because the State is unwilling to protect such victims.” Second, where non-state agents of persecution control all or part of the country such that they act as de facto authorities, all four agreed in principle that persons fleeing persecution carried out by these actors come within the meaning of the Convention definition. Professor Kalin observes that states have different approaches to determine the necessary conditions for a group to become a de facto authority. The main area of disagreement with the majority of governmental authorities concerns situations where the State is willing but unable to provide protection. For years, Germany, Switzerland, and France denied asylum to such forced migrants. Finally, while most states recognize as refugees those fleeing persecution where no authority exists that could protect them and other victims of persecution, these four states viewed the inability to protect in the same light as when the country of origin was willing but unable to protect.

As Kalin points out, the text does not support the interpretation that only state agents of persecution can create Convention refugees: “The wording of the 1951 Convention does not require any direct responsibility of the State.” As UNHCR’s current Director of International Protection explained about a decade

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113 Walter Kalin, Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect, 15 GEO. IMM. L.J. 415, 416 (2001).

114 See id.

115 See id. at 416–17.

116 See id. at 418. According to Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
ago, the refugee definition focuses on the act of persecution rather than the identity of the persecutor. That should not be surprising, given that the purpose of the Convention is to protect people from serious harm.\textsuperscript{117}

How has this issue evolved during the last decade or so? The High Court of Australia articulated its understanding of the non-state agent issue in a 2002 case involving domestic abuse. The High Court explained that “[i]t is accepted in Australia, and it is widely accepted in other jurisdictions, that the serious harm involved in persecution may be inflicted by persons who are not agents of the government.”\textsuperscript{118} It recognized that where the persecutor is a person or group of people, “the failure of the state to intervene to protect the victim” may be relevant to the victim’s fear of persecution—“whether the failure resulted from a state policy of tolerance or condonation of the persecution, or whether it resulted from inability to do anything about it.”\textsuperscript{119} The asylum seeker claimed that the persecution resulted from “systematic discrimination against women, involving selective enforcement of the law, which amounts to a failure of the state of Pakistan to discharge its responsibilities to protect women.”\textsuperscript{120} The High Court described this case to be one of alleged tolerance and condoning and cited to Lord Hoffman’s opinion in \textit{Ex Parte Shah}, where he classified the failure of the Nazi authorities to protect a Jewish shopkeeper set upon with impunity by business rivals as an element of persecution based upon race.\textsuperscript{121}

Recognizing non-state actors conceptually as persecutors, of course, is the first important step adjudicators took. Equally meaningful is determining when individuals do not have access to state protection from persecution by a non-state actor. In 2004, the European Council explained how to understand the State’s responsibility to protect in real terms. Article 7(2) of the European Council 2004 Qualification Directive provides that:

> protection is generally provided when the actors [both state and non-state controlling territory] take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm, \textit{inter alia}, by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access to such protection.\textsuperscript{122}

In essence, this establishes the rule of law as the measure of the state’s actual protection.

\textsuperscript{117} See Turk, supra note 111 at § 4.2.

\textsuperscript{118} Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002), 210 CLR 1, ¶ 22 (Austl.).

\textsuperscript{119} Id. ¶ 29.

\textsuperscript{120} Id. ¶ 25.

\textsuperscript{121} See id. at 30.

As courts analyze cases where the alleged persecutor is an individual or group of people, they continue to develop this rule-of-law measure. In assessing the adequacy of state protection for victims of domestic violence, the Canadian Federal Court considered critical factors to be access to restraining orders and the training of law enforcement units to facilitate effective implementation of legislation. The record in that case included evidence that the 2009 Hungarian law making restraining orders available was not effective; law enforcement units did not receive special training to facilitate implementation; Hungarian courts issued restraining orders in only twelve percent of reported domestic violence cases in 2010; and no data existed concerning breaches of these orders. As such, the court held that the Immigration and Refugee Board’s conclusion that applicants could have found meaningful state protection through the state legislation was not well founded and remanded the case for reconsideration.\(^1\)

This Canadian court also analyzed the circumstances under which asylum claimants are obliged affirmatively to seek police or state protection. In general, claimants must seek state protection unless the state is “unwilling or unable” to protect them.\(^2\) In this case, the applicants did not seek such protection. The court held that a totality-of-the-evidence test determines whether an applicant should have sought state protection.\(^3\) The court focused on evidence in this case of police corruption and abuse against Roma women and of such women experiencing a high incidence of domestic violence. Evidence did not show that government actions actually improved the situation. A study showed that Roma women reported domestic violence less often than non-Roma and lacked trust in law enforcement officials because of police antagonism and failure to provide adequate protection in the past. Accordingly, the Court held that the Board’s conclusion that the applicant “should have sought protection cannot be reasonable, in this particular case, when the totality of the evidence demonstrates that state protection would not have been reasonably forthcoming.”\(^4\)

Finally, one fascinating development with respect to persecution by non-state actors concerns the issue of the persecutor’s mens rea. By their actions, most persecutors intend to harm their victims, but adjudicators have found throughout the last two decades that persecution can proceed without such malice. A leading U.S. case authored by the Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals in an en banc decision held that female genital mutilation can be the basis for asylum and, as practiced by a particular tribe in Togo,

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\(^1\) See Judit Sebok v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2012] F.C. 1107, ¶ 25 (Can.).


\(^3\) Id. ¶ 25. The court closely examines the facts on record to reach this conclusion. See id. ¶¶ 22, 24.

