This paper examines Hannah Arendt's contributions as a theorist of international criminal law. It draws mostly on Eichmann in Jerusalem, particularly its epilogue, but also on Arendt's correspondence, her writings from the 1940s on Jewish politics, and portions of The Human Condition and her essays. The paper focuses on four issues: (1) Arendt's conception of international crimes as universal offenses against humanity, and the implications she draws for theories of criminal jurisdiction; (2) her "performative" theory of group identity as acts of political affiliation and disaffiliation, from which follows a radically different account of the crime of genocide than that of Raphael Lemkin; (3) the "banality of evil," and its relation to legal conceptions of mens rea; and (4) her ultimately inconclusive assessment of law's capacity to confront the radically unprecedented crimes of regimes that are themselves criminal, and which systematically invert the values necessary to distinguish legal rules from exceptions. The essay was written for a symposium on women and international criminal law in honor of Judge Patricia Wald.
Int'l Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming)
Scholarly Commons Citation
Luban, David, "Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law" (2011). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 619.