Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restriction on Treaty Verification in the United States
The United States and the Soviet Union recently signed a treaty that eliminates an entire class of nuclear arms, and allows more intrusive verification procedures than ever before. As technology improves and verification becomes even more central in arms control negotiations, Professor Koplow warns that the United States Constitution limits the types of verification procedures to which the United States can agree. After reviewing existing United States-Soviet Union arms control treaties and agreements, Professor Koplow examines potential verification procedures in light of the fourth amendment's protection of United States citizens from government intrusion. He argues that although many contemplated verification procedures could be implemented in this country, there are some that would not pass constitutional muster; some could be implemented only with a warrant of some kind, others could not be implemented at all. Professor Koplow concludes that the time is ripe for the United States to rethink its attitude toward verification of arms control agreements and to use the fourth amendment to guide and shape future negotiations and verification procedures.
63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 229
Scholarly Commons Citation
Koplow, David A., "Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restriction on Treaty Verification in the United States" (1988). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 1742.