\(^4\) Id. ¶ 25.
constituted persecution.127 “[S]ubjective ‘punitive’ or ‘malignant’ intent is not required for harm to constitute persecution.”128

In Chen Shi Hai, the High Court of Australia held similarly that “[p]ersecution can proceed from reasons other than ‘enmity’ and ‘malignity.’”129 The applicant was a three-and-a-half year old “black child,” the offspring of an unauthorized Chinese marriage where the parents had already had more than one child. (This third child was born while the parents awaited removal to China from Australia.) The Refugee Review Tribunal had determined that this child would be denied access to food, education, and health care beyond a very basic level and would probably confront discrimination such that he faced a real chance of persecution. But the Tribunal found that the persecution would not be for reasons of his membership in a particular social group, because the consequences he would likely suffer in China would not “result from any malignity, enmity or other averse intention towards him on the part of the authorities.”130 In the Tribunal’s view, it would result from their intention “to penalize those who have children outside the approved guidelines.”131 In contrast, the High Court held that the state targeted the applicant because he was a “black child,” observing that “from the perspective of those responsible for discriminatory treatment, [persecution] may result from the highest of motives, including an intention to benefit those who are its victims.”132

The 2004 EU Qualification Directive on Minimum Protection Standards included a directive on non-state agents of persecution, broadening protection for refugees in some countries.133 Article 6(c) listed non-state actors as agents of persecution or serious harm, if it could be demonstrated that the government or parties/organizations controlling it or a substantial part of its territory, including international organizations, is unable or unwilling to provide protection against persecution or serious harm.134 Inclusion of non-state agents of persecution broadened the refugee definition in Germany, France, and Italy, all of which transposed Article 6 literally into their refugee and asylum laws.135 Before 2003,

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128 Id. at 365.
129 Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293, ¶ 35 (Austl).
130 Id. ¶ 7.
131 Id.
132 Id. ¶ 35.
134 See id. art. 6(c).
The New Refugees and the Old Treaty

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the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) rarely granted asylum status to individuals who suffered persecution at the hands of non-state actors, but the concept of non-state agents of persecution is now part of French law.\(^{136}\) France interprets Article 6 of the Qualification Directive as allowing for persecution by non-state actors where the state or its authorities “refuse or are unable to provide protection.”\(^{137}\) In practice, France has recognized the following actors: armed rebel groups such as Islamic groups in Algeria, warlords in Afghanistan, chimères and RAMICOS\(^{138}\) in Haiti, armed groups in Iraq, revolutionary armed forces in Colombia, rebels in Somalia, and Kurd combatants; family members; and members of the local community, such as in cases regarding FGM, forced marriage, clans, tribes, mafias, and bandits.\(^{139}\)

Italy has applied the non-state actor principle in situations such as Somalia, where the state is incapable of providing protection because government authorities effectively do not exist, and translated the provision concerning non-state actors directly from the Directive.\(^{140}\) For example, during civil wars, militias that control parts of a state have been considered non-state agents of persecution.\(^{141}\)

Germany incorporated into Section 60(1) of its 2004 Immigration Act the exact definition of non-state actors of persecution that appears in the


\(^{137}\) European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 84.


\(^{139}\) See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 86.

\(^{140}\) See id. at 84.

\(^{141}\) See id. at 87.
Qualification Directive. The Federal Office guidelines include private persons such as family members as valid agents of persecution. The Federal Office has also accepted the following non-state agents of persecution: clans, criminals, mafia, bandits, paramilitaries, religious extremists, and terrorists. Some courts ruled that only those agents who possess levels of power and organization comparable to a state’s will qualify as non-state agents of persecution, but the higher Federal Administrative Court decided that no such particular requirements will apply in order to qualify a person or group as a non-state actor. Nor do such particular requirements apply in the case law to situations in which the applicant’s country of origin possesses no functioning state authority.

The concept of a non-state agent of persecution thus has developed over time. From the beginning, most states applied the 1951 Convention to cases involving such persecutors. Germany, Switzerland, and to some degree France and Italy were outliers for some time, but have since aligned their positions on non-state agents of persecution with the majority of other states. The non-state persecutor has raised important issues regarding the state’s willingness and ability to protect citizens from serious harms. In conformance with the purpose of the Refugee Convention, adjudicators have applied the terms of the refugee definition to new agents of persecution as the nature of the state has changed. Have they also found the definition capable of addressing new types of persecution?

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142 See id. at 84.
143 See id. at 84, 86–87.
144 See id. at 87.
145 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] July 18, 2008, BVerwGE 1 C 15.05 (Ger.); European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 87.
146 See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 87; see also Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Apr. 27, 2010, BVerwGE 10 C 4.09 (Ger.).
147 At the global level, one related development that may have contributed to a shift in this debate followed adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This global agreement defines persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender grounds as a crime against humanity, capable of commission by both state and non-state agents. Germany, Switzerland, France, and Italy each signed on to this treaty in the year it was created. STATE PARTIES TO THE ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
C. The New Targets of Persecution under the Refugee Convention: Particular Social Groups Today

Given the significant ways in which the state and agents of persecution have changed since 1951, it should come as no surprise that refugees have fled new forms of persecution. One of the five grounds established by the Convention definition, membership in a particular social group, has played a key role in protecting refugees in the context of the changing nature of persecution. What did this ground mean in 1951, and what does it mean today?

In the first part of the twentieth century before the Second World War, the international community approached refugee flight as group movement. At the request of the League of Nations, the first High Commissioner for Refugees focused his efforts on assisting over one million Russians who fled civil war and famine. The League quickly expanded High Commissioner Nansen's mandate as the Graeco-Turkish War created over two million refugees. The new groups included Greeks, Turks, Armenians, and Bulgarians.¹⁴⁸

This group-based, ad hoc approach to international displacement shifted when the Allied Powers focused on the forty million displaced persons at the end of the Second World War.¹⁴⁹ Most repatriated after the war, some unwillingly, including Ukrainians and those from the Baltic States. When significant numbers of Eastern Europeans resisted repatriation, causing a major diplomatic confrontation in the fledgling UN Security Council, the U.S. led an effort to end these returns and establish an agency mandated to find a durable solution other than repatriation for these refugees. In establishing the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in July 1947, the UN General Assembly declared that no refugees with “valid objections” shall be returned to their country of origin.¹⁵⁰

Which objections were valid? To answer this question, the General Assembly created the IRO Constitution and the first modern refugee definition—an individual rather than group-based concept. Valid objections related to fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, derived from the Nazi experience and applicable to the Soviet one. The human rights of individual refugees—reflecting the fundamental dignity of each person—were born.

