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This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, and with it, the advent of the modern class action. As the fiftieth anniversary approached, many scholars, including myself, said that class actions were dead, dying, or headed for a zombie state. Many of the Supreme Court’s recent class action cases all but confirmed that view. In just the last six years, the Supreme Court ratcheted up the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes and Comcast v. Behrend, increasing the cost and difficulty of obtaining certification. And, in a series of cases, the Court permitted the use of class action prohibitions in arbitration contracts, thus eliminating a swath of class actions and, often, the underlying claims themselves. The Court’s language in these cases also tracked stock arguments against the class action, leaving the distinct impression that the Roberts Court was on a mission to diminish or destroy the class action procedure.

But a funny thing happened on the way to the funeral: just as the obituaries for the class action were being written, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that breathed new life into it. In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II) and Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, the Court reaffirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory, a critical tool in securities class actions. In Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, the Court vindicated the use of statistical proof to satisfy Rule 23 requirements, distancing itself from strong suggestions in prior cases that individualized proof requirements would doom class certification. And the language in these cases tracked stock arguments in favor of class actions.

To paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of the class action’s death now seem greatly exaggerated. But the Court’s class action decisions raise a new and perhaps more vexing question. If the Court is not fully intent on destroying the class action, what drives its seemingly disparate decisions? Do they reflect an anti–class action agenda losing steam, as Professor Coffee has suggested? Was the unbridled anti–class action agenda an illusion to begin with? Or is there a deeper explanation for these decisions? Part I of this Article demonstrates that the Court’s “pro–class action” decisions cannot be easily reconciled with their “anti–class action” counterparts through traditional means—neither through straightforward applications of Rule 23, nor precedent, nor particular case facts. But Part II posits that the Court’s seemingly disparate class action cases can still be rationalized. To do so, however, one must look past the procedural veneer and consider the underlying substantive rules and remedial regimes at stake. Indeed, a key question presented in each case—notwithstanding what appears in the petitions for writs of certiorari—is whether the Court will embrace an interpretation of a substantive rule that has the effect of facilitating the availability of the class action. The Court’s ultimate answer reflects a composite judgment about the substantive rule at issue and its implications for the availability of the class action device. Accordingly, to the extent one insists that procedural rules are, or ought to be, transsubstantive—that, “in form and manner of application, [they do] not vary from one substantive context to the next”—the Court’s class action jurisprudence might actually be deemed “non-transsubstantive.”

This Article’s thesis has numerous implications—for separation of powers, judicial lawmaking power, federalism, the role of precedent, notions of transsubstantive procedure, procedural theory, and the nature and legitimacy of the judicial role, among others. The limitations of the Article format permit consideration in Part III of just two: First, the implications for the nature and scope of the federal courts’ procedural and substantive lawmaking powers under the Rules Enabling Act [hereinafter Enabling Act]. And second, related implications for the nature and legitimacy of the judicial role in “procedural” opinions.