In this article the author, in a context in which principles and the principle of proportionality are at the heart not only of jurisprudence but also of constitutional and human rights interpretation, claims that when there were those ready to raise the hand to declare a unanimous winner, some critics and skeptics appeared. In addition, to the traditional objections, they worry that proportionality invites to doing unnecessary balancing between existing rights, inventing new rights out of nothing at all (in detriment of those already well-established ones), and even worse in doing so balancing some rights away. In order to answer to such objections and to reject them, as well as to reinforce the importance of this development, the author: first, revisits the constitution of principles and of the principle of proportionality, which per definitio contradicts each one of this objections; and, then, restates the constitution of the principle of proportionality as a principle of principles not only in constitutional and human rights interpretation but also in legislation, including constitutional reformation, and adjudication.
7 Problema: Anuario de Filosofia y Teoria del Derecho 83-113 (2013)
Scholarly Commons Citation
Flores, Imer, "Proportionality in Constitutional and Human Rights Interpretation" (2013). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 1168.
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