The IRO refugee definition is very similar to the Refugee Convention definition, created only four years later. The Refugee Convention negotiators

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¹⁴⁹ See id. at 13.

¹⁵⁰ Id. at 16.
added a fifth ground, membership in a particular social group,\footnote{Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, \textit{Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting}, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.19 (1951), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cda4.html.} proposed by the Swedish delegate.\footnote{See id.} The \textit{travaux preparatoires} only briefly mention this ground and give no information as to what the Swedish delegate or the other negotiators had in mind by this term. In introducing it at the 19th Meeting, the Swedish delegate simply said: “Such cases existed, and it would be as well to mention them explicitly.”\footnote{Id.} This was not at all controversial. In fact, the delegates adopted this ground by unanimous consent without discussion at the 23rd Meeting.\footnote{See Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, \textit{Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting}, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.23 (1951), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cda10.html.}

Because so much jurisprudence during the last quarter of a century has focused on the types and targets of persecution, it may come as quite a surprise to many that the negotiators did not even discuss this aspect of the definition. As Aleinikoff points out, the delegates seriously debated other aspects of the refugee definition, perhaps more than any other topic. They focused on issues such as the geographical and temporal limitations of the definition. But there is “virtually no discussion” of the kinds of persecution.\footnote{T. Alexander Aleinikoff, \textit{The Meaning of Persecution in U.S. Asylum Law}, in \textit{Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States} 292, 297 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).} Aleinikoff concludes:

> My best reading of the \textit{travaux} is that the Convention was written with the intent of protecting all persons (and groups) then existing in Europe who had been or were likely to be the victims of persecution. No forms of persecution were intentionally excluded (although various other exclusions were written into the Convention).\footnote{Id.}

The concept of particular social group (PSG) may have referred to groups such as gay people persecuted by the Nazis and the wealthy class targeted by the Soviets.\footnote{See \textit{The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary} 62–64 (A. Zimmermann, J. Dorschner & F. Machts eds., 2011).} Almost fifty years ago, the first major treatise writer on international refugee law, Professor Grahl-Madsen, observed that “[n]obility, capitalists, landowners, civil servants, businessmen, professional people, farmers, workers, members of a linguistic or other minority, even members of certain associations, clubs, or societies, all constitute social groups of various kinds.”\footnote{Atle Grahl-Madsen, \textit{The Status of Refugees in International Law: Volume 1} 219 (1966).}
Developed increasingly since the 1980s, PSG especially reflects the changing nature of persecution and its agency. Today states apply this ground to a range of groups in need of protection, where the government is unable or unwilling to meet its responsibilities to its citizens. Such groups include those defined by gender, sexual orientation, procreation, age, family, and socioeconomic status.¹⁵⁹

Indeed, gender-related asylum law has developed considerably over time. In 1985, the Executive Committee of UNHCR, which is constituted by governments, observed that “[s]tates, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a ‘particular social group.’”¹⁶⁰ In 1999, the U.K. House of Lords granted the claims of two married Pakistani women who were subjected to serious physical abuse by their husbands in Islam and Shah, defining the social group as “Pakistani women” and acknowledging the applicants’ counsel’s argument concerning the dangers that await Pakistani women who transgress social mores.¹⁶¹ Today, states grant asylum to women and girls who transgress or object to prevailing social mores of their societies.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ See Ram v. MIEA (1995) 57 FCR 565, 568 (Austl) (describing class-based executions during the French Revolution and during Pol Pot’s rule in Cambodia as “textbook examples” of persecution for membership in a particular social group); SZLAN v. MLAC (2008) 171 FCR 145, [70] (Austl) (commenting that a Maoist “policy of targeting suitably wealthy victims [for extortion] would tend to support a finding that ‘wealthy Nepalis’ were a relevant particular social group that needed to be considered”); MA6-03043 [2009] CanLII 47104, [18] (Can. I.R.B.) (recognizing that “poor Haitian women with HIV/AIDS” can constitute a PSG); MAO-06253 [2001] CanLII 26873, 2 (Can. I.R.B.) (finding that “in a country where major landholders, with impunity and the use of violence, still oppose agrarian reforms designed to provide poor and disadvantaged peasants with a minimum of dignity and chance for survival, membership in such an agricultural cooperative is a sacred and essential right which no one should be compelled to waive”). In Bastanpour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Posner thought that the kulaks (affluent Russian peasants) who had been persecuted by Stalin were the sort of group intended to be covered by the term “particular social group,” cited in A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 265–66 (Austl).


¹⁶² See, for example, Asylgerichtshof [AsylGH] [Asylum Court] Dec. 6, 2012, docket No. C16 427465-1/2012 (Austria) (deciding that an Afghan girl raised in a traditional Afghan-oriented parental home and thus prevented from exercising her fundamental human rights, is a member of a particular social group and eligible for refugee status); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG] [Administrative Court] Jan. 18, 2011, A 6 K 615/10 (Ger.) (stating that “unmarried woman with a ‘Western’ lifestyle” in Iraq would be at risk of gender-based persecution).
For some two decades now, courts and other adjudicators in Europe and North America have recognized many different types of gender-specific persecution and gender-related grounds of persecution, including women subjected to forced marriage, single Muslim mothers of illegitimate children, Iranian women or divorced women in Iran, women in El Salvador, honor killings, dowry-related deaths, female genital mutilation (FGM), domestic violence, forced abortion or sterilization, and trafficking.


164 Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg [VG] [Administrative Court] Apr. 13, 2011, 3 A 2966/09 (Ger.);


166 SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v. SBBK (2003) 199 ALR 43 (Aust.) (finding error in lower court’s refusal to recognize Iranian woman who desired to live apart from her husband and obtain a divorce as well as divorced women in Iran as members of particular social groups); see also Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (1996) (N.Z.) (finding that the “particular social group” limb of the Convention is particularly relevant to a woman’s asylum claim based on the male domination of women in Iranian society at large).

167 Decision by Immigration Judge Amy C. Hoogasian, San Francisco Immigration Court, Nov. 7, 2012 (on file with author; non-binding) (this case involved a woman targeted by a gang member).

