Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2003

Abstract

This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors' professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal's control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors' duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a particularized story about the shareholder interest. The exercise complicates the agency description, highlighting multiple and unstable shareholder demands that displace the unitary model of the shareholder usually brought to bear. This fragmented and volatile model of the shareholder provides neither a basis for articulating a coherent set of instructions respecting aggressive accounting nor for imposing conservative accounting. The Article concludes that legal positivism provides a more appropriate conceptual framework. Auditor duties should be conceived in formal rather than relational terms, with fidelity going to the rules and the system that auditors apply rather than to a client interest.

Publication Citation

53 Duke L.J. 439-489 (2003)

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