Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Winter 2024
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.4945868
Abstract
We discuss the design of an effective merger review policy for the 21st century. We argue that the practice of the past decades is inadequate and propose a move towards much stronger rebuttable structural presumptions. These presumptions establish that all mergers above certain thresholds are illegal unless the merging parties can prove that merger-specific efficiencies will be shared with consumers and yield tangible welfare gains. These presumptions are grounded on solid economics and also acknowledge the real-world limitations in enforcement resources and information asymmetries between companies and regulators. We outline how to establish such presumptions in practice, defending the implementation of an ex-ante system that selects in advance (rather than per transaction) which companies and markets are subject to the presumption. Finally, we outline which merger-related efficiencies can rebut the presumption.
Publication Citation
Forthcoming: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 40 No. 4: New Directions in Competition Policy (Winter 2024).
Scholarly Commons Citation
Lancieri, Filippo and Valletti, Tommaso, "Towards an Effective Merger Review Policy: A Defence of Rebuttable Structural Presumptions" (2024). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 2639.
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2639