168 Migrationsöverdomstolen [MIG] [Migration Court of Appeal] 2011-03-09 UM 3363-10 & 3367-10 (Swed.); Nejvyšší správní soud (Dec. of the Supreme Administrative Court of May 18, 2011), 5 Azs 6/2011-49 (Czech); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG] [Administrative Court] Sept. 8, 2008, A 10 K 13/07 (Ger.).

169 CRDD U96-03318, June 9, 1997 (Can.) (Indian woman whose in-laws target her because of their dissatisfaction with dowry).

170 See In re Kasinga, supra note 127 (granting asylum to woman who fled Togo to avoid a polygamous forced marriage and feared subjection to FGM upon her return); Matter of A-T-, 24 I & N. Dec. 617, 621 (A.G. 2008) (interpreting asylum law’s nexus requirement by concluding that a victim of FGM cannot have her social-group claim rebutted merely on the grounds that she cannot be subjected to the procedure again, but that the government must demonstrate that the applicant is no longer at risk on account of her membership within the particular social group); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that applicant was part of a persecuted social group and eligible for asylum as a Somali female, and noting “the possession of the immutable trait of being female is a motivating factor—if not a but-for cause of the persecution [of FGM]”); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that applicant suffered from FGM on account of being a member of the social group of Somali females).

171 S.A.N., Jan. 13, 2009 (No. 1528/2009) (Spain) (gender-based persecution is included in the Convention ground “membership of a particular social group” because both “sex” and “women” can be considered social groups; sexually violent acts, domestic and family violence, that cause deep physical and mental harm constitute grounds upon which persecution can be claimed); Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161 (holding that “women in Pakistan” are a particular social group, and granting refugee status to two Pakistani women because, by virtue of the fact that they were female, their husbands suspected them of adultery and the State would not protect them);
Starting in the 1990s, UNHCR and various governments promulgated their own guidelines for gender-related violence and asylum claims. The use of rape in the Bosnian civil war, which received significant media attention, affected adjudicators' understanding of this sexual violence as a form of persecution. International jurists declared rape a war crime for the first time.

Domestic violence as a form of persecution has been a particularly challenging issue in terms of the nexus to a PSG. An applicant may be abused by a spouse or a relative for various reasons, but if she can show that her likely subjection to further abuse without state protection is by reason of membership in a PSG, such as "women in Pakistan," then she may be eligible for asylum protection. Questions of systematic discrimination against women involving

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172 Re VCT, [2000] C.R.D.D., VA0-00592 (Can.) (Chinese woman arrested and forced to have an abortion protected as member of particular social group of women in China who have one child and are faced with forced sterilization); Verwaltungsgericht Trier [VG] [Administrative Court Trier] Mar. 23, 2011, 5 K 1181/10.TR (Ger.) (granting refugee status to Chinese mother of two children, connecting fear of forced sterilization to "membership of the particular social group of women"); A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, supra note 159 (upholding Tribunal's order granting refugee status to Chinese "parents in the reproductive age group").

173 C.R.D.D. No. 261, V95-02904 (Nov. 26, 1997) (Can.) (determining a Ukrainian woman trafficked into prostitution by Ukrainian organized criminals to be a member of a particular social group, namely "impoverished young women from the former Soviet Union"); SB [2008] UKAIT 00002, available at http://www.aist.gov.uk/Public/Upload/i2087/00002_ukait_2008_sb_moldova_cg.doc (concluding that "former victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation" were members of a particular social group); Cour nationale du droit d'asile [CNDA] [National Asylum Court] Apr. 29, 2011, No. 10012810 (Fr.) (granting refugee status to claimant as a member of the particular social group: "prostitutes who come from the State of Edo and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks").


selective enforcement of the law have been explored in a number of cases. For example, the applicant in *Khawar*:

claims that the violence is tolerated and condoned; not merely at a local level by corrupt, or inefficient, or lazy, or under-resourced police, but as an aspect of systematic discrimination against women, involving selective enforcement of the law, which amounts to a failure of the state of Pakistan to discharge its responsibilities to protect women.\(^{176}\)

In another Australian case, the Refugee Review Tribunal granted refugee protection to a Filipina woman fleeing domestic violence in her home country on the basis of her being a member of the particular social group of women. Tribunal Member Lesley Hunt described how shared immutable and social characteristics bind women as a particular social group *per se*.

That domestic violence... is regarded in many countries as a private problem rather than a public crime, can be directly attributed to women’s social status; to the fact that historically, in many societies, women have been, and in many instances still are, regarded as being the private property of firstly their fathers then their husbands... whilst there does exist separation in lifestyles, values, political leaning, etc., women share a defined social status and as such are differentially dealt with by society as a group. It is women’s social status that often leads to the failure of state protection, and this is particularly so with regard to domestic violence.\(^{177}\)

Canadian adjudicators frequently identify highly particularized social groups defined by a combination of gender, nationality, and personal circumstance. Examples of these formulations that Canadian courts have recognized as grounds for granting refugee protection include: “women who are subject to domestic violence in Ecuador”\(^{19}\), “Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse”\(^{178}\), “Bulgarian women vulnerable to wife abuse by men with government

\(^{176}\) *Khawar*, supra note 118, at ¶ 25.


influence”;180 and “Westernized Tajik woman in a society moving towards Islamic orthodoxy, with no male protection,”181 to note just a few.182

The U.K. House of Lords has recognized that domestic violence victims denied adequate state protection could receive asylum and that “women” from relevant states could comprise a PSG.183 In 1999, the Lords deemed in Shah that two Pakistani women were harmed by their husbands for personal reasons but found that the applicants were denied state protection in Pakistan because of their gender, supplying the nexus to the particular social group of Pakistani women.184 Lord Hoffman explained that the central issue in determining the relevant social group was Pakistani women’s deprivation of human rights.185 In post-Shah decisions, the U.K.’s Immigration and Asylum Chamber has rejected women per se as particular social groups from applicants in certain states, usually on the ground that women’s treatment in these states was better than Pakistani women’s treatment in Shah.186 However, applicants from some states with egregious gender persecution have received asylum on the basis of membership in a PSG:187 for example, the Court of Appeal found that the Ethiopian government was complicit in gender persecution because it rarely prosecuted rapes and offered a statutory marital rape exception.188

Spain’s case law also supports granting asylum to claimants who request protection based on gender persecution by non-state actors. The National High Court granted refugee status to an Algerian woman who alleged physical and mental abuse inflicted on her and her children by her husband, ruling that


181 See id. at 652.

182 See Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161.

183 See id. at 654.

184 See id. at 652.


186 See, for example, RG (Ethiopia) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 339, [45]–[46]; P&M (Kenya) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1640, [21], [37]; NI (Pak.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] UKAIT 04408, [9].

187 See RG (Ethiopia), supra note 187.
gender persecution is included in the Convention’s PSG ground because both “sex” and “women” can be considered social groups.189

PSG issues connected to domestic violence have been controversial in the U.S. While years of litigation and very slow rulemaking have not yet yielded the precise legal guidance needed, the Department of Homeland Security argued in an unusual brief to the administrative appellate Board of Immigration Appeals that the agency believes that women of a particular nationality who are (1) in domestic relationships they are unable to leave or (2) viewed as property by virtue of their position in a domestic relationship, may constitute a particular social group under the refugee definition.190 In 2014, the Board issued a precedential decision holding that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constituted a cognizable particular social group.191

The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women urges states to fulfill their obligation to eliminate violence against women.192 It specifically presses states to take protective measures against persecution of women by non-state actors, noting:

International human rights law requires a state to take measures—such as by legislation and administrative practices—to control, regulate, investigate, and prosecute actions by non-state actors that violate the human rights of those within the territory of that state. These actions by non-state actors do not have to be attributed to the state, rather this responsibility is part of the state’s obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the rights of all persons in a state’s territory.193

Claims based on family membership or family status have similarly been found to fall into the PSG framework. Such claims include membership within a family or couple that is involved in honor killings;194 procreation, either for couples or one member of the couple only;195 and forced marriage.196 It is well

190 See DHS Brief, supra note 171, at 14.
194 See, for example, 1209126 [2013] RRTA 109 (Austl); Migrationsöverdomstolen [Migration Court of Appeal] 2011-03-09 UM 3363-10 & 3367-10 (Swed.).
195 See, for example, He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2003); AX (Family Planning Scheme) China CG [2012] UKUT 97 (IAC) (16 Apr. 2012); A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, supra note 159.
established that a family can constitute a PSG; the main issue with these claims is whether fear of persecution is connected to the individual’s status as a family member.\textsuperscript{197}

Claims based on age have included claims of “black children,” or children born of an unauthorized marriage and in contravention of China’s one-child policy,\textsuperscript{198} street children,\textsuperscript{199} and abandoned children.\textsuperscript{200} The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Tribunal recognized a young Sri Lankan boy who faced a serious possibility of forced conscription as a child soldier and decided that he was a Convention refugee based on his membership in a PSG.\textsuperscript{201}

Sexual orientation claims have become increasingly prominent and accepted. Recognized PSGs in this area have included gay men,\textsuperscript{202} lesbians,\textsuperscript{203} bisexuals,\textsuperscript{204} and transgendered individuals.\textsuperscript{205} The interpretation of this term of

\textsuperscript{196} See, for example, Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg [VG] [Administrative Court of Augsburg] June 16, 2011, AU 6 K 30092 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg [VG] [Administrative Court of Oldenburg] Apr. 13, 2011, 3 A 2566/09 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG] [Administrative Court of Stuttgart] Mar. 14, 2011, A 11 K 553/10 (Ger.) (“unmarried women from families whose traditional self-image demands forced marriage”).

\textsuperscript{197} See Judit Sebok, supra note 123, at 5; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sarrayola (1999) F.C.A. 1134 (Austl.) (finding that claimant whose family was threatened by a Colombian organized crime organization responsible for the death of her brother, is a member of a PSG based on her family membership; granting a protection visa, even though her brother’s death was not motivated for a Convention reason); Lavin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding parents of Burmese student dissidents a PSG).

\textsuperscript{198} See Chen Shi Hai, supra note 129.


\textsuperscript{201} See Savundaranayaga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] F.C. 31 ¶ 21(Can.).

\textsuperscript{202} See HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 643 (gay man from Iran); Verwaltungsgericht Köln [VG] [Administrative Court of Köln] Sept. 15, 2011, 18 K 6103/10.A (Ger.) (gay man from Guinea); Amfani v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) (imputed PSG—Ghanaian mistakenly believed to be gay); Nejvysší správní soud zed ne 05.10.2006 (NSS) [Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Oct. 5, 2006], čj. 2 Azs 66/2006-52 (Czech) (gay man from Armenia).

\textsuperscript{203} See Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007) (lesbian woman from Uganda); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG] [Administrative Court Stuttgart] June 29, 2006, A 11 K 10841 (Ger.) (lesbian woman from Iran).


\textsuperscript{205} See Ornelas Chavez v. Gonzalez, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (transgender woman from Mexico); Asylgerichtshof [Asylum Court] Feb. 24, 2011, A4 213316-0/2008 (Austria) (transgender woman from Egypt).
art as it applies to sexual orientation has evolved. Around 1980, for example, Dutch and Canadian courts disagreed as to whether “sexual disposition” could constitute a particular social group.

Other accepted PSGs today range from slaves to clan members to groups based on “former” status, such as former government personnel who possess classified information, police officers, and child soldiers.

Given the worldwide prominence of gangs, new PSGs have arisen in connection with those targeted by gang-based violence. Gangs try to recruit the very young, marginal youth (poor and often homeless), and single women or women heads of household with children. Rebuffing such recruitment and refusing to pay extortion demands are considered insults and acts of serious disrespect in gang culture. Persistent refusal to join often triggers increasing

209 See Sepuhwida v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2006) (former personnel of Colombia’s Attorney General’s office who possessed valuable, classified information); Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir.1998) (former bodyguard to daughters of Peruvian President); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2007) (defected from the KGB Intelligence Service); Garcia v. Atty Gen., 665 F.3d 496 (3rd Cir. 2011) (civilian witnesses who assisted law enforcement against violent gangs in Guatemala).
214 See Boerman, supra note 85; UNHCR Gang Guidance Note, supra note 213, at 2.
violence because it is seen as a challenge to the respect and reputation that gang members depend on to thrive.\(^{215}\)

Even when children succumb to the pressure to join gangs, the persecution that they face does not cease. Youth, particularly those with tattoos, presumed to be gang members are most likely to be targeted by the police, rival gangs, and death squads engaged in “social cleansing.”\(^{216}\) “[H]aving one or more tattoos renders a person suspicious in the eyes of the police and of society at large; tattooed youths in particular face discrimination and run a high risk of being attacked as gang members.”\(^{217}\) At one point during the Salvadoran government’s Mano Dura campaign, the Anti-Gangs Act of 2003 specified that being tattooed established gang membership.\(^{218}\) In some cases, the police have killed persons with tattoos on the spot.\(^{219}\)

Gang-related claims for protection are one of the most controversial areas of refugee law today in the U.S.,\(^{220}\) the U.K.,\(^{221}\) Australia,\(^{222}\) and Canada.\(^{223}\) Some

\(^{215}\) See Boulton, supra note 98, at 16–17.

\(^{216}\) NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 181–82 (Laura Pedraza Farina, Spring Miller & James L. Cavallaro eds., 2010).

\(^{217}\) Id. at 182.

\(^{218}\) See id. at 110–13.

\(^{219}\) See id. at 186–91.

\(^{220}\) See, for example, Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2005); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re Orozco-Polanco, File No. A75-244-012, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. of El Paso, TX, 123-23 (Dec. 18, 1997). Much of the current judicial debate in the U.S., for example, centers on issues regarding “social visibility or distinction” and “particularity.” First, there is a debate as to whether the refugee definition requires more than a showing that a claimant fears persecution in connection with an immutable characteristic or one that is so fundamental to an individual’s identity that they should not be forced to change. See A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d, Uzcategui v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2007); CA-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d, Castillo- Arias v. Atty’ Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006). At present, there is a circuit split. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding both social visibility and particularity requirements and rejecting the proposed social group of “young women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment”); Valdiviez-Galdamez v. Atty’ General, 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (joining the Seventh Circuit in rejecting visibility and particularity concepts); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding particularity test, but declining to rule on social visibility while noting circuit split), Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521-22 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding social visibility and particularity tests). Second, where “social visibility or distinction” and “particularity” are required, judges differ with regard to the meaning of these terms. See Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009)) (“[T]he Board requires that a particular social group have ... ‘social visibility, meaning that members possess characteristics ... visible and recognizable by others in the native country.’”). But see Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Board cited cases which hold that a group must have ‘social visibility’ to be a ‘particular social group,’ meaning that ‘members of a society perceive those in question as members of a social
states have begun to recognize as refugees individuals who fear persecution in connection with gangs, while others have rejected that understanding of the Refugee Convention. I would argue that such struggles to determine just who merits protection demonstrate the evolving nature of persecution and the ongoing viability of a definition created over sixty years ago.

In recent years, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board granted Convention protection to a journalist who was targeted by an organized crime group as a result of articles he had written. Australia’s Refugee Tribunal granted protection to an applicant based on a fear of persecution as a result of pursuing an occupation (public transport drivers) targeted by gangs to pay extortionate demands. But adjudicators in Canada and the U.K. have also rejected other gang-related claims.

As of now, many gang-related claims in the U.S. are rejected with respect to membership in a particular social group. But a close look reveals that in certain gang-related cases, claimants may be eligible for protection. U.S. federal courts have held or indicated support for the concept that membership in a particular social group can involve the following gang-related circumstances: witnesses who have testified against gang members; family members of such witnesses; family members of those who resist forcible recruitment; and

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221 VM (Kenya) v. Secy of State for the Home Dept [2008] UKAIT 00049, [214] (“Appellant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in her home area in Kenya at the hands of members of the Mungiki, from whom the state is unwilling or unable to protect her, by reason of her membership of the particular social group ‘women in Kenya’ (alternatively ‘intact women (girls)’”).

222 RRT Case No. 0906782 (2009) R.R.T.A. 1063 (Austl) (concluding that the reason “bus, public transport and truck drivers are targeted [by MS-13 and MS-18 in El Salvador] is their membership of the particular social group they comprise”).


224 See id. at 5. The Board found that the claimant “should not be expected to abandon his vocation and go into hiding in another location in Mexico.” Id.

225 See RRT Case No. 0906782, supra note 222, ¶ 84 (where the recognized particular social group was “bus, public transport, and truck drivers”).

226 See, for example, Orphée v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] F.C. 966, [20] (Can.) (dismissing a claim from a taxi driver on the basis that the ‘vocation of taxi driver does not constitute an innate characteristic or one that is fundamental to human dignity’); Emilia Del Soorro Gutierrez Gomez v. Secy of State for the Home Dept [2000] UKIAT 00007, ¶ 73(Ill)) (refusing to recognize participants in community-based group that provides legal advice to victims of gang extortion).

227 See Garcia, supra note 209.

228 See Crespin-Valladares, supra note 220.

former gang members.230 One immigration judge held that tattooed youth in such circumstances constitute a particular social group.231 Another immigration judge found an Evangelical Christian eligible for asylum in connection with gang persecution.232

As explained earlier, much has changed since the General Assembly adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention in response to Nazi and Soviet persecution. Governments continue to persecute but also create refugees when they prove to be ineffective at protecting their citizens from non-state agents of persecution. Moreover, those non-state agents come in many forms. Some act like governments and control territory and the lives of those who reside under their de facto jurisdiction. Others persecute nuclear family members in societies that enable men to treat women, girls, and boys as property.

While both state and non-state agents target some of the same individuals and groups, many new refugees flee particularly from non-state actors. This is especially the case with respect to targeting connected to gender, sexual orientation, age, and family, as described above.

Identifying the new refugees is an ongoing challenge for states and civil society. Not surprisingly, jurists, advocates, UNHCR, and experts disagree in robust ways over recognizing new targets of persecution. But through such contestation, Member States have determined that many new refugees, too, merit the protection provided by the 1951 Convention.

V. WHAT HAS ENABLED THE REFUGEE CONVENTION TO ADAPT TO CHANGES OVER TIME?

What has made it possible for this treaty to evolve with respect to new agents, forms, and targets of persecution? The State Parties created a treaty with two core and interlocking characteristics enabling this development: a special purpose that goes to the fundamental nature of the state system, and terms that possess a reasonable degree of flexibility. Recognizing these traits, lawyers have continuously adapted the refugee definition to new circumstances.

230 See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 366–67 (6th Cir. 2010).


First, the Convention focused on one of the central purposes of the modern state: to protect citizens and residents from serious harm in connection with personal characteristics or fundamental beliefs and opinions. Of course, a treaty's purpose generally matters under international norms. According to the Vienna Convention, states must interpret treaties in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and "in the light of its object and purpose." As Professor Steinbock explains, the object and purpose are grounded in the terms of the treaty; the terms cannot be fully understood outside that context. He refers to Professor Brownlie's "principle of integration," which holds that the meaning of the terms "emerges in the context of the treaty as a whole and in light of its objects and purposes." According to Steinbock, "[t]his is especially so when the textual approach leaves the decision-maker with a choice of possible meanings."

Steinbock identifies the protection of the innocent as one important purpose of the Refugee Convention. "The core concept of the refugee definition is protection against the infliction of harm on the basis of differences in personal status or characteristics." Steinbock locates this purpose "within what is probably the most prevalent theme of post-1945 human rights law: non-discrimination." As Steinbock argues, the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protect an individual targeted in connection with any status or characteristic that is a discriminatory and irrelevant basis for the infliction of harm. The object and purpose itself means that the refugee definition is applicable to a "wide variety of social statuses and affiliations." As such, the object and purpose enable the refugee definition to respond to "evolving forms of oppression."

Second, in addition to establishing a special purpose, states created the refugee definition with "flexible" terms that make it open to a variety of interpretations. While that allows adjudicators to apply the treaty to new forms

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235 Id. at 19 (internal citation omitted).
236 Id. at 20.
237 Id. at 21.
238 Id.
239 See id. at 34.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 See Sztucki, supra note 12, at 58.
and targets of persecution, commentators have noted that it also enables instability: "numerous amendments to national immigration and refugee legislation, which do not in any case follow the same pattern, have demonstrated the ‘flexibility’, or rather the instability, of the substance of the Convention definition." Critics of the 1951 Convention’s definitions have argued that vague wording has forced states to come up with their own definitions, including both expansive and restrictive interpretations.

Certainly, adjudicators, advocates, experts, and officials debate and disagree about the meaning of these terms. At the same time, consider the ways in which adjudicators have applied the refugee definition to non-state agents of persecution and new forms and targets of serious harm over time. Lord Hoffman analyzed this characteristic with respect to membership in a particular social group in the Shah case:

[The concept of a social group is a general one and its meaning cannot be confined to those social groups which the framers of the Convention may have had in mind. In choosing to use the general term “particular social group” rather than an enumeration of specific social groups, the framers of the Convention were in my opinion intending to include whatever groups might be regarded as coming within the anti-discriminatory objectives of the Convention.]

In the same case, Lord Hope explained that the evolutionary approach enables adjudicators to take into account societal changes as well as persecutory forms of discrimination of which the treaty negotiators were unaware. In short, the terms possess adequate flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances.

Finally, lawyers have played a crucial role in understanding and applying the object and purpose of the refugee definition as well as its flexibility to changing times. This happened almost from the start when the first major European refugee crisis occurred following Western support for and Soviet repression of the Hungarian rebellion in 1956, as explained above. UNHCR’s top lawyer, Dr. Weis, applied the Refugee Convention to the already-changing

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243 Id. at 75 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
244 See, for example, Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 8, 16.
245 Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161, at 15.
246 See Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161, at 21.
247 One of the leading refugee law scholars, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, finds some of the 1951 Convention refugee definition criteria to be clear-cut, and others to be “open.” “These latter must inevitably be filled out by human experience; there are new groups of refugees, as there always have been new groups of refugees.” Professor Goodwin-Gill makes these observations in response to those who view the Convention as a “relic from a bygone era.” Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Editorial: Asylum 2001 – A Convention and a Purpose, 13 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE LAW 1, 7 (2001).
times then, as the chief legal advisors to the High Commissioner have continued to do to this day.

UNHCR's Protection Division (today's legal department) has contributed legal analyses to help guide state behavior through the Handbooks on Voluntary Repatriation,\textsuperscript{248} Emergencies,\textsuperscript{249} and Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,\textsuperscript{250} as well as guidance on such subjects as claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity,\textsuperscript{251} child asylum claims,\textsuperscript{252} and religion-based refugee claims.\textsuperscript{253} The Division directed the Global Consultations discussed above to meet the six main goals of its program of action: strengthening implementation of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, protecting refugees within broader migration movements, sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive and protect refugees, addressing security-related concerns more effectively, redoubling the search for durable solutions, and meeting the protection needs of refugee women and children.\textsuperscript{254} UNHCR lawyers also argue their interpretations of significant refugee definition issues in amicus briefs and other court submissions in the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and elsewhere. For example, UNHCR has explained its understanding of membership in a particular social group,\textsuperscript{255} immigration detention,\textsuperscript{256} well founded fear of persecution,\textsuperscript{257} gender-


\textsuperscript{252} U.N. High Comm't for Refugees, *supra* note 199.


based persecution, and internal armed conflict. Protection Division lawyers have written thoughtfully about specific definitional matters, as Volker Turk did regarding non-state persecutors discussed earlier. In the tradition of UNHCR legal analysis approaching the new forms of persecution and persecutors, Turk argues that the Convention wording on persecution possesses an open and flexible character that enables it to adapt to changing circumstances and forms of persecution.

Advocates have contributed significantly to our evolving understanding of the Convention refugee definition. Practitioners and NGOs have articulated legal arguments demonstrating how the refugee definition applies to a particular individual persecuted by a non-state actor in connection with a protected status or characteristic. Leadership and lawyering at non-governmental organizations have made a difference in how adjudicators and policy makers have interpreted this treaty to apply to the new refugees.

Scholars have brought special expertise to bear on analyzing the refugee definition. It is not uncommon for the high courts of various jurisdictions to refer to the analyses that these experts provide. When UNHCR sought to


260 Turk, supra note 111, at §4.2.

261 Many NGO’s—too many to name—have made a difference in this way, such as Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, and the various national Refugee Councils.

262 For example, Guy Goodwin-Gill advised on legal issues of statelessness and “returnability” in the case of North Koreans seeking asylum in the U.K. and the scope of exclusion under Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention. See’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Al Jedda [2013] UKSC 62 (9 Oct. 2013);
engage states in the new millennium on significant protection issues related to
the interpretation of the refugee definition, the agency called on well-recognized
scholars to provide their analyses as the basis for discussions, asked these
experts to further develop their studies based on those roundtables, and then
published their work in *Refugee Protection in International Law.*

Ultimately, as the above analysis demonstrates, judges have determined that
the Convention is applicable to new agents, forms, and targets of persecution.
The evolution of interpretations has benefitted at times from the comparative
law discussions of this international treaty as it has been applied through
domestic legal systems. According to Judge North of the Federal Court of
Australia and his co-author, “the people who are best equipped to persuade
judges are fellow jurists and experts.” Some national high courts have been
particularly open to consider the analyses of other high courts and at times adopt
such interpretations. Certainly the International Association of Refugee Law
Judges (IARLJ), made up of jurists throughout the world who focus on
interpreting the Convention definition, has contributed to a serious exchange of
ideas through their world conferences and publications. In fact, one can argue
that the challenges of understanding the refugee definition in light of changing
circumstances led to the very establishment of this organization in 1997.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Refugee Convention and Protocol constitute the major human rights
treaty on cross-border forced migration. The International Law Commission’s

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264 Anthony M. North & Joyce Chia, *Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee
Convention: A Proposal for the Establishment of an International Judicial Commission for
Refugees,* in *THE UNHCR AND THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW* 226, 242

265 See, for example, *Ex Parte Shah,* *supra* note 161, at 8; *Ward,* *supra* note 163; *A v. Minister for
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs,* *supra* note 159.

266 The IARLJ Constitution states that:

[Judges and quasi-judicial decision makers in all regions of the world have a
special role to play in ensuring that persons seeking protection outside their
country of origin find the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as
other international and regional instruments applied fairly, consistently, and in
accordance with the rule of law.

One of the major goals of the association is to promote “a common understanding of refugee law
principles” to jurists worldwide. The IARLJ Constitution is available at http://www.iarlj.org/
general/iarlj/the-association/constitution/english.
The New Refugees and the Old Treaty

project on examining treaties over time explained the need for studying such significant international agreements as follows:

As important treaties reach a certain age, in particular law-making treaties of the post-1945 era, the context in which they operate becomes different from the one in which they were conceived... As their context evolves, treaties face the danger of either being 'frozen' into a state in which they are less capable of fulfilling their object and purpose, or of losing their foundation in the agreement of the parties... Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice aim at finding a flexible approach to treaty application and interpretation, one that is at the same time rational and predictable.

The Special Rapporteur on “subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation” based his first report on “the jurisprudence of a, hopefully, representative group of international courts, tribunals and other adjudicative bodies, as well as on documented instances of State practice.” This expert found numerous instances where jurists and other decision makers applied an evolutive interpretation of a treaty provision to address changing contexts. The adjudicative bodies that have done so, often guided by Articles 31 through 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, include the Human Rights Committee, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Court of Justice, and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Special Rapporteur sums up this issue by stating that “[o]n balance, the jurisprudence of ICJ and arbitral tribunals does not seem to contradict the ‘general support among the leading writers today for evolutive interpretation of treaties,’ as the Tribunal in the Iron Rhine case has noted.”

The present Article has focused on one particular treaty and its interpretation by domestic and regional tribunals and agencies. The analysis presented here confirms the Special Rapporteur’s conclusion that “subsequent practice by the parties may guide evolutive interpretation of treaties.” As demonstrated by the above analysis, the parties to the Refugee Convention have adapted this agreement—created in 1951 to address a particular European
refugee situation—to changes over time with respect to new agents, forms, and targets of persecution. The treaty itself set out a clear purpose concerning a fundamental function of the state system as well as terms with sufficient flexibility that have enabled jurists and government officials—aided, prodded, and persuaded in many cases by advocates, UNHCR, and experts—to adapt the refugee definition to the changing nature of forced migration.

Of course, the treaty continues to protect those fleeing certain types of state persecution much like it did at the outset. But the State Parties that created and adopted the Refugee Convention could not have imagined the changing nature of persecution in its particularities. We now know that states and non-state actors continue to develop new ways and targets to persecute, and that identifying the new refugees can be difficult. While figuring out who the new targets are involves challenging legal analyses and debates, this treaty’s capacity to protect both the old and the new refugees today deserves recognition.

As long as the modern state system exists, one of its principal goals will continue to be the protection of citizens and residents. As policy makers, advocates, and experts consider how states can best address the needs of those displaced in connection with natural disasters and climate change, they would benefit from taking into account how the Refugee Convention has evolved over time. Focused on persecutory discrimination, the Refugee Convention has proven capable of protecting the new targets of persecution from new kinds of persecutors when these vulnerable individuals have sought the protection of another state. While some individuals displaced by natural disasters and climate change may be “persecuted” in connection with a characteristic protected by the Refugee Convention, the vast majority of these newest forced migrants will need new norms developed to address their unique situations. No doubt what is understood now in connection with disasters and climate change will evolve over time. Any new norms developed to ensure that states address the needs of these displaced persons should be capable of adapting to such changes.